ANNEX:
UK Government implementation of the ISPS Code
1. The
ISPS Code was given direct legal effect in the UK by the adoption
of EC Regulation 725/2004 on enhancing ship and port facility
security, by all Member States of the European Union on 31st March
2004. The Regulation entered into force on 19th May and applied
from 1st July 2004. In addition the UK developed secondary legislation
to create offences and penalties in the Ship and Port Facility
(Security) Regulations 2004 which came into force on 1st July
2004. The ISPS implementation process was communicated to industry
and other Government stakeholders by TRANSEC and MCA at regular
intervals. A dedicated maritime security website, e-mail account
and telephone helpline were also established to deal with enquiries.
2. A port facility
security questionnaire was sent out to over 1000 port facilities
in the UK seeking details of port ownership, traffic patterns,
cargoes handled and existing security measures. This exercise
enabled TRANSEC to identify those port facilities where the ISPS
Code would apply.
3. The Regulations
require that all port facilities handling ships engaged on international
voyages appoint a Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO), as the
designated security focal point. TRANSEC can refuse an appointment
if it appears that the officer will be unable to effectively fulfil
their duties. Each PFSO was required to undergo Counter Terrorist
Check (CTC) security vetting carried out by the Department at
no charge to industry. TRANSEC also required that deputy PFSOs
be appointed to ensure continuous cover. All deputy PFSOs must
also be vetted to CTC level. Also every ship is required to have
a Ship Security Officer (SSO) and a Company Security Officer (CSO)
responsible for co-ordinating security with the SSOs for that
company. All PFSOs, CSOs and SSOs must also attend a TRANSEC or
a Maritime Coastguard Agency (MCA) approved training course, and
pass the assessment that forms part of the course. TRANSEC and
MCA set national training parameters for security officer courses
and prospective training providers have to demonstrate their ability
to deliver against the identified criteria by submitting all course
material and CVs of the trainers for consideration and approval.
The training courses are also subject to unannounced inspection
to ensure the quality of the training remains at the expected
level.
4. TRANSEC inspectors
conducted detailed on-site assessments based on the questionnaire
responses and wrote port facility security assessment reports
which are protectively marked and controlled documents. The aim
was to ensure that port infrastructure was identified, likely
threat scenarios explored, any existing vulnerabilities (both
physical and procedural) identified with suitable counter measures
developed.
5. Ships were responsible
for conducting their own assessments, but these had to be approved
by the Flag State, in the case of the UK by TRANSEC for passenger
ships and the MCA for all other internationally trading ships.
6. To assist UK industry
comply with the requirements of the ISPS Code, TRANSEC developed
and disseminated under the cover of a protected marking, Port
Facility Security Instructions for four types of operation: Passenger;
Container/ro-ro, Chemical, Oil and Gas; and Other Bulk Cargo.
The Instructions covered the management of security (including
the formation of security committees, training, exercises, IT
security, and the vetting of staff). The Instructions also set
standards for security measures (including the designation of
restricted areas, pass systems, access control, searching and
patrolling). Supplementary Instructions were issued to provide
additional operational guidance for ships' pilots, ship repair
yards, pre-arrival notification procedures, Declarations of Security,
and ship security alert systems. Further Instructions were issued
for cruise and passenger ro-ro ships covering the designation
of restricted areas, searching requirements, control of ships'
stores and access control.
7. TRANSEC also issued
templates for security plans that could be used by PFSO's and
SSO's. The templates helped to ensure that the security plans
were consistent and fully met the security requirements. An equivalent
template was also produced for the non-passenger fleet.
8. TRANSEC and MCA
developed procedures for approving the security plans and issuing
compliance certificates. Plans were allocated to inspectors for
detailed checks to ensure they met the necessary requirements
and addressed any issues identified during the assessment process.
The approval process finished with notifying IMO and EU with details
of all compliant port facilities. A database recorded all the
stages of approving a plan.
9. It is the responsibility
of the PFSO's and SSO's to review their plans and the procedures,
requirements and activities laid down in it, on a regular basis
and at least every 6 months. They must also be reviewed in the
event of:
- operational changes;
- an independent audit or a TRANSEC or MCA inspection
of the port facility or ship identifies failings in the organisation
or questions the continuing relevance of significant elements
of the approved PFSP or SSP; or
- in the event of there being any unsuccessful
exercises, security incidents and changes in ownership or operational
control of the port facility.
10. Where
amendments to the plan are substantive the plan must be submitted
for re-approval. The PFSP or SSP should be audited internally
at least annually by personnel independent of the activities being
audited.
11. TRANSEC is also
responsible for setting the Security Level for port facilities
and UK and REG shipping. It does so after considering the JTAC
maritime threat assessment. The UK has five Threat Levels and
these are translated into one of the three ISPS Code Security
Levels. TRANSEC advises port facilities and ships of changes to
Security Levels as well as specific security requirements by fax
requiring recipients to operate a 24 hour fax machine. Telephone
calls are made where faxes have not been successful. Port facilities
and ships must ensure that revised measures are in place within
24 hours of notification of a change in Security Level. Confirmation
must be provided to TRANSEC that this has been achieved and may
be provided by e-mail, fax or telephone call. It is planned in
the near future that communications will be sent via a secure
internet based system.
