Appendix
Introduction and overview
The Committee's inquiry into the serious problem
of maritime piracy, published on 6th July 2006, examined a complex
and long-standing threat to seafarers around the world. The Government
welcomed both the opportunity for an informed debate on this issue
and to submit evidence to the inquiry. Having considered the Committee's
report in detail, the Government believes that it does not reflect
the role that the Government properly has in combating piracy
and underplays the work that it has done and is doing.
We also respond to the Committee's request for a
detailed explanation of what the Government has done to implement
the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code. In doing
so, we draw on the results of visiting independent European Commission
and United States Coast Guard inspectors whose findings clearly
demonstrate that we have done so fully and to their satisfaction.
We wish to highlight that far from being ashamed,
the Government is proud of the lead that it has taken within the
international community to set out the best measures that seafarers
can take to protect themselves from acts of piracy and armed robbery.
The Government also believes that the report fails to recognise
the important distinction between armed robbery and piracy. Whereas
every State has jurisdiction to intervene or investigate acts
of piracy in international waters, such extraordinary powers cannot
and should not be extended to territorial waters. Just as it would
be unacceptable to the UK for the navy of a foreign state to claim
jurisdiction over an act of armed robbery within UK territorial
waters, so the Royal Navy may not intervene in the territorial
waters of another state. This would be the unfortunate consequence
of combining piracy and maritime armed robbery into a single legal
definition. The Government therefore rejects the allegation that
it has been complacent in not having vigorously promoted a single
definition of piracy.
The report claims that it is a failure by any measure
for the Government not to know the current scale of the piracy
problem. Indeed it would be and that is why we ensure that we
are as well informed as possible, by analysing all of the information
available. Nearly all of the recorded violent attacks have taken
place in a handful of overseas locations with most occurring in
territorial waters where, as explained above, the Government is
limited in the direct action it can take.
Finally, the Government wishes to assure the Committee
that it is constantly vigilant in monitoring the potential links
between acts of piracy, armed robbery and terrorism. Until such
a link can be established it would be premature and unhelpful
to suggest that a link exists.
1. The report alleges that 'the Government does
not know the current scale of the (piracy) problem. That is failure
by any measure.' (page 32, para 104). 'The Government needs to
take the upward trend of violent attacks seriously, and to take
action to reverse it' (page 6, para 13).
The UK Government is as well informed as any other
Government or international organisation with an interest in maritime
affairs about the current scale of the piracy problem. While the
Government acknowledges that it does not know the precise number
of attacks due to the under-reporting of attacks by vessels in
certain areas of the world, the data does provide a good estimate
of the level of piracy or maritime armed robbery and therefore
the level of threat posed to seafarers in any one location. Most
importantly, the data does provide a number of clear trends which
the Government can analyse so as to understand where in the world
piracy is increasing or decreasing, the type of vessels targeted,
the type of weapons used in attacks and also the various methods
that pirates and armed robbers use to attack ships. The Government
has described each currently known attack method and the most
appropriate defensive strategy in its counter-piracy guidance
contained in Marine Guidance Note (MGN) 298. Whether the overall
number of attacks is higher than the known data reveals, is less
relevant in tackling the problem as the methods used by the attackers
will not differ. Masters and crew can defend their vessels against
attack methodologies rather than against 'numbers of attacks'.
The Government completely agrees with the Committee
that the violent attacks including rape, kidnap and murder by
pirates and maritime armed robbers against all seafarers over
the last decade are totally unacceptable. The Committee must recognise
however, that as all of these violent attacks have taken place
in the waters of a handful of foreign states and their neighbouring
international waters, the UK is considerably limited in the direct
action that it can take. The Government has repeatedly raised
the issue with the states in question (including the Transitional
Federal Government of Somalia) both bilaterally and via international
fora such as the IMO requesting that immediate action be taken.
Taking into account the considerable sensitivities regarding territorial
sovereignty, the UK believes that the best long term solution
is to engage with these foreign states through diplomatic channels
offering technical assistance where it can add real value.
Where the Navy is able to intercept pirate vessels,
it will. However, the Royal Navy no longer has the resources it
once had when fighting piracy in the 17th/18th centuries and cannot
act alone as the world's maritime police force. Piracy is, and
always has been, an international problem that requires an international
solution. The UK Government is playing its full part within the
international community in developing that solution.
