LESSONS FROM THE US COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT
ACT
16. Another possible legislative approach that was
frequently referred to in evidence was one based on the United
States Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). We learnt more about
the operation of this legislation during our visit to the USA
in February 2006. The CRA was enacted in 1977 to prevent so-called
"red-lining"the practice of banks explicitly
choosing not to offer lending services to people identified as
living in certain districtsand to encourage banks and thrifts
to help meet the credit needs of all segments of their communities,
including low- and moderate-income neighbourhoods. The CRA and
its implementing regulations require federal financial institution
regulators to assess the record of each bank and thrift in helping
to fulfil their obligations to the community and to consider that
record in evaluating applications for charters or for approval
of bank mergers, acquisitions and branch openings. We were told
that the CRA is part of a 'three-legged stool' that encourages
banks to serve the needs of low-income communities, the other
two legs being made up of fair lending and other anti-discrimination
laws, and reporting laws such as the mortgage disclosure acts.
Banks are evaluated in several areas and receive a rating based
on their activities in low-income communities. Ratings are based
on loan provision, branch and cash services and community development
activity. The CRA is principally concerned with lending rather
than the provision of current accounts. Banks can comply with
the CRA and improve their rating through direct provision of financial
products and services or by investing in organisations embedded
in local communities such as Community Development Finance Institutions
or local community banks. We learnt that banks increasingly view
CRA activity as activity that could yield profitable business
opportunities or attract tax relief. Sir Fred Goodwin, Chief Executive
of RBSwhich owns Citizens Financial Group in the UStold
us that
CRA has not been problematic to our [US] business
It brought some structure and consistency across the industry
A number of the leading players have actually gone some
way beyond it but it did act as a catalyst
[but] you could
probably do better than a CRA if you were trying to invent something.[27]
A key lesson from our visit to the USA was that,
over time, the CRA has become less important in forcing banks
into investment and other decisions that it might not wish to
make than in enhancing transparency about bank activities in deprived
communities.
17. One of the key recommendations of the Social
Investment Taskforce, which was established by the Chancellor
of the Exchequer to consider ways in which increased investment
could be made in the poorest communities, was that United Kingdom
banks disclose their lending data in respect of low-income areas.[28]
A recent report assessing progress in relation to the Taskforce's
recommendations concluded that, "while a number of banks
have disclosed some information about their activities, not all
have done so. The current regime of voluntary disclosure leaves
an environment where banks are providing information that makes
helpful comparison problematic."[29]
Ms Sarah McGeehan, Deputy Chief Executive of the Community Development
Finance Association (CDFA), recognised that "a structure
which was around disclosure of engagement in these markets, whether
it be through CDFIs, credit unions or direct provision
could enable us to understand relatively how different commercial
banks were doing, but also be able to show us where there were
opportunities in the market place; [the CRA] has opened up niche
markets for the commercial banks".[30]
18. Which? argued that the Government should consider
introducing "CRA-style disclosure requirements so that policy
makers can gauge the extent of financial exclusion and the behaviour
of individual firms".[31]
We put the suggestion to the banks that it would be useful to
have some measure of banks' performance, in terms of their engagement
with low-income areas. Mr Gary Hoffman, Chairman of UK Banking
and Barclaycard, Barclays, told us that Barclays disclosed information
concerning the proportion of Barclays current accounts, consumer
lending and ATMs in deprived areas.[32]
Mr Dyfrig John, Chief Executive Officer, HSBC, indicated that
HSBC did not currently publish such information but would be happy
to do so, providing that such information was reported by all
the banks on a consistent basis.[33]
Our conclusions
19. Some evidence we received argued that the time
is ripe to move beyond the current voluntary approach to enhancing
access to banking services for the financially excluded by introducing
a statutory requirement to provide banking services for all. The
precise form such a requirement might take remains unclear, as
some of its advocates acknowledge. The concept of a "universal
service obligation" is generally associated with services
that have been provided in the public sector or in sectors where
licensing or high barriers to entry confers a particular market
advantage. Banking could be seen as a more open and competitive
market than some markets to which universal service obligations
apply, making comparisons with postal or telecommunications services
of limited value, although it is possible to envisage a situation
in which statutory regulation undertaken by the FSA included more
stringent conditions on the activities of banks in relation to
the financially excluded. The case for the imposition of statutory
requirements relating to access to, or the provision of, banking
services for the financially excluded is closely linked to analysis
of the current performance of the banking industry and of individual
banks. This Report makes a contribution to such an analysis. As
matters stand, we do not consider that the case for such legislative
action has been made. We agree with the Economic Secretary to
the Treasury that more can be achieved at present by a voluntary
partnership approach, and also with his important point that the
willing participation of the banks will be essential in tackling
financial inclusion regardless of legislative action. However,
we also note the statement by the Economic Secretary to the Treasury
that a legislative approach "is not off the table",
and our approach in this Report is based on identifying areas
where we expect progress to be made by banks individually and
collectively if they are to be able to satisfy the Government,
legislators and the public in the future that the voluntary approach
is the best way forward. This Report contains recommendations
requiring action by the banks. We make such recommendations within
the context of our wish to identify benchmarks by which to assess
the effectiveness of the current voluntary partnership approach.
We expect to monitor closely actions taken in response to those
recommendations.
20. An important element in the monitoring by this
Committee, by the Government and by others will be an assessment
of information on the performance of individual banks. One of
the strengths of the CRA in the USA lies in the requirements it
imposed on banks to report information on activities in low-income
areas and the culture that helped to establish where banks were
more conscious both of their activities in such areas and of the
profitable business opportunities such activities created. Although
we do not see a case at present for the introduction of legislation
comparable to the US Community Reinvestment Act, we recommend
that the Government, the banks and the Financial Inclusion Taskforce
work together to prepare and then publish measures of engagement
by the individual banks with the socially excluded, provided on
a standard basis no later than the middle of 2007. More generally,
the adequacy of the provision by banks of information which enables
full and effective monitoring to be carried out will be an important
criterion in determining the overall success of the voluntary
partnership approach to combating financial exclusion in banking
services.
14 Q 981 Back
15
The New Economics Foundation, Basic bank accounts: the case
for a universal service obligation, 2005; see also Ev 408. Back
16
Ev 225, 332, 389 Back
17
Ev 503 Back
18
Ibid Back
19
Ibid Back
20
Q 42 Back
21
Q 18 Back
22
Ibid Back
23
Qq 789-792 Back
24
Q 488 Back
25
Q 981 Back
26
Ibid Back
27
Q 789 Back
28
Social Investment Taskforce, 'Wealth beyond welfare', October
2000, recommendation 3 Back
29
Enterprising Communities, Wealth beyond welfare, a 2005 update
on the social investment taskforce, p 2 Back
30
Q 310 Back
31
Ev 501 Back
32
Q 785 Back
33
Q 786 Back