The
Committee consisted of the following
Members:
Chairman:
Mr.
David
Wilshire
Blunt,
Mr. Crispin
(Reigate)
(Con)
Browne,
Mr. Jeremy
(Taunton)
(LD)
Campbell,
Mr. Alan
(Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty's
Treasury)
Cousins,
Jim
(Newcastle upon Tyne, Central)
(Lab)
Dorrell,
Mr. Stephen
(Charnwood)
(Con)
Dorries,
Mrs. Nadine
(Mid-Bedfordshire)
(Con)
Ellman,
Mrs. Louise
(Liverpool, Riverside)
(Lab/Co-op)
Field,
Mr. Mark
(Cities of London and Westminster)
(Con)
Gilroy,
Linda
(Plymouth, Sutton)
(Lab/Co-op)
Gwynne,
Andrew
(Denton and Reddish)
(Lab)
Herbert,
Nick
(Arundel and South Downs)
(Con)
Hopkins,
Kelvin
(Luton, North)
(Lab)
Hunter,
Mark
(Cheadle)
(LD)
Lucas,
Ian
(Wrexham)
(Lab)
McNulty,
Mr. Tony
(Minister for Policing, Security and Community
Safety)
Walley,
Joan
(Stoke-on-Trent, North)
(Lab)
Wright,
David
(Telford)
(Lab)
Glenn
McKee, Committee
Clerk
attended the Committee
First
Delegated Legislation
Committee
Monday 26
February
2007
[Mr.
David Wilshire
in the
Chair]
Draft Part 7 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (Extension to Animal Pathogens) Order 2007
4.30
pm
The
Minister for Policing, Security and Community Safety (Mr.
Tony McNulty):
I beg to move,
That the Committee has
considered the draft Part 7 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security
Act 2001 (Extension to Animal Pathogens) Order
2007.
The
Chairman:
With this, it will be convenient to discuss the
draft Schedule 5 to the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001
(Modification) Order
2007.
Mr.
McNulty:
I welcome you to the Chair, Mr.
Wilshire. I look forward to serving under your chairmanship. I also
welcome all other hon. Members
present.
The draft
orders were laid before the House on24 January. The purpose of
the draft Schedule 5 tothe Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security
Act 2001 (Modification) Order 2007 is to extend the list of controlled
pathogens and toxins given in schedule 5 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime
and Security Act 2001. When the Act was originally drawn up, the
classical list of agents from state biological warfare
programmes was used as the basis of schedule 5, and it primarily
addressed the state proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.
It was a familiar and logical starting point for that United Kingdom
counter-terrorism legislation, and it was used in the absence of any
other considered criteria. Those hon. Members who are looking for
bacillus anthracis, coxiella burnetii or Q fever, ricin or any of the
other rickettsiae, bacteria or toxins that might be called routine will
find them in the original list rather than the supplementary list that
forms the basis of todays order.
Since 2001, there has been
considerable debate within Government and within the United
Kingdoms scientific community about the pathogens caught under
the scope of the 2001 Act. Following those discussions, it has been
concluded that terrorist scenarios could involve more pathogens than
those currently listed in schedule 5 to that Act, so the list has been
revisited by a cross-Government group with the aim of placing it more
squarely within the current UK context.
The Select Committee on Science
and Technology endorsed the view that the 2001 Act should be updated
fully to reflect all materials of concern from a counter-terrorist
perspective. That view was echoedby the Privy Councillor
Review Committee, which reported on the Anti-terrorism, Crime and
Security Act in December 2003. We added pathogens and toxins
to the list only once we were satisfied that they could be used in acts
of terrorism that could endanger life or cause serious harm to human
health.
The approach
that generated the revised list is robust, and it will withstand wider
challenge; the process is proven and auditable. Experience with lists
of pathogens produced for other purposes, such as for health and safety
at work, shows that there is always debate about the precise position
of individual agents in such lists, and that they need to be reviewed
from time to time as more information becomes available. The key is to
make pragmatic decisions that are based on the knowledge of the experts
involved.
I am aware
that, in this area, as in so many others associated with terrorism, we
need to balance the protection of the public against placing undue
burdens on industry. However, we certainly do not want to force
unnecessary security requirements on industry. That is not the case
with the orders, and the way in which the provisions have operated to
date have not caused any problems. That is largely due to the sensible
way in which they have been applied by the police.
