Appendix: Government response
The Government welcomes the close interest in the
UK statistical system shown by the Treasury Committee over a number
of years, and welcomes this report on Independence for Statistics.
The Committee's report provides a valuable contribution to the
debate on the Government's proposals to legislate for independence
in statistics.
For ease of reference, the Committee's recommendations
are reiterated below (in bold, numbered paragraphs), with the
Government's response to each following.
1. The Treasury Committee has previously called
for the introduction of a Statistics Act and a clearer delineation
of the responsibilities of ministers, the National Statistician,
the Statistics Commission and others in relation to National Statistics
in order to guard against political interference in the production
and dissemination of official statistics. We therefore welcome
the Government's recognition that greater independence in the
statistical system is required and commend it on publishing its
recent consultation paper as a means of continuing the reform
process which it started in 1998. (Paragraph 16)
The Government welcomes the Committee's comments
on the Government's proposals to build on earlier reforms to the
statistical system in the UK, as set out in the consultation document,
Independence for statistics. The Government's proposals
aim to reinforce the independence, integrity and quality of statistics
produced in government, supporting the Government's agenda for
better public services, and contributing to long-term stability
in the UK economy.
2. We also welcome the Minister's acknowledgement
of the importance of addressing the existing low levels of public
confidence in statistics. Regardless of the detail of the Government's
final proposals we consider it essential that the Government ensures
that its proposals secure both sufficient independence and sufficient
perceived independence in the statistical system. It is crucial
that the Government carefully considers the way in which it communicates
the independence of statistics to the public with the aim of ensuring
that public trust in official statistics is significantly improved.
(Paragraph 17)
The Government recognises that perception plays an
important role in ensuring that official statistics command respect.
The Government is determined to ensure high standards of public
trust in the integrity of official statistics, and build on the
progress made to date. The Government accepts that the way in
which it communicates the independence of statistics to the public,
and indeed the debates in Parliament during passage of the Bill,
will play an important role ensuring its proposals are understood
and help reinforce the quality and integrity of statistics produced
in government.
THE FRAMEWORK FOR NATIONAL STATISTICS
3. We accept the Minister's point that it can
be difficult to define and quantify data produced outside of the
Government Statistical Service and we recognise that some data
is produced for internal use only. For this reason we accept that
it may not be feasible to apply a code of practice to all official
data. We believe however that it would be helpful if a clearer
distinction could be made between data which is produced for the
public domain and data which is used for internal purposes within
departments. (Paragraph 27)
The Government welcomes the Committee's recognition
of the difficulty of defining and quantifying data produced outside
of the Government Statistical Service, which encompasses a wide
range of outputs, from databases, to departmental management and
administrative data, to one-off research projects.
The current Framework for National Statistics describes
National Statistics as those key indicators that the Government,
business and the wider public rely on to provide an accurate,
up-to-date, comprehensive and meaningful description of the UK.
The Government's proposals aim to build on the current set of
designated National Statistics, by giving the new Board a statutory
responsibility independently to assess the quality and integrity
of all statistics currently designated as National Statistics
against a code of practice - that the Board itself will draw up
- and, on the basis of that, decide whether statistics should
receive formal approval as National Statistics.
4. We note the evidence we have received from
witnesses who described the National Statistics system as confusing
to both professional users and the wider public. We agree that
the current model is confusing. We are concerned that the creation
of National Statistics has resulted in the emergence of a two-tier
system, which has tended to undermine public confidence in official
statistics. We recommend that the Government seek to address the
problem by setting down clear criteria for what categories of
statistics should be classified as a 'National Statistic'. (Paragraph
28)
The Government's proposals aim to build on the current
set of designated National Statistics, by giving the new statistics
Board a statutory responsibility to independently assess the quality
and integrity of all statistics currently designated as National
Statistics against a code of practice. The Board will have a statutory
responsibility to develop and maintain the code.
It will be a matter for Ministers (as ultimately
accountable for directing the resources of their departments)
to propose statistics for assessment by the new Board; it will
be a matter for the Board - having undertaken its independent
assessment - to decide whether statistics should be approved as
National Statistics.
In addition, the Board will have a statutory responsibility
to advise, as the Statistics Commission does now, on areas of
concern about any statistics produced across government (whether
National Statistics or not) and, also as the Statistics Commission
does now, to maintain an overview of the coverage of the whole
system so that, when taken together, work programmes across the
system meet user needs.
5. We note that the Home Office has been able
to provide figures for the proportion of all its official statistics
which are designated as National Statistics. We recommend that
the Government publish the equivalent figures in respect of all
government departments in order to inform parliamentary scrutiny
of the expected legislation. (Paragraph 29)
The Government notes the Committee's recommendation.
Government statistics encompass a wide range of outputs, from
databases, to departmental management and administrative data,
to one-off research projects, much of which may be published or
publicly available. Against this background, to attempt to define
a proportion of total outputs in any one department which comprise
National Statistics is difficult to do consistently and accurately.
