3 Conclusion
43. We
hope that no city will experience events similar to those which
took place in London on 7 July 2005. These events demonstrated
the paralysing disruption terrorist attacks can cause to the transport
infrastructure of a major city. The threat of further attacks
remains very high. The means at the disposal of the UK Government
to counter terrorist threats to the travelling public must be
deployed effectively and efficiently.
44. Public vigilance
is one of the greatest assets in countering the dangers of terrorism
on the transport network. The Department for Transport's policy
of protective security needs to be vigorously proactive in order
to engage each member of the travelling public as a partner in
helping, where possible, to prevent future terrorist attacks on
the transport network. Imaginative policies and inspiring leadership
are called for, and TRANSEC is positioned to help provide this.
45. The Secretary
of State for Transport and TRANSEC were broadly reassuring when
we questioned them on 2 November. The trials of new screening
equipment in railway and London Underground stations announced
then, and planned for implementation early next year, are welcome.
We hope that these are the first of many protective security innovations
designed to place those who would kill without compunction firmly
on the defensive.
46. We have no
doubt that the staff of TRANSEC, and the Department generally,
are dedicated to reducing the threat of terrorism faced by the
travelling public. But the concerns set out in this preliminary
report remain. We intend to examine these, and the security of
UK transport generally, further in our forthcoming inquiry before
coming to final conclusions.
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