Memorandum submitted by HM Inspectorate
of Constabulary
INTRODUCTION
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC)
welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the Transport Committee
inquiry on the effectiveness of traffic policing in England and
Wales. HMIC is uniquely positioned to comment on this aspect,
both from operational and strategic levels, because of its long
history of inspecting police forces and its role in providing
the Home Secretary and other stakeholders with professionally
informed views on policing issues.
This submission sets out HMIC's views on the
areas relating to traffic policing subject to examination by the
Transport Committee.
1. THE STRUCTURE
AND ROLE
OF HMIC
1.1 The principal role of HMIC is to promote
the efficiency and effectiveness of policing and law enforcement
in England, Wales and Northern Ireland through assessment and
inspection of police organisations and functions, for which it
has responsibility to ensure:
— performance is improved;
— good practice is spread; and
— standards are agreed, achieved and
maintained.
It is also a key part of HMIC's role to provide
advice and support to criminal justice partners and the tripartite
partners (Home Secretary, Chief Officers and Police Authorities).
1.2 Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary
(HMCIC) is the principal police advisor to the Home Secretary
and fulfils a pivotal role in advising Ministers and Home Office
officials on aspects of policing, on both operational and strategic
matters. He also supports the Home Secretary in the selection
of senior appointments through his chairing of both the Police
Leadership Development Board and the Senior Appointments Panel.
1.3 The HMIC work programme is extensive
and increasing demands reflect those placed on the police service
generally. Some of this work is described within this report;
however, the most visible aspect and perhaps the area in which
HMIC is most recognised is its inspection programme, the guidance
and advice which flows from it and the production of inspection
reports. Focused force inspections, thematic inspections, Basic
Command Unit inspections and Best Value review inspections all
form part of the programme to drive improved performance within
the Police Service. The whole inspection programme is designed
to provide support where it is most needed and is informed by
an annual comparative Baseline Assessment of all forces.
2. SUMMARY OF
HMIC'S ACTIVITY
2.1 HMIC is one of the key organisations
driving improvements within policing and over the years has fully
supported the Government's efforts to reduce casualties. HMIC
is fully engaged at all levels within the Home Office and with
ACPO on road policing, with HMIs or staff officers contributing
to shaping policy and developments.
2.2 Through a combination of the national
community safety plan, the national strategic assessments and
the professional expertise which exists within the organisation
and its partners, HMIC seeks to identify key priorities for inspection.
Using the environmental scanning of the day, one such area was
that of road policing.
2.3 During 1998, HMIC undertook a thematic
inspection, which resulted in a report entitled "Road Policing
and Traffic". This highlighted a requirement to
"integrate road policing and traffic officers
into core policing and ensure strong and open channels of communication
in both directions for information and intelligence".
The report also called for monitored strategies,
based on local needs with structures and suitably trained, experienced
resources to meet aims and targets; local commanders held responsible
for intelligence-led delivery (with consistent prosecution policy)
alongside multi-agency partners; positive action to increase diversity
of staff; and investment in technology.
2.4 Since 1998, HMIC has conducted a further
36 separate thematic inspections on all aspects of policing including
Police integrity (1999); crime and disorder (Calling Time on Crime
2000); police visibility and accessibility (Open all hours 2001);
training matters (2002); diversity matters (2003); modernising
the Service (2004); child abuse prevention and investigation (Keeping
safe, Staying safe 2004).
2.5 In 2004, changes meant that performance
information was provided to HMIC as a customer of RDS and the
Home Office. Currently, only casualty figures for those killed
or seriously injured from road collisions exist and that is for
the purposes of the 2010 casualty reduction targets. Some further
data is collected by the Home Office but this is limited for any
meaningful performance assessment in comparative terms.
2.6 HMIC's principal methodology for inspection
is the Baseline Assessment and this is used to monitor efficiency
and effectiveness across a range of 27 policing functions and
activities including road policing. It operates through frameworks
of questions and standards expected providing self assessments
and incorporating the views of other regulators and partners.
Following an annual high level comprehensive assessment of strengths
and areas for improvement, a tailored programme of inspection
activity is set for each force. The results of the baseline assessment
for 2005 are detailed later in this paper at Section 4.
3. ACPO NATIONAL
ROADS POLICING
STRATEGY
3.1 In January 2005, the Department for
Transport, the Home Office and Association of Chief Police Officers
launched their national strategy to set roads policing in the
context of overall police work, establish the issues which are
a continuing priority for road policing, and identify the principles
which should underpin operational practice and the development
of policy. The strategy focuses on:
— Denying criminals the uses of the
roads by enforcing the law.
— Reducing road casualties.
— Tackling the threat of terrorism.
— Reducing anti-social use of the roads.
— Enhancing public confidence.
3.2 The strategy is now part of the delivery
of the National Policing Plan. It is recognised that few performance
indicators exist and there are proposals within the strategy to
develop indicators of outcome.