6. We acknowledge the benefits of the current
decentralised system as set out by the Government and endorsed
by the Office for National Statistics and others in the statistics
community. Given the apparently high levels of support for the
current system we do not suggest bringing all of the Government's
statistical operations together into a single office. (Paragraph 33)
The Government welcomes the Committee's endorsement
of our approach and recommendation against bringing all of the
Government's statistical operations together into a single office.
The UK has a long history of decentralised statistical production,
and the Government believes there are important strengths and
benefits in these arrangements, including:
- keeping statisticians close
to data suppliers and customers, giving them butter understanding
of their data;
- ensuring good working links to policymakers,
allowing them key insights into developments and needs; and
- maintaining professional statistical expertise
across government.
The strengths that flow from decentralisation outweigh
the potential benefits from centralising all statistical activity
in one office. The Government therefore plans to maintain the
current decentralised nature of the UK system.
7. However we note the Minister's acknowledgement
that the decentralised system affords government departments and
potentially ministers more influence over statisticians than would
a centralised system. We agree with the Royal Statistical Society
that a decentralised system risks perceptions of political interference
and that 'compensating mechanisms' are therefore required. We
recommend to the Government that although statisticians should
remain close to policy colleagues in departments they should have
formal responsibility to the National Statistician for any statistics
they produce which are intended for the public domain. We also
recommend that the Government examine the adequacy of the 'Chinese
Wall' arrangements which are currently in place in departments
- between departmental statisticians and the rest of the department
including ministers - and that it puts in place improved arrangements
if necessary. (Paragraph 34)
The Government notes the Committee's recommendations.
In the new system, statisticians will, as at present, continue
to be employed by government departments. Departmental Heads of
Profession for statistics will continue to be appointed by their
Heads of Department, but following consultation with National
Statistician, as Head of the Government Statistical Service.
All statisticians in government will have a line
of professional accountability to the National Statistician, as
Chief Professional Adviser. The Government intends that statisticians
outside of the central statistics office will remain within the
formal line management of their departments, and be accountable
to departmental Ministers for other aspects of their responsibilities.
8. We note the concerns of several witnesses that
the Government's consultation paper fails to address the independence
of statistics outside the ONS. We are not convinced by the Minister's
assertion that National Statistics "represent the most important
sources of data" for explaining "what is going on in
the economy and society", because they do not include some
of the most frequently quoted data on health, crime and education.
(Paragraph 43)
The Government recognises the importance of addressing
the independence of statistics outside the ONS. The Government's
proposed reforms go well beyond the central statistics office.
The new Board will have a statutory responsibility to independently
assess the quality and integrity of all National Statistics, to
consistent professional standards, whether produced within the
central statistics office or in policy departments across government.
Of around 1,450 statistical series produced by the
GSS, around 80 per cent are currently designated as National Statistics,
and will therefore be subject to independent assessment by the
new Board. Of these, the ONS is responsible for around 250 series;
the remainder (around 80 per cent) are produced in departments
and agencies outside the ONS.
In addition, the Board will have a statutory responsibility
to advise - as the Statistics Commission does now - on areas of
concern about any statistics produced across government (whether
National Statistics or not) and, also as the Statistics Commission
does now, to maintain an overview of the coverage of the whole
system so that, when taken together, work programmes across the
system meet user needs.
9. We agree with the Chief Statistician of Canada
that the public is unlikely to distinguish between statistics
originating from the ONS and statistics coming from other government
departments. We are therefore concerned that by addressing only
the independence of the ONS in its consultation paper the Government
may have missed an opportunity to improve public confidence in
official statistics. We recommend that the Government examine
including protocols in its forthcoming legislation that would
be applicable to all official statistics. (Paragraph 43)
The Government's proposed reforms go well beyond
the central statistics office and, having rejected an approach
that would centralise all the Government's statistical operations
in one office, it is important that the reforms do go beyond the
ONS. The new Board will have a statutory responsibility to independently
assess the quality and integrity of all National Statistics, to
consistent standards, whether produced within the central statistics
office or in policy departments across government.
Of around 1,450 statistical series produced by the
GSS, around 80 per cent are currently designated as National Statistics,
and will therefore be subject to independent assessment by the
new board. Of these, the ONS is responsible for around 250 series;
the remainder (around 80 per cent) are produced in departments
and agencies outside the ONS.
In addition, the Board will have a statutory responsibility
to advise - as the Statistics Commission does now - on areas of
concern about any statistics produced across government (whether
National Statistics or not) and, also as the Statistics Commission
does now, to maintain an overview of the coverage of the whole
system so that, when taken together, work programmes across the
system meet user needs.