2. The report alleges that piracy is on the increase
suggesting that British political activity has not been effective
and that 'the Government needs to be at the forefront of the fight
to destroy piracy but it is being insufficiently active.' (page
32, para 103). 'Activity 'on the ground' implementing international
agreements to tackle piracy and make travel by sea safer is what
is needed.' (page 8, para 19). The report also states that 'the
Government must demonstrate practical action that international
co-operation is succeeding in making piracy a thing of the past,
that is woefully lacking' and 'the Government needs to demonstrate
a new level of commitment in tackling piracy' (page 32, para 104).
The number of worldwide attacks of both piracy on
the high seas and maritime armed robbery committed within the
territorial waters of sovereign states, as recorded by the International
Maritime Bureau's Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur, reduced
from 445 attacks in 2003 to 276 attacks for the whole of 2005.
That, by any measure, cannot be described as an increase in piracy
activity. Recent positive developments in two of the worst piracy
hotspots during 2005 point towards a much improved picture. The
number of attacks in the Malacca Straits has now reduced to a
level whereby Lloyds of London has seen fit to remove the Straits
from its 'war risk' insurance rating list and political developments
in Somalia have resulted in the ousting of the pirate group operating
out of Xaradheere with no successful pirate attacks taking place
since April 2006.
Far from just talking about reducing piracy, the
Government has created an overseas capacity building programme
to strengthen maritime security and counter piracy in locations
of concern. The Government's Global Opportunities Fund provided
£345,000 in the 2005/06 financial year to this programme
and the Government has actively participated through speaking
and chairing panels in several IMO organised regional maritime
security seminars. These seminars have played an important role
in raising awareness of the incidence and impact of piracy and
armed robbery at sea and what measures states can take to protect
themselves against it. The overseas programme as it develops will
see growing bilateral working with countries that are of a high
priority to UK maritime interests. The programme will promote
the deployment of more UK experts 'on the ground' in overseas
ports to directly assess the level of security and to offer best
practice advice and, where appropriate, suggest improvements.
It will also offer reciprocal or return visits by the visited
state's maritime officials to the UK, with the opportunity to
meet with Government experts, visit UK maritime facilities and
undertake tailored training.
3. 'In its reply to this report, the Government
must spell out in detail what has been done to implement the (ISPS)
Code in the UK and internationally; and the measures that have
been taken to measure the extent and success
of that implementation' (page 9, para 24).
The Government began its preparations for implementing
the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (the ISPS
Code) in February 2003 in order to meet the 1 July 2004 international
implementation deadline. A summary of the key components of the
programme and subsequent compliance activity is given here with
fuller details contained in the Annex. The whole process was subject
to a comprehensive communication plan for industry via the National
Maritime Security Committee.
The adoption of EC Regulation 725/2004 by the EC
in May 2004 gave direct legal effect to the ISPS Code within the
EU. The EC Regulation was also supported by the UK Ship and Port
Facility Security Regulations 2004 which entered into force on
1 July 2004. These regulations created specific offences and penalties
and gave additional powers for duly authorised officers to enforce
the EC Regulation within the UK.
In 2003, the UK Government identified those port
facilities where the ISPS Code would apply. The Government required
that all port facilities appoint a Port Facility Security Officer
(PFSO) as the designated security manager who was required to
undergo security vetting and training. Company and Ship Security
Officers (CSO & SSO) were also appointed for UK and Red Ensign
Group registered ships engaged on international voyages and these
officers undertook appropriate training.
Inspectors from the Department for Transport Security
and Contingencies Directorate (TRANSEC) carried out detailed on-site
assessments of port facilities, producing a report for each identifying
the threats to and the vulnerabilities of that port facility.
Ships conducted their own assessments which were subject to TRANSEC
approval. TRANSEC developed comprehensive security instructions
setting prescriptive risk based standards. The instructions cover
a wide range of activities including establishing security committees,
the use of security patrols, exercises and detailed information
on the types of security fencing and lighting required.
TRANSEC also issued Port Facility and Ship Security
Plan templates to the PFSO/SSOs which they then completed and
returned for approval. Port Facilities and Ships whose plans had
been approved were then issued with a security certificate indicating
compliance and the IMO was notified via its online database.
Since 1 July 2004, the TRANSEC inspection team has
regularly inspected all port facilities and passenger ships, including
cruise ships while overseas with the MCA inspecting cargo ships
through a programme of announced and unannounced visits. TRANSEC
has additionally undertaken covert security testing at UK ports.
