Select Committee on Transport Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1 - 19)

WEDNESDAY 2 NOVEMBER 2005

MS KAREN BUCK MP, MS SANDRA WEBBER, SIR ROY MCNULTY AND MR RICHARD JACKSON

  Q1  Chairman: Good afternoon, Minister, ladies and gentlemen, may I welcome you most warmly to this Committee. This is your first blooding so, of course we shall be very gentle with you, as is our wont. Can I ask you to identify yourself and your colleagues?

  Ms Buck: My name is Karen Buck and I am the Parliamentary Under-Secretary responsible for the aviation area. This is Sandra Webber, the official who leads on this area.

  Sir Roy McNulty: I am Roy McNulty, Chairman of the CAA, and on my left is Richard Jackson who is the Director of the Consumer Protection Group in the CAA.

  Q2  Chairman: Am I to take it, Minister, that you wanted to say one or two things to us before we begin?

  Ms Buck: If that is okay, I will perhaps make a few very brief opening comments. To start, I am very pleased to be here and I want to say how grateful I am to the CAA for the work that they did in preparation for this decision, and I do understand (although it will be for Sir Roy to make his own comments) that there will have been disappointment at the CAA about the decision that we came to. The decision was not made by looking at the work of the CAA and basically criticising and deconstructing it; it was very much a question of saying: "Here is an excellent piece of work, a very sound piece of work, setting out the arguments for the levy", but that when it came to focusing on that decision, which we did, as you know, in the preparation for the Civil Aviation Bill, we felt that it was right to take effectively a different approach; that it was really very much in the context of the Better Regulation Framework, and that said despite the undoubted advantages of the CAA's proposal in terms of simplicity and in the comprehensive nature of the consumer protection, we felt that, effectively, the problems that exist in this area did not merit an approach based on compulsion. We felt that, as the Better Regulation Taskforce Outline suggested, it was more important for regulation to only be very much focused on specific risk. In this case the level of risk—and there is a level of risk—did not warrant a 100% compulsory levy. We felt that we do not require insurance to be taken out in other areas of life (and I am sure there will be some questioning along those lines), but that as the travel market has changed so much over the course of the last decade it really was very much now for an increasingly independent-minded travelling public to make their own decisions. We felt that whilst the CAA's proposal suggested areas of inequity they would be replaced by other areas of inequity and people would be paying the same levy if they were on a cheap flight to Dublin or Prague as they would for a luxury package holiday, and that there would also be the other inequities of the system that people would be covered for insurance purposes for an airline collapse but not necessarily for other elements of the holiday package that they would have assembled independently. So, in the end, on balance, we decided to go for the more deregulatory approach. The three areas that we are concentrating on now and for the future are how we can improve awareness and education for consumers in the voluntary context (I will not go into detail on that as I am sure people will want to ask questions on this); that there are various options for cover that we want to promote understanding of; that there is an arrangement around repatriation, and we have had meetings already with a number of different airlines to discuss improving the deal on repatriation, and then, of course, also, the Committee will understand, the two sides of industry, broadly (with some exceptions) came down on different sides: the tour operators favouring the levy, the airlines not favouring a levy. In recognising that the tour operators and package operators would feel that they were left with a burden, the CAA has now been asked—and we may want to discuss that more—to review bonding. We hope with those initiatives under way and now progressing that we will be able to move towards better consumer protection but in a lighter touch and deregulatory framework.

  Q3  Chairman: Can I ask you one or two factual questions before we get on to these aspects (and the various points you raise will undoubtedly be covered)? You did not reply originally (you being the department) to our report, and you said that you were asking the CAA to undertake some research. They then did that. Am I to understand that having got their report you totally re-jigged the terms of reference but did not ask the CAA to do another inquiry; you simply said: "No, we do not think that is a very good idea"?

  Ms Buck: What we did was take the work the CAA produced—as I say, I am not here to start picking holes in that—and say here was a proposal in the round. I can understand where that is coming from, it makes complete sense in its own terms but is that the approach that we want to go down?

  Q4  Chairman: What you are saying is that although that was presumably the kind of idea you put to the CAA originally, you changed the terms of reference when you got their report?

  Ms Buck: I am not quite sure what you mean by "terms of reference" in this context.

