Memorandum submitted by Provident Financial
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Provident Financial welcomes the
Treasury Select Committee's inquiry into financial inclusion.
As a commercial supplier of small sum credit to some 1.6 million
customers in the UK, Provident has a thorough understanding of
the credit requirements of those on moderate to low incomes.
Affordable credit for people on lower
incomes has to be designed around the realities of life on a lower
income where cash budgets are tight and incomes can fluctuate
without warning.
The home credit sector provides small,
short-term loans collected weekly from the customer's home by
a company agent. Repayments are small, and therefore manageable,
and there are no extra charges at all for late or missed payments.
The cash price of a loan is important
to customers, but the qualities of convenience, good service,
flexibility and control are key elements in product design. The
agent's weekly home visit is central. It is the major factor in
the cost of providing home credit, but it helps manage the risk
of lending, assists the customer's budgeting and provides regular
face-to-face communication.
DTI research shows that sub prime
credit models such as home credit can work out cheaper than mainstream
products. Customers often cannot avoid missing occasional payments,
so credit products that accommodate volatility of income or unexpected
expenses offer a rational alternative to mainstream products.
Customers on lower incomes prefer systems that enable them to
stay in control.
Many people judge home credit solely
on its APR, but APR is a flawed measure. It distorts the apparent
cost when loan terms are short and fails to deliver usable comparisons
for products with different characteristics. It also fails to
include the default charges and service fees often levied on products
other than home credit.
Home credit customers use other products.
Between 70% and 85% have bank accounts and between 30% and 45%
have credit cards. They nevertheless have strong preferences for
home credit as shown in very high satisfaction levelsProvident's
customer surveys show 94% are satisfied.
The cost of providing home credit
leads to higher APRs and some commentators have called for price
controls. However the UK's mainstream advice agencies all agree
price controls would not help widen access to more affordable
credit.
Credit counselling services report
they receive few complaints and advise on few problems related
to home credit.
Provident Financial supports the
Government's initiatives to broaden the provision of affordable
credit.
INTRODUCTION
1. Provident Financial welcomes the Treasury
Select Committee's inquiry into financial inclusion and the opportunity
to submit its views on this policy area.
2. We note that the committee is undertaking
a wide-ranging enquiry on financial inclusion. Provident Financial's
experience in this area arises from its position as a commercial
supplier of small sum credit to around 1.6 million customers in
the UK. Our submission will therefore focus on affordable credit.
3. Small sum credit in the UK is available
from a range of providersfrom purely commercial organisations
such as Provident Financial or credit card providers to departments
of Government such as the DWP, and newer Third Sector providers
such as Community Development Finance Institutions. We welcome
this growing diversity of provision and the choice it offers to
consumers.
4. It is widely recognised that credit is
now an integral part of daily life. Credit provides individuals
with a `financial smoothing system' to enable them to match income
with outgoings. It is beneficial to the vast majority of those
who use it and to the wider economy.[269]
Many of Provident Financial's UK home credit customers are on
lower than average incomes. Our experience of providing credit
to such customers is that, in common with other groups, those
on lower incomes can benefit from access to credit products which
match their requirements and enable them to better manage their
personal or household finances.
PROVIDENT FINANCIALCOMPANY
STRUCTURE
5. Provident Financial is a public company
listed on the London Stock Exchange. Provident's principal business
is home credit, which is the provision of small, short-term, unsecured
loans, which are collected from customers' homes by company agents.
The company has been providing home credit products since it was
established in 1880.
6. In recent years, Provident has extended
its product range in the UK. It now has a credit card subsidiary
called Vanquis Bank. Until recently, the company also had a motor
finance subsidiary, Yes Car Credit. This was closed for business
at the end of 2005.
7. Provident has two home credit subsidiaries
in the UK: Provident Personal Credit (PPC) and Greenwood Personal
Credit (GPC). Currently PPC has around 1.3 million customers and
GPC around 300,000. Together they have around 12,000 agents who
make around 80 million home visits a year. They also employ 2,800
staff.
8. Both businesses are licensed and regulated
by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT). The OFT reports extremely
low levels of complaint about Provident's home credit businesses
(indeed any home credit business).
