Martin
Horwood: One is probably intended to achieve the other.
There is clearly a problem with trying to define religion using the
term “supernatural principle”, which may well not apply
to many religious traditions, whether they involve belief in a god or
not. There is also a problem with taking out those two lines, which
were thoughtfully negotiated and would guarantee charitable status for
traditions that do not involve belief in a single
god. I am not
attempting to demonstrate that my view on religion or the definition of
religion, my interpretation of humanism as religion or even my
interpretation of Theravada Buddhism or Taoism is absolutely correct. I
am simply pointing out that the issue is a minefield into which
politicians should not stray. The hon. Member for Isle of Wight would
be wise to withdraw his
amendment. 10.45
am
Mr.
Turner: I am of course grateful for the hon.
Gentleman’s unsolicited advice, but does he really mean it when
he says that humanism is a form of
religion?
Martin
Horwood: The existing charity law allows charitable status
to the British Humanist Association, so I hesitate to contradict our
learned judges in their judgment that humanism counts as a religion.
There is an organisation that I believe calls itself the organisation
of religious humanists—I do not remember the exact
name—which has sought to attach to humanism certain ceremonials
and rituals and some of the outward forms of traditional religion. The
concept is a moveable feast, therefore, and we should hesitate before
defining things too closely in the Bill. Existing charity law has been
quite adequate in this respect and the new draft Bill provides
satisfactory
clarification. We
are also considering amendment No. 3, which appears to be intended to
remove the clause that would make charitable purposes and public
benefit retrospective. I need to listen to the arguments of the hon.
Member for Isle of Wight before passing judgment on that. I suspect
that amendment No. 53 is the chess amendment, which seeks to remove the
requirement for physical exertion in schools as part of the definition
of sport. I have a lot of sympathy with that. It might also apply to
other, motorised forms of sport that might also pretty clearly count as
sport. The Bill’s requirement of physical exertion seems
slightly unnecessary, although if the brain is an organ and is exerted
in the process of playing chess, that may be physical exertion of a
kind. We could
consider an amendment that would define sport as anything that ever
appeared in the old BBC programme “Grandstand”, which
seemed to cover just about everything, but I suspect that the lawyers
would not like that. However, I am sympathetic to the amendment and I
look forward to the hon. Gentleman’s supporting
comments.
Mr.
Turner: I shall come to the amendment proposed by the hon.
Member for Cheltenham at the end of my remarks, because it ties in well
with my amendment No. 3. It is appropriate to start, however, with
amendment No. 1, as he has offered his somewhat qualified support for
it. It proposes the inclusion of the promotion of the efficiency of the
police service and welfare of police dependants as a specified
charitable purpose. I
am grateful to the Police Dependants Trust for giving me information on
the amendment. The trust spends something like £1.9 million a
year in support of police officers, former police officers and their
families. It helps some 5,000 families, a number which the trust
estimates to be approximately one fifth of the number of families that
could be registered and that should perhaps be helped. It was set up
after the tragic death of three police officers in Shepherd’s
Bush in 1966, which I think was the first occasion when the murder of
police officers made an impact on my growing intellect. My intellect
may not have grown very far, but that event impacted on it at the time.
The trust is a small and efficient organisation that was set up to
support the welfare departments of a number of constabularies. However,
other organisations would benefit from the amendment as
well—many constabularies have their own police
charities. I am
proposing the inclusion of the provision because there has been some
concern in the trust that it may be excluded if it is not specifically
included in the
definition in clause 2(2). Its argument is that police officers occupy a
unique position in British society as officers of the Crown, whose
daily responsibility is to put themselves in harm’s way. I do
not for a moment exclude those other representatives of emergency
provisions, such as the fire service, the ambulance service and the
Royal National Lifeboat Institution to which the right hon. Member for
Cardiff, South and Penarth (Alun Michael) referred a moment
ago. Alun
Michael: Is not the answer the same in respect of the
police as it is in respect of those organisations and professions, in
that there is no obstacle to charitable registration under the Bill, as
drafted? Indeed, is it not the case that the Police Dependants Trust is
registered as a charity and there is no suggestion that it would cease
to be so if the Bill were
enacted?
