Written evidence from The Electoral Commission
WELSH AFFAIRS COMMITTEE INQUIRY: BETTER GOVERNANCE
FOR WALES
INTRODUCTION
1. The Electoral Commission welcomes the
opportunity to submit evidence to the Welsh Affairs Committee's
inquiry on Better Governance for Wales. The Commission's
representatives will be happy to expand upon or supplement any
of the points made below in oral evidence to the Committee.
2. The Commission's representatives giving
oral evidence to the Committee will be Glyn Mathias, Electoral
Commissioner, who has particular responsibility in the Commission
for Welsh affairs, and Kay Jenkins, Head of the Commission's Wales
Office.
3. The Commission's evidence to the Welsh
Affairs Committee is based on matters within the Commission's
statutory remit, that is, electoral issues. The Commission submits
no evidence to the Committee on the question of a new Executive
structure for the National Assembly for Wales or on enhancing
the Assembly's powers, as these are not matters in relation to
which the Commission has any statutory role.
4. The Commission's evidence mirrors its
submission to the Secretary of State for Wales made in response
to the White Paper Better Governance for Wales, September
2005, available on www.electoralcommission.org.uk.
ABOUT THE
ELECTORAL COMMISSION
5. The Electoral Commission is an independent
body established by the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums
Act (PPERA) in 2000. The Commission is headed by a Chairman and
four other Commissioners. The Chairman and Commissioners do not
have connections to any political party, nor is the Commission
accountable to Government. It is funded by and responsible to
Parliament through a committee chaired by the Speaker of the House
of Commons. We aim to foster public confidence and participation
in elections by promoting integrity, involvement and effectiveness
in the democratic process.
6. Under Section 6 of the PPERA, the Commission
is required to keep under review, and from time to time submit
reports to the Secretary of State, on such matters relating to
elections as the Commission may determine. The elections for which
the Commission has statutory responsibilities include elections
to the National Assembly for Wales. The Commission is also required,
by section 5 of PPERA, to prepare and publish reports on the administration
of elections to the National Assembly for Wales. The Commission
is required to promote public awareness of current and pending
electoral systems in the UK, under section 13 of PPERA.
7. We have, to date, published the following
reports on elections in Wales:
(a) The National Assembly for Wales elections
2003: the official report and results (November 2003).
(b) Local elections in Wales 2004: the
official report (December 2004) (Undertaken at the request
of the Welsh Assembly Government).
8. Prior to the National Assembly election
in May 2003, we published in December 2002 the research report
Wales Votes? This focused on public attitudes towards Assembly
elections.
9. We have also published the following
relevant reports on UK-wide elections, including Wales:
(a) Election 2001: The official results.
(b) The 2004 European Parliamentary elections
in the United Kingdom (December 2004).
(c) Securing the vote (May 2005).
Further reporting on the UK Parliamentary election 2005 will be
published by the Commission in autumn 2005.
10. In all of the reports cited, we have
commissioned and published the findings of expert research on
attitudes towards voting and the electoral process, including
quantitative and qualitative public opinion polling. Our reports
also include the findings of expert election results analysis
including, for example, on the two votes currently used in the
National Assembly electoral process.
PROMOTING PARTICIPATION
AT ASSEMBLY
ELECTIONS
11. The Commission very much welcomes the
intention signalled in the White Paper to implement a key recommendation
made in our statutory report on the National Assembly elections
2003, that is, to provide for powers for the Assembly to arrange
for public information campaigns to promote participation in its
elections. We believe this will be beneficial to voters and look
forward to working alongside the Assembly in fulfilling our own
duty to promote public awareness of the 2007 Assembly elections.
Promoting participation at elections is, of course, the collective
responsibility of all involved in the electoral process.
ELECTORAL ISSUES
12. The White Paper outlines the Government's
proposal to change the provisions currently in the Government
of Wales Act such that individuals would be prevented simultaneously
from being candidates in constituency elections and being eligible
for election from party lists. The Commission's comments on this
proposal are set out below.
Some context and criteria
13. The Electoral Commission's statutory
remit requires us to promote public awareness of all current and
pending electoral systems in the UK and the Commission has not
to date taken a view on the merits of any particular electoral
system.
14. The White Paper is not concerned with
the merits of particular electoral systems and proposes an amendment
to an element of the existing additional member system that the
White Paper argues causes voter confusion and concern.
15. In formulating our own proposals for
changes to electoral law and practice, we place the interests
of the voter at the centre of our considerations. Our priority
is that electoral arrangements should create the best possible
conditions for political parties and candidates to engage with
the electorate. Furthermore, we aim to ensure that electoral practitioners
can effectively and efficiently administer electoral arrangements.