The UK has also hosted security visits to its port facilities
by the EU Commission inspectorate and the US Coast Guard. These
inspections and visits have provided independent evidence that
the UK has fully implemented the ISPS Code.
4. 'The Government must promote a single definition
of piracy vigorously with its international partners.' (page 11,
para 31). The report states that 'the Government has been complacent
in not having pressed vigorously (for this)' (page 11, para 30).
The Government rejects the allegation that it has
been complacent. There is only one international and long-standing definition
of piracy, which is the definition contained in article 101 of
the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This purely
relates to incidents on the high seas or outside the jurisdiction
of any state, i.e. taking place within international waters.
Any equivalent criminal act that occurs within the territorial
waters of a sovereign State is described as maritime
armed robbery.
Whereas every State has jurisdiction to
intervene in or investigate acts of piracy within international
waters, such jurisdiction cannot and should not be extended
to territorial waters. It would be unacceptable to the UK for
the navy of a foreign state to be able to claim jurisdiction over
an act of maritime armed robbery within the UK's territorial
waters. This would be the unfortunate consequence of wrapping
an act of piracy and an act of maritime armed robbery into one
definition. We have no doubt that this view would be shared
by other Governments. It may be that certain private bodies, such
as the International Maritime Bureau, use different definitions
for their own commercial purposes, but that is a matter for them
and cannot affect the internationally agreed definition described
above.
5. 'The Government needs to take the lead in ensuring
that investigations of attacks by states do not unduly delay the
commercial operations of the vessel concerned' (page 13, para
39).
The Government has not yet received any information
from UK or Red Ensign Group (REG) registered shipping on whether
the investigations by foreign authorities of acts of piracy or
maritime armed robbery attacks have caused undue delays. The matter
was raised again with the industry at a meeting of the National
Maritime Security Committee Shipping Panel in September 2006.
Any evidence received will be carefully considered. The UK Government
does not have a remit to interfere in the investigations of foreign
States concerning vessels from a third party State.
Port incident investigative training has been delivered
by the Metropolitan Police in the past, to several countries where
piracy and armed robbery occurs, in order to maximise the possibility
of effective and prompt criminal investigations.
6. 'Where corrupt officials demand payments from
Masters (Government should make) the strongest representations
to the countries concerned and that they should, if necessary,
be 'named and shamed' (page 14, para 39).
The UK Government would, where it received firm and
specific evidence of corruption amongst the officials of a maritime
administration or law enforcement agency of a foreign State, make
strong diplomatic representations as a matter of course. To date,
the Government has not received any such evidence from the Master
of a UK or REG registered vessel. Any such evidence would need
to be handled sensitively as it may be required for submission
to a court of law. 'Naming and shaming' and publishing such evidence
would therefore not be conducive to ensuring due legal process
and a fair trial.
7. The Government must discuss 'with the insurance
industry to mitigate the effect on ships' premiums of Masters'
reporting piratical attacks, and to ensure that premiums are not
raised automatically when a report is made. The classification
of piracy from a maritime to a war risk needs to be reassessed
to ensure that it has not increased the disincentive on ships'
Masters to report attacks' (page 14, para 39).
The Government has not yet received any information
from the UK shipping industry to date that states that the cost
of insurance premiums is having an effect on the reporting of
piracy incidents. The matter was raised again with the industry
at a meeting of the National Maritime Security Committee Shipping
Panel in September 2006. Any evidence received will be carefully
considered.
The Government is very clear in its counter-piracy
and maritime armed robbery guidance contained in MGN 298 issued
to all UK seafarers, that all acts of piracy and maritime armed
robbery must be reported both to the nearest Maritime Rescue and
Co-ordination Centre, for forwarding on to the local law enforcement
agencies or naval authorities of the Port of Coastal State concerned
and also to the ship's maritime administration. The contact details
for the IMB's Piracy Reporting Centre are also provided. The UK
Government would not view any cost or inconvenience occurred in
reporting a piracy incident as a valid reason to avoid reporting
an incident.
Piracy has not been classified as a war risk per
se. During 2005, Lloyds Joint War Committee (JWC) drew up a list
of countries and sea areas where it would be necessary for a ship
travelling to that area to have war risk insurance cover. This
may result in a higher premium (applied per single voyage), in
addition to the general hull insurance policy. This list which
included the Malacca Straits was drawn up on the advice of Aegis,
a consultancy firm specialising in security risks. The Government
understands that the JWC reviews this list from time to time depending
on the Aegis assessment of the threat to shipping and any actions
taken by the host/ littoral states to mitigate the threat.
