| Targets, policies, delivery
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| 1. | Baseline data should always be published with targets. In the absence of data, targets cannot be measured and are consequently useless. Baseline data for the strategic roads indicator were set late and after the publication of targets. This is evidence of poor Departmental administration. Data from some strategic routes has been excluded from the new congestion target because of quality problems. The Department needs to ensure this data is made available as soon as possible, and to apply the congestion target to the excluded routes quickly. (Paragraph 7)
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| 2. | The next series of Local Transport Plans have been submitted. The targets for congestion on urban roads will not however be set in time for the new LTPs. Given that it is the intention that the LTPs will contain the urban road targets, this represents particularly poor internal planning by the Department. In the meantime we expect the Department to give local authorities clear and consistent guidance on congestion strategies. This must be coordinated properly with the targets when these are set finally in July 2006. The Department should include urban congestion performance information in all subsequent Annual Reports. (Paragraph 10)
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| 3. | By ignoring the 'person delay' aspect of congestion measurement on the strategic road network, the Department may risk losing the impact of other significant policy initiatives , for example, car share lanes. (Paragraph 12)
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| 4. | Traffic Officers in the West Midlands have been given targets for attending and clearing incidents. This is welcome. Targets for Traffic Officers in other areas must be published as soon as possible. We also expect the Department to explain how it will measure the overall impact of the new Traffic Officers on road congestion and safety. (Paragraph 14)
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| 5. | The Government is not pursuing the fuel duty escalator as part of its strategy to constrain traffic growth. Yet it admits that traffic growth would have been slower over the last 6 years had the escalator still been operating. The Department should publish its estimate of the quantity of traffic which would have been removed from roads in England and Wales over the past 6 years had the Fuel Duty Escalator been applied. (Paragraph 16)
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| 6. | The Department abandoned its intention to launch Lorry Road User Charging when it decided to consider a national road user pricing strategy. This has been an embarrassing muddle which might have been avoided with appropriate foresight. Any full road pricing scheme is perhaps 10 years away, but we expect the Department to give priority to ensure that a viable scheme is developed without undue delay. The Department must pursue a practical plan to ensure that foreign lorries make a financial contribution to UK road damage costs. (Paragraph 20)
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| 7. | The Department's road casualty reduction target is insufficiently challenging and needs to be strengthened. Where local safety targets are not being met, the Department must press local authorities to introduce 20 mph zones where appropriate and monitor the results carefully. There is an alarming upturn in 'drink drive' casualties. We expect to see an effective publicity campaign reaffirming the message that 'drink driving' kills. This should be supported by a specific enforcement effort by the police. (Paragraph 24)
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| 8. | The punctuality and reliability of the UK rail network is not yet good enough for a major Western country. The Government must set a tough new target that provides a genuine challenge for the industry to improve its performance. Where apparent improvements in punctuality and reliability arise merely from slackening the timetable, targets must be toughened still further if real improvements are to be produced. Clear interim milestones should be set to help measure progress towards achieving targets. (Paragraph 27)
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| 9. | We see no inconsistency between the Secretary of State's wider responsibilities and encouraging passenger 'take-up' on the railways, and we do not therefore accept the Department's rationale for abandoning a heavy rail growth target. We hope that the Government's position does not mask plans to reduce sensible spending on the railway. While a reduction in subsidy payments to train operators would be welcome; and making the operations of Network Rail more efficient would save money; controlling financial resources for the railway must not mean abandonment of the policy of encouraging rail use. The Department's approach also appears at odds with the aggressive approach to increasing passenger numbers being promoted by recent rail franchise winners. (Paragraph 30)
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| 10. | We invite the Secretary of State to reconsider this issue. He should look in particular at identifying a growth target for rail which encourages patronage in the regions where passenger numbers are often low and road congestion is severe. (Paragraph 31)
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| 11. | We are concerned that 10 per cent of rail posts in the Department remain unfilled. We expect the Department to tell us what steps it is taking to make up this shortfall. (Paragraph 32)