9. The UK home credit sector as a whole
comprises about 550 companies and serves about 3 million customers
via 28,000 agents.[270]
HOME CREDIT
10. The key characteristics of home credit
are as follows:
Loans offered by the home credit
sector are smalltypically in the range of £100 to
£500;
They are short term, usually from
23 weeks to a year in duration;
Repayments are collected from the
customer's home by a company agent;
Most agents are women; for example
80% of Provident's agents are women. Many have been customers
themselves and live in the same communities as their customers;
Repayments are collected on a weekly
basis, which means repayment amounts are small and manageable;
There is a fixed, all-in charge for
the credit, which is set out clearly for the customer in the contract;
There are no penalty fees for late
or missed payments; extra interest does not accrue; each repayment
brings down the amount owed;
The loans are unsecured.
11. The key to the business is the home
collection system. This provides customers with a convenient,
personal service. It imposes a discipline on the agent whose reputation
depends on treating her customers well. It also offers a discipline
for the customer which they find helpful for control and certainty
over their spending and budgeting. This was confirmed by the National
Consumer Council (NCC) who found that:
"home collection provides a highly valued
discipline over repayment that helps low income customers keep
on top of their finances."[271]
12. Home collection also builds in flexibility.
The agent can easily reschedule payments on the spot if that is
what the customer requires.
TRANSPARENCY
13. Home credit is almost uniquely transparent.
There are no penalty charges for missed or late repayments. For
instance, if a £100, 50 week loan carried a £35 charge
for credit, the customer would pay nothing more than that £35,
even if the loan took 60, 70 or even 80 weeks to repay. This facility
holds particular appeal for customers, helping them cope with
fluctuating incomes or unpredictable outgoings. It also means
that, unlike some other types of credit, the customer's costs
remain fixed.
14. All these characteristics mean that
home credit is highly suited to those on lower than average incomes,
who work to tighter budgets and may have more volatile incomes.
The product design it tailored to customer needs. The majority
of Provident's new customers are introduced by existing customers.[272]
15. The Competition Commission recently
commissioned research into home credit customers that reached
the same conclusion:
"home credit loans were well tailored to
customers' needs. The application process was uncomplicated (no
long forms) and fairly easy; the payments (weekly, fortnightly
or monthly) were usually affordable and manageable, and the regular
collection at agreed times helped customers make sure they had
the money ready and kept up with payments. There was the knowledge
that if payments were missed the amount owed would not go up and
that agents were usually quite reasonable about missed payments
and were willing to accept less rather than miss a payment altogether.
Many respondents found that paying in cash gave them a feeling
of control over their budget."[273]
THE ROLE
OF THE
AGENT
16. The typical Provident agent is female
and has around 130 customers. She is paid on a commission basis
according to the amounts she collectsnot what she lends.
This encourages responsible lending because it is expressly not
in the interest of the agent to lend amounts that a customer cannot
repay.
17. The home collection system also enables
the agent to build good working relations with her customers.
The weekly visit means that she has a good overview of the household's
circumstances and thus whether the customer is going to be in
a position to repay. It also ensures that the terms, conditions
and costs of a home credit loan can be clearly explained to would-be
customers.
18. Research conducted by MORI for the NCC
illustrates the value customers attach to the agent system. It
found that the majority of home credit customers:
"praised the attitude and behaviour of their
collectors."[274]
19. The agent-based home collection system
is an essential part of the home credit model. It is pivotal in
managing the risk of lending to those on lower than average or
volatile incomes. Without it, bad debt would rise to unsustainable
levels. The Competition Commission also recently found that agents
help home credit companies to contain bad debt risk and that the
relationship between customers and agents was "
good,
but businesslike."[275]
WHY DO
CUSTOMERS CHOOSE
HOME CREDIT?
20. Provident's customers know a lot about
alternative credit products and actively choose to use home credit.
Over 56% of Provident customers said that they shop around before
choosing a credit product; and 75% said they had used at least
one other source of credit (alongside home credit) in the previous
year.[276]
21. Convenience, service levels, flexibility
and control are what matters to customers. Price, particularly
on the basis of the total cash cost of the credit and the weekly
repayment, is also important. Professor Elaine Kempson of the
Personal Finance Research Centre commented in her 2005 report,
Affordable Credit:
"[users of home credit] generally know the
total amount of money that they have to repay on their loans.
The same is not necessarily true for all forms of credit."[277]
22. Many customers choose home credit in
preference to other small sum credit products which may appear
cheaper in APR terms but which will, in fact, cost more. Elsewhere
in Affordable Credit, Professor Kempson concluded:
"buying goods on rental purchase at 29.9%
APR can work out more expensive than taking a loan at 200% APR
from a home credit company to buy the goods from a high street
retailer. This is analogous to the situation with credit cards
where variations in the structure of charges mean that a card
with a low APR may be more expensive than one with a higher APR."[278]
23. These are rational choices, with customers
focusing on certainty and fixed repayments to inform their borrowing
decisions. Home credit customers are well aware that if they use
certain credit products missing payments can lead to significant
charges. (For example, a £35 charge for a dishonoured cheque
or a £25 charge for a missed credit card payment.) For those
on lower incomes such charges are significant and unwelcome.