The UK Government plays no part in this process which
it views as an entirely commercial matter. The Joint War Committee
in a letter dated 7 August 2006 made known the outcome of its
most recent review which has seen the deletion from its list of
the Malacca Straits. A new area described as the 'North East coast
of Sumatra' constituting the North Western area of the Malacca
Straits has instead been added, where the majority of piracy attacks
have taken place.
8. 'Every opportunity must be taken by the (International
Maritime) Bureau itself, and national governments, to publicise
the reporting opportunities offered by the Bureau (through its
Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur) and to encourage Masters
to report incidents to it' (page 14, para 40).
The UK Government clearly sets out in its counter-piracy
and maritime armed robbery guidance contained in MGN 298 the process
that a Master should follow in reporting any attack. The contact
details for the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre are listed in this
guidance note enabling the Master of any UK or Red Ensign Group
registered ship to report incidents and/or obtain anti-piracy
advice. The Government will remind UK and REG flagged vessels
to do this in future piracy related communications sent to industry.
9. 'Piracy reporting in general must be better
structured with a single international standard for reporting
incidents, and a procedure agreed for passing this information
on to the most appropriate local or international force for action'
(page 14, para 40).
A single international standard adopted by IMO for
reporting piracy incidents already exists, both for the Master
of the ship immediately after the incident has occurred and also
for the Flag State of the vessel once it has investigated. This
single procedure is laid down in IMO document MSC/Cric.623/Rev.3,
dated 29 May 2002. The format for ship reporting and the action
to be taken by the State are also set out in the appendices of
MGN 298.
10. 'The measures required to deal with piracy
are clear. These will often amount to 'hot pursuit' agreements
(but) the piecemeal approach taken to the development of (them)
so far is unlikely to provide the flexibility of response to address
the problem of piracy world-wide. The arrangements need a more
systematic and international focus with the IMO in the lead. The
UK Government needs to press much harder for this outcome' (page
17, para 52).
There are a great number of jurisdictional tensions
and sovereignty sensitivities that need to be overcome in negotiating
'hot pursuit' agreements across complex maritime boundaries. The
2005 'hot pursuit' agreement between the three littoral states
of the Malacca Straits is a positive step forward and in this
particular case was one measure amongst a package of measures
agreed to strengthen maritime security in the Straits. The international
community including the UK Government encouraged the development
of this agreement, because any attempt to impose it via the IMO
would not have worked, and might have set back relations with
the proud sovereign nations of Indonesia and Malaysia. This agreement
also allows for the use of joint air patrols to back up the maritime
hot pursuits. Any such agreement if it is to succeed will require
a number of naval and air units to work in co-operation, supported
by well structured, motivated and co-operative law enforcement
agencies. Although there are positive signs of progress in the
Malacca region, this unfortunately is not the case at present
in other piracy hot spots such as the Gulf of Aden/ Somalia. It
is therefore too simplistic to believe that the measures required
to deal with piracy are clear and will often amount to 'hot pursuit'
agreements. Hot pursuit agreements are not a universal answer
to solving a piracy problem, not least because there are few Naval,
Coastguard or Police vessels available. Such agreements are just
one part of a wider package of measures that are required to effectively
counter piracy and will not work in all piracy prone locations,
where they may be seen by some as being desirable.
11. 'We would like the Government to tell us what
social and economic programmes it is supporting in areas where
piracy is endemic and which are aimed at eradicating piracy' (page
17, para 53).
The Department for International Development (DFID)
is responsible for ensuring that government overseas development
assistance is targeted appropriately to achieve the aim of halving
world poverty by 2015. DFID has no specific anti-piracy programme,
but DFID programmes to strengthen the capacity of the state,
for example through security sector reform, will improve the domestic
justice processes that the report highlights.
12. The report alleges that 'the UK Government
and the international community generally, ought to be ashamed
that they have failed to put effective measures in place to prevent
the present high level of piratical attacks on seamen and women'
(page 19, para 54).
The UK Government rejects this allegation. The UK
Government's responsibility is to protect UK and REG seafarers
while at sea. The Government has set out very clearly the best
measures that seafarers can take to protect themselves while at
sea from piracy and maritime armed robbery attacks in MGN 298.
