Examination of Witnesses (Questions 120-139)
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
COMMISSION
23 MAY 2006
Q120 Mr Clapham: The figures that
you referred to that you have just put your hand on, is there
any chance of us being provided with those? It would help in the
debate.
Sir Jonathon Porritt: Of course.
Absolutely.
Q121 Mr Clapham: Thank you. Turning
again to our scientific base, do you feel we have got the capacity
to deal, on the one hand, with decommissioning and waste and,
on the other hand, with new build?
Sir Jonathon Porritt: One of the
big issues that we surfaced in doing this research was the issue
about capacity, and even very enthusiastic advocates for nuclear
acknowledge that there are some extremely serious capacity issues.
As I understand it, those capacity issues are already being felt
with the new reactor in Finland where they are finding it difficult
to recruit in the numbers of qualified staff that they need to
carry out different functions in their construction programme.
If you think about what a 10 gigawatt replacement programme would
look like and the capacity needed to do that, coupled with a commitment
to engage in the decommissioning challenge that we face in this
country and move forward on a waste-management strategy rather
than just allow the problem, as it were, to fester, just sitting
there without any idea what we are going to do about it, this
is a huge set of skills which would be required for the UK Government
to move forward on all three fronts at the same time.
Q122 Mr Hoyle: Is there any circumstance,
Sir Jonathon, in which you might see yourself supporting nuclear
power in the UK?
Sir Jonathon Porritt: What we
have said, and we have tried to be absolutely upfront about this,
is that we are advisers to the UK Government and did not feel
it was appropriate for us to make judgments about whether nuclear
might be appropriate to other governments elsewhere in the world,
and on one occasion we somewhat jokingly said that were I the
Chairman of the Sustainable Development Commission in France,
the job of persuading the French President that they did not need
any more nuclear power but could simply decommission all their
existing reactors and move to alternatives in France, that would
be a pretty steep advocacy challenge, if I could put it like that.
We also looked at what is necessary in China, in India, and we
acknowledge that different circumstances in different countries
may well persuade the governments of those countries that nuclear
is an important part of their mix. That is a long preamble to
us saying that we have done the detailed analysis on the issues
here in the UK and came out, at the end of that analysis, strongly
of the opinion that new nuclear was not necessary for the UK to
meet its over-arching energy objectives. Can I imagine any set
of circumstances in which nuclear would be necessary in the UK?
It is difficult, because there are those who say that if we continue
to prevaricate on efficiency, renewables, CHP and so on, we might
see a gap opening up so precipitously in front of us that we would
by default have to bring in nuclear as the only means of bridging
the gap. The truth is that that gap will only open up over time
and, once we are aware of how big the gap is, because of our inaction
on all of those different areas, it would be too late for nuclear
to make the contribution that it would be required to make at
that stage. It is difficult for me, as Chairman of the Commission,
to see those set of circumstances, but I have to reflect the views
of the Commission, the commissioners here, because some commissioners
did not come out with an outright: "No, it is not appropriate
for the UK", they came out with a statement saying, "This
is not appropriate for the UK now, in the knowledge that we have
about the challenge that we face today", but also said that
there might be a set of circumstances in the future where they
would be persuaded that nuclear was a necessary part of the mix.
Q123 Mr Hoyle: There seems to be
a bit of hypocrisy here, because we are quite happy to take nuclear
power from France, which is 60 miles away (the nearest reactor),
and I do not see how we balance that off either when we talk about
prices. Yet, at the same time, we are encouraging the interconnector,
which was meant to operate both ways. It certainly works one way,
and that is about sending nuclear power to the UK—nuclear
electric generation—and to the Channel Islands, which are
totally dependent.