However, I
have listened to the concerns that have been expressed, particularly
those raised by the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry,
on how the orders should apply in relation to genetically modified
organisms. As a result of those representations, I have decided that it
would be useful to have guidance drawn up, in conjunction with the
police, on how the orders should apply in relation to genetically
modified organisms. I have asked my officials to ensure that key
representatives from the commercial sector are involved in drafting the
guidance and to put in place arrangements for monitoring the
implementation of the orders in order to deal with the
associations concerns.
The other order that we are
discussing today is the Part 7 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and
Security Act 2001 (Extension to Animal Pathogens) Order 2007. Its
purpose, shockingly, is to extend the legislation to cover animal
pathogens. Under section 75 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security
Act 2001, the Secretary of State may, by order, extend the legislation
to cover animal pathogens, plant pathogens, toxic chemicals and pests.
The powers may be extended ifthe Secretary of State is
satisfied that the chemicals concerned could be used in an act of
terrorism to endanger life or to cause serious harm to human health, or
if the pathogens or pests could be used in an act of terrorism to cause
widespread damage to property, significant disruption or
alarm.
After concerns
were raised about the possible useof animal pathogens as
terrorist agents, a group of representatives from the police, the
Governmentand the Security Service confirmed that the World
Organisation for Animal Health list A of animal pathogens provided a
means of identifying which animal pathogens were of concern. My right
hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs subsequently proposed additional animal pathogens that were
considered potential bioterrorist agents. Those animal pathogens form
the list that we are discussing today.
Plant pathogens were not
considered, as suitable controls were already in
place.
Mr.
Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con): The
Minister is going into great detail, but can he give us a little
context? Precisely how may these pathogens or toxins be held under the
Act? I suspect that my hon. Friend the Member for Arundel and South
Downs (Nick Herbert) will go into some detail, given some of the
representations that we have had from the pharmaceutical industry, but
will the Minister tell us whether a burden of proof will automatically
be placed on any individual who holds any of these toxins or pathogens?
Will such individuals have to show that they are not holding them for
terrorist purposes? Perhaps the Minister could go into some detail
about how the current legislation works in that
regard.
Mr.
McNulty:
I think, unless I am corrected, that that is the
case. Pathogens or toxins held in any commercial situation must
certainly be held under security conditions that reflect their
importance and the fact that they have been placed on both lists,
sothe hon. Gentlemans description of the situation is
entirely right. Such substances must be kept in secure and appropriate
locations, with secure and appropriate processes, audit trails and so
forth to establish thatthey have been legitimately purchased,
procured and consumed. The hon. Gentleman is right that we can and
should outlaw individuals from keeping pathogens or toxins in their own
homes, and we can do that under the list in schedule 5 as it stands or
under the extended list, if the Committee passes both orders in
substance. If the position is any different, I am sure that someone
will tell me. I shall let the hon. Gentleman know in due
course.
Jim
Cousins (Newcastle upon Tyne, Central) (Lab): Just before
my hon. Friend took that intervention, with which he dealt fully and
helpfully, he mentioned plant pathogens in passing. Clearly, such
pathogens are not the subject of our discussion, but given that he has
mentioned them, can he discuss the issue a little further? It is
possible that plant pathogens could be used in a hostile or frightening
way.
Mr.
McNulty:
I do not doubt my hon. Friends latter
point, but we have been advised in consultation with the Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs that suitable controls are already
in place in theagain, I apologise to the
Hansard
reporter, in particularPlant Health (Great Britain) Order 1993,
S.I. 1993/1320, as amended, with which we are all, of course, familiar.
That order implements EC plant health directive 2000/29/EC, which
prohibits the import, movement and keeping of certain plants, plant
pestsincluding pathogensand other materials that pose a
risk to plant health. DEFRA tells us that that is sufficient to give us
the same security and other coverage for plant pathogens as we
originally sought in schedule 5 for general pathogens and as we are
seeking in the extended list of general and animal pathogens. Following
our consultation not only with DEFRA, but with its scientists and more
generally, we know that that is the case.
The
Chairman:
Order. We have had one intervention from both
sides of the Committee, and both have been fascinating, but the
Committee is considering a specific
matter. I would therefore discourage people from following their
interests and encourage them to follow the wording of the draft order.
It would be helpful if they could do so.
Mr.
McNulty:
Thank you, Mr. Wilshire. None the
less, I thought it important that the Committee knew about the 1993
order.