10. We acknowledge the Minister's argument that
ministers are ultimately responsible for the outputs of their
departments and that they may therefore have some incentive to
see their departmental statistics awarded the National Statistics
kite mark of quality. We are nevertheless concerned that retention
of this control by ministers would undermine the perceived independence
of the system. The promise of a more thorough audit would not
appear to offer a strong incentive for ministers to designate
statistics within their departments as National Statistics. If
the Government proposes to retain the basis of the current National
Statistics system, we recommend that decisions about designation
should rest with the independent board, not with ministers, in
order to ensure that decisions about what constitutes a National
Statistic are made objectively and consistently by a body external
to the government departments concerned. (Paragraph 44)
The Government notes the Committee's recommendation.
The Government remains of the view that Ministers, as ultimately
accountable to Parliament and the electorate for determining priorities
and directing the resources of departments, should retain the
decision on whether to propose statistics for assessment by the
Board. With the added status and credibility that the independent
assessment process will give to confidence in National Statistics,
there will increasingly be an incentive for Ministers to want
within the system statistics that cover the key areas of activity
that their department is responsible for. It will, however, be
a matter for the new Board - having undertaken its independent
assessment - to decide whether statistics should be approved as
National Statistics.
The Board will also be given a statutory responsibility
to advise on areas of concern about any statistics produced across
government (whether National Statistics or not) and to maintain
an overview of the coverage of the whole system so that, when
taken together, work programmes across the system meet key user
needs.
11. We note the Statistics Commission's concerns
regarding the clarity and enforceability of the existing Code
of Practice. We therefore welcome the Government's proposal to
establish a statutory code of practice and its assurance that
drafting the code would be a matter for the independent governing
board without involvement from ministers. The introduction of
a new statutory code of practice would offer the opportunity to
establish a code which is unambiguous, able to be understood by
a wide range of readers and sufficiently precise as to be readily
enforceable. We are pleased to hear that the Statistics Commission
intends to put forward proposals for a new statutory code of practice
in the next few months. (Paragraph 50)
The Government is aware of the concerns of the Statistics
Commission regarding the clarity and enforceability of the existing
Code of Practice. The Board will have a statutory responsibility
to develop and maintain the code. In order to ensure that the
Board has the flexibility to ensure the code is fit for purpose,
it will be backed by statute, but not set out in statute. In practice,
the Government expects that any changes to the code made by the
Board will be based on the advice of the National Statistician,
following consultation with key stakeholders as appropriate. The
Government welcomes the announcement by the Statistics Commission
that it will consider bringing forward proposals on how the Code
of Practice might be developed for the new system.
12. We have considered the Minister's justification
of the current anomalous treatment of the Retail Prices Index
whereby the Framework for National Statistics gives the National
Statistician responsibility for "developing and maintaining
statistical standards definitions and classifications" of
all statistics other than the RPI. We question whether the degree
of Government exposure from changes to the RPI is such that the
Chancellor of the Exchequer needs to retain control of its scope
and definition particularly given that equivalent indices in comparable
countries are not treated as 'special cases'. We invite the Government
to explain more fully why it considers that the RPI should be
treated differently from other key macroeconomic statistics. (Paragraph
56)
The current RPI governance arrangements reflect the
importance of the RPI as a key economic indicator, used for a
wide range of policy, legislative and contractual purposes including:
up-rating pensions and social security benefits; indexing tax
thresholds; and calculating the inflation uplift on index-linked
gilts (ILGs). In particular, changes to the RPI have the potential
for widespread economic consequences, especially through the impact
on ILGs.
Like other gilts, ILGs' terms and conditions are
covered in the prospectuses under which they are issued. ILGs
first issued before July 2002 were issued under prospectuses that
contained an early redemption clause to protect investors' interests.
This requires the Government to offer to redeem ILGs at (inflation-adjusted)
par if there is a change to the way that RPI is constructed which
"in the opinion of the Bank of England, constitutes a
fundamental change in the Index which would be materially detrimental
to the interests of the stockholders". If this clause
were triggered while the ILGs were trading below par (that is,
where the prices of the relevant ILGs in the secondary market
were below the inflation-adjusted face-value of the bonds), then
rational investors would be expected to take up the offer in the
prospectus; the costs to Government in this case could be significant.
The potential implications of such a change on investor confidence,
also has the potential to have a disruptive impact on the market
more generally, requiring large-scale refinancing, and fragmenting
the market.
GOVERNANCE OF THE INDEPENDENT STATISTICS OFFICE
13. We support the Government's proposals that
the independent governing board should have a "strong non
executive presence" among its membership. However, we are
concerned about the Government's apparent intention to invest
the board with executive functions. We would prefer that the Government
ensure a clear statutory separation between the role of the National
Statistician in the executive (or operational) delivery of statistics,
on the one hand, and the board's responsibilities for the oversight
and scrutiny of the statistical system as a whole, on the other,
and we recommend accordingly. (Paragraph 63)
The Government notes the Committee's recommendation.