Sir Jonathon Porritt: Yes, and
we flag that in our report. The one thing that I hope we have
really succeeded in doing is saying that this argument is not
helped by people who ignore the realities of our current situation
or are so passionately pro- or anti- that they obscure the degree
to which we are currently dependent on nuclear, not just our own
but on that that comes from France, and on the very substantial
consequences of opting to remain non-nuclear for the future. We
have said time after time, if government decides that it can meet
these challenges without nuclear, it is still an absolutely huge
challenge to achieve the carbon savings and the security of supply
issues without nuclear. It is a massive challenge. We have not
tried to undersell that at any point; we have tried to be very
upfront about how big an issue that is going to be for the Government.
Q124 Chairman: You state at page
19, paragraph 3.22 of your main position paper, "The UK's
renewable resources are some of the best in the world, and could
provide all the UK's electricity over the longer term." Is
that the view of the Commission?
Sir Jonathon Porritt: Yes, it
is, but I have to qualify it instantly by saying that it could
only meet all of our electricity needs at a very considerable
financial burden. The research papers that we looked at in this
respect are able to demonstrate the theoretical capacity for nuclear,
the realistic capacity, if you like, in terms of when you start
factoring in some of the issues regarding siting, planning, grid
connections and so on, and then, thirdly, is it realistic financially
as well as realistic in all those logistical and infrastructure
terms, and so on? When you factor in financial realism, which
is obviously to be a very important point for the taxpayers of
this country, then the figure falls away from a theoretical 100%
resource back to something much closer to the figures that we
have quoted there, which is around 65% of total electricity generation
at the moment; but even that (and we do make this point very clear)
comes at a considerably higher cost than people are paying for
their electricity today.
Q125 Chairman: This commendably objective
paper The role of nuclear power in a low carbon economy
is a bit different from your interpretation of it, it is a little
more journalistic in its style, and I note that the Commission
has broadly seven environmentalists, five people I cannot quite
define, two industrialists, and the vote at the end on alternative
positions to nuclear power seems roughly to reflect the composition
of the Commission. Did you just reinforce your own prejudices
during the conduct of the inquiry? Did anyone change their minds
on important issues?
Sir Jonathon Porritt: I must,
first of all, correct a misapprehension about the make-up of the
Sustainable Development Commission. We do not have seven environmentalists
actually. In fact, some people have criticised the Commission
for not having enough environmentalists as fully paid up environmentalists,
because most of our commissioners, in fact, reflect different
sectors, whether it is education, or health, or concerns about
work issues, economic issues, and so on. It is true that two of
the business people on the Commission felt that nuclear would
be a necessary part of the mix for the UK in the future; two other
business people on the Commission did not. I would not want you
to paint all of our business representatives on the Commission
into the pro-nuclear box and all these kind of zealous greenies
into the anti-nuclear box, because it really was not quite like
that. We did not carry out a before and after exercise, as in
vote now and 15 months later vote again, but I can genuinely reassure
you that a lot of commissioners, if they were sitting next to
me here, would tell you that a lot of their views about nuclear
power changed during the course of this inquiry, because, as the
research emerged and as we were able to dig deeper into some of
these things, what is inevitably a set of prejudices that you
bring with you to any engagement in a debate of this kind were
tested very hard indeed, and I can speak for that personally.
I was pretty convinced before we started this inquiry that the
issue about availability of uranium, so resource issues around
uranium as well as resource issues around oil and gas in the future,
was a massively problematic issue for the nuclear industry to
have to cope with. The research we did indicated that that is
not really the case; that actually if you look at availability
of supplies over the next few decades, it is likely that those
supplies will be sufficient for considerable expansion in the
global nuclear industry. That comes with two caveats: (1) is the
uranium that is being brought on there of a high enough grade
to ensure that you are not emitting vast amounts of carbon by
having to purify, enrich that uranium to the level that is required
for burning in a reactor, and (2) we do not really know because
there has not been a lot of prospecting for uranium over the last
20 years and those countries that have already very advanced uranium
mining facilities have not needed to expand those facilities very
much because the nuclear industry has basically been on hold.