24. Provident has investigated the financial
understanding of, respectively, Provident's customer base, potential
home credit customers and wider credit market customers, and sought
to understand better the criteria driving customers' choices between
different credit products. A survey asked customers which credit
product they would choose if they had to borrow £500. Customers
were provided with details about the cost and value characteristics
of a credit card, a bank personal loan or a Provident home credit
product. When the products were compared on a headline APR and
key product terms basis (ie summary box style information), the
personal loan was the cheapest and 75% of the sample chose this
product. However, when the same customers were given additional
information about the additional charges they could face on the
credit cards and personal loans if payments were missed, and on
the flexibility of home credit, the proportion choosing the personal
loan dropped to 56% and the proportion choosing home credit rose
from 14% to 30%.
Customers were then asked to imagine that there
could be a drop in their income over the next 12 months, perhaps
because they could be made redundant, and were then asked which
product would best suit their needs. Only 41% of the sample then
chose the personal loan, whilst 40% chose home credit.
These changes support Provident's view that,
while customers are aware of the relative prices of different
credit products, regardless of whether they have experience of
home credit or not, customers also appreciate the convenience,
flexibility and control associated with home credit.
REPAYMENT REALITIES
25. Research for DTI by Policis looking
at credit markets in several countries has shown how important
it is to understand the realities that face many consumers. There
is a consistent pattern showing that those on lower incomes often
cannot avoid missing payments whether it is because of volatile
incomes, life events (such as job losses) or unexpected expenses:
"regular late and missed payments are a
feature of credit account management for a significant minority
of low income customers."[279]
26. Policis also concluded that it was useful
for consumers to have credit product formats which helped them
to manage life's ups and downs. This was because:
"under uneven repayment conditions, sub
prime credit models [such as home credit] can be cheaper than
mainstream models, confirming the rationality of consumer choices."[280]
Where these products do not exist, consumers
have to use second best choices: typically mainstream products
which they struggle to repay.
WHAT OTHER
CREDIT PRODUCTS
DO HOME
CREDIT CUSTOMERS
USE?
27. Provident's customers use a range of
other credit products. Competition Commission research indicates
that between 70% and 85% of home credit customers have bank accounts
and between 30% and 45% have credit cards.[281]
28. Provident's own customer surveys conducted
in 2004 provide further detail:
Provident customers' usage of other credit
products[282]
Customers with a mortgage
| 17% |
Customers using agency (weekly) mail order |
42% |
Customers using hire purchase | 8%
|
Customers with a credit card | 31%
|
Customers with an overdraft | 29%
|
Customers with a savings account | 44%
|
29. Provident customers are most likely to use a home
credit loan for a special occasion like a birthday or Christmas,
to purchase household items or for holidays.[283]
CUSTOMER SATISFACTION
30. The Competition Commission acknowledged home credit
customers' high levels of satisfaction with home credit in its
Emerging Thinking document:
"the weight of evidence presented to us points to high
overall levels of customer satisfaction with the service provided"[284]
and:
"home credit is characterised by high reported levels
of satisfaction among existing customers."[285]
31. Similarly the OFT found that there were:
"high levels of satisfaction with the quality of service
provided by home credit lenders generally."[286]
Provident's own surveys of customers indicate that 94% are
satisfied and 66% are very satisfied.[287]
THE COST
OF PROVIDING
HOME CREDIT
32. Several features drive the cost of home credit as
explained by Professor Kempson:
"Lending to people on low incomes differs from mainstream
(or prime) lending in a number of key respects. First, there is
a higher risk of default as their circumstances are much more
likely to change. Second, people on low incomes want (and often
need) to make weekly repayments in cash. Both these factors increase
the costs of lending. Third, the amounts they want to borrow tend
to be relatively small and for short periods of time. As the costs
of lending are largely fixed, this means that the charges for
borrowing are high in relation to the amounts borrowed. This explains
why charges among commercial sub-prime lenders are high; why not-for-profit
lenders with lower charges require subsidies; and why mainstream
lenders are reluctant to enter this particular market."[288]
33. Home collectionwhich is an integral feature
of the productalso has a large impact on home credit providers'
costs, a point recognised by the Competition Commission in its
Emerging Thinking document:
"The principal cost is the labour-intensive network of
branches and agents which helps to contain bad debt risk and is
one of the features of home credit most valued by customers."[289]
APRA FLAWED
MEASURE
34. Very often, it is the APR figure that causes some
commentators to think that home credit companies' prices are excessive.