The general
point is that the threat posed by the possible terrorist use of
pathogens and toxins remains real. It is imperative to ensure that
terrorists do not have access to dangerous substances. The benefits of
increasing the scope of substances subject to control are difficult to
quantify as it is impossible to assessto what extent greater
national safety is secured and potential dangers are avoided by such
preventative measures. However, denying terrorists access to such
substances is an important part of the preventative measures that must
be taken by the
Government.
If the
orders are approved by both Houses, they will come into force two
months after they are made. I commend them to the
Committee.
4.41
pm
Nick
Herbert (Arundel and South Downs) (Con): I am sure that we
all agree on the need to extend the controls and the list of toxins and
pathogens. The risk of attack with unconventional weapons is clear.
After all, there was the sarin attack in Japan more than a decade ago,
which killed 12 people and injured hundreds. There was the anthrax
attack in the United States in 2001, in which five people died, and, in
2004, ricin powder was delivered to the office of the US Senate
majority leader.
The
head of MI5, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, was clear in her first ever
public speech at Queen Marys college in London in November last
year that an estimated 200 groups and more than 1,600 individuals were
actively engaged in plotting terror attacks in the UK and abroad. She
specifically warned that the threat of tomorrow may include the use of
chemicals, bacteriological agents, radioactive materials and nuclear
technology.
There was
a report yesterday that the number of plotters could actually be
considerably greater than 1,600. Apparently, a document entitled
International Terrorism in the UK is being circulated.
It warns that the scale of al-Qaedas ambitions to attack the UK
is even greater than previously judged. I do not know whether the
Minister is able to say anything about a document that the press have
seen but that we have not. I imagine not, but he may choose to update
us on what he judges to be the current state of the threat from
al-Qaeda, and whether the warning from the head of MI5 remains valid,
or whether the situation is more serious than she suggested just a
short time
ago.
Nevertheless, it
remains clear that the potential risk from unconventional weapons is
great. That is why the legislation was passed and why, some time later,
we are dealing with a proposal to extend the list of
pathogens.
Mr.
Field:
There is no cause whatever for complacency on any
side of the Committee, but I wondered why my hon. Friend excluded from
his chronology the episode that took place in Forest Gate
some eight or nine months ago. As he may recall, some 250 policemen and
others in various suits were involved. It was presumed that all sorts
of poisons would be found, but there were none. I hope that my hon.
Friend will also ask the Minister for a chronology of actions covered
by the 2001 Act that have taken place in this country in recent years,
which involved the use of pathogens, toxins or any other
chemicals.
Although we
should not be complacent, equally, there is concern that we may
over-react, particularly as there is such a strong burden of proof on
the individual to ensure that by holding any chemicals they are not
somehow committing an
offence.
Nick
Herbert:
I listened to my hon. Friends
intervention with interest, and I shall let the Minister reply. I did
not comment on Forest Gate, partly because we have seen no evidence
that any such substances were used. I agree that we cannot be
complacent, but I do not accept that the actions of the police were
necessarily an over-reaction. There were certainly things that the
police needed to address in relation to their conduct and the way in
which they mounted the raidsenior officers subsequently made
that concession. It is clear that there are times when the police will
have to take precautionary action if they consider that the potential
risk is particularly great.
I wish to raise an issue
referred to by the Minister in his opening remarks: the concerns of the
Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry, which wrote to the
Secretary of State a few days ago on 20 February. It raised concerns
about the effects of the order and made it absolutely clear that,
although it has no reservations about the principle behind the
extension of the list of organisms and toxins under schedule 5, it is
worried about the effect of the wording. In particular, it is concerned
about the wording in notes (c) and (d) of the draft instrument, which
relate to the transfer of elements of genetic material from specified
pathogens to new hosts. The association says:
As currently worded,
the content could be construed as suggesting that storage and use of
the modified host organisms should be subject to high security measures
even where the pathogenicity of the modified host is
unaffected.
It goes on
to suggest that that could have serious consequences, including
that
genetically
modified organisms that have low or minimal pathogenicity and which
would normally safely be handled in low containment facilities with no
special security measures will now have to be subject to the high
security standards required for high risk organisms which require
containment in level 3 or, in some cases level 4
facilities.
That would
require considerably greater investment in higher levels of security by
the companies concerned and the association
states:
This
could have a severe inhibitory effect on research in genetic
modification for legitimate beneficial purposes and make the UK
significantly less attractive to carry out research
in.
If those were the
necessary consequences of scheduling those organisms in order to
protect the public, everyone would have to accept them. The question is
whether they are necessary or if the wording unnecessarily includes
certain organisms.