But it is true that, if you talk to the Australian Government,
or the Canadian Government, let alone the Government of Kazakhstan,
you will hear some extremely optimistic assessments of availability
of high-grade ore for the foreseeable future. So, that issue for
me changed as we researched, and I think genuinely the secretariat
would confirm that individual commissioners pretty much all changed
certain positions as we went through the process.
Q126 Chairman: As Jeremy Paxman would
have said, "Well anticipated, Porritt", because that
was one of my questions for you later on uranium supply, but you
have dealt with that one. Thank you very much. Is it fair to say
that what swung it for many of you is your enthusiasm for microgeneration—and
we look forward to your report on microgeneration, which you are
due to produce shortly—which argues against a centralised
grid. The trouble with nuclear is it locks you into a centralised
grid for the foreseeable future?
Sir Jonathon Porritt: We spent
a lot of time analysing and then reflecting on a number of different
opportunity costs, areas of opportunity cost, if you pursued a
nuclear replacement programme. Some of those opportunity costs
would come forward in terms of straight availability of capital
to invest in renewables at the same time as investing in a major
new nuclear programme; some of the opportunity cost comes in flexibility
in terms of the lock-in factor, but if you go for a 10 gigawatt
nuclear programme, let alone a 20 gigawatt programme, you are
pretty much locked into the infrastructure needed to deliver that
electricity into our economy, into the grid, for the next 50 years.
What that almost certainly means is that the necessary investment
in upgrading our grid in this country would be geared to a very,
in our opinion, old approach to electricity distribution through
a central grid-based system. At that point we did look at the
opportunity costs of lock-in. We looked at what would happen if
we could not bring forward more opportunities through decentralised
energy systems which we believed were going to work much better,
for a host of different reasons, and I think you probably do not
want to go into those today, but we did feel that if you pre-empted
the possibility of major new investments in decentralised energy
supply and use systems, then that would cost this country very
severely in terms of the opportunity costs for the future.
Q127 Chairman: But similar considerations
would apply to new build in coal with carbon capture and storage
as well?
Sir Jonathon Porritt: It does,
indeed, if you are going for a very large plant. The one area
where it does not really apply is for smaller scale gas-fired
plants, particularly if you are talking about combined heat and
power for use in inner city areas where you can take the heat
and use that for district heating schemes of that kind; but then
you have got much more flexibility, because plant size can come
right down from the massive plants that we are talking about at
the moment.
Q128 Miss Kirkbride: You mentioned
a minute ago security of supply, not just with regard to uranium,
which is a slightly different issue, but, obviously, given that
so much of our supply is based on fossil fuels at the moment,
which we used to supply ourselves but which will now have to come
from other parts of the world which are politically challenging,
I just wondered where that was factored into your deliberations
on nuclear: because no matter what progress we make on renewables,
albeit the 100% progress that you are talking about looks like
a long way off, whatever progress we make on being more efficient,
we are still going to have to burn fossil fuels for a very long
time, are we not, and they are going to be coming from places
that we are not very comfortable with. Is that right?
Sir Jonathon Porritt: I feel quite
comfortable about Norway personally. I do not think our security
of supply is massively threatened by Norway and Norway's investment
in new infrastructure is going to be hugely significant for us
over at least the next 30-40 years. When we talk about security
of supply around gas, people instantly leap to President Putin
and Russia, but that is not actually the full picture in terms
of the places from which we resource this gas, and, do not forget,
as we move towards diversified sourcing, we will have more coming
into this country by other means, not necessarily dependent on
the pipelines through to Russia, so it is not quite as grim a
picture as us with Putin's hand around our neck in the way that
is sometimes portrayed. However, I am not going to disagree with
the broad thrust of your argument because it is true that, even
if we got really serious about efficiency and did what many experts
believe is now possible, which is to reduce total energy consumption
in this country by 50% over the course of the next 20-25 years,
and even if we began to bring renewables forward at scale, made
sure that all those offshore wind farms were coming on-stream
in the time period allowed for, that we had a really serious biomass
programme in this country instead of a pathetic imitation of a
serious programme that we have got at the moment, if we really
got serious about microgeneration and all the rest of it, it still
does not totally account for all the energy that we need in the
interim period; so, yes, we will continue to use fossil fuels.