The UK has also made this guidance available to the international
community via the IMO. Additionally, many of the security measures
that the UK has required to be installed on board ships in order
to meets its obligations under the ISPS Code have strengthened
the protection of seafarers. The Government issues notifications
to industry on piracy hotspots with specific advice tailored to
that area. It also has a regular dialogue with industry and the
Trade Unions via the National Maritime Security Committee to ensure
that all practical measures that can be put in place to protect
our seafarers, are in place on board UK and REG flagged ships.
Were industry or the Unions to bring evidence of a specific Government
measure having been ineffective or which resulted in harm to a
UK or REG seafarer, the Government would swiftly act to rectify
the policy. There is no significant specific evidence of UK ships
being victims of piracy but many ships of other flags have British
crew.
13. 'We wish to know from the Government what
its policy is on placing guards on merchant marine vessels' (page
21, para 64) including:
The placing of unarmed security guards on UK and
REG flagged merchant ships is not required by the UK Government
and views this as a commercial matter. Shipping owners are free
to place such guards on board their ships should they wish to
do so. This occurs on board many UK/REG flagged passenger vessels
and the Government is content with this measure for dealing with
any disruptive or criminal behaviour which may occur onboard and
also for rarer security related situations.
i. 'under what circumstances it believes vessels
should receive the protection of armed guards?'
The Government does not encourage the carriage of
firearms on board UK & REG registered merchant ships. Only
in exceptional circumstances will the Government condone the use
of armed guard protection on board such ships. For example, certain
shipments of nuclear material and certain VIP passenger movements
have received armed guard protection.
ii. 'what training to ensure effective use of
arms and minimise accidents is available to those guards and to
those who travel with them on board ship?'
The Government believes that the best way of minimising
accidents on board ships from the use of firearms is to discourage
their carriage. In the exceptional circumstances where armed guard
protection is justified, ship owners should ensure that their
guards are properly trained.
iii. 'what rules of engagement exist for armed
guards at sea?'
The Government has not set rules of engagement for
armed guards at sea, in line with its policy of discouraging the
carriage of firearms on board UK/REG flagged ships. Any company
providing an armed guard protection service to a UK/REG flagged
merchant ship is fully accountable under UK law and the laws
of any State in whose territorial and internal waters the arms
are carried.
iv. 'what controls are there on ship owners'
decisions to provide their vessels with armed guards?'
While the Government does not encourage the carriage
of firearms on board UK/REG flagged merchant ships, there are
legal provisions governing their carriage. Firearms are controlled
under the Firearms Act 1968 as amended and the most recent relevant
amendments to the Act (made in 1997 and entering into force in
1998), were explained in Merchant Shipping Notice 1704 published
in January 1998 by the Department of the Environment, Transport
and the Regions. Permits to carry firearms on board ships are
issued by the Police under guidance issued by the Home Office.
Where firearms are carried on board UK/REG flagged merchant ships
the ship security plan should detail how and where they are stored
and state the procedures for accessing them.
14. 'The recommendation of the Marine Accident
Investigation Branch is that all merchant vessels over 500 gross
register tons have a minimum of a Master plus two bridge watch-keeping
officers.' 'We want to know what steps the Government is taking
with the industry to ensure the proper crewing of ships; and their
adequate training' (page 22, para 71).
The Government successfully enlisted the support
of the Member States of the European Union and the European Commission
to invite the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to review
its current guidance on safe manning levels. At its meeting in
May 2006 the IMO's Maritime Safety Committee agreed that the matter
should be reviewed and it will feature on the agenda of a meeting
of the IMO's relevant technical sub-Committee in January 2007.
Securing international agreement in the IMO will take time and
success cannot be guaranteed; but applying the MAIB recommendation
to UK ships in advance of international agreement on higher manning
levels would put those ships at a competitive disadvantage and
would probably result in a large number of them leaving the UK
register.
The Government ensures that those serving on UK ships
are properly trained and certificated and regularly liaises with
the industry on training and certification issues. As part of
that process the UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency undertakes
audits of seafarer training establishments both here and overseas
and that effort is supported by audits undertaken by the European
Maritime Safety Agency.
In addition Ship Security Officers serving on UK
flagged ships are required to attend a mandatory UK Government
approved training course from a recognised and approved training
organisation. The Government developed a core security competence
framework, in conjunction with the Merchant Navy Training Board
and industry Trade Associations, to ensure Ship Security Officers
had a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities
and how to best meet them.