  Q5  Chairman: Originally, the reason that we did not get a reply—and this Committee were quite relaxed about it—was that you informed us you were going to ask the CAA to look into the question (presumably all aspects of the question—I do not think you limited their inquiry) and give you advice on how you should proceed, and that would cover things like the inequity not just between the ATOL members and the non-ATOL members but between people who bought their packages one way and people who bought them another. Are you saying to me you that you got that reply, you looked at it and you said: "This is not right; it is not in-depth enough, we need a different approach", but you did not go back to the CAA and ask them to do it again, you simply said: "No, we don't accept this"? Is that right or wrong?

  Ms Buck: I would not phrase it like that. I would say—

  Q6  Chairman: I do not think we need worry about the words, it is the result. Is that what happened?

  Ms Buck: I think it kind of matters because I do not recognise that as the approach. We asked for a piece of work, the work was done, it was an entirely sound and sensible piece of work—

  Q7  Chairman: So good you ignored it.

  Ms Buck: In looking at that and looking at what was an unfolding debate around the regulatory framework we took the decision to go down a different approach, not to criticise or undermine that work.

  Q8  Chairman: I do not think we are too worried about your relationship with the CAA; they are big boys, I think they can probably recover if they feel you are being unfair. Let us ask Sir Roy before we go any further. Do you want to tell us briefly the main relevant findings of your report into the collapse of EUjet?

  Sir Roy McNulty: From our point of view it confirmed the findings and the modelling that we had done over last winter and into the spring that people would get back but it would cost them significant amounts of money and cause them both inconvenience and distress, not least due to the lack of information as to what had happened to the airline they thought they were going to return on. In other words, it was a bit of a mess. The costs that people incurred were very close to the modelling work that we had done with Ernst & Young over the winter. So it worked out as predicted.

  Q9  Chairman: So they did not realise they were not protected against the failure of the airline?

  Sir Roy McNulty: Absolutely. Between 60 and 70% of the people either did not know or actually believed they were protected.

  Q10  Chairman: Did they have to pay additional fares to get home?

  Sir Roy McNulty: They paid additional fares. Easyjet for one week made a £25 flight available but the big problem for most of those people coming from Kent was that Easyjet took them to some place a long way away from Manston and the surface transport to get them back home cost them, on average, £100 per group of passengers.

  Q11  Chairman: Do you want to tell us approximately the percentages of who did what? Who got the cheap flights for £25 in one week and who got the others?

  Sir Roy McNulty: Can I ask Richard Jackson, who has the detail to hand?

  Mr Jackson: I am not sure I can answer that question.

  Q12  Chairman: Approximately.

  Mr Jackson: We did a survey. What exactly are you trying to find out?

  Q13  Chairman: Tell me what happened. In this group of passengers, what was their average payment, how many of them got one scheme and how many got another?

  Mr Jackson: About 16% of people abroad were able to get back on the cheap schemes for £25. Of those who did not return on the day they intended to, half cut their holiday short to take advantage of that scheme because the special offers were only open for a week. The airlines other than Easyjet who offered cheap flights took relatively few passengers. Our estimate is that about 53% of those stranded eventually came back with Easyjet in some shape or form, paying a variety of fares depending on how they had booked.

  Q14  Chairman: We are assuming it was at least £100 to get back to Manston.

  Mr Jackson: Yes. It turned out to be about £100 to get back to Manston; the model predicted that there would be a considerable cost to get back to the original airport.

  Q15  Chairman: Sir Roy, are the airlines that offered rescue packages to EUjet customers likely to be able to point to some benefit to themselves from doing so?

  Sir Roy McNulty: I would guess so in the sense that they presumably filled seats that would otherwise not have been filled.

  Q16  Chairman: Did you have any indication that EUjet was going to collapse?

  Sir Roy McNulty: No, we did not. I should make it clear that EUjet is an Irish registered airline, looked after by the Irish Aviation Authority, and is not an airline we deal with.

  Q17  Chairman: We understand that, but do you not have a watching brief if there is something wrong with a particular body?

  Sir Roy McNulty: We do.

  Q18  Chairman: Had there been any rumours? It was flying mainly out of British airports.

  Sir Roy McNulty: There had been rumours but no hard information. It was an odd situation with the interlocking ownership between the airline and the airport, which makes one wonder what the viability of the enterprise was.

  Q19  Chairman: You think there might have been some creative Irish accounting?

  Sir Roy McNulty: I think it is possible. It certainly was not very sound Irish accounting.


 
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