The Government intends that the independent Board will be non-executive
in nature, composed of a majority of non-executives and headed
by a non-executive chair. The National Statistician will be Chief
Executive of the central statistics office, and have responsibility
for the day-to-day delivery of the business of the office, and
head of the executive team. The Board will be responsible for
holding the National Statistician to account for the running of
the central statistics office, replacing the role of Ministers
now.
14. If after considering our recommendation the
Government decides to proceed with the proposals in their current
form we recommend that it establish a separate scrutiny body in
addition to the board. The establishment of such a body is in
line with the recommendations of the Statistics Commission's 2004
report Legislation to build trust in statistics.
(Paragraph 64)
The Government has considered carefully the case
for a separate scrutiny body, in addition to the Board. The Government
believes that its proposals - for an independent Board which will
be non-executive in nature, and with the National Statistician,
as Chief Executive, responsible for the day-to-day delivery of
the business of the office, and head of the executive team - provide
the best way forward.
15. We have considered the appropriateness of
the Government's proposal to appoint all board members in accordance
with the Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments' Code
of Practice. The proposal would mean that ministers would be offered
a final choice from at least two recommended candidates. We acknowledge
the concerns expressed by some witnesses that ministerial involvement
in the process of appointing members to the new independent board
could give rise to the perception of political interference. On
balance, however, we consider that the proposed adherence to OCPA
guidelines is sufficient to ensure independence. We agree with
the National Statistician that public perceptions about the independence
of the board will depend more on the actions of board members
than upon the way in which they are appointed. (Paragraph 68)
The Government welcomes the Committee's recommendation.
To ensure the independence of appointments to the Board, the Government
intends that all members - including the Chair and Chief Executive/National
Statistician - be appointed through open and fair competition
and in line with the Office of the Commission for Public Appointments
(OCPA) guidance. The Government intends that the Chair and Chief
Executive/National Statistician will be Crown appointments, on
the advice of Ministers, and all other non-executive Board members
will be Ministerial appointments, following consultation with
the Chair.
16. The Government's consultation paper does not
make any reference to the secretariat of the independent board.
The ONS has suggested two distinct models: one in which the board
shares a secretariat with the National Statistician; and another
in which the secretariats are separated. We recommend that the
secretariats of the independent department should maintain clear
separation between executive and regulatory functions. (Paragraph
70)
The Government believes it should be a matter for
the new independent Board to decide how to organise its support
team. The Government has made clear that the independent Board
will be non-executive in nature, composed of a majority of non-executives
and headed by a non-executive chair. The National Statistician,
as Chief Executive of the central statistics office, will have
responsibility for the day-to-day delivery of the business of
the office, and head of the executive team.
17. We are concerned that the consultation paper
does not clearly set out the responsibilities of the National
Statistician. We agree with the Chief Statistician of Canada that
the Government's proposals need "major strengthening"
in this area. (Paragraph 75)
The Government's proposals aim to strengthen the
role of the National Statistician in the new system. The Government
intends that the National Statistician will, as now, be:
- the Chief Executive of the
central statistics office (and therefore responsible for the
day-to-day delivery of the business of the office and head of
the executive team);
- the Chief Statistical Adviser to the Government
and the Board on all professional and technical statistical matters;
and
- Head of the Government Statistical Service
(GSS), providing leadership to all professional statisticians
within government, and being consulted on the appointments of
all departmental Heads of Profession for Statistics (who will
continue to have a responsibility to the National Statistician
for the professional quality of their work).
In addition, the Government intends that, in the
new system, the National Statistician will be:
- a full member of the new
Board (sharing responsibility with other Board members for
ultimate decision-making rather than, as now, advising Ministers
as the decision makers); and
- a higher-status Crown appointment (rather
than, as now, appointed by Ministers).
18. We believe that the professional authority
of the National Statistician over the executive delivery and coordination
of statistics should be clearly and unequivocally provided for
in legislation. The proposed responsibilities of the National
Statistician as set out by the Chief Statistician of Canada and
the RSS seem to us to be sensible and we recommend that future
legislation take adequate account of these proposals. The National
Statistician must be given the professional responsibilities and
statutory authority necessary to perform the roles of chief executive
of the statistical office. (Paragraph 76)
The Government has made clear that the National Statistician,
as Chief Executive of the central statistics office, will have
responsibility for the day-to-day delivery of the business of
the office, and head of the executive team. The National Statistician
will also be the Chief Statistical Adviser to the Government and
the Board on all professional and technical statistical matters.
The Government is keen to ensure the any legislation allows for
the effective operation of the new system.
19. We recommend that the title 'National Statistician'
be retained. (Paragraph 79)
The Government notes the Committee's recommendation,
and intends to strengthen the role of the National Statistician
in the new system. The Government intends that the National Statistician
will, as now, be:
- the Chief Executive of the
central statistics office (and therefore responsible for the
day-to-day delivery of the business of the office and head of
the executive team);
- the Chief Statistical Adviser to the Government
and the Board on all professional and technical statistical matters;
and
- Head of the Government Statistical Service
(GSS), providing leadership to all professional statisticians
within government, and being consulted on the appointments of
all departmental Heads of Profession for Statistics (who will
continue to have a responsibility to the National Statistician
for the professional quality of their work).
