Select Committee on Transport Written Evidence


APPENDIX 7

Memorandum submitted by British Airways plc

1.  INTRODUCTION

  1.1  British Airways welcomes the opportunity to submit evidence to the Transport Select Committee on the subject of the collapse of the airline EUjet and the provision of assistance for "stranded" budget airline passengers.

  1.2  British Airways is one of the largest airlines in the world, operating to more than 215 destinations in 90 countries. In the financial year 2004-05, it carried almost 36 million passengers and reported an operating profit of £540 million.

  1.3  It is a founding member of the oneworld alliance of scheduled airlines operating globally and has franchise agreements with six carriers, which encompass marketing and selling arrangements, and code-share arrangements with 11 airlines.

2.  CONSEQUENCES OF COLLAPSE OF EUJET

  2.1  Approximately 6,000 passengers were left without return flights to their point of origin at the 18 destinations served by EUjet throughout the United Kingdom and Europe, primarily Spain. Every destination to which EUjet flew from and within the UK has flights operated by other airlines to the South East of England, offering passengers options to return to base.

  2.2  In addition, it is estimated some 90,000 customers with reservations for future travel may have lost the money paid for these, unless the cost of the ticket exceeds £100 and was paid for by credit card or they had insurance.

3.  IMPACT ON UK AVIATION

  3.1  British Airways is concerned that the failure of EUjet and the subsequent grounding of its fleet may result in calls for the introduction of a levy scheme to protect travellers using scheduled airlines, budget or otherwise.

  3.2  In reality, the number of passengers affected by the failures of budget airlines is extremely small in respect of the total market. In July 2005, there were 23 no-frills carriers, including EUjet, operating in the UK-Europe market. These carried a total of 5,933,510 passengers, collectively accounting for almost 51% of the total market[3]. Ryanair and easyJet account for 34% of the market, leaving a 16.5% share to be spread around the other budget operators.

  3.3  Since July 2003, there have been five failures among the no-frills airlines serving the UK market. With the exception of EUjet, none was UK based. The UK based airline Duo was never in this niche—it was a lower cost business airline operating to major airports with a full service product.

  3.4  The peak market share attained by the failed airlines during the July 2003-July 2005 period demonstrates how small these carriers actually are in the UK market: Air Polonia 0.15%; Flying Finn 0.05%; Volareweb 0.17%; Vbird 0.05%; and EUjet on 0.32%. Although operating in a different sector, the highest market share reached by Duo was 0.42%.

  3.5  British Airways believes that to introduce a levy on all passengers travelling on scheduled airlines to provide a fund to cover the repatriation and refund costs of those affected by airline failures is unfair and disproportionate, based on the market share highlighted in 3.4.

  3.6  In addition, to introduce a charge on all UK-based airlines would be ineffective for those passengers flying with non-UK based airlines, which on recent performance, are more likely to fail.

  3.7  British Airways believes its inclusion within any levy scheme will lead to a rise in prices to British Airways' customers without providing justifiable consumer benefit to them. It does not add value to their purchase. Many years of hard earner financial diligence and professionalism allows British Airways to be more confident that it is financially robust. Newer, weaker airlines are unlikely to be in this position.

  3.8  If a levy scheme is to be introduced, we urge the CAA and the Department for Transport to consider an alternative approach that regulates weaker players in the market. Inclusion of all scheduled operators means that customers of these less robust airlines would potentially be cross subsidised by those travelling on the more-established carriers.

4.  INSURANCE

  4.1  Insurance is widely recommended for everyone travelling overseas, on all forms of transport.

  4.2  Passengers seeking cheap air fares with smaller, less-established airlines do so on the basis of "Caveat Emptor", and adequate insurance cover would ensure that those unfortunate to find themselves without flights due to an airline collapse could do so without difficulty or great cost.

  4.3  British Airways supports the Foreign & Commonwealth Office "Know Before You Go" campaign which offers advice to all travellers. The campaign offers essential advice and strongly advises that everyone should have proper insurance for their trip, for medical and emergency cover, and also for travel arrangements.

  4.4  The aviation industry should not be treated any differently from all other sectors of the economy in terms of consumer protection. It is well recognised that customers have a wide choice when purchasing air travel, and it is for the individual to exercise this choice freely when opting for a more or less risky product.

5.  CONCLUSION

  5.1  We would suggest an analysis be undertaken of how many, if any, passengers were actually "stranded" overseas or required consular assistance as a consequence of the failure of EUjet before any proposals for a protection levy are progressed.

  5.2  If the Government were to intervene in the commercial activities of the aviation sector it would distort the marketplace and alter the relationship between supplier and consumer. This would distance aviation yet further from normal liberalised industries and business, and add another layer of regulation instead of removing historical anomalies.







3   CAA Monthly Passenger Figures, July 2005. Back


 
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