Select Committee on Transport Fourth Report


2  TARGETS, POLICIES, DELIVERY

3. The Department's aim is 'transport that works for everyone'. It seeks to achieve this aim by means of a strategy made up of 'sustained investment', 'improvements in transport management', and 'planning ahead'. The strategy is in turn fulfilled by means of a number of objectives, targets and policies. Some of these are delivered in collaboration with partners, such as other Government Departments and Agencies, and local authorities.[2] There is evidence however that, in some cases, the Department's targets, policies, and delivery are flawed.

Congestion

4. Following the publication of the 10 Year Plan for Transport, the Department spent several years attempting to identify a more meaningful indicator of congestion than that used in setting the 2010 congestion target.[3] In addition, the Department acknowledged three years ago that it would be difficult to meet the 10 Year Plan target for congestion which was to reduce congestion levels below those in 2000 by 2010.[4] That congestion target was finally replaced in July 2005. There are two new congestion indicators: one for the strategic road network; and one for urban roads, although specific targets for the latter are not due to be set until July 2006.[5]

Strategic road indicators

5. The Department's indicator for the strategic road target has been developed after a long delay. We look forward to the first report of progress against the target in the Annual Report for 2006. The baseline for the target is August 2004 - July 2005. Regrettably however baseline data was not published with the indicator.[6]

6. The Department also told us that "It is likely that some routes will be excluded from the target because data for these routes will not be of good enough quality."[7] The Department gave the A30 from Exeter to Bodmin and some sections of the M42 and M40 near to Silverstone and Castle Donnington as examples.[8]

7. Baseline data should always be published with targets. In the absence of data, targets cannot be measured and are consequently useless. Baseline data for the strategic roads indicator were set late and after the publication of targets. This is evidence of poor Departmental administration. Data from some strategic routes has been excluded from the new congestion target because of quality problems. The Department needs to ensure this data is made available as soon as possible, and to apply the congestion target to the excluded routes quickly.

Urban road indicators

8. Targets for urban roads have not been set and consequently progress will not be reported until 2006-07. The number of urban road targets has been restricted to a limited number of routes in the ten largest urban areas.

9. Local authorities have a vital role to play in tackling congestion in towns and cities. New Local Transport Plans (LTPs) have recently been submitted and are unlikely to be revised until 2011. The Secretary of State announced on 7 February that correct data would not be available in time to set congestion targets in the Local Transport Plans in March 2006. LTPs are now expected to include 'congestion tackling strategies', quantifiable targets being set in July when the Public Service Agreement is established.[9]

10. The next series of Local Transport Plans have been submitted. The targets for congestion on urban roads will not however be set in time for the new LTPs. Given that it is the intention that the LTPs will contain the urban road targets, this represents particularly poor internal planning by the Department. In the meantime we expect the Department to give local authorities clear and consistent guidance on congestion strategies. This must be coordinated properly with the targets when these are set finally in July 2006. The Department should include urban congestion performance information in all subsequent Annual Reports.

Is congestion policy 'joined up'?

11. We are pleased that at long last the Department has adopted indicators for congestion on strategic and local roads, but we are concerned that the measure for strategic roads is restricted to 'vehicle delay' and fails to take account of 'person delay'. This is disappointing because other Departmental policies have demonstrated a focus on the number of people on the network and not simply the number of vehicles.

12. For example, the Department has announced plans to introduce 'high occupancy vehicle lanes' on the strategic road network; and the Highways Agency has won an award for a scheme on strategic roads in Hampshire which is designed to encourage people to share vehicles.[10] By ignoring the 'person delay' aspect of congestion measurement on the strategic road network, the Department may risk losing the impact of other significant policy initiatives , for example, car share lanes.

Can traffic officers help tackle congestion?

13. Highways Agency Traffic Officers are being introduced to the strategic road network to "patrol the network, assist motorists and work closely with the police, to help keep traffic moving and ensure that roads operate safely."[11] There is a staged roll-out, so full service benefits are not expected to accrue before 2008. The West Midlands is the only area to have reached full capacity and now has targets for attending and clearing incidents.

14. Traffic Officers in the West Midlands have been given targets for attending and clearing incidents. This is welcome. Targets for Traffic Officers in other areas must be published as soon as possible. We also expect the Department to explain how it will measure the overall impact of the new Traffic Officers on road congestion and safety.

What affect would the fuel duty escalator have had on congestion?