Mr.
Turner: I suspect that the same argument could be advanced
in respect of clause 2(2)(l), which was added to the Bill in another
place for the
promotion “of the
efficiency of the armed forces of the
Crown” to be considered a
recognised charitable purpose. That seems to represent a similar
recognition of the particular role of the police in serving the
community and putting themselves at
risk.
Alun
Michael: Is not the argument that, having extended the
provision to one particular activity, where do we stop? The hon.
Gentleman seeks to extend matters in the same way. We could argue that,
in another place, they went further than they needed to although a
tradition in both Houses that goes back to almost the first Act of
Parliament required that people practise with bows and arrows so that
they were ready when they were called to the armed services. We could
say that there is a long-standing tradition in the armed services that
needs to be treasured in the same way that we treasure arcane and
out-of-date legislation, and that it should stay rather than seeming to
dilute and diminish the category that was added by their
lordships.
Mr.
Turner: Perhaps we need to reinstate a charitable purpose
that had been a charitable purpose until the beginning of the 20th
century in respect of the practice of defending oneself and
one’s family by the use of arms. That charitable purpose has
somewhat disappeared in recent years, but I do not believe that a
distinction can be drawn except on the basis of antiquity. One of the
things that the Bill is meant to do is to bring charity law up to date,
so it would not do any harm to include the welfare of police officers
and their dependants, particularly because the Home Office and the
police force seem to be withdrawing from becoming involved in such
work. That is not because of any malice, but because they want to focus
their funds and resources on front-line policing. The funding of police
welfare and its provision have suffered and there is a need for a
charity such as that to remain
involved. One of the
worries that has been drawn to my attention is that the charity
commissioners have inspected some police welfare funds and advised them
that they are in danger of not being recognised as
charitable organisations. That is on the basis of those
funds—those charities—making what they consider to be the
best decisions about the deployment of their resources in the interests
of their beneficiaries. The problem may be the application of the
public benefit test that we shall come to later in our debate rather
than clause 2, but I am worried—as is the Police Dependants
Trust—that too tight a definition of the purpose of the charity
could restrict the activities of the trust. It says that its chairman,
Norrie Flowers, repeatedly approached the Parliamentary
Secretary’s predecessors who were responsible for such matters
and those at the Home Office for support for the amendment, but they
did not agree with
it. The letter that I
have received from the Charity Commission on its treatment of the
Police Dependants Trust and similar charities—I am referring to
a similar charity in this case—tells me that charities have
certainly received formal reviews from the Charity Commission. The
commission tells me that such visits are not inspections, but that they
are designed to ensure compliance with the legal framework and to
advise on good practice. The commission says that it was picking up on
the charities because they did not apply a particular test when
allocating resources in the interests of needy dependants of police
officers and former police
officers. It is
worrying that the Charity Commission is imposing such a restrictive
test that the Police Dependants Trust and other charities fear that
they may be squeezed out. Clause 1(1) states that
“ ‘charity’ means an
institution
which— is
established for charitable purposes
only”. That is why I
believe that it is appropriate to include the Police Dependants Trust
and other such organisations within the definition: they have been
advised that giving a Christmas bonus to police widows is not a
charitable purpose, because it does not involve an assessment of need,
and that is why the trust has asked for the amendment. I think that it
is frankly silly of the Charity Commission to be so pernickety in the
way that they advise, inspect and review small charities, and to expect
charities to be so pernickety as well. Nevertheless, that is the advice
that the commission has given, and that is why I want the Bill to be
amended. As the hon.