Our estimate was that the amount that we would need if we did
all of those things is at a scale where we would not be imperilled
by having to depend on just one supply inð ñall
circumstances and, therefore, causing considerable anxiety if
for geopolitical reasons that monopoly supplier chose to punish
the UK by either charging more or discontinuing supply in those
circumstances.
Q129 Miss Kirkbride: Is your 50%
reduction of energy use compatible with economic growth? Where
does economic growth fit into the 50% reduction?
Sir Jonathon Porritt: It is certainly
compatible in our mind with economic growth, because we are persuaded
that the only way in which nation states are going to be able
to grow their economies in the future is if they achieve these
massive increases in energy and resource efficiency. I do not
know where this Committee sits on this issue, but we will see
further oscillation in the price of fossil fuels, there is no
question about that, but, whichever way you cut it, we are never
going to go back to fossil fuels and where they were two or three
years ago ever, and I do not think anybody in the industry thinks
that we will either. We are looking at an increased cost for industry,
an increased cost for the private consumer from energy consumption,
which means that the smarter we get about reducing energy use,
the better off we will be, both in competitive terms for the economy
as a whole and, in personal terms, for our use of energy in our
homes, our cars, if we have cars, and so on. Our read is that
far from energy efficiency being a threat to competitiveness,
we would argue precisely the opposite, which is those countries
that get serious about energy resource efficiency will be the
most competitive countries in the future and those that do not
will be punished for that failure to accept a new reality about
energy supply and cost.
Q130 Miss Kirkbride: Where does the
fuel reprocessing argument feature in your deliberations and the
UK's approach to that?
Sir Jonathon Porritt: The issue
about reprocessing is obviously a very big one, because it goes
to the heart of the volumes of nuclear waste that we would have
to deal with. The assumption that we have made in our assessment
of waste arising from a replacement programme are based on a simultaneous
assumption that reprocessing would cease. There may be some who
disagree with that and think that we will continue with a reprocessing
industry in the UK. We genuinely think that is very unlikely,
for cost reasons alone, and, therefore, made the assumption that
we would not have reprocessing. Without reprocessing spent fuel
needs to be classified as high-level nuclear waste, which means
that the volumes of nuclear waste which would then need to be
disposed of through a new nuclear programme rise substantially,
and I think the figures we gave were that they would rise by at
least 300% as a consequence of spent fuel needing to be disposed
of as high-level waste. That is a very big issue for a waste management
strategy for this country, and that is why when we say that, if
the Government claims they have got a clear resolution to nuclear
waste issues in this country, you look at a question like that—are
we going to continue with reprocessing or are we not—and
it has a massive bearing on the costs of a nuclear power programme
and on some of the liabilities going forward in the future, those
liabilities either being borne by a private sector generator or
company, whatever it might be, or being borne by the taxpayer
through a government decision. Those are massive issues that do
need to be looked at as part and parcel of this approach to a
proper waste management strategy.
Q131 Miss Kirkbride: Why are we not
going to do it any more? You said cost.
Sir Jonathon Porritt: Because
the economics of reprocessing are extremely parlous. Many people
in the nuclear industry do not believe that they are really viable
in any serious sense. We have had huge difficulties technically,
as you know, with our reprocessing plant here in the UK and, unless
something dramatically different was to materialise in the use
of that technology, it does not seem to us that it is going to
be a viable part, if we have one, of a nuclear supply chain.
Q132 Dr Wright: In terms of the environmental
landscape issues and in terms of what the Government would desire,
i.e. to use some of the existing nuclear power station sites to
upgrade and probably renew, they are all mainly on the coastline,
and, obviously, with coastal erosion and sea-level rises there
is risk to that particular element. If this is going to be the
case and the Government have to revisit the criteria that is going
to be laid down, would this pose a significant risk to the Government
to try to fast-track some of the planning processes and obviously
extend the time that it is going to take to build the nuclear
power stations?
