APPENDIX 2
Memorandum submitted by Mr Reg Harman
CONTEXT—THE
POTENTIAL FOR
GAIN OR
LOSS1
Winning the contest to stage the Olympic Games
for 2012, together with the Paralympics, is a substantial achievement
and reflects highly on those who have worked for this. The 2012
Games will provide the opportunity to demonstrate on a highly
lit world stage that Great Britain offers the highest standards
of management and cultural achievement. But any failures will
be vividly shown up and debated in the world's press. London is
a world centre of finance and culture, and thus plays a crucial
role in the national economy. So any loss of confidence could
have a serious impact on the country as a whole.
To enjoy the Games in comfort, visiting spectators
will need transport of the highest quality, in ease of use, comfort
and directness of travel. Many visitors will be from other countries,
including Continental Europe, and they will judge travel to and
from Olympic sites in relation to provision in their own country.
Few will have a car available, and so most will travel by public
transport. Athletes and officials will also need top class travel;
though they will be provided with car, taxi and minibus services.
The Candidate File chapter on Transport (14.)
sets out the main features. It contains a lot of data, but it
takes a very bullish line rather than define the plans more fully.
In consequence some key aspects remain uncertain, and little detailed
planning information beyond the contents of the File appears to
be available. [1]
The rest of this submission reviews these aspects
and then presents brief answers to the Committee's questions based
on the issues raised in the review.
KEY ISSUES
IN PLANNED
PROVISION OF
TRANSPORT
Movement to and from the Olympic sites will
be determined by their capacity and the timing of events. Some
sessions could involve significant peak movements, such as when
large numbers leave after the end of a key event (eg a major final).
The transport system will need to be able to move these numbers
swiftly and conveniently.
The major site is the Olympic Park, featuring
the Stadium, Arenas and other venues. Much of the focus in the
Candidate File is on transport related to the Olympic Park, where
visitor access is targeted as being 100% by public transport.
Some questions arise over aspects related to other sites. These
issues are discussed in the following paragraphs.
The Candidate File stresses the level of major
investment in transport. However, almost all of the schemes which
it lists are already approved. No mention is made of the Crossrail
project, currently going through Parliamentary processes; nor
of the Thameslink 2000 project either. This illustrates a much
broader issue. London is now the only significant capital city
in western Europe not to have connected its suburban lines into
a cross city fast metro as the core of a city transport strategy
(indeed, many lesser cities in mainland Europe have done so too).
Success in moving visitors conveniently during the period of the
two Games will depend on having an integrated public transport
system of ample capacity on which the exceptional demands in terms
of quantity and quality can be accommodated. London does not have
such a system.
POTENTIAL SCALE
OF MOVEMENTS
AT THE
OLYMPIC PARK
From Table 14.14 of the Candidate File, the
peak number of spectators at the Olympic Park for a session could
reach 140,000, and the average per session 100,000, the Stadium
itself contributing over half. This implies very large peak movements,
perhaps with daytime arrivals and evening departures for the Park
reaching 80,000-100,000. Four-fifths (78%) of all spectators will
come from London and return there in the evening.
There are many rail routes into the Park area,
serving mostly Stratford station. Many spectators may have in
practice only one route available, although others will have potentially
several routes. Those coming from origins in the west and centre
of London could use up to five routes: the Olympic Javelin, via
Underground to Kings Cross; rail from Liverpool Street, via Underground
to Liverpool Street; the Central Line; the Jubilee Line; and the
Docklands Light Railway.
Any constraints on capacity on one line could
be dealt with by having visitors use alternative routes. However,
this requires effective management, through sound planning and
good on-the-spot direction. For peak departures (eg late evening
after completion of a major event), it might be possible to direct
London-bound passengers from one route (eg the Olympic Javelin)
to another (eg the Jubilee Line) if the first faced overload or
delay. But this will need to be done with sensitivity; it concerns
large numbers of visitors from abroad and from elsewhere in Great
Britain, mostly unfamiliar with the geography of London and its
transport systems.