15. 'We want to know what the UK Government is
doing to find out how pirates are gaining access to sophisticated
technologies; and what it is doing to help to deny them the use
of (them)' (page 24, para 78).
In referring to sophisticated technologies, the report
is principally referring to the open broadcast short range Automatic
Identification System (AIS). AIS was first developed as a tool
to enhance maritime safety, by allowing ships to plot the whereabouts
of other ships in the vicinity thereby reducing the chances of
collision. The VHF transponding and receiving equipment used for
AIS is therefore widely available and as such it is impossible
for the Government to prevent pirates acquiring it either by plundering
it from the ships they attack or by other means, for example legal
purchase.
The Government has already advised Masters of UK
and Red Ensign Group registered shipping that they may temporarily
cease broadcasting Automatic Identification System signals when
in open waters (particularly in known piracy affected waters),
if they judge that the security of the vessel is being compromised
by those signals. Detailed advice to Masters on this issue is
contained in MGN 298. The Government recently wrote to the Security
Officers of all UK/ REG flagged ships asking for feedback on their
experience in using AIS to date. The consultation period is now
over and responses are being analysed with a view to developing
best practice guidelines for this equipment.
In 2005 the Government also reached an agreement
with a UK based internet provider of AIS information to introduce
a package of risk mitigation measures including a time delay and
a reduction in the quantity of information accessible from their
site. This mitigation package therefore helps to reduce the risk
of AIS being successfully used for real-time attack planning.
16. 'Operations such as that undertaken by the
Royal Navy's Maritime Trade Operations' Unit in Dubai are welcome.
Consideration needs to be given to how these may be strengthened'
(page 27, para 91).
The Government has offered to provide a Maritime
Trade Operations (MTO) service to Indonesia although this offer
has not as yet been taken up.
17. 'Well organised and determined terrorists
could take control of a ship and use it to achieve terrible ends.
Dangerous cargo could be seized and used as a weapon; hostages
could be taken'. 'We want the Government to tell us what further
practical steps it is taking to lessen this all too real risk'
(page 27, para 91).
As detailed in the Annex, the UK Government has comprehensively
implemented the security measures contained in the ISPS Code as
required under EC Regulation 725/2004. All of these measures are
in some part designed to prevent seizure of a ship, its crew or
its cargo.
In chapter 9, paragraph 83, the report reprints NUMAST
evidence that "a liquefied natural gas carrier could make
a very dramatic explosion" if detonated and used as a weapon.
The Government and many of the major oil and gas suppliers have
undertaken extensive and independent research into this attack
scenario and have run sophisticated modelling software to assess
the consequences of a successful attack. That research suggests
that this assertion is a dramatic exaggeration, since the gas
is transported at around -162 degrees Celsius. It is incredibly
difficult to ignite in this state, let alone detonate in a single
explosion.
18. 'The Government must drop its 'nothing has
been proved' refrain (on links between piracy & terrorism)
(page 28, para 92).
The Government believes that the report does not
accurately portray the current maritime terrorist threat. It appears
to draw heavily on inaccurate open source media reporting and
evidence submitted by NUMAST and several security consultancy
firms. This evidence has confused acts of piracy with maritime
terrorism. This evidence is not based on informed and corroborated
intelligence. The question of any piracy and terrorism link
is kept under constant review by the appropriate autonomous
intelligence agency which continually monitors and reassesses
all received intelligence regarding piracy and maritime terrorism
to see whether any links can be established. Until such a link
can be established, it would be both premature and unhelpful to
the shipping industry to change the official Government line.
Indeed the Government notes a significant number
of inaccuracies in the report such as in chapter 9, paragraph
84 which states "intelligence estimates that Al Qaeda and
its affiliates now own dozens of phantom ships". This claim
originated in open media reporting several years ago and is in
direct contradiction to the threat intelligence picture held by
the Joint Threat Assessment Centre (JTAC). The Government has
not seen any intelligence that substantiates this claim.
19. 'We expect the Government to take the probability
of a future maritime terrorist attack with the utmost seriousness.
We do not believe that it is yet demonstrating a sufficiently
robust approach. We would have liked to see evidence of fresh
thinking and more resources deployed in a 'smarter' way being
brought to bear on this problem' (page 28, para 93).
