House of Commons - Transport

Select Committee on Transport First Report

2 Matters for further investigation

7. The scale of the continuing threat to UK transport systems appears formidable. We have no reason to challenge the Secretary of State's sombre view of the present risk that 'it is one that we are going to be living under for the rest of our lives and probably our children's lives as well'.[3]

8. We have no doubt that the threat to the travelling public in the UK from terrorist attacks remains grave. We shall examine the nature and threat that this presents to our transport networks thoroughly in the course of the forthcoming inquiry.

Threat prediction

9. It is unlikely that any workable protective security system for transport networks can be completely effective at all times. The question is, whether and how the present protective security system can be improved. Its effectiveness is critically dependent upon the success of those responsible for providing information about the nature and timing of violent threats. As the Department notes 'Relevant and timely threat information must be a cornerstone of transport protective security regimes if they are to remain proportionate and flexible.' [4]

10. The destruction which terrorists inflicted upon travellers and the London Underground and bus network on 7 July represents a relative failure for the UK's protective security arrangements. The Director of TRANSEC said that 'what is never known, and it makes it very hard for us to assess the success of our job, what is never known publicly, and we do not know either, is what has not happened and what attacks have been prevented.'[5] This may be true, but is cold comfort to those affected directly by the events of 7 July.

11. We shall seek to consider the process by which much protective security on our transport systems is based on 'relevant and timely threat information', and we shall examine what approaches the authorities may be considering to heighten practical protection for the travelling public.

Co-operation within Government to meet attacks

12. The intelligence and security apparatus available to respond to the current threat of terrorism is necessarily complex. Unless lines of communication between the agencies are consistently excellent this complexity could slow urgent action in the event of an emergency. The example of the attack on the United States in 2001, which demonstrated substantial weaknesses in crisis management, communications and coordination on the part of those responsible for protective actions is chillingly before us :

"We learned that the institutions charged with protecting our borders, civil aviation, and national security did not understand how grave this threat could be, and did not adjust their policies, plans, and practices to deter or defeat it. We learnt of fault lines within our government- between foreign and domestic intelligence, and between and within agencies. We learned of the pervasive problems of managing and sharing information across a large and unwieldy government that had been built in a different era to confront different dangers.'[6]

13. This must not happen in the UK. The Secretary of State said that there were lessons to learn after the events of 7 July, and that the Government was not complacent, but that a quick and co-ordinated response by agencies, transport operators, and Ministers to the July events had been made possible by training. Experience gained from previous incidents was also relevant.[7] He contrasted UK intra-agency cooperation where 'services work very closely together' with comparable US bodies which 'were fairly free standing and fairly independent of each other'.[8]

14. We shall wish to test the positive view of the Secretary of State for Transport about coordination within Government to meet the terrorist threat, and the capacity of the emergency services to deal with a major terrorist incident on UK transport networks.

Co-operation between Government and the transport industry

15. While TRANSEC is able to give directions to industry on the implementation of protective security measures,[9] good co-operation between the UK Government and the transport industry is the foundation of sound security for the travelling public. TRANSEC told us about the elaborate arrangements for ensuring co-ordination between the Government and transport industry, including a number of national security committees, sub-committees, and working groups, for each transport mode.[10] The Director of TRANSEC was positive about this relationship 'We share the problem with [industry], brief them on the threat, make sure that they understand the sort of threat that they might be under, and then we work with them to try to devise a measure that will meet that particular risk that we all share'[11].

AVIATION SECTOR

16. Evidence we received from the aviation sector reflected some tensions with the Government on security matters. British Airways told us that "there is over-regulation in the UK when compared with security regimes existing in both Europe and the US", which compromises the "competitive position of the United Kingdom's airlines and airports":[12]

17. British Airways was unaware that any Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) had been undertaken "to demonstrate that the additional requirements are either proportionate or reasonable to address the assessed threat";[14] had an assessment been undertaken "its analysis and conclusions have not been shared with industry, nor was it consulted."[15] The Secretary of State thought that no RIA had been carried out. [16] We found this state of affairs surprising. All security measures need to provide public reassurance while representing value for money. Our forthcoming inquiry will examine what action the Department is taking to achieve cost effectiveness in protective security for UK transport networks.

18. Virgin Atlantic, too, expressed concerns about the absence of a review mechanism for security requirements. It also pointed to what it considered to be deficiencies in the efficiency of intra-governmental security co-ordination; a lack of cross border co-ordination with alleged "considerable duplication" between the Safety Regulation Group of the UK Civil Aviation Authority of the European Air Safety Authority (EASA); and the costs of recent anti terrorist security measures imposed by European governments on European airlines and airports which amounted to Euros 3 billion.[17] The company considered the present arrangements for a military response to bomb alerts on civil aircrafts to be inappropriate; and argued that denying airlines information about the UK 'country threat level' was 'unacceptable.'[18]

OTHER TRANSPORT SECTORS

19. We had disquieting evidence from other parts of the transport industry. For example, the alleged poor state of some train radios on the London Underground which, it was claimed, could compromise safety in an emergency; and alleged inadequacies in the way procedures for identifying potentially dangerous packages in the Underground are being applied.[19]

