Annex A
LAND TRANSPORT
SECURITY AND
THE LONDON
JULY ATTACKS
1. Security regulation was introduced in
the Channel Tunnel network in 1994, the heavy rail network in
February 2000, the light rail network (London Underground) in
October 2003 and the Docklands Light Railway in September 2005.
From November 2005, the Glasgow Subway will be formally regulated.
From July 2005, the security of dangerous goods in transport was
also brought under formal regulation.
2. Industry is responsible for the implementation
of the regulated security measures. DfT inspectors monitor and
enforce compliance against the security standards.
3. The hierarchy of measures are devised
in response to the mode-specific threat levels identified by the
intelligence services. An important aspect of TRANSEC's work is
to inform the relevant UK industry of any changes in the threat
levels and the required response measures. This is done by a secure
means of communication, available 24/7.
Pre-Madrid security regime
4. Rail security in Great Britain has strong
foundations in place which have been developed over time to deter
the Irish terrorist threat. Its focus has been on bombs left in
stations and, to some extent, on trains, and to make it as hard
as possible to leave unattended items. Many of the security measures
in place (left luggage screening, station searches, restrictions
on litter bins and BTP-developed rail staff procedures to evaluate
the risk associated with the discovery of an unattended item)
were specifically developed to deal with that threat.
Post-Madrid review of rail and underground security
5. Following the Madrid rail attacks in
March 2004, TRANSEC undertook a comprehensive review to examine
rail security measures already in place nationally and investigate
new ways of improving those measures. It was undertaken in conjunction
with the BTP, industry and other Government departments.
6. The outcomes of the review, endorsed
by Government in late 2004, identified a package of short, medium
and long-term measures to enhance rail counter-terrorist security
and for industry to deliver. These centred on: new regulatory
measures; new and improved guidance; better working arrangements
with the BTP and industry; and further studies into long-term
transport security issues.
7. A key feature of the review was to ensure
that the measures were proportionate, pragmatic, sustainable and
did not place an undue burden on industry. The measures were designed
for the prevailing threat at the time and to be introduced without
requiring a significant shift in the "open" nature of
the rail system. Furthermore, the measures not only continued
to address the threat from bombs deposited on stations but also
extended the focus to trains.
8. Running in parallel with the Madrid review,
the BTP produced in December 2004 its National Strategic Framework
which was designed to provide an over-arching approach for co-ordinating
the police response towards countering a heightened threat from
terrorism upon the rail network. It describes how it could provide
a national capability that takes into account alterations to the
threat level.
Rail security post-7 July
9. The 7 July attacks against the London
Underground were the first suicide attacks in the UK. On that
day, the mandatory security requirements were raised to their
highest level across the rail and underground networks resulting
in the tightening of the existing measures. Prompted in part by
TRANSEC, industry also introduced measures over and above their
regulatory requirements, previously agreed with TRANSEC.
10. A rail industry working group has been
convened to keep under review existing security policies and consider
any further areas for action following the London attacks. This
will ensure greater and more prompt focus is given to the full
range of rail security issues.
11. TRANSEC is collaborating with NSAC to
support its research and development activities in a number of
areas that are of relevance to transport security. These include:
— evaluation and development of "Intelligent
Vision Systems"—CCTV;
— investigation into blast effects
and blast mitigation strategies, with a particular emphasis on
blast on tube trains; and
— behavioural sciences—including
techniques for identifying suspicious behaviour.
Bus and coach security
12. TRANSEC will issue to all bus and coach
companies in the United Kingdom in November 2005 protective security
advice and guidance. This will be based in part on the regimes
TRANSEC has in place for elements of the rail industry.
| 