In addition, the Government intends that, in the
new system, the National Statistician will be:
- a full member of the new
Board (sharing responsibility with other Board members for
ultimate decision-making rather than, as now, advising Ministers
as the decision makers); and
- as a higher-status Crown appointment (rather
than, as now, appointed by Ministers).
ESTABLISHING A NON-MINISTERIAL DEPARTMENT
20. We have considered the arguments for transferring
the new non-ministerial department from HM Treasury to the Cabinet
Office. On balance, we conclude that the residual responsibilities
of Government in relation to the new independent statistics office
should remain with HM Treasury, although we do not agree that
the Government can credibly argue that locating the new department
outside the Treasury would detrimentally affect the Treasury's
ability to coordinate and measure departments' progress against
public service agreements and efficiency targets. The residual
responsibilities of ministers in respect of the new non-ministerial
department are likely to be limited and we therefore do not believe
that the precise location of the new department is particularly
important. However, if HM Treasury is to retain residual responsibility
for the new department, we recommend that the Government consider
carefully how it will demonstrate that its proposals will result
in a genuinely independent statistics office. What is important
is that the new department should be perceived to be more independent
than the present arrangement. (Paragraph 89)
The Government welcomes the Committee's recommendation
that the residual responsibilities of Government in relation to
the new independent statistics office should remain with HM Treasury,
and its recognition that the residual responsibilities of ministers
in respect of the new non-ministerial department are likely to
be limited. Central to the Government's proposals is the creation
of a new Board, independent from Ministers, composed of a majority
of non-executives and headed by a non-executive chair. The Board
will replace the current role of Ministers in holding the National
Statistician, as Chief Executive, to account for the running of
the central statistics office. Independence will be further reinforced,
through the creation of a Non-Ministerial Department, removed
from Ministerial control.
The Government recognises that perception plays an
important role in reinforcing the independence of statistics produced
in government. The Government is determined to ensure high standards
of public trust in the integrity of official statistics, and build
on the progress made to date, and accepts that the way in which
it communicates the independence of statistics to the public will
play an important role ensuring its proposals help reinforce the
quality and integrity of statistics produced in government.
FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE NON-MINISTERIAL DEPARTMENT
21. It is important that the Government consider
the detail of the process whereby the new statistics office's
budget will be set, and the extent to which Parliament might be
involved in this process. We look forward to the Government producing
detailed proposals and recommend that it outline these proposals
in its response to this report. (Paragraph 94)
The Government notes the Committee's recommendation.
The Government believes there are a number of key criteria needed
to underpin funding for the new arrangements:
- sufficient independence
in relation to government spending controls to avoid a perception
that statistical independence could be compromised;
- sufficient transparency in the funding
mechanism to build public confidence in independence; and
- sufficient flexibility to meet changing
needs; combined with
- adequate safeguards to encourage efficiency,
secure value for money, and control public spending.
Given that statistics are a public good, it is appropriate
- as now - for funding to come principally from general taxation.
To reinforce independence, while allowing for long-term planning,
the Government intends that funding for the functions of the new
Board and the central statistics office be set outside the normal
Spending Review process, via periodic review, with subsequent
increases determined by formula. The expenditure of the new Board
and the central statistics office will be paid out of money voted
by Parliament. The Government will provide further detail in due
course.
22. We welcome the Government's proposal to set
the funding of the independent statistics office outside the Spending
Review process. However, there is very little detail in the consultation
paper about how these funding arrangements will work in practice
and in oral evidence the Government was unable to provide us with
any further detail or clarification. (Paragraph 99)
The Government notes the Committee's recommendation.
To reinforce independence, while allowing for long-term planning,
the Government intends that funding for the functions of the new
board and the central statistics office be set outside the normal
Spending Review process, via periodic review, with subsequent
increases determined by formula. The expenditure of the new Board
and the central statistics office will be paid out of money voted
by Parliament. The Government will provide further detail in due
course.
23. We share the concerns of the Statistics Commission
and the Chief Statistician of Canada that the proposals as they
stand could undermine the new independent statistics office's
ability to determine its own work programme. However we agree
with the Government that some constraint must be placed on the
funding of the new independent statistics office's work programme
in order to safeguard public spending. On the question of the
appropriate frequency of the periodic review of the new office's
budget, we recommend that the Government adopt a minimum period
of five years between reviews in order to allow the statistics
office to operate with reasonable certainty. (Paragraph 100)
The Government notes the Committee's recommendation,
and will provide further detail in due course.
24. We share the concerns expressed by some of
our witnesses, that the Government's proposal to retain the census
within the Spending Review may well limit the new independent
statistics office's ability to undertake long-term planning for
future censuses. We recommend that the Government re-examine the
implications of this proposal, bearing in mind the importance
of enabling proper long-term planning of the census to take place.