20. The Road Haulage Association (RHA) expressed concerns that neither the costs nor staffing of a proposed Government scheme to allow police access to information to all freight movements appear to have been assesed.[20] We were also told that an initiative to develop 'Truckwatch', a scheme "to ensure that a commercial vehicle and/or its cargo" may not be used as transport weapon, or to facilitate the delivery of a weapon, has stalled.[21]

21. The Road Haulage Association told us that co-ordination of transport security within Government must be improved;[22] and we heard about the high cost and evident unpopularity of the so-called "modal approach" to transport security in the industry from the Freight Transport Association.[23]

22. We are not in a position at present to conclude whether the complaints we heard from the transport industry about the current protective security arrangements are justified, or to gauge their overall significance. It is obvious that effective security for the travelling public rests on sound co-operation between Government and the transport industry. While there is a developed structure of national security committees to ensure that this co-operation is effective, there is some evidence that improvements may be necessary.

23. The cost of transport security is never going to be popular with those who are required to pay. But it is essential that appropriate protective security measures are put in place for the UK transport network generally. These must be properly maintained and are upgraded regularly. There can be no compromise on this point. It is important that the Government reassures industry about the proportionate nature of the security measures required; and that industry adopts a realistic approach to meeting its obligations. We shall explore these matters further in our inquiry.

TRANSPORT SECURITY AND CONTINGENCIES DIRECTORATE (TRANSEC)

RESOURCES

24. To perform its tasks,[24] TRANSEC has a staff of 200 and a budget of £16.8 million,[25] 0.125 percent of the total public spending budget of the Department for Transport in 2003-04.[26]

25. The Director of TRANSEC said that she was 'satisfied with the numbers we have', and told us that her establishment is protected from staffing cuts.[27] She said that most comparable organisations abroad were 'envious' of TRANSEC's staffing levels.[28] The Secretary of State told us that 'If there was a case to be made for employing more people, that would be something we would certainly look at.' But he appeared satisfied that TRANSEC had sufficient resources currently.[29] While these comments were broadly reassuring, it is vital that TRANSEC's resources fully match the current terrorist threat to UK transport. We have no details about how TRANSEC's budget is broken down currently. The Director of TRANSEC has undertaken to provide us with information on this, and we shall then make our own judgement about its resource levels.[30]

26. Sufficient resources must be devoted to counter the terrorist threat to UK transport. We are aware that the budget of TRANSEC does not represent all Government spending on security. The transport industry's contribution also needs to be counted. The skilful deployment of TRANSEC's human and financial resources however is the key to focussing the UK's overall transport protective security regime.

OPERATIONAL MATTERS

27. There was no opportunity for us to examine in detail the wider operation of TRANSEC. For example, the approach adopted to enforcement, the value of international liaison, the reason for the prioritisation of security for 'closed' over 'open' transport systems, the application of technology to protective security, and a variety of security issues affecting the aviation, maritime, railway, bus, and underground sectors. Our forthcoming inquiry will include these aspects of TRANSEC's work.

REPORTING

28. TRANSEC is required to report annually to the Secretary of State for Transport, and a document is placed in the Library of the House of Commons.[31] The production of reports by TRANSEC originates in a commitment by the Government during the passage of the Aviation and Maritime Security Bill to report on the National Aviation Security Programme. Subsequent reports have extended beyond aviation.[32] It is our firm view that TRANSEC should continue to report on its protective security activities, and that these reports should continue to be publicly available. But we have a number of concerns about the present arrangements.

29. We were concerned at the absence of detail about corporate affairs in recent TRANSEC annual reports. The reports for 2003-04 and 2004-05 contain little detailed breakdown of expenditure, or information on human resources, which featured in earlier reports. The Director of TRANSEC said that 'perhaps too much detailed information had gone into the earlier reports and particularly now we wanted to get something that we put on our website which would be very accessible to the general public.'[33]

30. We did not find this argument particularly convincing. It is not obvious why omitting expenditure and human resources material from recent reports should enhance the accessibility of TRANSEC's website. TRANSEC should explain any decision to adjust the level of information it provides publicly in its annual report. Such adjustments should be minimised to facilitate comparisons of its activity and performance year on year.

31. TRANSEC annual reports contain no performance measures. We were assured that TRANSEC performance targets do exist,[34] and that internal monitoring procedures are in place.[35] TRANSEC's business plan is classified "because of all the material we bring together and it will tell you something about the vulnerabilities we perceive which we are working on."[36] It should not be beyond the Department's capacity to devise performance measures for inclusion in TRANSEC's annual reports which avoid exposing classified information while at the same time providing a sound measure of public reassurance.