16. At the National Assembly elections in
2003, the main story, alongside the actual election results themselves,
was the low levels of voter turnout, at only 38%. We commented
in our statutory report[1]
that all concerned with elections and electoral processes were
left with a serious challenge. We stated that all those with an
interest in promoting democratic involvement had, and continue
to have, a responsibility to examine how they could more effectively
engage with and gain the confidence of the electorate.
17. In our audit of political engagement[2]
we pointed out that what is incontrovertible is that turnout is
on a downward trend in the UK and that much research has found
the public to have low opinions of politicians and of politics.
Turnout at the UK Parliamentary election in 2005 showed only a
marginal improvement on 2001.
18. We believe it important that any amendment
to the current electoral process is considered in the context
of a continuing distrust of politicians and against the interplay
of factors that resulted in low turnout at the last National Assembly
election. Any change should be considered in the context of how
it might impact on public perceptions and voter participation
at the next Assembly election.
19. Any change should also be considered
for its impact in a UK-wide context, as well as within Wales.
In particular, the same electoral arrangements apply to the Scottish
Parliament and were introduced at the same time as those of the
National Assembly. Wales would have an electoral process unique
to itself if the proposal in the White Paper were implemented.
20. In light of these points, we believe
the following criteria are important in considering a change to
the existing electoral arrangements for the National Assembly:
(i) the change and the reasons for modifications
should be comprehensible to voters;
(ii) the change should be "fair"
and be seen to be fair in the eyes of voters;
(iii) there is a need to avoid of accusations
of partisanship, which could impact adversely on participation;
and
(iv) there is a need to consider broader
context, including the potential impact of any change on other
electoral systems in the UK.
International comparisons: dual candidacy
21. There are around 30 countries that have
mixed or additional member electoral systems (AMS[3]).
Compensatory systems with lists, like that used for the National
Assembly elections, normally explicitly or implicitly permit dual
candidacy. They normally require that in the event of double success,
the successful candidate must sit as a member for the constituency.
22. Candidates have been permitted to run
for both constituency and lists in Germany since the AMS system
was inaugurated there in 1949. New Zealand, Japan, Hungary and
Russia, all of which introduced mixed member systems in the 1990s,
permit dual candidacy. In Italy, Denmark and some regions of Germany,
dual candidacy is expressly required.
23. Prevention of dual candidacy to our
knowledge has until now only been tried in the Ukraine, prior
to the 2002 Parliamentary elections there.
24. Preventing dual candidacy was considered
when the electoral system for Quebec (Canada) was reviewed in
2003. Although the review acknowledged concerns that defeated
constituency candidates were being "recycled" as regional
AMs, the review board concluded that dual candidacy should be
required. It was proposed to make mandatory what was likely to
happen in any event, namely that the most advantageous places
on each party's list should go to the party's constituency candidates
in the region. The conclusion was that each regional AM must therefore
have contested a constituency seat.
25. In light of international norms, we
would caution that there should be compelling reasons for introducing
a change to an electoral process that is as yet untested over
a period of time. Whilst the effects of change can to an extent
be predicted, unexpected trends might emerge that have not been
possible to assess or analyse from experience in other countries.
Voter perspective: dual candidacy
26. In the time available to respond to
the White Paper, it was not feasible for us to commission public
opinion research on the issue of dual candidacy. Drawing on our
quantitative and qualitative research on public attitudes to the
National Assembly election in 2003, however, we note that the
"Clwyd West problem" as described in the White Paper
did not emerge in any of our attitudinal research about voting
in the election. As our research included unprompted questions
to the public about their reasons for voting or not voting, this
may suggest that there was in fact low public salience of the
issue at the time.
27. In the absence of any research findings
on voter attitudes on dual candidacy in the public domain, we
believe it is necessary for the Government to provide more information
regarding the justifications underpinning the statement in the
White Paper that voters are confused and concerned about the issue
and that it is a disincentive for voters. It would be helpful
for any evidence base to be made publicly available, to throw
further light on this matter.
28. It is possible that some of those members
of the public said to be critical of dual candidacy may in fact
be criticising an outcome of proportional representation, compared
with the majoritarian "first past the post" system to
which voters in Britain have been traditionally accustomed. The
Additional Member System used at the National Assembly elections
is specifically aimed at an outcome whereby the party list system
"corrects" the advantage gained in the constituency
election under first past the post.
Impact on political parties and candidates: prevention
of dual candidacy
29. There would be no impact on the proportionality
of the result; it would remain as at present.
30. At present, some high profile candidates
stand for election in constituencies, with the fall back of election
through the regional list. A party may be unlikely, under this
proposal, to risk a high quality candidate to challenge in a constituency
election; opposition parties may be obliged to run their major
players in regional lists to ensure election. This may impact
adversely on the quality of some constituency contests, where
opposition candidates may be perceived to be "second string".