(Paragraph 105)
The Government notes the Committee's recommendation,
and will provide further detail in due course.
25. According to the Minister, the new non-ministerial
department will have no new efficiency or relocation targets.
However, it is not clear from the consultation paper whether or
not the Government will require the new independent statistical
office to assume responsibility for the ONS's existing efficiency
targets for 2007-08 and existing relocation targets for 2010.
If the non-ministerial department is to be expected to meet the
ONS's existing targets, it is not yet clear how the Government
expects to hold the new non-ministerial department to account
for these targets. We recommend that the Government clarify these
points in its response to our report. (Paragraph 108)
As the Minister testified before the Committee, the
Government expects that the new funding arrangements will be designed
in such a way that the Board is subject to the "discipline
on the sorts of efficiencies that we expect of departments and
public agencies".
The Government intends that any reforms to the statistical
system should, as far as possible, reinforce the significant beneficial
organisational and modernisation work already underway in ONS,
and across government more generally, in light of the Lyons Review
of public sector relocation and the Gershon Review of public sector
efficiency. The Government will provide further detail in due
course on the funding arrangements for the new Board and the central
statistics office.
PARLIAMENT'S SCRUTINY ROLE
26. We agree with the Government that the production
of statistics is an executive function, and we are content that
Parliament's role should be limited to that of scrutiny in respect
of the new independent statistics office. (Paragraph 109)
The Government welcomes the Committee's recognition
that the production of statistics is an executive function and
its recommendation. Statistics are a public good, serving a wide
range of users. The Government therefore intends to reinforce
with legislation the existing independence of statistics, rather
than making statistical production a function of Parliament. However,
the Government places a high priority on the central role of Parliament
in holding the statistical system directly to account, and plans
to introduce more direct reporting and accountability to Parliament.
27. We expect that the House will consider what
form select committee scrutiny of the new independent statistics
office should take at an early stage of the legislative process.
Provided that Treasury ministers continue to have residual responsibility
for the new independent statistics office, we would expect that
this Committee would continue to take the lead role on behalf
of the House of Commons in calling members of the board and the
National Statistician before it to answer questions relating to
the performance of the office, its funding, and appointments to
the board. (Paragraph 115)
The Government notes the Committee's recommendation.
The Government expects Parliament to play the central role in
holding the statistical system to account under the proposed reforms.
The Government expects there to be full and direct accountability
to Parliament for the statistical system under the proposed reforms,
in the same way as for other independent institutions, such as
the Bank of England, the Financial Services Authority and the
competition regulators. The Government invites Parliament to consider
how to reinforce its role in scrutinising the performance of the
reformed statistical system and holding the new Board to account,
including through the select committee system.
28. The Government proposes that the new independent
board's annual report "would be laid before Parliament directly
by the board, rather than via a Minister". It is not clear
what the Government has in mind with this proposal. In practice,
all papers laid before the House of Commons must be laid by a
Member or, in a few agreed cases, by the Clerk of the House. We
can therefore only assume the Government is suggesting that it
would be for the Clerk of the House to lay the board's annual
report before the House. It is, of course, for the Clerk himself
to decide whether it would be appropriate for him to agree to
lay the board's annual report. However, it seems to us that it
would be more in line with current practice if the new board's
annual report was laid by ministers from the department which
assumes the residual responsibilities of Government in relation
to the new independent statistics office. This appears to be current
practice in respect of other non-ministerial departments and does
not appear to compromise their independence. Consequently, we
consider that the new board's annual report should be laid by
a Treasury minister. (Paragraph 119)
The Government welcomes the Committee's views on
the appropriate Parliamentary procedures to ensure there can be
full and direct accountability to Parliament for the new statistical
system. It also notes the current practice in respect of other
non-ministerial departments and that it does not appear to compromise
their independence. As such, the Government accepts the Committee's
recommendation.
29. We agree with the evidence submitted by the
Clerk of the House on the proposed arrangements for dealing with
Parliamentary Questions which fall within the responsibility of
the new independent statistics office. There is no precedent for
Committee chairmen to be conduits for answers from outside bodies
as the Government proposes, and we are concerned that any such
move would conflict with their interest in scrutinising such bodies.
Members might experience difficulty in directing questions if
answers were to be presented by the "Chairs of the committees
responsible for statistical matters": in the House of Commons
it is not entirely clear which committee best matches that description,
while in the House of Lords there is no Committee with responsibility
for statistical matters. We therefore recommend that the existing
arrangements remain in place, with Parliamentary Questions being
directed to the National Statistician via the relevant minister
who will assess the extent to which he or she is responsible for
answering before referring the remainder to the National Statistician
and subsequently presenting the answer to the House of Commons
and the House of Lords and arranging for it to be printed in Hansard.
