Peter
Bottomley: My hon. Friend is going backwards. Surely the
whole point is not to draw up a definitive list, but say that if there
is not already discretion for local authorities, they ought to have
it.
Mr.
Turner: I assure my hon. Friend that I was not going
backwards, merely hoping that we could draw up the list, find out how
few opportunities there were for local authorities to remit fees and
return to the issue on Report with the support of the Parliamentary
Secretary.
Peter
Bottomley: I should like to put on record that I do not
believe that the discretion exists for village halls and other
organisations that need to go beyond their temporary entertainment
licences. That is one of the things that the Minister should raise in
his discussions with other people.
Mr.
Turner: That example sprang to mind when national scales
of charging were mentioned. I think I have said enough; in fact, I know
I have—that does not need confirmation. I am grateful to the
Parliamentary Secretary for agreeing to consider the matter and I shall
question him closely about his progress on it as soon as we get back
from the recess. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the
motion. Motion and
clause, by leave,
withdrawn.
New
Clause
13Exercise
of information powers ‘Before
section 8 of the 1993 Act
insert— “Z8
Exercise of information
powers In undertaking any
action under sections 19, 20 or 26, the Commission shall have regard
to— (a) the need to
ensure that the burden on staff or volunteers of the charity is
proportionate to the objectives of the action taken or
proposed; (b) the need to
ensure that its costs are proportionate to the objectives of the action
taken or proposed; and (c) the
extent to which the charity depends on regular donations from members
of the public.”.’.—[Mr.
Turner.] Brought
up, and read the First
time.
Mr.
Turner: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second
time. This is another
new clause to which the Cheltenham principle may be attributed, and I
want to be sure of whether that is the case. I draw the
Minister’s attention to paragraph (c) in particular. It is
relevant to consider whether charities have close relations with
members of the public, as do those that raise
funds.
Edward
Miliband: The Committee will recall that, last week, we
spent some time discussing the duty on the Charity Commission to act
proportionately. The Charity Commission has that duty, and that of
acting reasonably. We have strengthened that by giving the commission a
specific duty to have regard for the principles of best regulatory
practice. Its regulatory activities should be proportionate,
accountable, consistent, transparent and targeted only at cases for
which they are needed.
That duty applies to all the
commission’s functions, including those specified in the new
clause. In reaching its decisions in respect of the exercise of its
powers, the commission will take all relevant matters into account. On
that basis, the commission will be required to follow best regulatory
practice. I do not see the need for additional requirements, which
would add confusion, not clarity. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will
withdraw the
motion.
Mr.
Turner: The Parliamentary Secretary has confirmed that
paragraph (c) is covered. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw
the motion. Motion
and clause, by leave,
withdrawn.
New
Clause
14Disclosure
of information to and by Northern Ireland
regulator ‘(1) This section
applies if a body (referred to in this section as “the Northern
Ireland regulator”) is established to exercise functions in
Northern Ireland which are similar in nature to the
functions exercised in England and Wales by the Charity
Commission. (2) The Secretary
of State may by regulations authorise relevant public authorities to
disclose information to the Northern Ireland regulator for the purpose
of enabling or assisting the Northern Ireland regulator to discharge
any of its functions. (3) If
the regulations authorise the disclosure of Revenue and Customs
information, they must contain provision in relation to that disclosure
which corresponds to the provision made in relation to the disclosure
of such information by section 10(2) to (4) of the 1993 Act (as
substituted by paragraph 99 of Schedule 8 to this
Act). (4) In the case of
information disclosed to the Northern Ireland regulator pursuant to
regulations made under this section, any power of the Northern Ireland
regulator to disclose the information is exercisable subject to any
express restriction subject to which the information was disclosed to
the Northern Ireland
regulator. (5) Subsection (4)
does not apply in relation to Revenue and Customs information disclosed
to the Northern Ireland regulator pursuant to regulations made under
this section; but any such information may not be further disclosed
except with the consent of the Commissioners for Her Majesty’s
Revenue and Customs. (6) Any
person specified, or of a description specified, in regulations made
under this section who discloses information in contravention of
subsection (5) is guilty of an offence and
liable— (a) on summary
conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a
fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or
both; (b) on conviction on
indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to a
fine, or both. (7) It is a
defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (5) of
disclosing information to prove that he reasonably
believed— (a) that the
disclosure was lawful, or (b)
that the information had already and lawfully been made available to
the public. (8) In the
application of this section to Scotland or Northern Ireland, the
reference to 12 months in subsection (6) is to be read as a reference
to 6 months. (9) In this
section— “relevant
public authority”
means— (a) any
government department (other than a Northern Ireland
department), (b) any local
authority in England, Wales or
Scotland, (c) any person who is a
constable in England and Wales or
Scotland, (d) any other body or
person discharging functions of a public nature (including a body or
person discharging regulatory functions in relation to any description
of activities), except a body or person whose functions are exercisable
only or mainly in or as regards Northern Ireland and relate only or
mainly to transferred
matters; “Revenue and Customs
information” means information held as mentioned in section
18(1) of the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 (c.
11); “transferred
matter” has the same meaning as in the Northern Ireland Act 1998
(c. 47).’.—[Edward
Miliband.] Brought
up, read the First and Second time, and added to the
Bill.