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| 12. | Lessons from the success of London's bus strategy must be identified and, where appropriate, applied throughout England and Wales. The Secretary of State has now acknowledged that the bus Quality Contract scheme has failed. It must be discontinued. We recommend that the Department grants the additional powers to local authorities to enable them to have more effective control over local public transport, and buses in particular. (Paragraph 37)
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| 13. | The Public Private Partnership contracts do not appear to be delivering the promised improvements to the London Underground. The travelling public deserves much better. We are aware that the Underground is now the direct responsibility of Transport for London. But, despite the small print, the Department cannot escape ultimate responsibility for so significant a part of London's transport infrastructure. It is a truism that London could not function on a daily basis without the Underground; but we have also pointed to its importance to the success of the London Olympics in a separate report. (Paragraph 41)
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| 14. | The Government must continue to take a very close interest in the performance of the London Underground. In order to force up standards of passenger satisfaction on the Underground: regular and stringent reviews of the PPP contracts should be undertaken by Transport for London; changes which may improve performance should be identified clearly; and Transport for London should be able to count on the Government's strong and continuing support to build momentum for major improvements. Having set up the PPP contracts, the Department cannot wash its hands of the London Underground. (Paragraph 42)
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| 15. | The Department's inability to enforce compliance by local authorities may be delaying the achievement of some air quality targets. We are alarmed by the Department's complacency towards the very serious health risk posed by transport generated pollutants. (Paragraph 44)
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| 16. | The Department is failing to display dynamic leadership in tackling air quality and is taking too long to address underperformance in reducing pollutants. We recommend that it sets a firm deadline in the near future for producing and implementing a strategy which deals effectively with air pollutants from the transport sector. These local pollutants have a negative impact on public health. We expect the Department to use all available tools to ensure the best possible standard of air quality. (Paragraph 46)
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| 17. | We were disappointed that the Secretary of State's oral evidence failed to catch fire with the sense of conviction and urgency we had expected him to demonstrate on this issue. Measures are available to influence transport behavioural changes in the short term, for example those set out in the Department's own report Smarter Choices - Changing the way we travel, need to be given a much higher profile. (Paragraph 51)
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| 18. | We see no reason to delay the rapid and widespread introduction of these inexpensive, yet highly effective, measures. (Paragraph 51)
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| 19. | Transport is a major contributor to the problem of climate change. The Department for Transport must take a lead in mitigating its destructive effect. We recommend that the Departmental Annual Report for 2006 sets out clearly the Department's commitments, the action plan to achieve reductions in destructive emissions, and appropriate milestones. The Department will receive the support of this committee in whatever reasonable and practical measures it proposes. It must not be deterred from implementing strategies that may prove unpopular in the short-term if these are likely to prove the most effective solutions. (Paragraph 53)
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| 20. | We would like the Department for Transport to explain exactly what inter-departmental arrangements it has with the Department for the Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) for delivering joint targets for greenhouse gas emissions; and whether these follow recent guidelines set by the National Audit Office. (Paragraph 56)
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| 21. | The Department needs to adopt imaginative and effective strategies for increasing representation by women and staff with disabilities in the Senior Civil Service. It has failed to meet targets in these areas for 2004/05. Targets for 2005/06 have been toughened. We wish to know what specific measures the Department will adopt to meet these. Setting more difficult targets is laudable. But there needs to be a sound, underpinning delivery strategy. If there is not, the exercise will be cosmetic and the Department will fail again. (Paragraph 59)
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| 22. | The Department is to be congratulated for meeting the target for recruiting staff from ethnic minorities. We invite it to set the pace in Whitehall by adopting a further, and yet more challenging, target for improving future ethnic minority representation. (Paragraph 60)
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| Evidence based policy |
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| 23. | We are alarmed and perplexed at the Government's proposal to reduce the penalties for breaking speed limits in urban areas. This flies in the face of evidence that this will cause casualties to increase. We recommend that the Government reverses its position. (Paragraph 63)