This in turn is likely to favour sitting candidates.
31. In preparing its response to the White
Paper, the Commission contacted all political parties registered
to contest elections in Wales. From those that responded giving
us their views, the majority were strongly opposed to the change.
Some parties advocate more fundamental change to the Assembly's
electoral process or indeed to the Assembly itself. But there
is a perception that the change proposed favours incumbency and
the current party of Assembly Government that holds the large
majority of constituency seats.
CONCLUSION: PREVENTING
DUAL CANDIDACY
32. Our main consideration is the voter's
perspective. In light of the need to encourage voter participation
at the Assembly election in 2007, we would caution against any
change that is perceived to be partisan and could add to a prevailing
distrust of politicians.[4]
33. On the evidence available to the Commission,
which we have reviewed above, we do not believe that the case
for change has been made out.
AN ALTERNATIVE
APPROACH—A SINGLE
VOTE
34. In the course of discussions about the
White Paper's proposals, an alternative option to preventing dual
candidacy has been mooted; that alternative was referred to, for
example, by Secretary of State Peter Hain at a seminar held to
discuss the White Paper in Cardiff. The option is that the current
AMS system could operate with one vote.
35. A compensatory mixed system such as
AMS may operate with one vote; the vote is cast for a constituency
candidate but is also considered to be cast for the candidate's
party, thereby electing regional candidates from a party list.
The current d'Hondt formula of calculating vote shares could operate
with the one vote; the total of the constituency votes across
the region could be used to calculate the allocation of list seats,
rather than the total of the regional vote currently used. The
calculation could take into account the number of constituency
seats won when calculating the list allocations, similar to the
present system. However, without seeing this option set out in
written proposals detailing how it would work, comments are to
an extent speculative.
36. It is notable that, in the context of
National Assembly elections, implementing this option would mean
that a voter would cast one vote in an election for five candidates—to
elect a constituency Assembly member and four regional members.
International comparisons
37. The overwhelming majority of existing
compensatory systems have two votes. Changes over time indicate
a clear trend towards two votes. The exceptions to the two vote
system are the two largest Lander of Germany: Northern Rhine-Westphalia
and Baden Wurttemberg.
38. The option has also been raised in Scotland
during deliberations of the Arbuthnott Committee, which is considering
the consequences of having four different systems of voting in
Scotland, and different boundaries for Westminster and Scottish
Parliament constituencies. However, there is little evidence that
the option has been widely debated in Scottish civic society or
is one which has attracted significant media or public comment.
Voter perspective
39. One vote could be said to be simple
and straightforward; voters would have only one choice to make.
The corollary is that voter choice would be reduced. Personal
and political choices would be merged; voters would no longer
be able to vote for a preferred individual local candidate with
their constituency vote and a preferred party, which might be
different, with their second vote. Neither would any other type
of differential or "tactical" voting be possible.
Impact on political parties and candidates
40. Of those political parties in Wales
who gave us their comments on this issue, opposition is strongest
from smaller parties and from those who advocate more fundamental
change to the Assembly electoral process.
41. The main disadvantage of this option
is that small parties would have significant hurdles to mount
in order to attract votes. Under the single vote proposal, a party
or individual effectively has to stand in a constituency election
in order to gain votes and would have to stand 40 candidates,
one in each constituency, in order to claim to be contesting the
election across Wales. Even within one region, a party would have
to contest every constituency to be said to be covering the whole
region. This would be a significant cost and resource issue for
small parties.
42. In National Assembly elections, it is
already comparatively difficult for small parties or independent
candidates to be successful in the regional vote. This is because,
in practice, the threshold to be elected in the regions is already
high, at about 12% of the vote. This contrasts with elections
to the Scottish Parliament, where the ratio of regional to constituency
seats is lower. The proposal would therefore to the disadvantages
faced by small parties or independent candidates.
Conclusion: a single vote
43. Our conclusions on this issue are similar
to those on the proposal set out in the White Paper; we would
caution against any change to the current electoral process without
strong evidence to back the case. If this proposal were to be
considered actively, it would need more flesh on the proposed
process and should therefore be the subject of full consultation.
1 September 2005
1 The National Assembly for Wales elections 2003,
November 2003. Back
2
Research reports, jointly with Hansard Society, March 2004. Back
3
In drawing international comparisons, we have been assisted by
Prof D Farrell of Manchester University, Dr R Scully of Aberystwyth
University and Mr A Ellis of the IDEA in Sweden. Back
4
For example, see Audit of Political Engagement, The Electoral
Commission, March 2004. Back
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