12. Ships are required
to provide the Port State with pre-arrival security information
at least 24 hours in advance. This information should include
confirmation of the ship's Security Level. Information can either
be provided through the ship's agent or direct from the SSO. All
PFSOs have been issued with comprehensive decision making flowcharts
and contact lists to ensure that TRANSEC is informed of any ship
arriving at Security Level 2 or 3. Operational guidance has also
been circulated to the shipping fleet.
Compliance activity
13. TRANSEC's
and MCA's Inspectorates are responsible for ensuring that all
UK ports and ships subject to the ISPS regime are complying with
UK requirements.
14. For the ports,
initial compliance was tested by inspections of all port facilities
during the latter half of 2004. Subsequent compliance has been
ensured by a programme of unannounced and announced inspections,
participation in Port Security Committees and observing port facility
exercises and drills.
15. Maritime compliance
activity has been reviewed recently and a methodology has been
introduced which links inspection frequency to risk criteria
(e.g. size and profile of the port). Maritime compliance activity
is undertaken in accordance with the principles set out in the
TRANSEC Compliance Policy Framework document which has been shared
with the Transport Select Committee Inquiry "Travelling without
Fear". A specific outcome of the Compliance Policy Review
is that we have introduced a system of Deficiency Notices from
1st September 2006 for dealing with any serious or persistent
compliance failings. This change is supported by the maritime
industry.
16. In March 2006
TRANSEC reintroduced a maritime covert testing programme for UK
ports and ships which are subject to security regulation by TRANSEC.
The aim is to further assess levels of compliance and examine
the effectiveness of existing security requirements. The focus
of the covert testing programme will be on passenger operations
as these are the most likely to be attacked.
17. A European Commission
maritime security inspection team carried out a detailed three
day inspection at Portsmouth Continental Ferry Port in January
2006 to assess compliance with the ISPS Code and EC Regulation
725/2004. This was the first such inspection at a UK port and
only the second inspection anywhere in the EC. The EC team
found overall levels of compliance to be good and the port
also passed a covert test of its access control measures. The
EC team confirmed to TRANSEC that they were very satisfied
with the security arrangements at the port and their recommendations
were limited to minor procedural changes that have already
been implemented.
18. In May 2006 a
US Coast Guard (USCG) delegation visited the UK as part of the
International Port Security Program. The USCG use these visits
to engage in bilateral discussions with trading nations around
the world to exchange information and share best practices to
align port security programmes through implementation of the ISPS
Code and other international maritime security standards. They
visited facilities in Southampton, Bristol and Liverpool and raised
no concerns about the levels of compliance. The USCG observed
in an out-brief document that TRANSEC has "close ties and
exceptional working relationships with the maritime industry"
and a "very robust review cycle". They felt that the
travelling road-show training programme "provides continuity,
consistency and provides means for continuous contact for ports"
and that the prescriptive measures developed in the Port Facility
Security Instructions (PFSI) "provides consistency among
implementation and reduces ambiguity".
International work
19. The
global importance of achieving a secure maritime trading system
means that the UK must not consider its implementation of the
ISPS Code in isolation. It is necessary to develop a strategy
to define, prioritise and co-ordinate the protection of UK seafarers
and ships and to safeguard our wider interests.
20. The strategy will
promote the adoption of a risk based approach so that resources
and effort will be channelled to meet prioritised objectives and
ensure the strategy is sustainable. The potential resource impact
will be lessened by enhancing co-operation and co-ordination between
the various UK Government stakeholders and closer integration
and collaboration with the maritime industry and foreign Governments.
The success of the strategy will be monitored and objective measures
of effectiveness will be developed. It will be reviewed in light
of international developments but is expected to form the basis
of the UK's international civilian maritime security initiatives
for the next few years.
21. The UK cruise
ship sector has been identified as a potential terrorist target
and the increased threat and additional vulnerabilities that exist
at many overseas locations has resulted in TRANSEC conducting
at least one annual security inspection of each UK flagged cruise
ship overseas. These security inspections are conducted both on
an announced and unannounced basis depending on the type of work
being conducted. Annual inspections provide TRANSEC and UK cruise
lines with important information about how the risk to these operations
is being managed. These overseas visits are structured so that
officials conduct bi-laterals with the relevant UK diplomatic
post representatives, relevant host government officials and port
authorities.
22. In July 2006 the
UK Government signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the French
Government on civilian maritime security. The Memorandum consists
of two parts: national and local (pertaining to the English Channel)
and will form the basis of closer co-operative working with the
French Government for the foreseeable future.
23. TRANSEC has over
the last two years, developed an overseas capacity building programme
utilising FCO Global Opportunities Funding (both from the Counter-Terrorism
and Economic Governance Funds).
So far this has focused on supporting the
attendance of officials from priority Member States at seminars
and training courses organised by the International Maritime Organisation.
This programme may move more towards bi-lateral working with specific
priority countries. The initial focus will be on risk prioritised
States where the UK can add value through the application of its
technical knowledge and experience.
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