Memorandum submitted by Andrew Leyshon,
Paola Signoretta and Shaun French, School of Geography, University
of Nottingham
THE CHANGING GEOGRAPHY OF BRITISH BANK AND
BUILDING SOCIETY BRANCH NETWORKS, 1995-2003
1. EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
This submission to the Treasury Committee on
Financial Inclusion provides summary information from an Economic
and Social Research Council-funded project (RES-000-22-0686) undertaken
at the School of Geography, University of Nottingham between 2004-2005.
The research analysed the changing geography of bank and building
society branches in Great Britain between 1995 and 2003. The closure
of banks and building society branches can have significant consequences
for customers, who may have to incur additional costs to travel
to undertake transactions or obtain face-to-face advice, in addition
to engendering a sense of loss and abandonment within local communities.
The loss of counter services and cash transmission is particularly
problematic for local businesses. This project updated research
undertaken by the authors in the 1990s which mapped changes in
bank and building society branch networks between 1989 and 1995.
The current research confirmed that the branch networks of both
banks and building societies have now been in a continuous process
of decline since at least the late 1980s. Between 1989-2003 banks
closed 36% of their branches, converted building societies[319]
22%, and building societies 17%. Between 1995-2003, banks closed
22% of their branches, converted building societies 19% and building
societies 5%. Thus, closure rates varied between institutions
over the period, with banks in particular being anxious to drive
down costs by closing branches in the face of investor pressure.
This long run process of closure is also a product of a more competitive
market for retail financial services, which forces all firms to
seriously appraise costs against revenues. It is also a result
of new distribution channels supplementing the branch, and changes
in the ways in which customers access financial services.
Closures vary geographically, as firms adjust
their branch networks to spatial variations in markets. The average
branch closure rate for bank and building society branches for
all areas between 1995 and 2003 was 20%. However, the highest
rate of closure—almost 24%—was experienced in Multicultural
metropolitan areas, which include poor inner city areas. Higher
than average rates of branch closure were also experienced in
areas defined as Prospering metropolitan, Traditional manufacturing,
Built up areas, and Student communities. Meanwhile, areas that
experienced lower than average branch closures tended to be more
affluent, and which could safely be described as typically `Middle
England': these were Suburbs and small towns, Coastal and countryside
areas and Industrial hinterlands.
We anticipate that this process of geographical
adjustment will continue for the foreseeable future because those
areas with lower than average rates of branch closure—Suburbs
and small towns, Coastal and countryside areas and Industrial
hinterlands—continue to have a smaller share of branches
than their share of the population. Moreover, the population of
these areas possess the socio-economic profiles that make them
highly attractive to retail financial services firms, which means
that, against a background of overall decline, we anticipate a
further reduction in the share of bank and building society branches
located within less affluent urban areas and a relative increase
in the proportion within more affluent suburban areas and small
towns.
2. RESEARCH BACKGROUND
The aim of this research project was to update
earlier research undertaken in the 1990s which mapped the changing
geography of bank and building society branches between 1989 and
1995. An Economic and Social Research Council-supported project
undertaken between 2004 and 2005 updated the figures to 2003,
and revealed that the branch networks of both banks and building
societies have now been in a continuous process of decline since
at least the late 1980s. This decade and a half of branch network
shrinkage was initially triggered by problems sown by financial
services firms during the mid- to late-1980s as they adjusted
to increased levels of competition following the re-regulation
of the sector. But it has also been a product of investor pressure
on banks, the growth of new distribution methods which now supplement
the branch as a channel for the sale and purchase of retail financial
products and services, and subsequent changes in the ways in which
many customers access retail financial services.
Despite the relative decline in the strategic
importance of the branch to banks and building societies, the
Government nevertheless considers the branch to be an important
bulwark against financial exclusion (PAT 14/HM Treasury, 1999).
