Select Committee on Treasury Written Evidence


Supplementary memorandum submitted by One Parent Families

  1.  We think that there are good reasons on both administrative and policy grounds for removing the childcare element of Working Tax Credit. The lack of responsiveness of childcare costs was one of the major criticisms of the fixed nature of WFTC awards. Research suggested that this was one element of the system that claimants did want to be more responsive. Under Working Families Tax Credit callers to our helpline reported problems in not being able to claim new or increased childcare costs after the date of the initial claim for WFTC. Other research also suggests that this lack of responsiveness was a problem. Research into the childcare element by MORI for the Revenue found that "The fact that WFTC awards were fixed created difficulties for some recipients. The key issue was where needs changed over the course of the award. This could lead to disparities between the award and actual childcare use.... On occasion the gap between what was being claimed and what was being paid out in childcare had caused severe if short term hardship."[21]

  2.  But the system chosen for the payment of the childcare element of tax credits at present represents a halfway point between simplicity and responsiveness that satisfies neither requirement effectively. Moreover, the childcare element may not be the most effective way to meet policy goals. Removing the childcare element from Working Tax Credit would considerably reduce the administrative burden on the Revenue.

  3.  The operation of the childcare element is far from simple. At present, there are four basic methods of calculating average weekly costs, based on past childcare costs:

    —    Same amount weekly—add last four weeks and divide by four;

    —    Different amounts weekly—add last 52 weeks and divide by 52;

    —    Same amount monthly—take last month, x 12, divide by 52;

    —    Different amounts monthly—take last 12 months and divide by 52.

  And two based on future costs:

    —    An estimate of costs over the next 52 weeks if childcare has not yet or has recently started;

    —    Total costs divided by the total number of weeks used if childcare is expected to last less than a year (eg few months before a child goes to school).

  4.  In order to report changes in childcare costs, costs have to have fallen to zero, decreased by £10, or increased by £10 per week over a period of four consecutive weeks. Therefore while increases in costs can be recouped, they must have been incurred for a month previously, which for those on a low income does not constitute a high degree of responsiveness.

  5.  Our own research found that parents find the current system difficult: just over a quarter of those in the sample required to calculate their childcare costs struggled with this, with lone parents reporting problems recalling how much was paid, understanding the instructions provided by the Inland Revenue and actually performing the calculation.[22]

  6.  Two options for reform have been put forward for the way in which the childcare element within the Working Tax Credit operates:

    —    System 1 (Average weekly costs)—Claimants would estimate their total costs for the tax year, divide by 52 to arrive at their average weekly cost, and receive an award based on that average weekly cost each week or 4 weekly. Claimants could base the cost on their costs over the last tax year, or could estimate how much they expected to spend in the current tax year if they were anticipating a significant change from the previous year's costs, or if none had been incurred. If a claim was made in-year, the claimant would estimate their total costs to the end of the tax year and divide by the number of weeks left to the end of the tax year.

    —    System 2 (Actual costs)—Claimants would claim for their actual costs. They would provide the Revenue with their actual weekly cost (or monthly if costs paid monthly) and would then receive an award paid every week/four weekly based on the actual cost until that cost changed or childcare ceased.

  7.  System one has been criticised for being difficult for low income parents to operate, as the extra cash will not be in their pockets at the time of the increased childcare costs. System two has however come under similar criticism as placing an unreasonable administrative burden on the Revenue. Following several meetings about the issue the Revenue now appear to have reached an impasse in attempts to reconcile simplicity and responsiveness.

  8.  Looking at the policy objectives of meeting the costs of childcare there are also reasons to think that the childcare element of working tax credit may not be the best or only mechanism available. There may be a number of reasons why the Government wishes to subsidise formal childcare use through the Working Tax Credit, including:

    —    To encourage or enable families, and particularly women, to work.

    —    To encourage the use of formal childcare which may have beneficial outcomes for children.

    —    To help reduce poverty by meeting the costs of childcare that low income families are already using.

  9.  The Institute for Fiscal Studies in their Green Budget of this year suggested that the current system does little to address these objectives. Their arguments can be summarised as follows:

    —    It is not transparent—it is likely that mothers who are thinking about returning to work and using formal childcare will find it hard to work out how much money they will be entitled to receive for childcare, and this uncertainty may reduce the extent to which the childcare element of WTC can persuade mothers to enter work.

    —    It is not well designed to raise the quality of formal childcare—research from the US suggests that subsidies like the childcare element of WTC are not well designed to increase the quality of care used by parents. A review of the economics literature on childcare found that "when price falls, consumers substitute towards quantity and away from quality".[23] They also point out that the termination of childcare payments when a job ends is unlikely to be beneficial for children due to the disruption caused (One Parent Families have long argued for a run on in childcare costs at this point).

    —    It is not the best designed instrument for helping mothers to work; evidence from the US suggests that childcare subsidies are reasonably effective in increasing what parents spend on formal childcare, but have little or no impact on mothers' labour supply decisions.

    —    It is not particularly well targeted on helping the poorest families—because the poorest families are not in work, which is a condition of claiming the childcare element of WTC.[24]

  10.  The childcare element of Working Tax Credit therefore does not seem to be operating effectively either administratively or in terms of meeting its policy objectives. We therefore think that there is a good case for removing childcare subsidies from the tax credit system and paying them by another means—and thus removing an administrative burden from the Revenue.

  11.  We obviously do not want Government to stop meeting the costs of childcare and therefore need to suggest other ways in which this could be done. The IFS Green Budget suggested two ways in which childcare costs could be met:

    (a)  To give the Government greater control over the quality of childcare provision, the demand side subsidy of the Childcare element of Working Tax Credit could be turned into a supply side intervention that directly increases quality. Such interventions could be universal, limited to deprived areas, or means tested against parental income in some way.