APR was introduced by the Consumer Credit Act 1974. It was intended
to provide a benchmark for comparing the cost of different credit
products. However, there are problems with using APR to compare
the price and value for money of home credit and other credit
products.
35. First, it is widely accepted that APR exaggerates
the `apparent cost' for short-term loansparticularly for
loans of less than a year. The DTI recognised this in its 1999
paper on Extortionate Credit:
"The mathematical formula for APRs can considerably distort
the apparent costs of credit involving short repayment periods,
particularly agreements of less than 12 months, and small amounts
of money."[290]
36. Second, the rules for calculating APR allow certain
charges to be excluded from the APR calculation for some products.
Examples of this are the monthly fee on a current account overdraft
or any fees incurred as a result of late or missed payments.
37. Also, APR is of absolutely no use when, as with mail
order, the credit charge is built into the price of goods. Apparently
cheap `0%' credit, may hide a substantial implicit credit charge.
Home credit, in contrast to many other products, does not contain
any hidden or extra charges.
38. A number of different organisations have recognised
the shortcomings of APR. For example in its 2000 policy paper,
Daylight Robbery, Citizens Advice concluded:
"The interest rate as expressed by the APR figure is
not a particularly helpful guide to the overall cost of a credit
facility on a small loan. In such cases, the relatively high administrative
costs proportional to the amount borrowed results in a high APR
figure but one that still represents a non-extortionate agreement.
For example, we suspect that most readers would initially be concerned
if we were to report evidence of a credit agreement with an APR
of 153%. However, the same readers may not be so concerned to
hear of a loan of £50 repayable over 20 weeks at a weekly
cost of £3 where the lender had the costs of door-to-door
collection. The fact is that we would be reporting on exactly
the same loan in both cases."[291]
PRICE CONTROLS
39. Some have argued that interest rates or APRs should
be capped. However, all the authoritative, large-scale research
on this issue finds that this would in fact be detrimental to
those customers that a price control would be intended to protect.
40. In 2004, the DTI commissioned Policis to conduct
an extensive study on `The effect of interest rate controls in
other countries'. The research concluded that:
"the consumers most likely to be impacted by rate ceilings
are thus those operating outside the financial mainstream, either
un-banked or, having run into problems with debt, the credit impaired;"[292]
and
"rate ceilings affect the availability of dedicated sub
prime models and create credit exclusion for those who cannot
access mainstream credit."[293]
41. Professor Kempson also addressed rate caps in Affordable
Credit:
"a ceiling on interest rates has been heavily promoted
in the UK as a means of tackling extortionate credit. On the surface,
this is a simple and attractive idea that ought to benefit people
on the lowest incomes. This research has shown, however, that
there are high costs associated with lending to people on low
incomes who have a high risk of default. An interest rate ceiling
could do nothing to reduce these costs. Instead, the APR would
be reduced by displacing these costs elsewhere, for example in
the form of charges for defaultthe last thing that low-income
borrowers would want. It is also likely that more credit would
become tied to the purchase of goods and consumers would be faced
with high price mark-ups as retailers seek to recover the costs
of supplying credit. Both of these would result in the total costs
of borrowing being less transparent. Finally, there is a danger
that lenders would move out of this market altogether, leaving
poor people even more prey to unlicensed lenders."[294]
42. In October 2005, during the passage of the Consumer
Credit Bill, a group of the UK's leading consumer groups, money
advice agencies and think tanks (including Advice UK, Citizens
Advice, the Institute for Public Policy Research, the National
Consumer Council, Which? and the Association of British
Credit Unions) wrote to members of the House of Lords to set out
their views on the impact an interest rate ceiling would have
for lower income/higher risk groups. The briefing said that:
"An interest rate cap would not deal with any of these
underlying causes of high charges and we believe that it would
not help widen access to more affordable credit."
THE MONEY
ADVICE SECTOR'S
EXPERIENCE OF
HOME CREDIT
43. Compared with other lenders, home credit companies
lend small amounts. Typical loans are in the region of £100
to £500. Therefore, home credit is likely to constitute only
a very small proportion of an individual's total borrowing. In
total, all home credit lending accounts for only around 1% of
total UK unsecured lending.[295]
44. Nor does home credit feature significantly in the
total borrowings of those who approach the money advice sector
with multiple debt problems.