Initiatives such as the basic bank account and the decision to
pay social benefits into bank accounts have confronted banks with
a significant dilemma. That is, how to address the Government's
insistence that low income customers (who rely upon branch networks)
are served while at the same time seeking to adjust to a changing
competitive landscape, which is driving branch closure and relocation?
As the government admits in a recent policy document on financial
exclusion:
the basic transaction costs for low-income customers
are higher because they are heavier users of branches, making
them even less likely to generate profits for the bank. Therefore,
most banks do not see basic bank accounts as a commercial opportunity
(HM Treasury, 2004, page 29, emphasis added).
This dilemma also confronts building societies,
because some of the largest societies are also involved in the
delivery of basic bank accounts. Moreover, even those societies
not offering basic bank accounts will be affected because of the
potential for additional enquiries at branches and call centres
regarding the basic bank account. Moreover, the pressure to close
branches is particularly problematic for building societies because
by their very nature they are organizations that `have long taken
the challenges of financial exclusion very seriously: most societies
began in response to their members being excluded from affordable
housing finance and societies have been a safe home for the savings
of millions of low and moderately paid households for over 200
years'. (Dayson, 2004, page 8).
The aim of this project, therefore, was to assess
developments in the geography of the branch-based distribution
networks of mainstream financial services and thus assess the
extent of financial infrastructure withdrawal between 1995 and
2003.
3. BRANCH CLOSURES
1995-2003
The changing size of bank and building society
branch networks between 1989-1995 and 1995-2003 is represented
in Table 1. Between 1989-2003 the rate of branch closure was 36%
for banks, 22% for converted building societies and 17% for building
societies. Between 1995-2003, banks closed 22 % of their branches,
converted building societies 19% and building societies 5%. Comparison
of yearly average closure rates for the period 1989-1995 and 1995-2003
reveal marked institutional differences. Whereas the average yearly
rate of closure for former building societies quadrupled from
0.6% per annum between 1989-1995 to 2.4% per annum between 1995-2003,
and decreased only marginally for banks from 3.0% per annum between
1989-1995 to 2.8% between 1995-2003, the closure rates for building
societies more than halved during the same period, falling from
2.1% per annum between 1989-1995 to just 0.6% between 1995 to
2003. During interviews undertaken with representatives of retail
banks and of existing and converted building societies, it became
apparent that corporate governance plays a key role in explaining
unevenness in branch rationalisation; public limited companies
are under greater external financial pressures to reduce costs
and improve profits.
However, senior managers in three of the top
five British banking groups suggested that since 2000-2001 large
scale bank branch rationalisation has effectively been put on
hold. Although closures have continued to take place since 2000-2001
the respondents suggested that these were mostly the result of
`natural wastage', citing the end of leasing contracts, problems
with making individual branches compliant with the Disability
Discrimination Act and other mundane reasons for recent closures,
rather than the result of formal rationalisation programmes. Nevertheless,
evidence also emerged during the research in 2005 that some banks
have begun to introduce small-scale, phased closure programmes
which go beyond the natural wastage described above. Branch rationalisation
emerged as an important concern for building societies which,
in comparison to banks, had generally made smaller reductions
in their branch networks.