Sir Jonathon Porritt: I think
there are two issues there. One is whether or not we are going
to face a set of new considerations because of climate change
and increased sea-level affecting existing nuclear sites, many
of which are, indeed, on our costs. We did not do a detailed appraisal
of what the increased risk would be at those sites, and what would
happen if you simply went for the existing sites would certainly
need to be part of any strategic consideration. I cannot comment
with authority on that from the research that we did ourselves,
but it is pretty clear that some of those sites are going to be
very vulnerable and would probably not be available to government
for a new nuclear reactor on the same site as where the existing
reactors are today. That, I think, is a very big issue which would
have to be addressed head-on. The second point, which was more
about whether or not the Government is trying to short-cut planning
and consenting processes, licensing processes, to get approval
for a new reactor programme faster than would otherwise be the
case, is a hugely significant concern that we have, because we
are of the opinion that, were government to be seen to be short-circuiting
the proper planning and licensing processes for an expedited route
to a new nuclear programme, nothing could be more calculated to
raise public concern and anger than that single decision. That
does not mean to say that we are automatically saying that every
planning process has to be as long as the Sizewell B process,
whatever it might be. The planning process needs to be as thorough
and rigorous as it needs to be to ensure that the right decision
is taken with the right degree of public assurance. A fast-track
sounds to me like the wrong kind of approach to that; so we would
both need a national process, and we are completely convinced
on the Commission that you would still need to go for a local
planning inquiry for any particular site earmarked for a new reactor.
We do not believe that you could do without that.
Q133 Dr Wright: In terms of the question
of the wind turbines, quite clearly they cause an element of concern,
certainly when you talk about land-based turbines. Up in Cumbria,
for instance, an application was turned down and on the east coast,
in my constituency, we have the largest offshore wind farm and
no objections to that. It certainly has a nice impact as far as
I am concerned. However, I can understand that there are going
to be significant concerns for a mass of wind turbines through
the countryside and will cause concern as well as far as planning
is concerned. Do you not consider that wind turbines are going
to cause problems for the Government as well, in terms of landscape
issues?
Sir Jonathon Porritt: Yes. We
acknowledge that this is a matter of considerable concern. If
you look at the actual figures regarding planning applications
and the percentage of applications that are going through the
system, it certainly ought to be of concern to the DTI and to
government because a very large number are still being turned
down. We have, therefore, always argued that it is going to be
more politically acceptable for government to source more of its
wind offshore than onshore, simply because the controversies associated
with offshore applications and licenses are less than the controversies
associated with onshore, although there are still big issues with
the offshore planning process as well. The downside to that, of
course, is that offshore wind is considerably more expensive than
onshore wind, which is why we remain committed to a substantial
and ambitious onshore wind programme as a critical part of our
overall renewable energy mix and are less tolerant of some of
those protectionist voices than others are. When we are accosted
by people saying what a blot on the landscape it might be, we
are tempted to remind them that if climate change turns out to
be as grave an issue as many people believe it to be anyway, the
impact on their view and the impact on biodiversity in the UK
will be so irrelevant to them that they will barely believe that
they made such points at the time. I suppose we are talking about
proportionality. If climate change is as serious as we are now
told it is by our Chief Scientist and by most independent experts,
then excessively sensitive concerns about landscape are inimical
to a sustainable energy system for the UK.
Q134 Mr Hoyle: I am interested in
turbines. Obviously—you are quite right—people believe
the environmental impact is too great on land, the argument being
that we ought to go for more offshore. What worries me is not
so much that, but what percentage of the time are they actually
generating, because there is obviously a down-time when there
are so many out of a fleet, or whatever, but also low wind causes
a problem but high wind is a great problem where they cannot generate
electricity either. How efficient are they in reality? Is it 50%
of the time, 40%, 80%? I am not quite sure. Nobody has actually
given us a figure on down-time.
