Edward
Miliband: Again, I know that it is not the hon.
Gentleman’s intention, but—and I hope to short-circuit
this discussion—I fear that his amendment will do precisely what
he warned us earlier against doing. By substituting his wording for the
words in clause 17(2), convoluted though they might be, he would
transfer the onus from the charity, which would offer the donor the
opportunity to make a declaration, to the donor him or herself, who
would have to take the initiative and make the declaration. I fear that
the amendment will not achieve his purposes, but will work against
them.
Martin
Horwood: I am grateful to the Minister, but if he thinks
about it for a moment, he will see that that would be a desirable
outcome. It is always generally desirable for donations to be received
with as few restrictions as possible. That is generally a good thing
from charities’ point of view. If the donor wants to make a
restriction, it is up to them to make it clear what that restriction is
and to tell the charity when the donation is solicited whether there
are any particular concerns or restrictions, or projects to which that
donor wishes it to be
applied.
Edward
Miliband indicated
dissent.
Martin
Horwood: The Minister shakes his head, but I have been in
that situation as a fundraiser, and it is exactly right. I would far
prefer the onus to be on the donor to restrict a donation, rather than
on the charity. I am proposing a simplification that would be more
practical for fundraisers in the application of the Act. I hope that he
will look kindly on it.
Edward
Miliband: I will
not.
Martin
Horwood: Well, the Minister is mistaken in that case. I
thought he was a generous soul, but perhaps we were misled. Amendment
No. 100 seeks to remove the requirement for fundraisers to understand
Norman French to understand the
Bill.
Mr.
Turner: The relevant words in the hon. Gentleman’s
recent speech were “I have been a fundraiser, and I know what
it’s like.” He is trying to make it easy for fundraisers
and not for donors. Donors are usually quite interested in the purpose
to which their generosity will be applied. I am not an enthusiast of
amendment No. 101, and I understand the purposes behind the hon.
Lady’s
amendments. Amendments
Nos. 23 and 24 are designed to give guidance on how to make the
declaration. It is all very well saying that a declaration must or must
not be made, but it is helpful to have a cast-iron declaration to hand
if a donor wants to sign it. That would not be a bad thing for
charities to bring
forward. 12.15
pm Amendment No.
25 relates to the Lanesborough hotel case. If a donor makes a donation
and the charity fails, is the donor entitled to the value of the
original donation or to the value of the asset at the time of the
charity’s failure? The Lanesborough hotel—the case
involves a leasehold reversion not a charity—used to be
a hospital, and before that it was a property owned by the Duke of
Westminster. He gave the property for use as a hospital and it served
as such for a while, but then it ceased to be a hospital and the Duke
of Westminster had it back. Let us be clear: if we do not
have such a provision, we put donors off. I might be willing to give
something in the hope that it would be used to set up a monastery, but
200 years later along comes Henry VIII who says to me,
“We’re not having any monasteries, but you can have the
value of this handkerchief.” Actually, Henry VIII was not as
honest as that because he would not have given anyone the value of a
handkerchief, but the principle is clear. When the asset is a real
asset, it is sensible to provide for the donor to be able to reclaim
the asset or its current value, rather than merely the value of the
asset at the time it was donated. Will the Parliamentary Secretary say
who will decide the value of the asset? What was the value of Rievaulx
abbey at the time that it was dissolved by Henry VIII? What was its
value at the time that it was donated—if it was
donated?
Edward
Miliband: He knows.
[Laughter.]
Martin
Horwood: I am grateful to the hon. Member for Isle of
Wight for giving way, although it probably was not wise of me to
intervene at that precise moment. I am not about to provide him with
the answer to the question. I am worried because his idea about the
value of the gift at a later stage is not practical because of all the
changes that might have taken place in the meantime. He says that he is
worried about donors being put off, but surely what would put them off
the most is to be presented with a complicated declaration on the
possible failure of the charitable
purpose.
Mr.
Turner: The donors would be asked about the failure of the
charitable purpose anyway, so they might as well have something that
makes it clear whether they were or were not given such a declaration
and the opportunity to sign it. That would clarify matters. A donor
will want to know that his donation will be used for the purpose for
which he intends it to be used and that, in the event of a failure, he
will have the opportunity to recover the property and, in all
probability, give it for another charitable
purpose.
Mr.
Bone: In my constituency, we have the Rushden memorial
clinic; donations were given to provide hospital and medical
facilities. We did not envisage that the clinic would be closed, that
houses would be built on the site and that the clinic would be moved
away from the town. Donors are unhappy about that sort of thing. The
proposal for a declaration to ensure that donors would receive their
original money back would discourage such things from
happening.
Mr.
Turner: I agree with my hon. Friend. The Frank James
memorial hospital in East Cowes is a similar example. It was paid for
out of the pay packets of people who worked for what is now G. K.
Westland, which used to be the British Hovercraft Corporation
and, before that, Saunders Roe, which made the Empire flying boats.
Exactly the same circumstances apply. The hospital was taken over by
the health service, of course, but it would be sad for the donors to
see that asset lost. It upsets people to see an asset that they, their
parents or grandparents gave for the benefit of their town being
absorbed into a bigger asset in a town many miles away, albeit perhaps
providing a similar service. Where people give money to a charity, they
are entitled to expect the money to be spent in accordance with their
wishes. That is the purpose of amendment No.
27.
Alun
Michael: Would the value of the asset be net of the
additional investment or additional value that had been put in over the
years—perhaps by the health service or another
organisation—including the value of good
will?
Mr.
Turner: It is perfectly fair to say that the value should
be net. If a person gives a piece of land, at the end of the
process they are entitled to withdraw the value of the land, not the
value of the buildings on the land. That is perfectly fair, but it is
also fair that where a charity fails, the donor should not merely
receive the value of a silk handkerchief.