In order to assess the spatial characteristics
of bank and building society branches, an analysis of the geodemographic
characteristics of the census wards within which closures occurred
between 1995-2003 was undertaken using the Office of National
Statistics (ONS) 2001 Area Classification (`supergroups') (see
Table 2 for a definition of supergroups). Table 3 shows the rate
of branch closure by supergroup. The mean rate of branch closure
across all areas between 1995 and 2003 was 20%. However, rates
of net closure varied between the supergroups, with five supergroups
having closure rates higher than average, while three experienced
below average closure rates. The areas with branch closure rates
higher than average were `urban' in type. The highest rate of
branch closure (-23.6%) was experienced in Multicultural metropolitan
areas, and above average rates of branch closure were also found
in the following supergroup categories: Prospering metropolitan
(-22.4%), Traditional manufacturing (-22.3%), Built up areas (-22.3%)
and Student communities (21.4%).[320]
Multicultural metropolitan areas are concentrated
in Greater London and Lancashire (see Figure 1) and are characterised
by, amongst other things, higher than average levels of unemployment
rates and a far higher than average proportion of people identifying
themselves as Black, Indian, Pakistani or Bangladeshi. Prospering
metropolitan areas are concentrated in London, and include wards
located in other large cities like Manchester and Glasgow. Defining
characteristics of these areas compared to the national average
include a high population density, plus a high proportion of one
person households, flats, people born outside the UK, people with
a higher education qualification and, ironically, people who work
in the finance industry. Traditional manufacturing areas are concentrated
in the traditional manufacturing belt of Britain, the south of
Scotland, northern England and parts of Wales. A typical area
is the Longbridge ward in Birmingham. As in the case of multicultural
metropolitan areas, traditional manufacturing wards are characterised
by unemployment rates far above the national average, but also
an unusually high proportion of people working in routine occupations,
rented public and terraced housing. Built-up Areas, as defined
by the ONS, are mainly concentrated in Scotland, but also includes
areas in parts of Wales and England. These are areas of relative
poverty, with the following variables being far higher than the
national average: households with only one person (who is not
a pensioner); people who are unemployed; household spaces rented
from the public sector; people of a working age suffering from
limiting long-term illness; people who are separated or divorced;
household spaces which are flats. Finally, Student communities
are distributed throughout England, parts of Wales, and the south
west of Scotland. Places such as Fishergate in York, Westgate
in Canterbury and Eastney and Craneswater in Portsmouth are the
most typical wards in this supergroup. Variables with a proportion
far above the national average include: households with one person
(who is not a pensioner); people with a higher education qualification;
household spaces which are flats; people who are students; household
spaces rented from the private sector.
At the opposite end of the spectrum were areas
which had lower than average rates of branch closure between 1995
and 2003: these areas were Suburbs and small towns (-16.9%), coastal
and countryside (-17.0%) and industrial hinterlands (-18.6%).
Thus, in contrast to those areas that suffered higher than average,
which were urban in character, the areas that experienced lower
than average rates of closure were mainly small towns, suburban
and rural areas. Moreover, all three supergroups areas with closure
rates below the national average have no socioeconomic variables
that are far below, or indeed far above the national average.
They can, therefore, be considered for all intents and purposes
to be `Middle England'. Coastal and countryside wards are evenly
located throughout the UK, apart from the south east of England,
where they are mainly absent. The Suburbs and small towns supergroup
is comprised of three sub-groups: suburbs, prospering suburbs
and commuter suburbs, and is widely distributed throughout England
and Scotland (see Figure 1). Places such as Wootton in Bedford,
Bishop's Stortford All Saints and Sawbridgeworth in East Hertfordshire
are typical wards in this supergroup. The third and final supergroup
with a lower than average closure rate was Industrial hinterlands,
comprising two sub-groups, `out of town housing' and `industrial'
areas. Industrial hinterland wards are concentrated in south Wales,
southern Scotland and northern England, are again characterised
by a large number of socioeconomic variables close to the national
average. In explaining why Industrial hinterland areas were less
affected by branch closure it is important to note that these
areas had already been pruned of most of their branches during
the first wave of closure in the period 1989 to 1995.
4. INTERPRETATION
AND DISCUSSION
A total of 16 interviews were undertaken with
representatives of leading retail services organisations, industry
bodies and pressure groups to discuss the changing geography of
retail financial services branches within Britain. An analysis
of the findings of these interviews makes it possible to identify
at least four processes that have an influence on the changing
geography of bank and building society branches in Great Britain:
(i). Corporate governance
Rates of branch closure are, on average higher,
for public limited companies than for mutually owned organisations.