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| 24. | There was a 50 to 1 response on the part of the public to extending the M6 Toll road north of Birmingham to Manchester but further feasibility studies have been ordered by the Department. The Department should explain the point of consulting the public when it simply ignores the result. (Paragraph 64)
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| 25. | The Government rejected the Civil Aviation Report's advice on financial protection for air passengers. This was a well researched proposal, as the Government itself admitted, which would have provided universal protection for UK passengers from air carrier insolvency at a modest price. (Paragraph 65)
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| 26. | We expect the Department to base policy on sound evidence and not to develop proposals that conflict with known evidence. Where the Department sets aside expensive consultation and research, public money may be wasted. Where this happens it is of particular importance that a full and convincing explanation should be provided. (Paragraph 66)
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| 27. | We expect to see Sir Rod Eddington's study of transport and economic development based on sound evidence and thorough analysis. We shall watch with interest to see how his findings inform a post-2015 transport strategy which dovetails with the Department's short and medium term transport policies, targets, and spending commitments. (Paragraph 67)
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| Finance, efficiency |
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| 28. | It is absurd that in the twenty-first century the financial operations of a central UK Government department cannot be described as completely effective. The Department must publish a firm timetable for improving its financial management; it should tell us when the appropriate systems will be in place to ensure sound financial governance throughout the Department; and should provide us with an update of progress made since the 2005 Review. (Paragraph 69)
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| 29. | The Department has agreed a project plan aimed at enabling its 2005-06 Resource Accounts to be laid in Parliament before the Parliamentary Summer Recess. We invite it to inform us without delay of any significant variation to that timetable. (Paragraph 71)
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| 30. | We recommend that the Department seeks independent validation of its efficiency savings and provides clear details of how and when validation will take place. We recommend that the Department publishes the result of future validations in its Annual Reports and Autumn Performance Reports. (Paragraph 76)
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| 31. | The Department is relying upon local authorities to make £122 million worth of efficiency savings. These savings will contribute to the Department's overall saving. But it has no powers to guarantee that the local authority savings will be made. This is quixotic. The Department should identify another, guaranteed, £122 million savings over which it does have full control. We would like the Department to say what proposals it has to solve this administrative anomaly. (Paragraph 78)
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| 32. | We doubt that the validation provided by the Audit Commission of efficiency savings by local authority transport departments and Transport for London is sufficiently rigorous. We recommend that the Department assesses whether, in its view, the degree of validation achieved by the Audit Commission in these areas is providing a clear and verifiable picture of savings that are required. We wish to be informed of the result. Savings must represent genuine efficiencies, and must not lead to unwarranted cuts in local transport services. (Paragraph 80)
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| 33. | The Department has told us that it cannot "directly relate expenditure on consultants to efficiency gains". This is outrageous and needs to be rectified. The simplest financial transaction has at its core an understanding on the part of the purchaser about what he is purchasing and what benefit will accrue to him as a result of the purchase. It seems however that this is beyond the capacity of the Department's financial managers. (Paragraph 82)
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| 34. | The Department should provide us with a detailed explanation of the expenditure of the £10 million spent on consulting fees to implement the Department's Efficiency Programme. If this explanation proves unsatisfactory it is likely that we shall we shall hold a further hearing specifically on the Department's consultancy expenditure. It is absolutely essential that the Department should be able to identify clearly and concretely the benefits to the Efficiency Programme which have been purchased by the considerable expenditure made on external consultants. (Paragraph 83)
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| Departmental Agencies |
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| 35. | We were told about the commitment to a stronger group identity and improved financial governance for the executive agencies of the Department. This is all very well. But what we wish to know is what direct and demonstrable benefits a strong group identity has brought for those using the Agencies' services and the wider travelling public. The Department should explain what these are in the Government's reply to this report. (Paragraph 87)