15. We raised the link between fuel prices and congestion. The Department provided data showing that traffic fell slightly during the steep prices rises in the late 1990s and then rose steadily again as fuel prices fell from 2000 when the fuel duty escalator was discontinued. It concluded that "traffic growth since 2000 would have been slower had the fuel duty escalator still been operating."[12]

16. The Government is not pursuing the fuel duty escalator as part of its strategy to constrain traffic growth. Yet it admits that traffic growth would have been slower over the last 6 years had the escalator still been operating. The Department should publish its estimate of the quantity of traffic which would have been removed from roads in England and Wales over the past 6 years had the Fuel Duty Escalator been applied.

Lorry Road User Charging

17. The Annual Report 2005 states that Lorry Road User Charging will come into effect in 2007-08.[13] Since then, the Secretary of State has announced that the project will not continue.[14] It remains in abeyance until national road user pricing, applicable to all vehicles, is developed.

18. But national road pricing is not expected for almost a decade. Lorry Road User Charging was expected to contribute to the congestion, air quality and greenhouse gas targets.[15] The Department is already struggling to achieve these two environmental targets, and the abandonment of this scheme may prevent them being met. Unfortunately the Department told us it had not attempted to quantify what reduction in pollution would result from a Lorry Road User Charging scheme with the capacity to differentiate charges according to emissions standards, the sort of scheme which Government was procuring.[16]

19. Lorry Road User Charging was intended to apply to all lorries on UK roads, including foreign registered vehicles. All lorry drivers that bought fuel in the UK were to receive a reduction in fuel duty payments as they would be contributing already towards the road costs. The delay therefore prolongs the inequity of the current arrangements in which British hauliers contribute to mitigating the wear and tear on UK roads but the increasing numbers of foreign vehicles on UK roads escape.[17]

20. The Department abandoned its intention to launch Lorry Road User Charging when it decided to consider a national road user pricing strategy. This has been an embarrassing muddle which might have been avoided with appropriate foresight. Any full road pricing scheme is perhaps 10 years away, but we expect the Department to give priority to ensure that a viable scheme is developed without undue delay. The Department must pursue a practical plan to ensure that foreign lorries make a financial contribution to UK road damage costs.

Road safety

Are safety targets challenging?

21. The Department is on course to meet its road safety targets.[18] Under SR2004 the road safety target has been expanded to provide increased focus on tackling the higher accident rate in disadvantaged communities. More challenging targets for the 88 areas eligible for Neighbourhood Renewal Funding (NRF) have been added.[19] While this is welcome, the overall target may not be sufficiently challenging. The Mayor of London has met the national target of 40 per cent reduction in road casualties five years early, and has announced a new target of 50 per cent by 2010.[20]

Cyclists and young pedestrians

22. Despite record low numbers of road casualties in 2004, cyclist fatalities increased by 18 percent and drink drive fatalities by 2 per cent. The number of 12-15 year old pedestrians and cyclists killed or seriously injured also rose, by 10 and 17 per cent respectively.[21] These are significant increases and the Department should be very concerned about them. We hope the new Road Safety Bill currently proceeding through Parliament will introduce measures to enable police and local authorities to reduce casualties. The Department told us that:

    The Government recognises the need for lower vehicle speeds in areas where children and other vulnerable road users are likely to be, and local authorities are recommended to consider 20 mph zones. Research has shown that the risk of an accident involving a child is reduced by around two-thirds wherever 20 mph zones are introduced.[22]

20 mph zones

23. We support the introduction of 20mph speed zones to protect children. Since taking evidence on the Annual Report 2005 we have held hearings into traffic policing and technology.[23] In our report we will address in detail some of the road safety challenges identified above.

24. The Department's road casualty reduction target is insufficiently challenging and needs to be strengthened. Where local safety targets are not being met, the Department must press local authorities to introduce 20 mph zones where appropriate and monitor the results carefully. There is an alarming upturn in 'drink drive' casualties. We expect to see an effective publicity campaign reaffirming the message that 'drink driving' kills. This should be supported by a specific enforcement effort by the police.

Rail

Low targets

25. The rail performance target, measured by the Public Performance Measure (PPM), combining figures for punctuality and reliability, appears from provisional figures to have been met already.[24] Given that we are only at the start of the period over which this target was designed to apply, it is clear that the target of 85 per cent was set far too low. The Department told us that it is in discussion with the industry to set a more challenging target.[25]

26. The Public Performance Measure is assessed against the published timetable. Timetable changes at South West Trains in December 2004 led to an immediate, significant improvement in its PPM measure.[26] The Department told us that a comprehensive timetable review was underway covering the Manchester suburban network, and that another review covering the East Coast Main Line was due in early 2006. These timetable revisions alone may lead to further increases in PPM performance. But what is actually required is improvement based on better performing services if passengers are to experience real improvements.