Thus, rates of branch closure are higher in banks than in building
societies (see Table 1). One interpretation of the faster rate
of closure is that public companies are under more pressure to
make costs savings—which branch closures can deliver—as
they are driven by the necessity of producing value for shareholders:
[Bank A has] thrown a lot of money at technology
in branches, [and] when I go and speak to them they say, `Well
we're giving it 18 months; if it doesn't work, we might have to
do something different, because the analysts and the media crawling
all over our figures and saying you've got to get a bigger performance'.
[Bank B] are a global bank, but the UK's cost income ratio is
totally out of sync with the rest of the group. They say they
pick up 33% of the costs in the UK, but only deliver a 25% of
the profit they've got to do something about it, which is why
they have embarked on a [new] branch closure programme. (Derek
French, Chair, Campaign for Community Banking Services, Interview,
2005)
Such pressures, some of our respondents argued,
led to banks closing not merely branches that were losing money,
but also branches that were profitable, but just not profitable
enough.
Building Societies, meanwhile, are seeking to
exploit their organisational structure by revaluing their branches
and even using them as part of a marketing strategy that enables
them to be differentiated from banks. As one respondent put it:
Building societies are closing branches at a
much slower rate than banks. [T]he general view amongst building
societies is that the branch network is valuable for member relations
customers value the personal contact. That's not universally so
but it tends to be the case that building societies keep their
branches open for both financial and non-financial reasons. There
are some societies who say it's a sort of badge of honour that
they would not close a branch, particularly if it's the last branch
in a community (Industry Organisation B, Interview, 2005).
However, as the figures illustrate, building
societies have been engaged in a long run process of branch reduction
as they struggle to reconcile being mutually owned organisations
within a highly competitive market for retail financial services.
(ii). Branch closure policies
We have identified a more or less general convention
of evaluation that banks and building societies use to assess
the performance of their branches. Branch performance is continuously
assessed, usually as part of a formal annual review. The failure
of a branch to meet its targets initiates a series of interventions.
These range from discussions with management, through new investments
and/or the installation of a new management team, to the closure
of the branch. The level intervention will depend on: the perceived
nature of the local market—that is, its prospect of supporting
a successful branch—which is assessed with the help of what
are known as `branch planning services', which are provided by
companies such as CACI, and Geographical Information Systems tools,
which are provided by a range of consultancies, and; the perceived
deficiencies of the branch in question. However, the vigour with
which such interventions are pursued varies markedly from institution
to institution. As indicated above, the likelihood of closure
is greater for public limited companies than for building societies.
However, there are important exceptions: for example, one leading
retail bank insists that it is now company policy not to close
branches, and has not done so voluntarily since 2000, and actively
cross-subsidises branches that fail to cover their costs. Moreover,
there was evidence from interviews that, despite the accelerating
rate of branch closure since 1995, many retail financial institutions
are now beginning to reconsider the value of their branches.
(iii). New socio-economic geographies
Many institutions are dealing with the legacy
effects of earlier rounds of branch network construction. Most
of Britain's leading financial institutions have regional origins
(Pratt, 1998), which means that many still have branch networks
which are heavily skewed towards their region of origin. Therefore,
over the past 10-15 years or so banks, but mainly building societies,
have been faced with the uncomfortable task of closing numerous
branches within regions with which they are, or have traditionally
been, associated, with significant negative reputational effects
in some cases. At least one building society representative admitted
to being reluctant to close unprofitable `local' branches as the
negative publicity they would generate would more than outweigh
the potential economic savings. Nevertheless, changes in the social
and economic geographies of British society have meant that for
many financial institutions, a significant number of their branches
are `in the wrong place'. For them, closure programmes are part
of a geographical restructuring exercise that seeks to ensure
that their branch networks reflect these new social and economic
geographies. This involves redirecting their assets away from
economically struggling communities, where aggregate demand is
falling, and towards new, more prosperous communities, where market
opportunities are greater. As one senior manager responsible for