3.3 In order to receive a "fair"
grading within Baseline Assessment, considered as acceptable performance,
forces must have a strategy for road policing based upon the national
document.
4. BASELINE ASSESSMENT
4.1 In 2005 Baseline Assessments were conducted
including roads policing. The self-assessment was carried out
before the launch of the above national roads policing strategy,
however the assessment fieldwork was carried out after this date.
4.2 Some five forces were graded as Excellent,
27 as Good, 11 as Fair and none were graded as Poor. Of the 27
frameworks assessed, road policing revealed the 4th best performance
nationally. Frameworks on tackling Level 2 criminality and investigating
major crime were among the worst performance assessments. The
forces graded Excellent for road policing were:
4.3 The West Midland Police is the only
one of this group that has a roads policing unit (RPU) devolved
to each operational command unit (OCU), the remainder have centralised
units.
4.4 With regard to the focus of the inquiry,
the assessment revealed a number of key judgements through its
framework of questions that may assist:
Is there a systematic approach to determining
the resources needed for roads policing? (BA Question 7)
HMIC identified effective leadership with regards
to Road Policing at Chief Officer level in 90% of forces questioned
and where significant improvements were necessary in one force,
action plans were developed. The resourcing to this function ranged
from 1.5% of force establishment to 9.1%. However, this did not
impact upon the assessed performance. Training was being delivered
to roads policing staff in all forces and evidence was found of
specialist crime training being provided to improve the investigation
of road deaths as one example.
4.5 Does the force have a roads policing strategy
that fully supports and is integrated with other force strategies,
including the crime strategy? (BA Question 2)
HMIC discovered 70% of forces questioned were
deemed to have clear, well formulated strategy in place. There
was some room for improvement in wider consultation. Only one
force needed significant review. All of these documents took account
of the national strategy.
4.6 To what extent is roads policing activity
intelligence-led? (BA Question 8)
HMIC revealed 74% of forces questioned were
found to have an effective intelligence-led approach. The National
Intelligence Model was embedded in RPUs of many forces with resources
being tasked appropriately at all levels. Ten forces required
some development in this regard.
4.7 Have roads policing performance targets
been met and how well does performance compare with other forces?
(BA Question 3) Are the arrangements for roads policing -ie, centrally
managed or devolved—sufficiently clear to enable effective,
co-ordinated delivery? (BA Question 4)
HMIC found 63% of forces questioned were found
to have well formulated processes and culture for monitoring Roads
Policing performance. Of the 19 forces questioned on their 2010
casualty reduction target, all reported they were on track to
achieve it.
4.8 Does the roads policing strategy set out
the relative emphasis on different activities? (BA Question 5)
How well is performance measured and managed? (BA Question 6)
Good use of technology was found in 78% of forces
questioned, the remainder (eight forces) did require a degree
of review of such use. Clear evidence was found of good exploitation
of technology and technical support in the form of automated number
plate recognition (ANPR), speed detection equipment and road crash
investigation.
4.9 To what extent does the force engage with
external partners in relation to roads policing and casualty reduction?
(BA Question 11)
93% of forces questioned were found to have
well established and effective partnership arrangements in relation
to reducing road casualties. Evidence was found of improved relationships
with criminal justice partners.
5. PROTECTIVE
SERVICES REVIEW
5.1 In June 2004, the then Home Secretary
commissioned HMIC to provide a professional assessment of whether
the present 43 force structure is the right one to meet the challenges
posed by the present and future policing environment.
5.2 Central to our approach to this work
was the concept of protective services, which had its origins
in the discussion raised by the Home Office/Strategy Unit report
in 2004 on the nature of policing services at different levels.
At force, regional and national/international level they suggested
that the police protect the public, for example by dealing with
serious organised crime & terrorism. This is in contrast to
local policing where police work with the public at the neighbourhood
level in tackling anti-social behaviour, or where the police work
for the public in dealing with volume crime. [1]
5.3 The focus of protective services necessitated
the development of a new methodology for assessing individual
force capability and capacity in the following key areas[2]:
— Major Crime (homicide).
— Serious, Organised and Cross Border
Crime.
— Counter Terrorism and Extremism.
— Strategic Roads Policing.
5.4 Within this context "capability"
refers to an organisation's ability to provide a service to an
agreed standard. "Capacity" refers to how much of that
level of service can be provided.
5.5 The assessment methodology itself is
based on the series of templates that were developed in the Mind
the (Level 2) Gap report. Each protective service is assessed
in relation to standards identified with ACPO on; intelligence
(what do we know about the issue); prevention (what are we doing
to stop this); and enforcement/resolution (what ability do we
have to intervene effectively). The assessments obtained from
the review were combined to provide each force with an overall
rating for each protective service that was scored on a rating
system of 1-4 as follows:
1. Only reactive capability demonstrated.
2. Reactive capability, with only limited
proactive capability demonstrated.
