APPENDIX 11
Memorandum submitted by H G Price
INTRODUCTION
I am a peak hour commuter between Bristol Parkway
and London Paddington for which there is only one service provider—First
Great Western Trains (FGW). I pay for a monthly season ticket
and have commuted this route for five years. I will go on to make
specific points regarding cost, but in general terms have experienced
a highly expensive journey with extremely poor reliability, even
poorer punctuality and a standard of customer service that is
frankly appalling. My experience is shared by thousands of other
commuters and the many I have spoken to have a similar attitude
to myself. I have four points which I would like to lay before
the committee and would thank them for this opportunity.
Point 1. TOC massaging of the punctuality
figures to save paying compensation payments
The figures used to assess performance are compiled
on a daily basis. This conceals the fact that the peak hour trains
are significantly and consistently worse than those operating
outside peak hours, and considerably more expensive—by a
factor of five—too. So, for cheaper non-peak hour journeys
which are more than one hour late, customers gain a high percentage
refund, ie on an actually journey time basis. The peak hour customer
refund meanwhile is judged on the daily figures, conveniently
improved by the more reliable out-of-peak hour service. This is
inherently unfair and used as a means of saving compensation payments
by FGW. In fact the company seemed blissfully unaware that the
peak hour trains were worse until this fact was thrust under their
noses.
Point 2. There is a strong impression that
when Rail track passes on compensation payments for significant
track outages this is pocketed by FGW
When track is taken out of service for a planned
programme for maintenance, for example the tunnel modifications
at Chipping Sodbury and at Patchway, diversions are made to the
normal route meaning longer journeys and/or less services. There
is a strong impression that payment is made by Rail Tack to FGW
and this is simply pocketed by the company with no consideration
to the regular commuters who have no choice but to accept the
inferior service as they have already paid for a season ticket.
FGW refuse to answer regarding possible payments by Rail Track,
which tends to demonstrate their honesty and the fact that such
payments are made.
Point 3. FGW are the dominant provider of
services from Paddington to Swansea )there are no other providers).
There charging rate per mile is significantly higher on this route
than on routes where there is competition
These facts are agreed by the Rail Regulator,
see attached evidence. However the Rail Regulator does not see
that this is an abuse of dominance under Chapter II of the Competition
Law, as it is this organisation that decided what is or what is
not an abuse. This is outrageous and FGW are clearly in breach
of the law and the Rail Regulator is an accessory to this. This
amply demonstrates the abuse on fares that parties involved in
the industry are allowed to get away with, with no fear of prosecution
or redress until a Committee such as this steps in.
The car parks at "Parkway" type stations
are in remote spots and so there are no alternative car parks.
Thus FGW have the monopoly on parking and are dominant. Their
stated policy is to put car parking prices up as far and as fast
as they can. This is another abuse of dominance and again the
rail regulator does nothing
Point 4. The current Fare structures are
unfair and not in the interests of travellers or the country as
a whole
Templecombe and Castle Carey are two small towns
in Somerset very close to each other. The fare from Templecombe
to Waterloo is £52 return. The fare from Castle Carey to
Paddington (using FGW) is £103 return. Someone is making
a huge profit at the expense of the traveller so this can not
be fair.
CONCLUSION
— Fares are decided on the basis of
maximising TOC income not on the level of service provided or
on providing value for money.
— The consumer has no control or voice
in countering the excesses of the TOCs or Network Rail and the
latter have taken every opportunity to lessen such limited representation.
— The rail regulator is weak, ineffective
and appears to have no role in ensuring the customer gets value
for money.
— Regular commuters are fleeced by
the TOCs and charged the maximum and given little redress for
the poor service offered.
— Every opportunity is taken to maximise
TOC income regardless of the level of service provided. Time that
should be spent on reducing fares and improving service levels
is lost to wrangles between TOCs and Network Rail on assigning
blame for delays There is no effective incentive to reduce fares
or improve customer service. Targets that supposedly do this are
ineffective and poorly regulated.
— TOC will charge as much as they can
get away with. Weak and feeble regulation, a fragmented industry
and confused lines of responsibility permit this to happen.
— Some TOCs are abusing their dominance
and charging over the odds. Again, weak and feeble regulation
is allowing this to happen in direct contravention of the law.
— Costs are unnaturally high on the
UK train networks due to these facts and the lack of an authority
to control customer interest or fairness. Whilst the TOC Directors
are rewarded on increasing income fares will remain high and unfair.
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