his bank's branch networks put it,
the social and economic geography of [some places
have] changed absolutely fundamentally, and yet as a bank one
is expected still to be there because it's actually always been
there it's a bit like a post office people are very emotionally
attached to it. And certainly sometimes when we have [undertaken]
closures people living in particular places can see life kind
of ebbing away from their town, and almost when the bank goes
that's the final [straw]. And it isn't the bank that's killed
the town, the town is actually now fulfilling a different function,
and activity is now elsewhere. And so to me it would seem absolutely
perverse to expect that 1,500 plus branches would always stay
in exactly the same place because life, the community, the geography,
is changing so rapidly, and it's not like this is just affecting
banks; there's a zillion and one other things as well. So we need
to be responding to that. In many respects we're so far behind
this curve that actually there's some catching up to do. (Bank
B, Interview, 2005)
There is some evidence to back up claims that
the geography of branches lags behind that of population. For
example, Table 4 compares the share of population and branches
by geodemographic supergroup. Significantly, those areas that
experienced below average rates of branch closure—that is,
Suburbs and small towns, Coastal and countryside and Industrial
hinterlands—remained underrepresented in their share of
branches given their share of the population as a whole. Meanwhile,
many of the more urban areas that experienced higher than average
rates of bank branch closure between 1995 and 2003 had a much
larger than expected share of total branch networks given their
share of the total population. However, it is important to note
that this over-representation in urban areas is to some extent
explained by the proximity of these areas to city centres which
contain many branches that serve geographically distributed populations,
rather than the populations that live closest to them. A further
reason why Suburbs and small towns remain underrepresented in
their share of branches is the inability of financial services
firms to open in these locations due to planning restrictions.
As a representative a leading Building Society pointed out:
At the moment we're looking at certain locations
where we'd love to actually open a branch, if we could actually
find a location that we could buy. There are certain areas [where]
we've been banging our heads trying to find suitable sites for
a considerable time, and simply couldn't find [any]. So it's not
a case of not wanting to be in those places, it's just because
of zoning and things like that [we can't open a branch] unless
another financial institution closes in that area; the zoning
and the local council don't want too many financial [branches]
in the streets, so [if] a cafe or a restaurant [closes], you've
got to get it reclassified to be able to open it as a financial
institution, which means physically there's a limit to where you
can go. (Interview, Building Society E, 2005)
Therefore, although the geography of net branch
closures was uneven between 1995-2003, these differences may have
been even greater had not local planning regulations prevented
financial services firms from opening branches in many small towns
and suburban locations.
(iv). Use of branches and new distribution
channels
The accelerating rate of branch closure after
1995 was influenced by the normalisation of new distribution channels
introduced to the retail financial services sector and changes
in the ways in which customers used branches. The use of the telephone
as a distribution channel was developed within the British retail
financial services industry during the 1980s and became common-place
during the 1990s. From the late 1990s onwards, the Internet became
an additional distribution channel for retail financial products.
Both these developments were cited in interviews with key informants
in financial services firms as factors which not only mitigated
any negative social and economic consequences of branch closures,
but also partly contributed to closures in that it took business
away from the branch. Indeed, some institutions reported a steady
fall in the volume of business through branches, with one even
issuing a `use or lose it' challenge to its customers in regards
to some of its branches. But the ability to use the telephone
and Internet to mitigate the impact of branch closure is highly
uneven across the population as a whole, as there are cost and
cultural barriers to the use of these media among many financial
services customers; for such people, they are not a direct substitute
for face-to-face contact with staff in a branch.
Perhaps the most significant new distribution
channel for financial services has not been either the telephone
or the Internet but the partial integration of the Post Office
into the British financial services industry. As part of a campaign
against financial exclusion, the government marshalled the Universal
Banking Agreement with the 16 largest banks and the largest building
society, which required these institutions to introduce Basic
Bank Accounts for low income customers. These accounts provide
deposit and cash handing—but not overdraft—services.