Tom
Levitt: I rise briefly because the hon. Gentleman’s
argument reminds me of a local case. Describing it in detail would not
be long enough for a speech, but would be too long for an intervention.
It involves the Devonshire Royal hospital in Buxton, which was given to
the nation by the Duke of Devonshire about 100 years ago. It became
part of the NHS on its formation, but a few years ago Stockport health
authority, which then ran it, decided that it was surplus to
requirements as a hospital and no longer wished to use it. I had an
amusing interview in my constituency office, which I think I can now
disclose under statutes of limitations, with an agitated Duke of
Devonshire, who said, “For heaven’s sake, they’re
not going to give it me back are they?” He said that on the
grounds that the building had become a liability rather than an asset,
owing to the amount of money that was required to run it.
I would not like the word
“must” to be included, because that could mean giving a
liability back to donors, rather than the asset that they thought they
had donated in the first place. That is my argument against the hon.
Gentleman, but I cannot resist pointing out that amendment No. 100,
tabled by the hon. Member for Cheltenham, is probably the classic
embodiment of the Cheltenham principle, being harmless if not entirely
necessary.
Mr.
Turner: I fear that the hon. Gentleman heard me
mis-express the purpose of the amendment. Proposed new section 14B(4)
of the 1993 Act
says: “If a
scheme provides for the property to be transferred to another charity,
the scheme may impose on the charity trustees of that charity a duty to
secure that the property is applied for
purposes” of the charity.
My assertion is merely that the new subsection (4) should read that the
scheme “must impose” that duty on the trustees. If a
property is given for any purpose, it is there for that very purpose,
whether it is with charity A or with charity B. I do not see why there
is an option for the charity to transfer that property for a different
purpose. I am also
concerned about the principle of clause 15, because as far as I can see
clause 13 provides a broad power for varying the use of property. For
that reason, I may wish to oppose clause 15 on stand
part.
Edward
Miliband: The hon. Gentleman threw in a googly at the end,
but I shall try to deal with it
nevertheless. I shall
start with the worthy amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member
for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman). I have dealt with
amendment No. 134, which deals with work that has been
completed, and hope that I have reassured her about the 1993 Act.
Briefly, I am sympathetic to her de minimis desires, which are
expressed in amendments Nos. 135 and 136. The most acute of her very
acute points was about charities that had built up lots of small sums
from appeals spread over hundreds of years, which would have to go
through the process of cy-près with the Charity Commission,
issue new purposes and so on to get those amounts of money dealt with.
I undertake to consider whether there is a case for a de minimis
provision in relation to cy-près; I hope that that satisfies my
hon. Friend. In
amendment No. 101, the hon. Member for Cheltenham is contradicting his
own wise words, because he is transferring the onus. If someone gives
money to a certain appeal, but the money is to be used for a completely
different—albeit worthy—charitable purpose, it is fair
enough that the person giving money to the appeal should know that, and
should be offered the chance to make a declaration saying that that
cannot happen. That is the long and the short of what the provision
does.
Martin
Horwood: The circumstances that we are talking
about—cases in which a charitable purpose eventually
fails—are not common. They are extreme circumstances that need
to be catered for. The difficulty of trying to insert complicated
declarations as a matter of course is that they can disrupt the process
of fundraising, whether that is being carried out through a small
donation form, a coupon advertisement, or a delicate conversation with
a major donor. The declaration process may jeopardise the donation and
result in less money for the beneficiaries or the charitable purpose
for which the money is being raised. It is simply impractical to insist
on such complex declarations in those
circumstances.
Edward
Miliband: I am slightly sympathetic to what the hon.
Gentleman says. In a sense, we hold the opposite point of view from the
hon. Member for Isle of Wight, who, through his amendment, seeks more
reassurance about the donor being advised on how to make the
declaration. I am pretty certain that what he wants is implicit in the
wording of new section 14B(2)(b), and on that basis I hope that he will
accept that the wording in the Bill should stand. I shall come back to
the point made by the hon. Member for Cheltenham
later.
Peter
Bottomley: The Minister may come to this later, but why
does he not just change cy-près to “as near”
throughout the
Bill?
Edward
Miliband: Cy-près is a sort of long-standing
convention and it is well understood by those who need to understand
it. [Laughter.] Moving
swiftly on, I disagree with the hon. Member for Isle of Wight on
amendment No. 25. He seems to be confusing a charitable donation with
an investment. If one makes a charitable donation, one cannot expect
its value to increase and to get back that value if the charity fails,
but that would be the effect of his amendment.
First, if one gives money to a
charity, one does not expect to get it back; secondly, if in extreme
circumstances a charity fails and one does get it back, one cannot
expect it to have increased in value. I fear that if one gave a
handkerchief 200 years ago, one would get back a handkerchief or the
monetary equivalent. That is just one of those
things.
Mr.
Turner: Perhaps I did not express myself clearly; what I
am saying is that if one gave Rievaulx abbey 200 years ago,
what one might get back today is a handkerchief, because the value of
the abbey then was 7s 6d, which is about how much—or even
less—a handkerchief costs nowadays. I am not suggesting that the
donation should be an investment, but what if a donation increases in
value? If someone gives a charity a piece of land, it is reasonable to
expect to get back the piece of land, not just a
handkerchief. 12.30
pm
Edward
Miliband: I fear that that is not so. It is hard lines for
the person who gets back 7s 6d or the price of a handkerchief. Under
the hon. Gentleman’s amendment, the wording would mention a sum
equal to the relevant value at the time of the charity failing, but
that is tantamount to making it an investment, because one essentially
benefits from the capital growth of the
gift.
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