1 Introduction
1. The Government's decision on the future of the
energy sector, and with it the outlook for nuclear power in the
UK, is one of the most important issues it has faced in its time
in office. The outcome of the 2006 Energy Review will have ramifications
not just for this generation, but for generations to follow.[1]
This means it is vital that the Government makes its current assessment
on the basis of all the available evidence, with a view to putting
in place a framework to safeguard the long-term sustainability
of the UK's energy supply.
2. The scope of the Energy Review is vast, and the
timescale—at barely six months—is short. We decided
that the most useful way in which we could contribute to the debate
was to focus on three areas of energy policy where we felt some
of the assumptions made by interested parties needed close investigation.
Accordingly, we announced our intention of inquiring into "the
particular considerations that should apply to nuclear" new
build; the implications of increasing dependence on gas and coal
imports; and the capacity of microgeneration to meet a substantial
proportion of the UK electricity demand in the medium and long-term.
This Report is on the first of these topics.
3. Coverage of the Energy Review, rightly or wrongly,
has focused on the role that nuclear power may play in the future
energy mix. We believe that, in determining its policy on the
future of nuclear energy, there are a number of issues that the
Government needs to address. Our inquiry has sought to examine
these to provide a comprehensive overview of the matters for debate,
and to highlight those we believe are absolutely crucial. In so
doing, we have not sought to reach a conclusion either for or
against new nuclear build, but to reach definitive conclusions
on those issues where the evidence base allows us to do so.
4. Most of the technical objections to nuclear
power, such as the availability of fuel and the carbon profile
of nuclear power stations, have answers. Political issues, such
as security and proliferation, are matters of judgement. There
are other questions, however, that are both technical and political
in nature, such as waste management. The purpose of this Report
is to help focus debate on the issues that really need to be discussed
and not those that have definitive answers.
5. If the Government really wishes to meet its
objectives for carbon emissions and energy security, its policy
must sustain those technologies it wishes to be part of the energy
mix. However, we do not believe that the way to energy security
is for the Government to fix the proportion of the energy mix
that should come from particular technologies. Rather, it should
ensure a fair competitive environment for existing technologies,
while supporting innovation in new ones. A policy designed to
enable the construction of new nuclear power stations would be
credible only if it was based on four key elements:
- A broad national consensus
on the role of nuclear power, that has both cross-party political
support and wider public backing;
- A carbon-pricing framework that provides long-term
incentives for investment in all low carbon technologies;
- A long-term storage solution in place for
the UK's existing radioactive waste legacy; and
- A review of the planning and licensing system
to reduce the lead time for construction.
6. Two of these areas require action for the successful
implementation of energy policy, regardless of a decision on nuclear
power. The planning system and carbon pricing are as much issues
for renewable energy and the future of fossil fuel plants as they
are for nuclear. Moreover, it would be necessary to ensure any
decision in favour of new nuclear build would not undermine efforts
elsewhere, such as in energy efficiency.
7. In addition, there are issues which the Government
and Parliament must consider that have a strong ethical dimension
and will ultimately require a political judgment. These include:
- Whether, as a country, we
should create new radioactive waste, which subsequent generations
will have to manage;
- Whether the UK's nuclear policy poses internal
security risks and undermines efforts to prevent proliferation;
and
- The extent to which the UK needs to demonstrate
leadership in reducing carbon emissions, given the modest contribution
it can make relative to the rest of the world.
8. Finally, our Report highlights issues surrounding
nuclear power, where there has been debate, or where, underpinned
by the principles outlined above, the market and the Government
should be able to find a solution. Among our conclusions are that:
- Although new reactors may
be able to use existing sites, this cannot be guaranteed. Further
research would be needed to identify alternative sites;
- There are reactor technologies that could
seek licensing in the UK now, although we would be amongst the
first in the world to use them;
- Constraints in the domestic skills capacity
could be overcome with sufficient investment and use of international
resources;
- Constraints in infrastructure capacity could
be overcome with sufficient investment, although there are concerns
regarding certain reactor components;
- There should be sufficient uranium supplies
to meet any future UK demand;
- Financing the management of decommissioning
and waste storage is possible, provided a system for charging
the industry is in place from the start;
- The UK has the market players willing to deliver
a programme of new build, although the current electricity market
does not provide favourable conditions for them to do so;
- Nuclear power is a low carbon source of electricity,
comparable to renewable energy; and
- There is a clear understanding that the costs
of developing new nuclear power stations, including subsequent
decommissioning and waste disposal, would be met by the private
sector developers of each station.
9. Finally, we are concerned about the manner
in which this Energy Review has been conducted. Throughout the
process, the Government has hinted strongly that it has already
made its mind up on nuclear power. The last review took three
years to complete, yet this one has been conducted in the space
of six months, and has focused primarily on the electricity sector,
at the expense of consideration of transport and heating—both
equally important sources of carbon emissions in the UK. This
has not been an Energy Review, but an Electricity Review.
10. What is more, it is clear to us that the outcome
of the Energy Review has largely been determined before adequate
consideration could possibly have been taken of important evidence
that should inform the Government's policy decision. This includes
the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management's final report and
recommendations for the long-term storage of the UK's high level
radioactive waste, expected at the end of July 2006; and the Heath
and Safety Executive's recently published expert report, which
includes analysis of the potential for pre-licensing of nuclear
reactors. Further, there has been insufficient analysis of the
extent of the 'energy gap' the UK faces, for example, given the
potential for further lifetime extensions of some of the existing
nuclear fleet. All of these areas bear crucially on the key principles
we have highlighted above.
11. During our inquiry we took formal evidence from
the Institute of Physics; the UK Energy Research Centre; the Nuclear
Industry Association; British Energy; Sir Jonathon Porritt, Chairman
of the Sustainable Development Commission; the Chief Executives
of E.ON UK and EDF Energy; the Health and Safety Executive; the
Environment Agency; Professor Gordon MacKerron, Chairman of the
Committee on Radioactive Waste Management; Roger Brunt, Director
of the Office for Civil Nuclear Security; Professor Keith Palmer;
Dr Dieter Helm; and Ofgem. A full list of the witnesses is given
on page 86.
12. We also received 56 memoranda from other companies,
associations, and individuals. We would like to express our thanks
to all those who have contributed to this inquiry.
1 Department of Trade and Industry, Our energy challenge-securing
clean, affordable energy for the long-term, January 2006 Back
|