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| 36. | We expect the Department to minimise staff concerns about changes to working practices in the Executive Agencies arising from the 'shared services' agenda and the introduction of 'self-serving'. We would like the measures taken to ameliorate staff concerns itemised in the Government's reply to this report. (Paragraph 89)
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| 37. | We have become increasingly concerned by regular cost increases on the Highways Agency's road construction projects. This is a poor record which we shall be considering in more detail in our forthcoming report into the Executive Agencies. (Paragraph 90)
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| 38. | During our evidence session with the Secretary of State he made a commitment to act with increasing rigour on costs, including road projects. We shall hold him to his word and expect him to act on this, including "pulling the plug" on road projects where necessary. We understand the complexity of many road schemes. But this is no excuse for the production of grossly inaccurate financial forecasts. The Department must work closely with the Highways Agency to ensure realistic early assessments of project costs. We want the Department to spell out what measures it is taking to correct this unacceptable failure on the part of the Highways Agency. (Paragraph 92)
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| 39. | We welcome the move to increase the electronic 'delivery' of the Department's services. But Government's overall success in managing computerisation projects is notorious; frequently promise is oversold, 'delivery' proves disappointing, and schedules for completion are often not worth the paper they are written on. The MOT computerisation project has had its timetable revised. It is likely that we shall wish to look in more detail at this aspect of the Department's activities in the future. (Paragraph 94)
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| 40. | The Permanent Secretary appeared not to be aware that almost £25 million had been paid to Atos Origin IT Services Ltd for the Department's 'Transport Direct' electronic information system designed to offer the public a wide range of travel information. We were very concerned that the Department seemed not to know the details of so large a payment We would like the Government's reply to this report to provide full details of the procurement of 'Transport Direct'. (Paragraph 96)
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| Presentation |
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| 41. | The Department is falling short of the high standards of coherence and transparency we expect to see in its Annual Report. The Report must be structured directly around Departmental strategic objectives. Progress against Public Service Agreement and other Departmental targets, and resources allocated to each target need to be highlighted clearly. The Department should explain clearly in its Annual Report why any changes to targets have been made. Reporting the Department's Investment Strategy by objective would enhance clarity. (Paragraph 105)
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| 42. | The editorial control of this year's Annual Report is relatively weak. Improvements are likely to follow where the writing style is made more vigorous, straightforward and consistent in tone; where the presentation and design of the report uses a full range of imaginative graphic aids; and where the requirements of the general reader are kept firmly in mind throughout. We do not underestimate the problems of editing the output of a large central Department. But it is neither an unusual task, nor one in which officials and Ministers are unpractised. Production of the Departmental Annual Report is not a chore but an opportunity; and it must be done better. (Paragraph 111)
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| 43. | It may be that the flow of information from the various parts of the Department to the Report's editorial team is too slow. We recommend therefore that the Permanent Secretary reviews the resources put into the production of the Annual Report to ensure that sufficient time is allowed for imaginative editorial interventions which will ensure a top class production. We hope that action taken to address our constructive criticisms of the way in which the Annual Report 2005 has been presented will result in livlier reports in 2006 and beyond. (Paragraph 112)
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| Conclusions |
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| 44. | Our overall impression is of a well intentioned but sluggish and sometimes muddled Department which needs to 'raise its game' if it is to meet the considerable challenge of leading clear improvements to UK transport infrastructure and services while doing its bit to safeguard the quality of life in Britain. Inspirational leadership is needed at official level, but appears lacking. This needs to change. (Paragraph 113)
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| 45. | We shall invite the Secretary of State and the Permanent Secretary to give evidence about the Department's Annual Report 2006 after its publication later this year. By then, we expect the Department's potential for focused and energetic leadership in pursuing its aim of 'better transport for all' to be more clearly realised; and for that aim to be articulated with much more clarity and panache in the next Report. The Department can and must do better. (Paragraph 114)
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