    (b)  The childcare element of the Working Tax Credit could be replaced by tax credit changes that encourage all mothers to work—for example by increasing Working Tax Credit elements (eg the lone parent/couple element). Alternatively extra money could be redirected to children whether their parents are working or not by increasing Child Benefit or the per child element of the Child Tax Credit.

  12.  Providing greater supply side funding to secure universal free, quality childcare is an ambitious vision and one that we have long supported. In their vision for childcare in 2020, the Daycare Trust and Social Market Foundation suggest that all two, three and four year olds should be entitled to 20 hours per week free early education and care for up to 48 weeks a year, funded by payments to providers. They also suggest that additional wrap around education and care be available from 8 am to 6 pm for 48 weeks a year for all two, three and four year olds, and that additional wrap around care for five to 14 year olds is delivered though extended schools, and suggest, much as in the first IFS option that: "Childcare tax credits would eventually be abolished to help meet the costs of this package, which would primarily be funded through supply side grants to early education and care providers."[25]

  This vision has to some extent been taken up in the Government's ten year childcare strategy which sets out:

    —    A goal of 20 hours a week of free high quality care for 38 weeks for all three and four year olds with this Pre Budget Report announcing a first step of 15 hours a week for 38 weeks a year reaching all children by 2010; and

    —    An out of school childcare place for all children aged three to 14 between the hours of 8 am to 6 pm each weekday by 2010.

  13.  Yet the out of school childcare places are not necessarily free. Even if they were, and with full implementation of these goals, there will still be parents who need to pay for additional childcare, for example to cover atypical working hours, and who will need help with the costs of this. Although we think that the balance of funding should shift to providing supply side subsidies in order to secure free childcare places, there will still remain a role for some demand side payments.

  14.  Would demand side funding best be provided by giving more money to all working parents, or all those with children as in the IFS's second suggestion? While this may help to reduce poverty if extra money is put into Child Benefit and Child Tax Credits, or to increase work incentives if put into Working Tax Credit, we think that it is likely to make things difficult for parents who are actually trying to meet the costs of childcare, as it could bear no relation to childcare use. If, for example, the addition to Working Tax Credit amounted to £50 a week, those using childcare that cost, say £100 a week may be forced to reduce their hours in order to have to use only £50 worth of childcare.

  15.  We do not however want to replicate the highly responsive but complicated system we already have operating through the Childcare Tax Credit. An alternative, simpler system is operated in New Zealand, which might provide a model. The system includes some means testing, and relates to both the number of children you have and the number of childcare hours you use. A set payment is given for each childcare hour you use, depending on your income band. Income bands are different depending on the number of children you have in your family. At present you can claim for up to 50 hours a week if you are in paid work or study, and for nine hours if in neither. Current rates are as follows:


Number of children in family
The family's weekly income before tax
The subsidy (per hour) per child is up to

1
less than $770
$2.91
$770 to $849.99
$2.03
$850 to $929.99
$1.13
$930 or more
No subsidy
2
less than $950
$2.91
$950 to $1,039.99
$2.03
$1,040 to $1,129.99
$1.13
$1,130 or more
No subsidy
3
less than $1,110
$2.91
$1,110 to $1,219.99
$2.03
$1,220 to $1,329.99
$1.13
$1,330 or more
No subsidy

Source: Ministry of Social Development, New Zealand

http://www.workandincome.govt.nz/get-financial-assistance/extra-help/childcare-oscar-subsidy.html

  16.  We think that it might be possible to operate a similar system on a local authority level. This could operate in a similar way to the currently piloted Local Housing Allowance with local maximum rates being set. While in New Zealand the payments are made direct to childcare providers, we would prefer to see payments made directly to parents—and as local authorities are making payments directly to claimants under the Local Housing Allowance scheme this should be possible.

  17   Advantages of operating a scheme like this would be:

    —    It is simpler and more transparent than the current system of tax credits. Parents thinking of going into work and using childcare should be able to easily work out how much subsidy for this they will receive.

    —    It would enable local differences in childcare costs to be accounted for—we would expect, for example, the per hour subsidy to be higher in London.

    —    It takes into account family income, number of children and actual childcare use, albeit less precisely than the current system.

    —    It allows parents choice about the type and hours of childcare they use (although this is assuming that the payment would remain in place only for formal rather than informal childcare).

    —    It encourages childcare use amongst those not in work—albeit that free childcare provision should already be doing this.

  18.  Possible disadvantages with this system however are that:

    —    Local Authority practice in delivering Housing Benefit does not inspire great faith in their ability to provide timely and accurate payments to claimants.

    —    Parents using expensive childcare may lose out.

    —    Marginal tax rates would be very high as parental income reaches the upper limit of each income band.

  These would have to be weighed up carefully but we do think that it is worth examining the potential of this model.

January 2006






21   Nicholls J and Simm C (2003) The childcare element of Working Families Tax Credit-qualitative study Inland Revenue. Back

22   Griggs J, McAllister F and Walker R (2005) The new tax credits system: knowledge and awareness among recipients One Parent Families. Back

23   D Blau, "Child care subsidy programmes", in R A Moffitt (ed), Means-Tested Transfer Programs in the United States, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2003. cited in IFS (2005) The IFS Green Budget January 2005 IFS. Back

24   Adapted from Chote R, Emmerson C, Miles D and Oldfield Z eds. The IFS Green Budget 2005 IFS. Back

25   PricewaterhouseCoopers (2004) Universal early education and care in 2020; costs, benefits and funding options. Daycare Trust and Social Market Foundation. Back


 
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