Member for Cheltenham said, amendment No. 2 is designed to introduce a
clear definition of religion. Contrary to what he said about clause
2(3) being negotiated and agreed, the Committee that scrutinised the
draft Bill said that more needed to be done about the definition of
religion. The Committee made some proposals, but the reason for my
definition is that confusion arises from the Charity
Commission’s treatment of
charities. At present,
the charity law definition of religion is inconsistent. On the one
hand, case law generally indicates that the term refers to philosophies
based on belief in, and worship of, a deity. In 1999, the Charity
Commission rejected the Church of Scientology’s application for
registration on that basis. On the other hand, it has registered
organisations that promote multi-deity religions, such as Hinduism, and
no-deity religions, such as some schools of Buddhism. I have no
particular complaint about what is in clause 2(3); my complaint is
about what is not in it, which is why I am proposing what I consider to
be a better definition.
Edward
Miliband:
Modestly.
Mr.
Turner: The reason I can do so modestly is that it is not
my
definition.
Martin
Horwood: If the hon. Gentleman is not concerned about what
is already included in paragraph (a), why is he not proposing his
amendment by way of addition rather than
substitution?
Mr.
Turner: The reason is that I believe the amendment
includes what is in paragraph (a). Technically, it deletes the
paragraph, but the words of the amendment are inclusive of the
definition in the paragraph. Not all religions believe in a god, or a
supernatural being, but they do believe in a supernatural thing or
principle. The hon. Gentleman suggested that humanism is a religion.
That seems to me to be contrary to the tenets of most humanists,
although I accept that there may be some who define humanism as a
religion. The current definition, however, does not clarify what a
religion actually is—we are left with a complete void on that.
The amendment, as my hon. Friend the Member for Rochford and Southend,
East (James Duddridge) said, is based on the Australian definition and
defines religion
as “belief in a
supernatural principle, being or thing and acceptance and observance of
certain canons of conduct to give effect to those
beliefs.” 11
am
Alun
Michael: I am not sure that it does. Surely the hon.
Gentleman’s wording requires the impossible. It is essentially
philosophically unsound and confuses beliefs and principles. One cannot
give effect to a belief; one either believes something or does not. It
is possible to act consistently with a belief or a set of principles
based on a belief, but not to put a belief into practice. Therefore,
his wording is entirely
useless.
Mr.
Turner: The right hon. Gentleman is clearly cleverer than
the whole band of Australian lawyers and judges who found it a
perfectly adequate definition. I congratulate him on his imaginative
argument. He would probably be paid well at the Australian Bar for
promoting it. Putting one’s principles into action is something
that politicians try to do every day. I suspect that those with
religious beliefs try to do so as
well.
Alun
Michael: The hon. Gentleman has missed my point. Of course
we try to put principles into action, but his wording requires beliefs
to be put into action. A belief cannot be put into action; one either
believes something or does not. Principles are put into action, as he
reflected in the wording of his response to
me.
Mr.
Turner: As I said, the right hon. Gentleman might do well
if he were looking for a career at the Australian Bar. It is my
view—to avoid using a difficult word—that the definition
is broad enough to cover polytheistic and atheistic religions and to
indicate the boundaries of religion by requiring a belief in something
supernatural.
Tom
Levitt: As a non-believer, I am trying to come at the
issue objectively, but I do not see how one can have an atheistic
religion. It seems to me that a belief system must be based on some
belief, but how will that be proven? If I adhered to a religion that I
claimed
included a belief in a supernatural principle, how would the hon.
Gentleman’s amendment test whether the principle that I believed
in was
supernatural?
Mr.
Turner: The hon. Gentleman goes down an interesting path.
As a believer, I also find it difficult to believe that one can have an
atheistic religion, just as I find it difficult to believe that one can
describe humanism as a religion. I cannot answer his question, but I
can say that the definition has served other common law jurisdictions
well. It would have the advantage of allowing religious charities to
carry out charitable activities in the practical expression of their
belief, whether it is a belief in one god, many gods or indeed no god
but another supernatural thing or
being.
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