THE OLYMPIC
JAVELIN
The dedicated Olympic Javelin service, using
the express trains being built by Hitachi of Japan for the Integrated
Kent Franchise (IKF), will operate between St Pancras (IKF platforms),
Stratford International and Ebbsfleet. The Candidate File suggests
a capacity of 25,000 people an hour. However, the trains will
probably consist of two 6-coach units, each seating about 350
people, giving a total of 700 passengers. Since Eurostar and IKF
services will still be running, the maximum number of paths available
per hour for the Javelin is likely to be 12, giving a total movement
(each way) of about 8,500 per hour; ie one third the level claimed.
So most of the movement between the Olympic Park and central London
will need to be go by other routes: mostly the Central and Jubilee
Lines.
Because the IKF units are main line rather than
suburban, and many passengers will be unfamiliar with the route,
boarding and alighting will not be rapid. A train from London
will disembark all its passengers at Stratford International and
then load up again for Ebbsfleet, and vice versa, often at full
load in one direction. Time has to be allowed for boarding and
alighting, complicated by the use of the same platforms for both.
In the circumstances, each train could be standing for some time
at the platform, say between 3 and 5 minutes. This poses two serious
implications:
— The actual journey time including
boarding and alighting, will be quite a bit higher than the 7
minutes quoted, and it may well be perceived as much higher.
— The standing trains will take up
space on the CTRL route, potentially disturbing effective operation
of the Eurostar and IKF services.
CENTRAL AND
JUBILEE LINES
The Central and Jubilee Lines offer significant
capacity between them, especially as the Jubilee Line is being
upgraded, with longer trains, and they provide direct links from
much of western and central London. So they are likely to offer
preferred means of reaching the Olympic Park for many people,
especially given the limited capacity of the Javelin service.
However, there are three aspects which will need careful attention:
— Travelling time will be long. Running
times from the West End to Stratford are around 20-25 minutes
for the Central Line and 25-30 minutes for the Jubilee Line.
— The travelling environment of a Tube
train is rather confined, even for many Londoners; for visitors
from other countries it may prove a poor experience.
— The two Tube lines are both very
busy for much of the day, especially through central London. Thus,
for example, if large numbers of visitors seek to board in London
late morning to head for Stratford, they may cause capacity problems
for non-Olympic travellers and experience even more unpleasant
travel conditions.
EUROSTAR SERVICES
Visitors to the Games from mainland Europe by
Eurostar will have to change trains at Ebbsfleet and continue
by Javelin. Since Ebbsfleet is also serving as a major park-&-ride
location, there could be capacity problems. Yet Stratford International
will by 2007 be within 3 hours by high speed train for much of
northwest Europe, on a route built to the main European loading
gauge. If it were available, this could allow additional special
services to be run directly from other European capitals and major
cities, using both the Eurostar sets and other types of high speed
trains (eg the various of French TGV sets or German ICE3 sets).
This could not only prove attractive but also enhance Great Britain's
image among its (sometimes sceptical) European neighbours. Forgoing
this opportunity seems a remarkably short-sighted action; especially
when the Candidate File dwells on the scale of air travel provision
for international access.
THE EXCEL
SITE AND
DOCKLANDS LIGHT
RAILWAY
For events at the Excel site, potential peak
numbers per session of about 40,000 and average numbers of 30,000
are suggested (Table 14.14). The Excel site in 2012 will be served
only by the Docklands Light Railway. The peak capacity per hour,
even with present upgrading, is understood to be around 12,000
each way. This could result in pressure on capacity at times,
depending on the pattern of people arriving and departing.
RAIL ACCESS
TO OTHER
MAJOR CENTRES
Several other venues outside London are allocated
for various sports, including football and water sports. Numbers
per session at some of the city venues are expected to be high.