27. The punctuality and reliability of the UK rail network is not yet good enough for a major Western country. The Government must set a tough new target that provides a genuine challenge for the industry to improve its performance. Where apparent improvements in punctuality and reliability arise merely from slackening the timetable, targets must be toughened still further if real improvements are to be produced. Clear interim milestones should be set to help measure progress towards achieving targets.

Inconsistent policies between heavy rail and local transport

28. There is an inconsistency between strategies for rail and local transport. The PSA target for buses and light rail focuses on increasing passenger use but the rail PSA no longer contains a passenger use target. The Strategic Rail Authority had a duty to promote the growth of the railways but the Authority has now been dissolved. The Department for Transport has not adopted this particular duty along with the Authority's other responsibilities.

29. One explanation we were offered for this change is the role of the Secretary of State:

    One of the Strategic Rail Authority's formal objectives was to promote the use of the railway. Ministers considered whether, with the abolition of the SRA, the Railways Act 2005 should place a corresponding duty on the Secretary of State. They concluded, however, that while a duty of this sort was appropriate to the SRA with its exclusively rail-related functions, it would not be appropriate to the Secretary of State in view of his Departmental responsibility for all transport modes.[27]

A second reason given by the Department is that while there is a need to reduce a historic decline in bus use, this is not the case for rail:

    On many long distance and commuter routes…the issue is one of managing growth. These lines are often operating at or near capacity and the priorities are more likely to be infrastructure improvements and investment in new rolling stock. [28]

This is not invariably the case however as the Department also told us that "On some routes, and particularly those in rural areas, the need is still to increase passenger numbers."[29]

30. We see no inconsistency between the Secretary of State's wider responsibilities and encouraging passenger 'take-up' on the railways, and we do not therefore accept the Department's rationale for abandoning a heavy rail growth target. We hope that the Government's position does not mask plans to reduce sensible spending on the railway. While a reduction in subsidy payments to train operators would be welcome; and making the operations of Network Rail more efficient would save money; controlling financial resources for the railway must not mean abandonment of the policy of encouraging rail use. The Department's approach also appears at odds with the aggressive approach to increasing passenger numbers being promoted by recent rail franchise winners.

31. We invite the Secretary of State to reconsider this issue. He should look in particular at identifying a growth target for rail which encourages patronage in the regions where passenger numbers are often low and road congestion is severe.

Staff in the Department's new Rail Group

32. Following the Railways Act 2005 most of the responsibilities of the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) were transferred to the Department for Transport between April and August 2005. The Department told us that it had around 10 per cent of posts in its new rail group unfilled. In particular, it is short of rail engineers.[30] We are concerned that 10 per cent of rail posts in the Department remain unfilled. We expect the Department to tell us what steps it is taking to make up this shortfall.

Local transport

33. Bus and light rail patronage continues to decline in all regions outside London. The PSA target has been strengthened to include a requirement for growth in all regions to address this. The Department's Autumn Performance Report 2005 however notes that:

This amounts to a protracted delay for high quality bus services which will attract new passengers.

34. In addition, the prediction itself may be merely wishful thinking. Local authorities have been working to improve bus services as part of their Local Transport Plans since 2000. But success has proved largely elusive. The Department has failed to present evidence to convince us that the next five years will bring a step-change in delivery on bus patronage growth across all regions. The lack of progress in increasing bus patronage outside London reflects, in part, deterioration in working relationships between bus operators and local authorities.

Quality Bus Partnerships and bus policy

35. There seems to be a slowly dawning realism in Government about the failure of Quality Bus Partnerships. Mr Darling told us that "We are looking at what further improvements we can make in relation to the Quality Bus Partnerships regime, which patently is not working at the moment and does need to be looked at."[32]

36. But the Secretary of State needs to be bolder than this. It would be wrong to continue with a scheme that has failed to provide local authorities with the kind of powers needed to improve bus services. Not a single Quality Contract has been established.[33] The Government needs to show a fresh dynamism in devising policies to stimulate bus usage. While it may not be the entire answer, we believe that the unique franchising and subsidy system operated in London may be a key to increasing bus use outside the capital.