(Paragraph 123)
The Government welcomes the Committee's views on
the appropriate Parliamentary procedures to ensure there can be
full and direct accountability to Parliament for the new statistical
system, and notes the views in evidence of the Clerk of the House.
The Government accepts the Committee's recommendation.
PRE-RELEASE OF STATISTICS
30. We understand the Minister's concern that
ministers should have pre-release access to official statistics,
in order to allow them to give a substantive and considered response
to statistics upon release. However, we have heard nothing to
convince us that it is necessary for ministers to have access
to statistics 40 hours prior to their release. We consider that
ministers would still be in a position to respond meaningfully
to statistics given a considerably shorter period of pre-release.
We note that our conclusions match those of the 2004 Phillis Review
in this respect, and that the time provided for pre-release access
is much shorter in countries such as Australia, France and the
United States than it is in the UK. We therefore recommend that
the Government ensure that the statutory successor to the Protocol
on Release Practices is drafted so that ministers receive pre-release
access to all data other than market sensitive data no more than
three hours prior to release. In the case of market sensitive
data, we recommend that ministers receive pre-release access on
the day prior to release, after the markets have closed. (Paragraph
142)
The Government notes the Committee's recommendation
and welcomes the Committee's recognition of the importance of
pre-release to enable Ministers to account for the policy implications
of statistics at the time of publication and, in certain circumstances,
be in a position to announce policy decisions immediately after
the release of data. The principle of early access to data for
Ministers is widely accepted internationally, with many countries
- including Australia, France, Ireland, New Zealand and the US
- having in place some form of pre-release regime. The Government
continues to consider how pre-release might operate in the future
and will announce further detail in due course.
31. In addition to ministerial access, it seems
to us that it may also be in the interests of a properly functioning
democracy to give the relevant opposition spokespeople a degree
of pre-release access. We recommend that the Government ensure
that the statutory successor to the Protocol on Release Practices
is drafted so that opposition spokespeople receive pre-release
access on a similar basis to ministers, but no more than one hour
prior to release, rather than three hours. This would place opposition
spokespeople on a similar footing to ministers at the time of
release, and should enable a broader political debate to take
place on any given dataset. We recommend that the Government consider
incorporating this point in the statutory successor to the Protocol
on Release Practices. (Paragraph 143)
The Government notes the Committee's recommendation.
The Government continues to consider how pre-release might operate
in the future and will announce further detail in due course.
32. In addition to changes to ministers' pre-release
access, we consider further reform is needed in respect of civil
servants' pre-release access to statistics. We consider that the
statutory successor to the Protocol on Release Practices should
cover the use of data prior to official release by all government
personnel. Such a protocol should serve to discourage abuse of
pre-release and, in particular, to ensure that non-statisticians
do not comment on administrative data prior to release. (Paragraph
144)
The Government notes the Committee's recommendation.
The Government continues to consider how pre-release might operate
in the future and will announce further detail in due course.
33. Finally, in the interests of improving public
confidence in official statistics, we recommend that the independent
statistics office release alongside National Statistics its own
considered and non-partisan interpretation. Any implications for
Government policy could then be subsequently explained by the
relevant minister or government department. In order to discourage
misrepresentation of National Statistics by ministers and government
departments and, more widely, the media and other groups, we recommend
that the National Statistician should continue to have the authority
to monitor and police those who misuse and misrepresent statistics.
(Paragraph 145)
The Government notes the Committee's recommendation.
The Government continues to consider how pre-release might operate
in the future and will announce further detail in due course.
DEVOLUTION AND UK-WIDE STATISTICS
34. The benefits of having coherent UK-wide statistics
are self-evident. Based on the evidence we have received, there
are clearly problems with gathering comparable UK-wide statistics.
Such problems undermine any meaningful assessment of the success
of devolution because they make it difficult to measure the impact
of differing government policies implemented across the administrations
- in the fields of health and education, for instance. (Paragraphs
166 and 167)
The Government notes the Committee's recommendation.
Reflecting a long history of decentralised statistical production
in the UK, the devolved administrations retained authority over
statistical processes and production within their respective countries
as part of the 1998 devolution settlement. The Government notes
the concerns raised about the impact of this on the delivery of
coherent and comparable statistics across the UK, but as the Financial
Secretary made clear in evidence to the Committee, there is no
question of re-opening the devolution settlement. As a result
of the 2001 Memorandum of Understanding between the UK Government
and the devolved administrations, it will be a matter for the
devolved administrations to decide what action they might take
in response to the Government's proposed reforms; the Government
cannot impose new arrangements on them.
The UK Government continues to work closely with
the Devolved Administrations on the proposed statistical reforms,
including scope to update the Concordat on Statistics, agreed
alongside the 2001 Memorandum of Understanding, to secure delivery
of coherent and comparable statistics across the UK into the future.