To facilitate the availability of such accounts to poorer communities,
particularly those that might have been affected by earlier rounds
of bank branch closures, such services were made available at
Post Offices. Moreover, under further government pressure, some
leading retail banks and building societies—have signed
distribution deals with the Post Office to provide counter services
for their regular personal customers. Given that the Post Office
still has 14,500 offices, this considerably widens the geographical
scope of the retail financial services industry.
However, during interviews, the growing integration
of the Post Office with the retail financial system was identified
as problematic, in at least two regards. Firstly, it was cited
by some respondents as a potential factor in driving further bank
branch closures. As one respondent argued:
It does cost the banks significant amounts of
money to make an arrangement with the Post Office and so they
do it on a competitive basis, where they think their customers
will really value it. But, you know, if I were a bank who had
made that investment I'd be looking at my branch network [because]
there is an obvious read-across there [for potential closures].
(Industry Organisation A, Interview, 2005).
That is, banks could see Post Office branches
as effective substitutes for their own branches, which could be
taken into account in future rounds of branch closure. This might
not matter if such services were universally available at Post
Offices, given their current geographical distribution. However,
the Post Office has recently initiated a branch closure programme,
reducing its network down from over 16,000 branches in 2004, nor
are all banks and building societies permitting the Post Office
to distribute their products.
The reason for this is the second problem, which
is the emergence of the Post Office as a direct competitor to
banks and building societies following the introduction of Post
Office-branded financial products as part of a joint venture with
the Bank of Ireland. This development has deterred several leading
banks and building societies from signing full distribution deals
with the Post Office. Moreover, it would be a surprise to see
those organisations that have a distribution deal cite its existence
as an offsetting factor in future bank or building society branch
closures, given the almost universal hostility expressed in interviews
to the idea of the `white label', or shared, branch which has
been proposed by the Campaign for Community Banking Services (CCBS).
This proposal suggests that as branch networks continue to shrink
the number of communities able to support branch operations will
also decline, leading to more and more communities being denied
access to counter services and other financial services delivered
through a branch. One solution proposed by the CCBS is that, following
the closure of the last branch within a community, a white label
branch be established to act as a transaction agent for banks
and building societies, in much the way that the Post Office acts
currently for those financial institutions with which it has a
distribution deal (see http://www.communitybanking.org.uk/report_whitelabel.htm).
However, during our discussions, it emerged that the representatives
of both banks and building societies were uneasy with such a proposal
as it would represent a loss of control over their products at
the point of distribution; the strength of this opposition suggests
that both the idea of the white label branch and the extension
of the Post Office's role as a transaction agent is likely to
be highly problematic and not entered into voluntarily by the
banking and building society industries.
5. CONCLUSION
The branch networks of bank and building societies
in Britain have been in decline since at least the late 1980s.
They are likely to continue to shrink over the medium term as
a result of continued competition and pressures to lower costs
and increase revenues. The geography of closures has been uneven,
with higher than average closures taking place in predominantly
less affluent urban areas. More affluent non-urban locations have,
for the most part experienced lower than average closure rates.
The difference in closure rates would have been greater if not
for the proximity of many poor urban areas to city centres where
bank and building society branches serving wider populations are
located and the impact of local planning regulations which have
acted to restrict the number of financial services branches on
the high streets of more affluent suburbs and small towns. However,
against a background of overall decline, we anticipate a further
reduction in the share of bank and building society branches located
within less affluent urban areas and a relative increase in the
proportion within suburban areas and small towns.
REFERENCES
Dayson, K, 2004, Improving Financial Inclusion:
the hidden story of how building societies serve the financially
excluded, London; The Building Societies Association (available
at http://www.bsa.org.uk/Information/IndustryPDFs/8332291104.pdf;
last accessed 9 January 2006).
HM Treasury, 2004, Promoting Financial Inclusion,
London; HMSO (available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/8F9/37/pbr04_profininc_complete_394.pdf;
last accessed, 9 January 2006).
PAT 14/HM Treasury, 1999, Access to Financial
Services, Report of PAT 14, HM Treasury, November, National
Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (available at http://www.socialexclusionunit.gov.uk/downloaddoc.asp?id=127;
last accessed 9 January 2006).