Is the Minister satisfied that
simply offering guidelines about the interpretation of the order will
be sufficient? The association has specifically requested that the
draft statutory instrument be withdrawn and reworded to avoid any
unintended consequences, and laid again before Parliament. It has
suggested an alternative form of wording that I will not repeat, but
which the Minister has, no doubt, seen. The association argues that
that wording would ensure that potentially lethal toxins and pathogens
were listed and protected by the right levels of security, but that
those with low or minimal pathogenicity would not be subject to the
same high levels of protection. That seems to make sense. The Minister
may argue that he does not wish to hold up the introduction of the
orders because of the nature of the threat. That is an argument that I
am willing to accept, provided that he can give a reassurance that the
orders will provide the comfort that the industry
seeks.
Given that this
has been a two-year process within the industry, is the Minister
satisfied that there has been sufficient consultation? The industry
raised its concerns years ago, but it was only when it saw the draft
regulations that it became aware of the potential effects. Will he give
an assurance that there has been sufficient consultation with the
industry along the way and say why it is necessary to press on and not
to re-lay the statutory instrument? I am willing to accept that doing
so may be the right course. What monitoring will be conducted to ensure
that the problems that I have described do not occur and that there is
no unnecessary disinvestment in the pharmaceutical industry? I would be
grateful for those
assurances.
4.49
pm
Mr.
Jeremy Browne (Taunton) (LD): Like other hon. Members, I
welcome the broad thrust of what the Government are trying to achieve.
We are reminded, every time we enter the House and see the new barrier
that has been erected between the Public Gallery and Members in the
Chamber, that the threat is real. The barrier is part of the
Governments attempts, and global attempts, to combat the
increased risk from ever more exotic and diverse forms of terrorism.
They are not theoretical, because, as has been mentioned, they have
already been demonstratedluckily not on the scale that some
people envisage and fear, but that does not mean that a risk does not
remain.
I do not want
to go over ground that has already been heavily trodden, but I shall
touch on a few points, and would be grateful for the Ministers
response. The first, which has to some extent been explored already, is
about the areas of legitimate usage of pathogens that will be affected
by the attempt to clamp down on those who may want to use them
illegitimately.
The
hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster mentioned that it is
always difficult to ensure that scientists with legitimate objectives
but malign intentions are kept away from the chemicals in question,
and, for that matter, that people with decent intentions are allowed
access to the chemicals for laudable reasons. That is very different
from just identifying the chemicals. I should be interested to know
what legitimate commercial activities, if any, will be adversely
affected, and how we can best ensure that
people undertaking those activities are screened or safeguarded in some
way, so that the chemicals are put to those uses only.
It is a fair civil liberties
point that people possess all kinds of items that in different hands
might be dangerous. Nearly all of us have knives in our homes, to use
an example that is not entirely applicable, but which illustrates the
point; they are safely held by people who do not want to do harm with
them.
I wonder
whether the Minister would talk about another area that has not been
mentioned: the internet and its regulation. As I understand the
matterI do not want to dwell too long on this point or to
exceed my knowledge of matters to do with chemistry, which is not,
sadly, as great as it could bepeople with greater gifts than I
have can, potentially, through the internet, acquire forms of DNA and
sequences to enable them to put together pathogens that could threaten
human health. If that is not a matter of public concern, or if the
Minister has dealt with it and thought it through, I apologise for
raising it, but I should be grateful to know his thoughts on
that.
My final point
is about consultation. We are of course talking about legislation that
was introduced in 2001. I appreciate that such measures must be kept
under constant review, and revised, but it is none the less telling
that I and other members of the Committee have received the
representation from the Association of the British Pharmaceutical
Industry, and that in his introductory remarks the Minister
acknowledged that some accommodation had been sought with that
organisation after, I understand, the initial publication of the
Governments proposals. To what degree are the Government trying
to listen to advice and recommendations in advance of publication, to
try to ensure that the maximum possible number of harmful chemicals
will be banned from wide use, with the minimum impact on those with
legitimate reasons for holding those
chemicals?
4.54
pm
Jim
Cousins:
I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in the
debate. There are in Newcastle, the city that I represent, a number of
health and medical laboratories that are affected by the proposals, and
indeed the regional headquarters of the Health Protection Agency is in
my constituency.