37. Lessons from the success of London's bus strategy must be identified and, where appropriate, applied throughout England and Wales. The Secretary of State has now acknowledged that the bus Quality Contract scheme has failed. It must be discontinued. We recommend that the Department grants the additional powers to local authorities to enable them to have more effective control over local public transport, and buses in particular.

London Underground

38. Performance against the London Underground PSA target has deteriorated since the publication of the Annual Report 2005. The terrorist attacks of 7th and 21st July contributed to this.[34]

The Public Private Partnership

39. Before these attacks however, Transport for London had issued a public warning about the inadequate performance of the Public Private Partnership (PPP) at the close of its second year on 31 March 2005 stating that it "is not good enough and is less than what was promised."[35] It also highlighted an increase in overruns of engineering work, which it attributed to poor project planning and execution. A clear example was the prolonged disruption on the Northern Line in October 2005 caused by concerns over in-train signalling and other safety issues.

40. We challenged the Secretary of State on these points. Whilst pointing out, rightly, that contract decisions are for Transport for London to make, Mr Darling considered that the PPP contracts should be left unchanged as he believes overall improvements are being made.[36] We think that this is an over-optimistic judgement.

41. The Public Private Partnership contracts do not appear to be delivering the promised improvements to the London Underground. The travelling public deserves much better. We are aware that the Underground is now the direct responsibility of Transport for London. But, despite the small print, the Department cannot escape ultimate responsibility for so significant a part of London's transport infrastructure. It is a truism that London could not function on a daily basis without the Underground; but we have also pointed to its importance to the success of the London Olympics in a separate report.[37]

42. The Government must continue to take a very close interest in the performance of the London Underground. In order to force up standards of passenger satisfaction on the Underground: regular and stringent reviews of the PPP contracts should be undertaken by Transport for London; changes which may improve performance should be identified clearly; and Transport for London should be able to count on the Government's strong and continuing support to build momentum for major improvements. Having set up the PPP contracts, the Department cannot wash its hands of the London Underground.

Air quality

Targets for local air pollutants

43. The Department for Transport target for air quality which is held jointly with the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), is to reduce the concentrations of seven pollutants, measured at 100 monitoring sites around the country. The Departments are failing to meet the required target for two pollutants, nitrogen dioxide (NO2) and particulate matter (PM10). Transport is the primary source of pollution in approximately 95 per cent of places where these two targets are being, or are likely to be, exceeded.[38]

44. According to the Department, "Even with current policies and technologies, it is likely that there will still be some sites in urban areas and beside busy roads where the NO2 and PM10 objectives will not be met by the relevant dates."[39] While local authorities have no obligation to meet the air quality objectives, the Department expects them to use their traffic management powers and to work closely with the Highways Agency to that end.[40] The Department's inability to enforce compliance by local authorities may be delaying the achievement of some air quality targets. We are alarmed by the Department's complacency towards the very serious health risk posed by transport generated pollutants.

45. A review of air quality has been underway for over a year. Our predecessor Committee noted the ongoing interdepartmental review in the Departmental Annual Report 2004.[41] We are concerned that valuable time is being lost and strategies will not be implemented in time to ensure the target is met.

46. The Department is failing to display dynamic leadership in tackling air quality and is taking too long to address underperformance in reducing pollutants. We recommend that it sets a firm deadline in the near future for producing and implementing a strategy which deals effectively with air pollutants from the transport sector. These local pollutants have a negative impact on public health. We expect the Department to use all available tools to ensure the best possible standard of air quality.

Greenhouse gases

47. The new greenhouse gas target, which is shared with the Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and the Department of Trade and Industry, has two elements: an overall reduction of greenhouse gases, in line with our Kyoto commitment; and a 20 per cent reduction in carbon dioxide below 1990 levels by 2010. Whilst the Departments are on course to meet the Kyoto target, the Autumn Performance Report 2005 indicates that the UK is falling short of the carbon dioxide domestic target.[42]

48. There is little evidence that the Department for Transport has a realistic strategy to ensure it plays its part in reducing carbon emissions. As with air quality, a review of strategy is underway and so the same dangers of delay, outlined above, apply. The Annual Report 2005 stated that the revised Climate Change Programme was due to be published in late 2005.[43] By the time the Autumn Performance Report 2005 was published this had slipped to 2006.[44]

49. The report 'Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change' published by DEFRA identified that 2005 was the second warmest year on record and the Arctic sea ice shrank to its lowest extent last summer.[45] The report identified the key impacts of climate change on different regions. The Department for Transport must demonstrate more dynamism in seeking to contribute to the UK meeting its domestic target for reducing carbon dioxide emissions.