3. Reactive capability, with significant
proactive capability demonstrated.
4. Reactive capability with comprehensive
proactive capability demonstrated.
5.6 The Findings
Overall the findings were stark—very few
forces assessed fully met the required standard. It was also apparent
that size matters: larger forces were more likely to have much
greater capability and resilience whilst, in many cases, smaller
forces found it hard to provide the services to an acceptable
standard. It was also apparent that being bigger was not enough
to guarantee strong protective services. The environment (situation)
also mattered. For example, the presence of cities, ports, or
events (ie repeated exposure to risks and challenges) also enhance
the repertoire of protective services that forces offer the public.
Able leadership was also influential in that it allowed smaller
forces to punch above their weight on these issues.
5.7 This trend was also evident in relation
to our findings from the assessment of Roads Policing, albeit
the correlation was less marked than in the other six protective
services. Relative to most of the other protective services Roads
Policing can be considered to have scored well, albeit at a national
level the average rating fell between a "2" and a "3"
and thus did not show sufficient capability and capacity overall.
It rated well in relation to "enforcement" and "prevention"
functions, but the use of intelligence and information was generally
weak and was confined to the gathering and analysis of collision
statistics. In particular, many of the forces assessed had no
intelligence analyst dedicated to this function. A significant
number of forces also had a separate tasking and co-ordinating
process for roads policing units and where they were tasked it
was generally towards roads policing or reassurance issues rather
than tackling Level 2 criminality.
5.8 Where Roads Policing did appear within
Strategic Assessments, the focus was primarily on casualty reduction,
with limited or no consideration of tackling Level 2 criminality
and terrorist activity on the roads. In some cases, forces that
had a high profile for roads policing issues, did not feature
it within their policing plan.
5.9 Where forces had maintained a distinct
Roads Policing Unit (RPU) the focus was towards casualty reduction
as this is the only area in which there were, and are, clear performance
indicators. In addition, the historic role of traffic policing
has focussed on enforcement of vehicle related offences and this
mindset was still evident within some forces, particularly within
centralised RPUs. One force with a centralised unit demonstrating
good practice was Thames Valley, with these officers focusing
on both casualty reduction and tackling criminality.
5.10 However, it was also the case that
some RPUs suffer from what HMIC has termed "double hatting",
which occurs when specialist officers hold dual roles or responsibilities.
In many smaller forces RPUs are also often responsible for the
provision of firearms cover and the review identified an unfortunate
example of the complications that can arise whereby in one force,
officers were required leave the scene of a fatal road traffic
accident on a major road to deal with a firearms incident because
there were no other adequately trained resources immediately available.
5.11 The work of the Central Motorway Patrol
Group (CMPG), a collaborative enterprise between the West Midlands
Police, West Mercia Police, Staffordshire Police and Warwickshire
Police, has also achieved good results, balancing the desire to
address criminality whilst maintaining a focus on casualty reduction.
On the debit side, however, there were concerns around infrastructure,
procedural and human resource constraints and these have undermined
the overall perception of effectiveness.
5.12 It should further be noted that "Closing
the Gap" undertook a detailed analysis of the benefits, or
otherwise, of collaboration and concluded that under current policing
structures it does not offer an effective or efficient model for
gaps in Level 2 services. The experience to date is that management
costs are high, the functionality of operational support systems
is low and governance problematic. Present progress, practice,
and governance together with the fact that some are sceptical
of the value of change suggests that at best, progress will be
complex, slow and of limited impact. The position is best summarised
by one of the contributors to this element of the review who simply
stated "any success we have cannot be compared to how much
better we would have done if managed by one organisation".
5.13 The investment of forces into specialist
assets such as firearms seems directly attributable to size. In
some cases informal arrangements have developed into a permanent
service, allowing forces to chose to under-resource in this roads
policing area (one force assessed provides ARV cover to their
neighbour every night shift, without recompense).
5.14 Building on Good Practice
One clear benefit of the protective service
assessments is that they allowed HMIC to identify key critical
success factors. With regards to roads policing high performing
forces generally:
— Consider the range of national road
policing priorities including denying criminals use of the roads
network.
— Effectively and pro-actively target
these resources, through analysis and profiling, to preventative
and enforcement activity towards casualty reduction and tackling
criminality.
— Have developed a robust performance
regime which ensures effective measurement of the contribution
these resources make to force priorities.
6. CONCLUSION
6.1 While there is room for improvement
across the country, this framework area of the Baseline Assessment
is viewed as positive with less risk than other policing functions
given limited HMIC resources. The Protective Services Review provided
a countrywide intrusive inspection that added to our knowledge
and confirmed our position on roads policing.
7 March 2006
1 Police Reform: A joint Home Office/Strategy Unit
project-Summary Report, p 11 (2004). Back
2
These were agreed upon following consultation with ACPO and an
analysis of the 2004 National Strategic Assessment. Back
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