New Clause
15Human
rights compliance ‘(1) The
Commission shall investigate the activities of a charity where it
receives an allegation, substantiated by evidence,
that the charity, acting in concert with a government (whether or not a
party to the European Convention on Human Rights) has committed an act
which, had it been committed by a public authority, would have been
inconsistent with a Convention right as defined in the Human Rights Act
1998. (2) If, following any
such investigation, the Commission finds the allegation proven, it
shall either, if the charity is registered, strike the charity off the
register or exercise its other statutory powers in relation to the
charity, its property or assets or its charity trustees, officers or
employees.’.—[Peter
Bottomley.] Brought
up, and read the First
time.
Peter
Bottomley: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second
time. The Cheltenham
principle has been cited many times, but not by me; it will be now. The
Bill is riddled with the substitution of the words “the
commission is” for the words “the commission are”.
That is Cheltenham all the way through.
I now turn to something rather
more serious. I tabled the new clause very late, and so the Committee
ought to know that if the Minister gives any kind of response, I do not
intend to push it to a vote. Secondly, many of us have had
correspondence from Benedict Birnberg, Uri Davis, Roland Rance and
David Wolton. Those who have read the correspondence will know about
the issue that they had in mind, but I do not think that it is
appropriate for the Committee to become involved in that in any sense
whatsoever. The new
clause is about human rights compliance, and I am relying quite heavily
on a letter that Benedict Birnberg and his colleagues sent to the
Minister, dated 26 June. I shall also be quoting from a letter sent to
the Charities Bill team on 3 June. The proposed new clause
“is framed to make it
clear...that English charities may not engage in activities which,
were they committed by a public authority, would be inconsistent with
Convention rights as defined in the Human Rights Act 1998 and to
mandate”— to
require— “the
Charities Commission to investigate and take appropriate action against
charities which are alleged to do so by exercising its statutory
powers.” The allegation by
itself should not be sufficient. The wording of the proposed amendment
by which I have been assisted was based on the advice, I am told, of a
senior member of the judiciary.
The letter dated 3 June is from
correspondence with the Charity Commission and the charities unit,
which has now moved to the Minister’s Department from the Home
Office. It has been put to Benedict Birnberg and his colleagues that
existing charity law is sufficient to empower the Charity Commission to
take action to deal with the abuses that were alleged when a complaint
was put forward against a particular charitable trust. In fact, the
petitioners, if I can put it that way, supported the view that the law
was sufficient. That is why they wrote to the commission, seeking the
investigation of the activities that they alleged contravened
international human rights laws.
The Charity Commission rejected
the complaint, taking the view that it operated within a statutory
framework that precluded it from undertaking such an investigation, let
alone from having the power to cause any remedial action. The
petitioners considered, as they argue in the letter, that there was a
gap in charity law that needed to be filled, namely the deficient
powers, as they saw it, of the commission to monitor and intervene in
the affairs of a UK charity alleged to be engaged in activities that
would be incompatible with the Human Rights Act 1998 were it to be a
public authority. Mr.
Robert Flello (Stoke-on-Trent, South) (Lab): The hon.
Gentleman raises an extremely important and serious matter. Could he
explain to me, as I am confused, his position in relation to his hon.
and right hon. Friends, who appear to have a problem with the Human
Rights Act and think that perhaps we should get rid of
it?
The petitioners continued that
they carefully considered what the Charities Bill team sent back, but
that it reinforced their concerns. They were told that charity law
provides remedies either in circumstances when the
charity’s
“purposes cease to be charitable
under English law” or in
circumstances when the
charity “carries out
unacceptable activities (for example, activities that are
unlawful...)”. The
whole point is that because charity law is, in the petitioners’
view, so unspecific and lacking in clarity and the existing statutory
powers of intervention so limited, that prompts the question of what
purposes are non-charitable and what charity activities are
unacceptable or unlawful.
In the absence of clear
statutory precepts, the reaction of the commission to the
petitioners’ complaint and to similar complaints is bound to be
as it was. There is no criticism of the commission in what has been
said, but rather it has been questioned whether there is a gap in the
law. It may be that charity law needs amending—and the
petitioners would say that it certainly does—to make it explicit
that an English charity, or for that matter any charity anywhere in the
United Kingdom, may not engage in activities that contravene
international human rights provisions and standards, and that the
commission is mandated to intervene if it does
so.
3.30
pm The proposal
that was first discussed in correspondence has been changed and its
most recent form is the new clause that I am offering to the Committee
today. The particular wording does not matter, but the commission
wishes to see—and there is an argument here that the Committee
might wish to consider—an amendment that satisfied the principle
behind the concerns. The underlying issue is whether non-state
institutions have obligations under human rights treaties and if so, to
what degree. The purpose of the new clause is to make it explicit that
UK charities not only are expected to comply with international human
rights standards, but can be required to do
so. There are other
matters contained in a letter that could come up if we return to the
issue later, but I have spelled out the issue and the responses from
the Charities Bill unit, which was very open, and the Charity
Commission. The underlying question is not whether the law is being
applied or interpreted
properly, but whether there is a gap in the law. The Committee might
benefit from hearing the Minister’s
response. | 