Pratt, DJ, 1998, Re-placing money: the evolution
of branch banking in Britain, Environment and Planning A,
30, 2211-2226.
January 2006
Table 1
BRANCH NETWORKS OF TOP 10 BUILDING SOCIETIES,
TOP SIX BANK GROUPS AND TOP 10 CONVERTED BUILDING SOCIETIES, GREAT
BRITAIN, 1989-2003*
| Branches
| | Change (%)
|
| 1989 | 1995
| 2003 | 1989-1995
| 1995-2003 | 1989-2003
|
| Top 10 Building Societies** | 1,699
| 1,478 | 1,403 | -13.0
| -5.1 | -17.42 |
| Top 6 Bank Groups*** | 12,659
| 10,406 | 8,077 | -17.8
| -22.4 | -36.2 |
Top 10 converted building
societies****
| 3,473 | 3,348 | 2,702
| -3.6 | -19.3 | -22.2
|
* Note that the figures for converted building societies
include branches also included as part of the larger banking groups
above of which they are a part: thus, Cheltenham & Gloucester
are owned by Lloyds-TSB, Halifax and Birmingham Midshires are
owned by HBOS, Woolwich Equitable is owned by Barclays
** Nationwide, Britannia, Yorkshire, Portman, Skipton,
Leeds & Holbeck, Derbyshire, Coventry, West Bromwich and Chelsea.
(Source: Building Societies Yearbook 2002-03)
*** Barclays, HBOS, HSBC, Lloyds-TSB, and RBS-Natwest
(Source: Authors' research)
**** Abbey National (converted to public limited company
in 1989), Alliance & Leicester (1997), Birmingham Midshires
(1999), Bradford & Bingley (2000), Bristol & West (1997),
Cheltenham & Gloucester (1995), Halifax (1997), National Provincial
(1996), Northern Rock (1997) and Woolwich Equitable (1997). (Source:
Experian. Note that his section of the database was updated to
2004)
Table 2
ONS GEO-DEMOGRAPHIC AREA CLASSIFICATION: "SUPERGROUPS"
(source: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/about/methodology_by_theme/area_classification/wards/cluster_summaries.asp)
| `Supergroup' | `Supergroup' number
| Groups | Subgroup
| % of UK Population |
| Industrial Hinterlands | 1 |
Industrial Areas | Industrial Areas A
| 4.7% |
| | |
Industrial Areas B | 6.2% |
| | Out of Town Housing
| Out of Town Housing A | 4%
|
| | |
Out of Town Housing B | 4.6% |
| Traditional Manufacturing | 2
| Built-up Manufacturing | Built-up Manufacturing
| 4% |
| | Transitional Economies
| Transitional Economies A | 4.3%
|
| | |
Transitional Economies B | 3.3%
|
| Built-up Areas | 3 | Built-up Areas
| Built-up Areas A | 1.7% |
| | |
Built-up Areas B | 1.6% |
| Prospering Metropolitan | 4
| Prospering Metropolitan | Prospering Metropolitan A
| 2.8% |
| | |
Prospering Metropolitan B | 0.91%
|
| Student Communities | 5 |
Student Communities | Student Communities A
| 1.1% |
| | |
Student Communities B | 3.4% |
| | |
Student Communities C | 0.4% |
| Multicultural Metropolitan | 6
| Multicultural Areas | Multicultural Areas
| 3.1% |
| | Inner City Multicultural
| Inner City Multicultural | 3.6%
|
| Suburbs and Small Towns | 7
| Suburbs | Suburbs A | 7.8%
|
| | |
Suburbs B | 6.4% |
| | Prospering Suburbs
| Prospering Suburbs | 3.5% |
| | Commuter Suburbs
| Commuter Suburbs A | 5.5% |
| | |
Commuter Suburbs B | 4.4% |
| Coastal and Countryside | 8
| Countryside | Countryside A
| 2.5% |
| | |
Countryside B | 4.5% |
| | Senior Communities