Sir Jonathon Porritt: We would
very happily send you the report that we did on wind power last
year, which does give detailed answers to those questions about
intermittency, about reliability and all the rest of it, because
it is a very important issue and not one to be brushed aside,
but nothing like as big a block on including wind as a major component,
the foundation for renewable energy strategy, as people sometimes
make out, and (a tiny aside) the public opinion against wind power
is noisy, brash and all over the place, but if you actually look
at the surveys of people who live in the vicinity of wind farms,
therefore are most immediately connected with them, you will see
incredibly strong levels of public support for wind farms anywhere
in the UK that has got a wind farm in that vicinity; so we should
not get this out of proportion either.
Q135 Chairman: Do you believe the
opposition to wind farms is actually fuelled actively by the nuclear
lobby as well?
Sir Jonathon Porritt: I have no
evidence to that effect, but I cannot deny that such a suspicion
has passed through my mind.
Q136 Chairman: If you write in it
will be adopted here certainly.
Sir Jonathon Porritt: Almost as
guardedly as I have just expressed my answer to you, Chairman.
Q137 Anne Moffat: I certainly find
that public support where there are nuclear power stations is
very pro-nuclear power stations. The same thing could apply if
we had a power station in our constituency, Stromness and East
Lothian. I want to go back to planning. You seem to be answering
our questions very comprehensively before we get the chance to
ask them, so rather than wait, I thought I would jump in now.
I am sure you are aware of the political dimension of devolution
in Scotland and how they have power over planning permission for
any new build for nuclear. How do you think that is going to affect
the process? Do you think we should be UK-wide imposing new build
nuclear in Scotland and Wales if Scotland and Wales do not want
it?
Sir Jonathon Porritt: Obviously
an enormously sensitive issue. We did not go into this in depth
in our report, but, as we understood it, the actual decision about
this is not a devolved power, as such, but Scotland clearly would
have a power, through section 36 of the relevant Act, to ensure
that no nuclear power stations were built in Scotland. That obviously
makes the politics, the party politics, around nuclear power pretty
sensitive. I am not sure I am the best person to comment on that
in reality. We feel that the arguments that have been raised about
nuclear, whether it is in England, Wales or Scotland, are the
same and to a certain extent there are particular national issues
vis-a"-vis Wales and Scotland over and above the issues regarding
the UK as a whole, but, by and large, the arguments either for
or against are the same.
Q138 Anne Moffat: The electricity
generation, the percentage, is far higher in Scotland than it
is in the UK.
Sir Jonathon Porritt: Of course.
Indeed.
Q139 Anne Moffat: The other thing
I wanted to ask you about was a point you make in your paper about
your contributions in engaging with the public. Do you think that
we have engaged adequately with the public on the Energy Review
or do you think we need to do an awful lot more, certainly in
terms of new build nuclear?
Sir Jonathon Porritt: Our engagement
with the DTI at the moment around the Energy Review is not just
about the substance of the decision about what the right mix is
for the long-term energy needs of this country, but it is very
much about that issue about process. There is a school of thought
inside DTI which would have you believe that the consultation
around this Energy Review is sufficient in itself to persuade
the general public that the debate has been adequately thought
through and adequately had in this country. We fundamentally disagree
with that. The consultation processes around this Energy Review
have been extremely partial in many respects, selected audiences,
small groups of people. By definition they have not touched the
general public in the way that you would expect a consultation
engagement process actually to do, and there are massive concerns
in our mind if the Government says, "We have done all the
consultation as well as the analysis, and so we are moving straight
to a decision." One of the strongest recommendations we have
made to the Prime Minister around this issue is that, even if
they come to a conclusion that they are minded to bring forward
a replacement nuclear programme of 10 gigawatts, they should not
move instantly to that as a firm decision, they should then engage
with the general public about that intention as part and parcel
of a much fuller engagement process.
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