Changing travel behaviour

50. Recent research commissioned by the Department for Transport concluded that changes to travel behaviour will be more effective than technological change in reducing greenhouse gas emissions from the transport sector, though both approaches will be necessary.[46] The Department must not therefore place too much reliance on long-term vehicle technology solutions.

51. We were disappointed that the Secretary of State's oral evidence failed to catch fire with the sense of conviction and urgency we had expected him to demonstrate on this issue. Measures are available to influence transport behavioural changes in the short term, for example those set out in the Department's own report Smarter Choices - Changing the way we travel, need to be given a much higher profile.[47] We see no reason to delay the rapid and widespread introduction of these inexpensive, yet highly effective, measures.

52. We are also concerned by responses which indicated that the Department may be unwilling to use measures such as enforcement of existing speed limits to reduce emissions around the strategic road network.[48] The Department told us that savings in the region of half a million tonnes of carbon per annum could be achieved if no vehicles exceeded the existing speed limit. In a strategy with several strands, it is important that the Department publicises with imagination and gusto the important message that excessive speed is helping to destroy the planet if a real affect is to be felt. [49]

53. Transport is a major contributor to the problem of climate change. The Department for Transport must take a lead in mitigating its destructive effect. We recommend that the Departmental Annual Report for 2006 sets out clearly the Department's commitments, the action plan to achieve reductions in destructive emissions, and appropriate milestones. The Department will receive the support of this committee in whatever reasonable and practical measures it proposes. It must not be deterred from implementing strategies that may prove unpopular in the short-term if these are likely to prove the most effective solutions.

Joint working

54. Both the air quality and greenhouse gas emissions targets are joint Departmental targets with the Department for the Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs, and the latter also with the Department of Trade and Industry. DEFRA appears to 'own' the data systems underlying both these targets, and we are concerned that the Department for Transport is as fully involved as possible in delivering the targets.[50]

55. A recent National Audit Office report on joint targets found that such targets are most successful where Departments had formal, joint planning arrangements; joint rather than individual delivery plans, including interim performance indicators or milestones; and joint monitoring and reporting arrangements.[51] A pooled budget was also identified as helpful.

56. We would like the Department for Transport to explain exactly what inter-departmental arrangements it has with the Department for the Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) for delivering joint targets for greenhouse gas emissions; and whether these follow recent guidelines set by the National Audit Office.

Diversity

Targets

57. Government departments have an obligation to work towards the Cabinet Office targets for staff diversity in the Senior Civil Service. The Department exceeded its target for 2004/05 to employ ethnic minority staff, 3.6 per cent against a target of 3.2 per cent.[52]

58. It failed however to meet 2004/05 targets for women and people with disabilities by some considerable margin. It achieved only 26.5 per cent for women against a target of 35 per cent; and 1.2 per cent for people with disabilities against a target of 3 per cent.[53] More challenging targets have been set for 2005/06 but it seems highly unlikely that the Department will meet these. The situation has been compounded by the fact that all the senior staff transferred from the Strategic Rail Authority to the Department are male.[54]

59. The Department needs to adopt imaginative and effective strategies for increasing representation by women and staff with disabilities in the Senior Civil Service. It has failed to meet targets in these areas for 2004/05. Targets for 2005/06 have been toughened. We wish to know what specific measures the Department will adopt to meet these. Setting more difficult targets is laudable. But there needs to be a sound, underpinning delivery strategy. If there is not, the exercise will be cosmetic and the Department will fail again.

60. The Department is to be congratulated for meeting the target for recruiting staff from ethnic minorities. We invite it to set the pace in Whitehall by adopting a further, and yet more challenging, target for improving future ethnic minority representation.