| Senior Communities | 2.7% |
| | Out of Town Manufacturing
| Out of Town Manufacturing | 6.8%
|
| | Northern Ireland Countryside
| Northern Ireland Countryside | 0.91%
|
| Accessible Countryside | 9 |
Accessible Countryside | Accessible Countryside
| 5.1% |
Table 3
BRANCH CLOSURES AND OPENINGS BY BANKS, CONVERTED BUILDING
SOCIETIES AND BUILDING SOCIETIES, BY SUPERGROUP AREA, GREAT BRITAIN,
1995-2003
`Supergroup' | Total
branches
1995
| Total
branches
2003 | Branch
closures,
1995-2003
| Branch
openings,
1995-2003
| Net
change | Net
change
(%)
|
Industrial Hinterlands | 1873
| 1524 | 479 | 130
| -349 | -18.6 |
| Traditional Manufacturing | 1677
| 1303 | 499 | 125
| -374 | -22.3 |
| Built-up Areas | 1832 | 1424
| 508 | 100 | -408
| -22.3 |
| Prospering Metropolitan | 1431
| 1111 | 480 | 159
| -321 | -22.4 |
| Student Communities | 1829 |
1442 | 579 | 192 |
-387 | -21.4 |
| Multicultural Metropolitan | 1040
| 795 | 329 | 84
| -245 | -23.6 |
| Suburbs and Small Towns | 2651
| 2209 | 628 | 180
| -448 | -16.9 |
| Coastal and Countryside | 2341
| 1942 | 497 | 98
| -399 | -17.0 |
| Accessible Countryside* | 164
| 128 | 42 | 6 |
-33 | -22.0 |
Total | 14838 | 11871
| 4041 | 1074 | -2967
| -20.0 |
| |
| | | |
|
Note: This analysis includes 97.5% of total branches
open in 1995, and 93% of openings between 1995 and 2003. Branches
which could not be geocoded, that is given a location, were excluded
from the analysis.
* Due to the low numbers of openings branches in this
Supergroup, the margin of error was such that these data were
considered insufficiently robust for analysis and so Accessible
Countryside areas have not been considered in the report. The
data is presented here for information purposes only.
Table 4
SHARE OF POPULATION AND BRANCHES BY SUPERGROUP, GREAT
BRITAIN, 1995 AND 2003 (%)
`Supergroup' | Share of population
2001
| Share of branches
1995 | Share of branches
2003
|
| Industrial Hinterlands | 19.6
| 12.6 | 12.8 |
| Traditional Manufacturing | 11.7
| 11.3 | 11.0 |
| Built-up Areas | 3.3 | 12.3
| 12.0 |
| Prospering Metropolitan | 3.7
| 9.6 | 9.4 |
| Student Communities | 5.0 |
12.3 | 12.1 |
| Multicultural Metropolitan | 6.7
| 7.0 | 6.7 |
| Suburbs and Small Towns | 27.7
| 17.9 | 18.6 |
| Coastal and Countryside | 17.3
| 15.8 | 16.4 |
| Accessible Countryside | 5.1
| 1.1 | 1.1 |
Total | 100 | 100
| 100 |
Figure 1:
THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE MULTICULTURAL METROPOLITAN AND SUBURBS
AND SMALL TOWNS SUPERGROUPS, 2001.
This work is based on data provided through EDINA UKBORDERS
with the support of the ESRC and JISC and uses boundary material
which is copyright of the Crown and the Post Office.
319
That is, building societies that converted to public limited companies
between 1989 and 2003. Back
320
Due to the low numbers of branch openings in the Accessible
Countryside supergroup the margin of error was such that these
data were considered to be insufficiently robust for analysis.
therefore, Accessible Countryside areas have not been considered
in this report. The data is presented in Table 3 for information
purposes only. Back
|