35. We are concerned by the apparent fragmentation
of some statistics across the UK. We recommend that the Government
use the opportunity offered by its present consultation process
to examine what it can do, both unilaterally and in cooperation
with the devolved administrations, to improve coordination of
the collection and production of statistics across the UK's different
administrations. One step which the Government could clearly initiate
is a review of the 2001 Concordat on Statistics, which sets out
arrangements for the UK statistical work agreed between the devolved
administrations. We therefore welcome the Minister's commitment,
on behalf of the Government, to review the Concordat on Statistics,
particularly in light of his suggestion that, while this fragmentation
has been an issue for some time because of differing local circumstances
and requirements, devolution has led to an inevitable intensification
of the problem. We recommend that the Government negotiate a revised
Concordat with the devolved administrations, that the National
Statistician, in consultation with the chief statisticians for
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, be given responsibility
for drafting a revised Concordat and that the new independent
board be given responsibility for monitoring the implementation
of the revised Concordat. (Paragraph 168)
The Government notes the Committee's recommendation.
The UK Government continues to work closely with the devolved
administrations on the proposed statistical reforms, including
scope to update the Concordat on Statistics, agreed alongside
the 2001 Memorandum of Understanding, to secure delivery of coherent
and comparable statistics across the UK into the future.
36. Finally, it is important that the UK-wide
scrutiny and audit function currently undertaken by the Statistics
Commission is adequately replicated under the Government's proposals.
We recommend that the new independent board be given responsibility
for oversight of the statistical system throughout the United
Kingdom. (Paragraph 169)
The Government notes the Committee's recommendation.
Reflecting a long history of decentralised statistical production
in the UK, the devolved administrations retained authority over
statistical processes and production within their respective countries
as part of the 1998 devolution settlement. The Government notes
the concerns raised about the impact of this on the delivery of
coherent and comparable statistics across the UK, but as the Financial
Secretary made clear in evidence to the Committee, there is no
question of re-opening the devolution settlement. As a result
of the 2001 Memorandum of Understanding between the UK Government
and the devolved administrations, it will be a matter for the
devolved administrations to decide what action they might take
in response to the Government's proposed reforms; the Government
cannot impose new arrangements on them.
ACCESS TO STATISTICS
37. There appears to be strong feeling in the
statistical community about the need to provide government statisticians
with access to administrative data. We accept that such access
could bring about the economic and social benefits set out by
the ONS and others. However, as the Government has pointed out,
these benefits must be balanced against important privacy rights.
We recommend that the Government use the opportunity offered by
the forthcoming statistics legislation to allow government statisticians
greater access to administrative data. The Government should ensure
that appropriate safeguards are put in place to ensure that the
integrity and security of personal information is not compromised,
and that access extends no further than statisticians working
in specified parts of government. (Paragraph 176)
The Government welcomes the Committee's recommendation.
The idea of using any statistics legislation as a way to increase
sharing of administrative data across government departments drew
strong support during the Government's recent consultation process,
including in reference to international practice (given that the
principle of access by national statistics' offices to administrative
data for statistical purposes is one which is widely accepted
in many other countries).
The Government believes that increased data sharing
for statistical purposes has the potential to bring real benefits
in terms of: improving statistical analysis and therefore the
evidence-base for better policy making and resource allocations;
reducing the burden on business (especially small business) of
completing surveys on information already held by government;
addressing the problems of declining survey response rates; and
reducing the cost to government of conducting such surveys.
The Government recognises that the debate is a complex
one, and there are rightly concerns around the privacy rights
and confidentiality aspects of such data sharing, which were also
reflected in representations during the consultation.
38. We are concerned to hear that the previous
National Statistician considers that the capacity to protect properly
gathered information in the UK is declining. We recommend that
the Government take this opportunity to consider whether the protection
of people and organisations from the unauthorised disclosure of
information held about them for National Statistics or other statistical
purposes requires a statutory basis. We further recommend that
the Government consider whether it is appropriate that statutory
responsibility for protecting confidentiality should rest with
the independent board, given the possible implications for the
authority and independence of the National Statistician. (Paragraph
179)
The Government notes the Committee's concerns. The
ONS has a long history of maintaining data confidentiality and
already securely holds sensitive information on individuals, including
census returns, employees' earnings, and individual businesses'
profits. The Government intends that the new Board will have a
statutory objective to protect the confidentiality of all data
provided to it.
The National Statistician will also have an important
role to play in ensuring the Board meets this objective, through
their roles as: Chief Executive of the central statistics office,
Chief Statistical Adviser to the Government and the Board on all
professional and technical matters, Head of the Government Statistical
Service (providing leadership to all professional statisticians
within government), and as a member of the new Board themselves.
39. We note the concerns of the Statistics User
Forum regarding access to government statistics, including access
to data on the ONS website. We invite the Government's comments
on these concerns. The current review of the independence of statistics
offers a good opportunity for the Government to consider making
datasets held by government agencies and departments more freely
available to third parties. (Paragraph 183)
The Government recognises that high quality statistics
are a key resource for business, academia and the wider community,
and notes the Committee's recommendation.
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