2   Department for Transport, Annual Report 2005, Cm 6527, pp 20-25 Back

3   'average time lost in seconds per vehicle kilometre', Department for Transport, Delivering Better Transport Programme Report, December 2002, page 100, ft 2 Back

4   Ibid, page 119 Back

5   The measure for strategic roads is 'By 2007-08, make journeys more reliable on the strategic road network (PSA1); the measure for urban roads is 'By 2010-11, the ten largest urban areas will meet the congestion targets set in their Local Transport Plan relating to movement on main roads into city centres (PSA4)', Department for Transport, Autumn Performance Report 2005, Cm 6708, page 9 Back

6   The data was published eventually by the Department for Transport on 14 February 2006, "Journey Time Reliability on Motorway and Trunk Roads: Measure for PSA Target Published". Back

7   Ev 46 Back

8   Ev 46 Back

9   Rt Hon Alistair Darling MP, Written Parliamentary Statement, 7 February 2006 Back

10   'Innovative Highways Agency green travel scheme eases M27 congestion and wins award' , Highways Agency Press Notice, 8 March 2006 Back

11   Department for Transport, Annual Report 2005 page 58, paragraph 3.21 Back

12   Ev 47 Back

13   Department for Transport, Annual Report 2005, page 65, paragraph 3.43 Back

14   HC Deb, 5 July 2005, col 173 Back

15   Ev 46 Back

16   Ev 64 Back

17   HM Treasury, HM Customs and Excise, Department for Transport, Modernising the Taxation of the Haulage Industry: lorry road user-charge, Progress Report 3 (March 2004) Back

18   Autumn Performance Report 2005, page 19 Back

19   NRF is a strategy sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister designed to tackle the root causes of declining neighbourhoods. See, www.neighbourhood.gov.uk  Back

20   Mayor of London, Press Notice 14 February 2006 Back

21   Road Casualties Great Britain 2004: Annual Report, Table 2, page 49, Table 6c, page 59, Table 2a, page 27. In 30 mph zones, 50 per cent of cars exceeded the limit; 21 percent of cars exceeded 35 mph; 46 percent of 2-axle heavy goods vehicles exceeded 30 mph. Department for Transport, Vehicle Speeds in Great Britain 2005. Published 6 April 2006 Back

22   Ev 52 Back

23   Hearings held on 8 and 15 March 2006. 'Traffic Policing and Technology: getting the balance right'. Transport Select Committee Press Notice, 25 January 2006 Back

24   Department for Transport, Autumn Performance Report, Chapter 3 Back

25   Q 81 Back

26   From a PPM of 72 in October - December 2004-05 to 85.8 in January - March of 2004-05, National Rail Trends Yearbook, Office of Rail Regulation Back

27   Ev 1 Back

28   Ev 64 Back

29   Ev 64 Back

30   Q118 Back

31   Department for Transport, Autumn Performance Report 2005, page 15 Back

32   Q22 Back

33   Ev 1  Back

34   Department for Transport, Autumn Performance Report 2005, page 31 Back

35   Transport for London 'London Underground and the PPP: the second year 2004/2005, page 3 Back

36   Qq 38 - 40 Back

37   Transport Select Committee, Third Report of Session 2005-06, 'Going for Gold': Transport for London's 2012 Olympic Games (HC 588-l), page 40. Report published on 16 March 2006 Back

38   Ev 21, question 54 Back

39   Department for Transport, Autumn Performance Report 2005, page 22 Back

40   Ev 56 Back

41   Transport Select Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2004-05, The Departmental Annual Report 2004 (HC 409), paragraph 32 Back

42   Department for Transport, Autumn Performance Report 2005, Chapter 7 states that the UK is forecast to cut carbon dioxide emissions by 14 per cent by 2010, which falls short of the joint target between DTI, DEFRA and DFT to cut CO2 by 20 per cent. New inquiries into carbon emissions and bio-energy and climate change respectively were announced by the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee 'Reducing Carbon Emissions from Transport' on 19 January 2006; and the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee on 15 December 2005  Back

43   Department for Transport, Annual Report 2005, page 167, paragraph 9.19 Back

44   Department for Transport, Autumn Performance Report 2005, page 25 Back

45   Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, "Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change", Press Notice,30 January 2006 Back

46   As part of the 'Horizons Programme' Robin Hickman and Professor David Banister, University College London, have conducted Department for Transport-sponsored research into 'Visioning and Backcasting for UK Transport Policy". This study considers the potential for a 60% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions in the transport sector in the UK. Preliminary results suggest that the 60% reduction could not be met through technological change alone. Back

47   Qq 88-89 Back

48   Q48 - Q53 Back

49   Ev 55 Back

50   Department for Transport, Autumn Performance Report 2005, page 25 Back

51   National Audit Office, Session 2005-2006, Joint Targets (HC 453). Report published 14 October 2005  Back

52   Department for Transport, Annual Report 2005, page 46 Back

53   Ibid Back

54   Q130 Back


 
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