I
associate myself strongly with the point made by the hon. Member for
Cities of London and Westminster that there must be proper consultation
with respect to modified organisms. The provisions could apply
unnecessarily in cases where the relevant bad qualities are not
affected by contact with modified organisms. The Minister rushed out
some assurances about that, but I should be grateful if he took the
Committee through it more slowly and suggested how he proposes to
report back to us on the point about proper consultation, before any
guidelines under the orders are put into effect.
I am entirely satisfied that
proper use is being made of section 75 of the Act, and I have no doubt
that the matter before the Committee will be real and serious for us as
a communityperhaps more so than some of the great set-piece
debates that the House has on related topics from time to time. It may
be more real
and serious than the matters that we are to debatein March. It
is a very important matter, because the threats that we face are likely
to be brilliant and wicked improvisations on things that are normally
dealt with. It is for that reason that I want to take some of the
Committees time in pointing out some of the practical
implications.
In the
explanatory memorandum we are told that 395 laboratories are likely to
be caught by the order. Caught is not the right word,
because most of them have already registered under the 2001 Act. Almost
all of those are public sector or public sector-funded medical and
health research institutions. Only a relatively small number of them
are private sector laboratories in big pharmaceutical companies. That
is an important point to bear in mind when we are talking about the
practical implications. There are100 diagnostic laboratories
that have been exempt under a 2002 order. I ask the Minister to
reconsider that, because if we are considering the possibility of
brilliant improvisations some of those might occur at moments of crisis
in animal or human health, when diagnostic laboratories might be the
centre of some attention.
The explanatory memorandum
describes the costs as very limited and mentions
a
one-off cost of
£5,000 per laboratory.
I ask the Committee to bear in mind the
point that I made just now, that most of those costs will be borne by
health trusts and higher education research facilities, which are not
necessarily funded for matters of that kind. It is legitimate to ask
how the Government will indemnify such institutions against whatever
additional costs are involved, however small they might be. However,
the costs are not just thedirect costs of physical
containment; they alsoinvolve security of intellectual
property and what are described, perfectly properly, in the explanatory
memorandum as
personnel
security and the insider
threat.
Those
are serious matters for institutions such as health research
laboratories and medical research laboratories in universities. I ask
the Minister to clarify something that troubles many people in such
settings, some of whom have interpreted the requirements on them in one
way, and some of whom have interpreted them quite differently. Will
compulsory vetting of all those who might come into contact with these
pathogens be required at any stage?
The regulatory impact
assessment for the part 7 order gives us some information about what
that will mean in practice. Paragraph 4.5 tells us:
Most of the
laboratories which will be affected by the revision...have already
been visited.
Paragraph
7.1 tells us:
All those laboratories
that will be affected by the amendment to the legislation have already
been visited.
Paragraph
10.3 tells us:
All those laboratories
affected...have had initial contact with the Counter-Terrorism
Security Advisers.
It is
legitimate to ask the Minister about how those practical matters affect
institutions. Those three descriptions do not all mean the same, but
which most accurately reflects the present situation? What will be the
inspection and monitoring arrangements for the
laboratories that will now be involved as a result of extending the
list? How regular will inspections be? What will the requirements
be?
It is also worth
bearing in mind the list of diseasesin the schedule.
Incidentally, one of those diseases is Newcastle disease, and as one of
the Members of Parliament for Newcastle, I should clarify that the
disease did not originate there; it was identified there for reasons of
health and medical research, but it is not an affliction of the people
of Newcastle. That aside, the foot and mouth virus is being added to
the schedule, and it is quite extraordinary to think that we went
through the foot and mouth crisis, with all the potential for some
malevolent force to cause mayhem, but that the virus was not listed
among the controlled pathogens. That is very worrying. Similarly, the
pandemic influenza viruses and highly pathogenic avian influenza
viruses will be added to the list. The scope for potential problems in
that respect is considerable, and I should be grateful if the Minister
explained how far such problems might go.
Finally, I must put to the
Minister a point that flows directly out of the issue before us and
which greatly troubles the scientific community: having listed all
these potentially dangerous pathogens, how far have the Government got
in thinking about constructing a rapid response vaccine facility to
deal with the misuse of such
pathogens?
5.3
pm
Mr.
McNulty:
We have had some very pertinent contributions,
and I shall try to deal with them in turn, in so far as they relate to
the orders, although wider concerns have, quite rightly, been
expressed. I agree with the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs
that the threat is very real, and I should emphasise that. Over the
weekend, the papers generallyI shall not refer to individual
items in individual paperssaid that the situation was getting
more severe, and the Home Secretary has also said that. Such comments
reinforce what Eliza Manningham-Buller said; indeed, if anything, we
are in a more severe position than we were when she made her speech in
the autumn.