45. In a 2003 report, Citizens Advice (England and Wales)
found that home credit did not feature as a major source of debt
among those seeking debt advice. Even among those on low incomes
(less than £800 a month) home credit featured as a debt for
only 3 to 4% of clients. Of the 12 categories of debt recorded
by Citizens Advice, clients were more likely to have 9 to 10 other
categories of debt before home credit.[296]
46. The Competition Commission also noted that:
"credit counselling services and Citizens Advice Bureaux,
which handle many cases of overindebtedness or other debt problems,
have told us that they receive few complaints and advise on few
problems related to home credit."[297]
CONCLUSION
47. Provident Financial welcomes the committee's interest
in financial inclusion. We have been pleased to co-operate with
the Government's earlier work on developing policy in this important
areafrom contributing to the work of Policy Action Team
14 in 1999, to more recent assistance to HMT's Financial Inclusion
Taskforce.
48. Our contribution to these processes has been to share
our knowledge and experience of how credit can be provided effectively
on a commercial basis to those on lower than average incomes.
49. Our experience, and the findings of academic researchers,
consumer groups and regulators, highlight that convenience, service
levels, flexibility and control are what matters to would-be borrowers
on lower than average income. Product design is key.
50. `Affordability' is one of the essential design features
of a small sum credit product. However lower income customers
judge credit to be affordable on several measures and not just
in terms of APR. For such customers, affordability also means:
manageable individual repayments which can be
made on a regular basis that matches their budgeting schedule;
a fixed, all-in cost which will not increase if
payments are missed; and
reassurance that each repayment made will reduce
the total amount owed by the amount of that repayment.
51. We welcome the Government's ongoing initiatives to
broaden the provision of affordable credit. We believe that lower
income borrowers will welcome an increased range of small sum
credit products. We have offered our experience of the home credit
lending model to leading practitioners in the Community Development
Finance sector and the credit union movement.
January 2006
269
See for example DTI White Paper, Fair, Clear and Competitive-The
Consumer Credit Market in the 21st Century, DTI 2003. Back
270
Figures from Consumer Credit Association website. Back
271
Claire Whyley and Steve Brooker, Home Credit, an investigation
into the UK home credit market, National Consumer Council
2004, p 26. Back
272
Provident internal research, Customer Survey year to December
2004. Back
273
Andrew Irvine Associates for Competition Commission Home Credit
Market Inquiry, Research Report, 2005, p 30. Back
274
op cit NCC, 2004, page 11. Back
275
Competition Commission, Home Credit Market Inquiry, Emerging
Thinking, 2005, para 21. Back
276
op cit Provident internal research, 2004. Back
277
Elaine Kempson and Sharron Collard, Affordable Credit, The
way forward, Joseph Rowntree Foundation/Policy Press, 2005,
p 15. Back
278
ibid p 28. Back
279
Policis for DTI, The effect of interest rate controls in other
countries, DTI, 2004, p 22. Back
280
ibid, p 25. Back
281
Competition Commission, Emerging Thinking, 2005, para
12. Back
282
Provident research year to December 2004. Back
283
ibid. Back
284
Competition Commission, Emerging Thinking, 2005, para
11. Back
285
ibid, para 34. Back
286
Office of Fair Trading, Home Credit, The OFT's reasons for
making a reference to the Competition Commission, 2004, para
45. Back
287
Provident research year to December 2004. Back
288
Kempson and Collard, 2005, p 19. Back
289
Competition Commission, Emerging Thinking, 2005, para 21. Back
290
Elaine Kempson and Claire Shyley for DTI, Extortionate Credit
in the UK-A report to the Department of Trade and Industry
by Elaine Kempson and Claire Whyley, DTI, 1999, page 29. Back
291
Citizens Advice, Daylight Robbery-The CAB case for the
effective regulation of extortionate credit, 2000, pp 33-34. Back
292
op cit Policis for DTI, p 21. Back
293
ibid, p 34. Back
294
op cit Kempson and Collard, 2005, p 30. Back
295
Datamonitor, UK Non Standard and Sub Prime Lending 2004,
2004, p 135. Back
296
Citizens Advice, In Too Deep, CAB clients' experience of debt,
2003, page 120. Back
297
Competition Commission Emerging Thinking , 2005, para
36. Back
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