32. Security is not included in the Department's Public Service Agreement (PSA). The Secretary of State pointed out that not all activities of the Department were reflected in the PSA.[37] In the present circumstances consideration should be given by the Department to amending the PSA to include security. This would not only signal that work to protect the security of the travelling public was a priority for the Department, but would be a welcome statement of the Government's willingness to subject such work to Parliamentary and public scrutiny. We are pleased that the Secretary of State expressed himself willing to consider this.[38]

33. A more informative general approach to describing TRANSEC's 'front line' activities in the annual report could also be considered. For example, a review of rail security was conducted in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the Madrid trains in 2004 and resulted in 'a package of 18 short, medium and long term measures to enhance rail counter-terrorist security'.[39] While there is some information about the review in the Department's separate submission to this committee,[40] the absence of detail about these measures in TRANSEC's annual report means that the reader is unable to judge their efficacy. Consequently, much of the point of the information is lost. Another example is the reference to the exercise code-named 'ATLANTIC BLUE' in which the report asserts TRANSEC participated successfully. But no further information is provided about it.[41]

34. TRANSEC's annual reports need to demonstrate convincingly how the Directorate's activities in the reporting year have contributed directly to enhancing the safety of the travelling public and the UK transport network. TRANSEC reports are made to the Secretary of State but are read by others. We assume that the Secretary of State has access to separate information which enables him to make full sense of TRANSEC annual reports' rather bare narratives. But for readers without such access, these reports require more contextual analysis and background to be fully adequate.

35. The rationale for TRANSEC continuing to have an annual report separate from the Department's Annual Report is not clear. The Annual Report already contains a short section on security,[42] and therefore covers some of the ground in the separate TRANSEC document. The Department may wish to consider whether bringing TRANSEC's reports within the Department's Annual Report would avoid duplication. The Annual Report has a wider circulation than TRANSEC's document, and making this change could represent some increase in transparency for UK transport protective security activities.

36. We were also concerned about the length of time between the close of the latest reporting period, March 2005, and the report being received in the Library of the House of Commons, November 2005, almost eight months. While this is an improvement on the publication of the report for April 2003 to March 2004 which, according to the Department's website, was published on 5 April 2005, it remains too long.[43] The latest annual report extends to sixteen pages, and a report of this length should not take the best part of a year to produce.

37. Annual reports as spartan as those of TRANSEC represent a missed opportunity to refresh outreach with the travelling public about the crucial importance of security on the UK transport network. TRANSEC needs urgently to improve the presentation and content of these. If future reports are to be useful and credible, a rigorous effort must be made to distinguish between material which is genuinely sensitive from that which can be disclosed. The reports should contain performance measures, and consideration should be given to including security within the Department's Public Service Agreement. Reports should be made within a reasonable time of the end of the reporting period.

Public confidence in TRANSEC

38. The public must have confidence in those who regulate the security of our transport networks. TRANSEC aims 'to retain public confidence in transport security'.[44] Without this confidence, the full co-operation of the public is unlikely to be forthcoming when security measures on UK transport networks are implemented. While it is self-evidently in every traveller's interest to exercise vigilance and to report suspicious circumstances to the authorities, many security measures slow travellers' journeys and, for that reason, are in themselves unwelcome. In addition, the implementation of new security measures is an additional responsibility for transport operators.

39. High awareness amongst the travelling public is one of the greatest potential assets in the common defence against terrorist outrages on the UK transport network. In the course of our forthcoming inquiry we shall examine what the Government, TRANSEC and industry are doing to enlist the support of the public systematically in the co-operative effort to counter the present terrorist danger; and what training is offered to transport staff to ensure that those in the 'front line' of transport networks are able to cope with any future terrorist incidents.

Secretary of State for Transport's announcement on 2 November 2005

40. In the course of his evidence to us on 2 November, the Secretary of State announced that new security equipment was to be tested on the railway and underground networks in London next year. We warmly welcome this evidence of activity on the part of the authorities to explore ways of making travel safer.[45] We expect the Department for Transport to publish the results of the trials, and to explain the basis of future decisions on any permanent deployment of such equipment on the networks.

Media

41. Sensationalist media reporting of terrorism stimulates fear without adding value to the debate on ways to prevent outrages. Comprehensive, balanced and accurate media reporting about terrorist organisations, threats to transport networks, and the Government's response, is an important aspect of the effort to combat what is a largely hidden threat. Such reporting can expose the irresponsibility and inhumanity of terrorism.[46]

42. We were surprised to see on TRANSEC's part of the Department's website the statement that 'we do not think it is helpful for the media to highlight alleged weaknesses that may tempt those with questionable motives to seek to exploit them.' While encouragement must not be given to those seeking to disrupt our transport systems, we think it may be simplistic to urge the media to desist from reporting flaws in protective security when these are uncovered. We expect the relevant authorities to deal swiftly and effectively with security weaknesses, and with those who would exploit them. We shall be interested to pursue the effect of media reporting of transport security incidents in our inquiry.

3 Q 26. 'Britain remains a target of the highest possible priority to al-Qaeda and its affiliates.' Sir Ian Blair, Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Dimbleby Lecture 2005, 16 November 2005, http://www.met.police.uk/ Back

4 Ev 3 Back

5 Q 26 Back

6 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission On Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, New York, 2004, xvii Back

7 Q 32 Back

8 Q 32 Back

9 Q21 Back

10 Ev 4 Back

11 Q 21 Back

12 Ev 29 Back

13 Ev 29 Back

14 Ev 29 Back