Very significant public transport access to all of these is also
expected. To provide this access from across the country calls
for fast and high capacity services; which in practice means rail
travel. Much of this would be through additional and even special
services, some outside the normal route patterns. In recent years
rail travel to football matches and other large sporting events
has been constrained; sometimes charges or controls have been
imposed to keep numbers down to available seating. This reflects
the complex rights and funding of the franchise operators, coupled
with limits to capacity of both infrastructure and trains. This
approach needs to be changed if the intended convenience of travel
to enjoy the events is to be achieved.
RESPONSES TO
THE COMMITTEE'S
MAIN QUESTIONS
Funding the investment
The Candidate File stresses the $30 billion
to be spent on London's transport system prior to 2012. The infrastructure
schemes listed in Table 14.1 amount to only $11.5 billion, and
the context of the $30 billion is unclear. The $11.5 billion includes
the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, various extensions to the Docklands
Light Railway and to the East London Railway, together with a
range of smaller schemes. While access to the Olympic Park was
a factor in some cases, these schemes are mostly committed ones
which would have been built anyway. Large elements of the funding
are through Public Private Partnership (PPP) arrangements. The
total directly attributable to the Olympic Games amounts to $164
million, 1.4% of the listed infrastructure spending. Only $15
million of this, 0.1%, is on public transport, being the makeshift
arrangements for the Olympic Javelin.
So in practice very little is being spent directly
on transport for the Olympic Games, and much of the infrastructure
spending is coming through private funding. The existing Spending
Agreement between the Government and the Mayor does not provide
for additional projects on top of this. Effective high quality
access to and from the Olympic Park and other venues requires
the provision of much more capacity, and this must require much
greater expenditure. Primarily such funding can only come from
the public purse. Bringing forward funding approval for Crossrail
might well form the crucial element in this.
Great Britain's overall spending on transport
infrastructure is poor compared to other European countries, hence
the serious congestion on both rail and road systems, without
any apparent relief. Much of the current spending is concentrated
in the South East of England. This is understandable, given the
role of London and the South East in the nation's economy. However,
achieving high quality in society, the economy and the environment
throughout the country requires effective transport support for
all parts, with major investment in the rest of England's urban
areas and in those of Wales and Scotland. Thus proper investment
in the Olympic Games transport should not form a reason for diverting
funds from the already limited development of transport elsewhere
in the country.
Olympic projects within London's longer term needs
Although the Mayor's Transport Plan for London
sets out clear objectives and programmes for developing London's
transport, it does not amount to a proper strategy. The Regional
Transport Strategies for the South East and East Anglia Regions
are even less definitive. This contrasts with the approach taken
in most other European capital cities. In Paris, Madrid, Stockholm
or the Dutch Randstad, for example, the adopted city transport
strategies define sets of projects, are linked into national strategies,
and have regularly updated funding commitments by Government,
in cooperation with regional and city authorities. This has resulted
in major integrated projects for rail and other modes. The Paris
RER, the Dutch Randstad line quadruplings and the Stockholm city
centre line, for example, all serve the city and its region, and
are well integrated with the rest of transport development and
with spatial (land use) planning.
London has nothing like this, hence the makeshift
approach to catering for the Olympic Games. The Thames Gateway
forms one of the major regeneration projects in the world, certainly
in Europe, yet in relative terms virtually nothing has been committed
to significant transport improvement. Similar remarks apply to
the Lea Valley/Cambridge corridor, one of the Government's major
growth areas within its Sustainable Communities policy. Major
investment is needed, not least for regional public transport
to integrate these (and other) growth regions into the London
regional community as a whole.