The Government believes that it has taken a robust
while pragmatic approach to protecting the UK maritime industry
from terrorist attack. The UK has comprehensively implemented
the ISPS Code and was one of the first signatories to SOLAS to
do so. The Government develops policy and deploys resources in
a way that is appropriate to the level of threat to UK assets.
A comprehensive Department for Transport draft International Maritime
Security Strategy is currently being considered within Whitehall.
In addition, since January 2006, TRANSEC and the
MOD have worked together to develop a new risk assessment process
for piracy in the form of a matrix. The matrix quantifies the
number and nature of attacks in a number of sea areas prone to
piracy and armed robbery. The output of the matrix will be used
to manage risk and ensure objectivity when deciding to alter the
security posture of UK Flagged Shipping. The matrix covers a number
of specific maritime areas which have had a piracy problem and
is based on six key risk criteria which include the number of
incidents occurring in an area and the potential for violence.
Each criterion is given a qualitative score which is calculated
by multiplying each of the risk scores by a weighting to produce
an overall sum. A final sum (risk score) is then expressed as
one of five indicator levels from Negligible to Extreme. This
indicator level forms the forecast for expected piracy attacks
in a specific area for the forthcoming month.
The matrix also provides a cumulative count of incidents
since the beginning of the year. This figure is used to give an
overall comparison of the different regions and can be used for
trend analysis. The populated matrix is printed in a 'Worldwide
Threat to Shipping' bulletin distributed across Government every
month by the MOD and will continue to evolve over time.
20. 'The Government must assess the situation
as a matter of urgency' in Iraqi waters to:
i. 'discover why piratical attacks in these waters
have appeared in the last year'
The Government of Iraq is responsible for border
security including the security of Iraqi territorial waters in
the Gulf. The UK Government is concerned by reports that fast
boats, some apparently with Iranian markings, have been attacking
and robbing Iraqi fishermen in or near Iraqi waters. The
IMB report issued in July containing piracy and maritime armed
robbery statistics for the first half of 2006, show an encouraging
50% drop in the number of attacks in Iraqi waters.
ii. 'to (investigate) what relation these (attacks)
have to insurgency operations'
Chapter 10, paragraph 96 states that in 2005 there
were attacks on the Basra Oil Terminal by heavily armed gangs.
This is inaccurate as the attacks took place during 2004 and Government
intelligence points towards the involvement of the now deceased
Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi and his terrorist organisation. The insurgency
in Iraq is closely monitored by the UK Government and it would
not be appropriate to elaborate any further on received intelligence
in this reply.
iii. 'consider the deployment of additional naval
units to the area' (to prevent further attacks) (page 30, para
97).
The UK Government is not considering sending further
naval assets to Iraqi waters as a result of these attacks. The
UK is, however, training Iraqi naval forces and they are now using
some new patrol boats to enhance their maritime security capabilities,
including dealing with the threat from piracy and maritime armed
robbery.
21. 'The popular image of piracy as a joke is
redundant and has failed to keep pace with reality. The Government
must now consider what imaginative and practical measures might
be taken to broaden the public understanding of piracy as a brutal
and cowardly crime' (page 31, para 100).
Piracy seldom directly affects the general public
of the United Kingdom and the Government does not believe that
it would be a good use of public resources trying to 'dispel Hollywood
myths' about pirates. The Government believes the real issue is
ensuring that UK seafarers including both merchant mariners and
British individuals holidaying on their private yachts understand
the brutal reality of modern day pirates. Neither does piracy
normally affect fare paying passengers on board cruise ships.
However, despite the best attempts of the Government and the international
community via the IMO to protect shipping, unfortunate incidents
can still occur. This was demonstrated recently when the Captain
of the Bahamian flagged 'Seabourn Spirit' ignored the official
advice of the IMO and company instructions regarding safe sailing
distances from the Somali coast and found his ship under attack
having sailed into known piracy infested waters.
The Government has through its MGN 298 counter-piracy
guidance explained in some depth the dangers of encountering pirates,
the methods that they employ to attack ships and how they can
best be countered. The Government is also in regular communication
with the UK shipping industry and the IMB through its National
Maritime Security Committee, discussing the latest developments
in piracy attacks and what further practical measures can be taken
to ensure the safety of seafarers. The Royal Navy is closely engaged
with the British Chamber of Shipping and other key maritime institutions
in promoting a better understanding of the issues around piracy.
This is helping to re-assure seafarers that steps are being taken
to address the problem.
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