APPENDIX 8
Memorandum submitted by Virgin Atlantic
Virgin Atlantic is aware that the Transport
Select Committee is currently conducting a short inquiry into
transport security and will be taking oral evidence from the Secretary
of State for Transport on Wednesday 2 November. Unfortunately,
it has not been possible for us to compile a detailed memorandum
in the time available. Nevertheless, transport security remains
a very important issue to Virgin Atlantic and I thought it would
be useful to send you a short letter outlining key areas of concern.
Virgin Atlantic takes its security responsibilities
very seriously and has worked closely with the Department for
Transport, Home Office and other agencies at the UK, EU and international
levels as new security measures are developed and implemented.
However, we have a number of concerns going forward:
— Lack of co-ordination across government
departments: We remain concerned about the lack of co-ordination
across government on security issues and would urge government,
as a minimum, to expand the role of the Department for Transport's
Transport Security Division (TRANSEC) to include responsibility
for all initiatives relating to aviation security.
— Lack of cross-border co-ordination:
Virgin Atlantic, along with other airlines, remains concerned
at the role of the Safety Regulation Group of the UK Civil Aviation
Authority in relation to the European Air Safety Authority (EASA).
There is already considerable duplication between the powers and
responsibilities of SAG and EASA. Terrorism does not respect borders—there
is an urgent need for national authorities to co-ordinate with
international organisations to work effectively together to establish
global standards of airline security.
— Burden of costs: It should be borne
in mind that terrorist action is aimed at governments and not
the airline industry. Virgin Atlantic, in common with other airlines,
reacted swiftly and effectively to the need for increased vigilance
and security following the tragic effects of September 11th However,
the burden of increased security measures has been considerable,
with European airlines and airports paying out
3 billion for additional anti-terrorist security
measures imposed by EU governments. This can be contrasted with
the US, where industry has received an estimated US$32 billion
in financial aid.
— Lack of review of security requirements:
Layer upon layer of security measures are imposed on airlines
but no review seems to take place to go back and verify the validity
of previous measures when new ones are introduced. A good example
of this was the continuing ban on metal cutlery despite the subsequent
requirement to keep cockpit doors locked throughout a flight.
Amendments to the rules on cutlery were only introduced after
sustained lobbying from the airline industry. Virgin Atlantic
believes that the Government should undertake a regular review
of the validity of security regulations and measures.
— Scrambling of military aircraft in
the event of a threat against civil aircraft: Virgin Atlantic
is very concerned about the use of military aircraft to intercept
civilian aircraft when a "bomb threat" is made against
a particular flight. In these cases, where there is no threat
of terrorists being on-board an aircraft, the scrambling of military
aircraft actually worsens the safety environment. Virgin Atlantic
strongly believes that the UK military's response to such events
should be an appropriate and proportionate response to the perceived
threat—we do not believe that this is the case at present.
One recent example of the lack of harmonised
working within the UK Government is in relation to the notification
of changes to UK threat levels. The Department for Transport has
responsibility for advising airlines of changes to the "aviation"
threat level, but at present there is nothing officially in place
(with the Security Service or JTAC) for changes in the UK country
threat level to be notified to airlines as they occur. This is
a major cause for concern as often the data is "leaked"
to the press, and airlines then have to try and verify it with
the relevant government departments. The UK "country"
threat classification is of importance to Virgin Atlantic as we
have crew hotels in the UK, transport staff between UK airports,
and are also responsible for managing threats against non-airport
sited Virgin Atlantic assets. Aviation Security is much wider
than just the airport/airside assets. In many respects the target-hardening
of airside assets may force terrorists to attack soft targets
such as check-in queues, airport forecourts and other areas where
the public gather. As an airline is responsible for assessing
threats made against us (including those targeting our non-airport
based assets), it is vital that we have timely notifications of
changes to both the "country" and "aviation"
threat levels. In our view, the current system in place is unacceptable.
In the event of your committee deciding to conduct
a wider inquiry into this issue, Virgin Atlantic would be more
than willing to submit more detailed evidence. In the meantime,
please do not hesitate to contact me if you require any further
information on any of the points I raise above.
28 October 2005
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