The long delayed Crossrail project appears crucial
here. It does have a potential capacity of 25,000 per hour in
each direction. If the core tunnel section of this project were
completed in time, it would assure excellent transport between
London and the Olympic Park. Beyond the Games it would fulfil
its intended function as the key artery for the Thames Gateway
regeneration, and perhaps the Lea Valley too, thus leaving a true
long term legacy from the Games. Without this, the temporary arrangements
proposed will offer nothing. Indeed, focusing on short term provision
only may divert attention from Crossrail and complementary projects,
thus setting back any hope of an effective transport system to
underpin London's regeneration and growth.
Impact of the Games on London's quality and environment
As discussed above, the Candidate File transport
proposals appear to offer poor access coupled with the risk of
serious crowding to parts of the network. This will affect the
east side of London, which includes the Docklands area and lines
serving the City; there could also be serious problems for the
West End. In consequence the period before and during the Games
could worsen travel conditions for people in London, including
those areas that play a major role in the city's economic and
social life. There could also be disruption during the run-up
period needed for preparing the various ad hoc projects, such
as the Olympic Route Network, the Olympic Javelin, and the park
& ride sites and services.
Lessons from the experiences of other Olympic
cities
The main problem that has arisen for one or
two Olympic Games has been difficulty and delay in getting to
and from the Games sites. In contrast, some Olympic Games have
provided adequate transport, in quantity and quality, to the extent
that the Games have been judged a success. It is interesting that,
despite concern before the event, the Games at Athens in 2004
achieved this; in part this reflected completion of various major
transport projects in time, these projects also forming part of
the city's long term strategy for growth.
Problems in transport have usually reflected
ad hoc arrangements applied on top of a poor overall city transport
system, especially one lacking sufficient public transport capacity;
this has affected more than one North American Games. In contrast
most European cities have public transport networks with substantial
capacity, most of them still under expansion. London's current
approach and provision follows the North American approach of
poor overall public transport capacity and ad hoc arrangements.
Contents of the Olympic Transport Plan
There is clearly a need to plan rapidly for
transport for the Olympic Games. All elements need to be developed,
and investment processes in Great Britain are slow compared to
some of our European neighbours. Central to development must be
a reappraisal of the key elements of access for the Olympic Park.
The timescale probably does not allow development of a significant
new project in time for its agreement and construction. However
the key problem of capacity between central London and Stratford
would be solved by construction of Crossrail. So the first step
in developing the Olympic Transport Plan should be to assess the
Crossrail's benefits for the Olympic Games, as an additional value
on top of the longer term regeneration gains that this scheme
already offers.
Powers of the Olympic Delivery Authority
Because the Olympic Games will prove a milestone
in the development of Great Britain over the coming decades, it
is essential that transport be a major success. So the Olympic
Delivery Authority should have strong control over transport development
and funding relevant to the Olympic Games. However, this should
not mean that it is able to override the decisions of other bodies
also charged with transport development. To be successful, its
plans must be integral with development of a top quality transport
system for London and its hinterland. The Olympic Delivery Authority
will need to understand and influence this. It needs to have first
rate transport expertise included in the staff, led by a senior
transport manager who forms part of the Authority's executive
board.
CONCLUSIONS
Gaining the Olympic Games for 2012 offers major
opportunities for Great Britain to enhance its standing in the
world through laying on really successful Games. It also raises
the risk of failure under the international media spotlight if
any serious problems arise. The transport infrastructure in London
and the South East, like the rest of Great Britain, suffers from
low capacity, relatively limited investment and no real strategic
planning. Far from addressing this, current plans for the Games
propose to rely on makeshift temporary arrangements which will
probably cause poor travel conditions for visitors to the Olympic
Park, congestion for the rest of London, and further delay in
addressing the key transport needs of the Thames Gateway. This
needs to be urgently addressed if holding the Olympic Games is
not to undermine Great Britain's long term future. Given the time
constraints, constructing the main part of the Crossrail project
by 2012 may prove essential to success.
23 August 2005
1 The writer approached the TfL Olympic Planning Team
for more information on the Olympic Javelin but was informed that
this was not available as it was a matter of commercial confidence. Back
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