The threat is
therefore very real, but let me say a couple of things by the by.
First, no Government are omniscient: we do not know exactly where the
next threat will come from or what form it will take, although the
orders refer specifically to some such threats. Eventually, we may need
to look at other items, and the balance between the perfectly
legitimate use of certain substances and their use by those who would
terrorise us may come starkly into consideration. Hydrogen peroxide is
not on a list; it is freely available in very diluted quantities from
the local high street hairdresser. However, as most people know, it is
a constituent part of many of the bombs that have threatened
usand, indeed, of those that have gone
off.
Nick
Herbert:
I am grateful to the Minister for his pretty
explicit confirmation that reports over the weekend saying that the
threat level had increased from that set out recently by the director
general of MI5 are correct. Given the level of threat that she
described in
November, it must surely be of great concern to the
House and to the British public. Does not he agree that it is
unsatisfactory that we should have to learn about that through a
newspaper by way of a leak?
The
Chairman:
Order. We are going down an interesting avenue,
but I am afraid that it is not strictly relevant to our
debate.
Mr.
McNulty:
Nor, Mr. Wilshire, is it terribly
interesting. Were the hon. Gentleman to refer to any number of speeches
or comments made by me or the Home Secretary since November, all the
way up to recent times, he would know that the nature of the threat is
real and getting more and more severe. That is absolutely clear, and it
reinforces what the director general of MI5 and others have said. The
fact that the nature of the threat is growing has been made clear by
any number of people. For the record, tedious as it may be, nothing
that I have said, now or previously, is or was a comment on any leaked
document in
The Sunday Telegraph or otherwise.
To business. The points made by
the hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster again were well
madecertainly the home point. However, whether it is
residentialthat is most unlikelyor commercial,
individuals who want, quite legitimately, to keep and work with those
pathogens must tell the police straight away. The police have to look
at the premises and secure them in the normal fashion. It is a matter
of law; not to notify the police is a criminal offence under section 67
of the Act, and the remedies and the penalties for that are clearly
laid out. It is most unlikely that pathogens would be kept in
residential premises, but the point is made none the less, and whether
it is the residential or the commercial route that is taken, it has to
be done in the appropriate fashion.
I disagree with the hon.
Gentlemans second point, but I do not want to labour the matter
because he went off the substance of our deliberations when speaking
about an over-reaction specific to police activity. I accept the wider
point that he made about the balance to be drawn between the legitimate
use of pathogens, and other materials not the subject of our
deliberations today, and public safety and the threat of
counter-terrorism; it was well made. However, as other hon. Members
have said, that is a balance that we deliberately face. Nor was his
reference to the burden of proof appropriate. It is not an offence to
hold the pathogen; as I said, the offence comes in not carrying out the
necessary obligations under the lawnotifying the police and the
other dimensions, including the security of the
premises.
I take very
seriously the points made by the Association of the British
Pharmaceutical Industry, but we have taken scientific advice and we
think that its concerns are misplaced. Certainly the wording offered in
its letterthe hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs was right
that I have seen it and discussed the matter with officialsdoes
not offer much more by way of safeguards than the wording of the
orders. Experience in other countries that already deal with more
extensive listsand, crucially, the way that those lists are
implementedparticularly the USA and Germany, has not borne out
those concerns. However, it is right and proper that they should be
raised in Committee and by way of correspondence with members of the
Committee.
I repeat that we have listened
to concerns about how the order should apply specifically to
genetically modified organisms. We decided that it would be useful to
draw up guidance on that, in conjunction with the police, and I have
said that officials must ensure that key representatives of the
commercial sector, including the ABPI, are party to discussions on
drafting guidance and putting in place the arrangements that are
necessary for monitoring the implementation of the
order.
We have gone
some way to deal with the concerns. As I said, experience in other
countries thus far does not indicate that there has been a drag, a draw
or an unnecessary burden on the relevant industries. However, as I
believe was stated in the response to the ABPIs letter, the
police will provide advice on a case-by-case basis. It is within the
constraints of the order that each commercial premises, and each
commercial operator, will be dealt with on a case-by-case basis when
assessing the aspects on which we have been deliberating, whether that
be the nature of the processes involvedmany processes make
pathogens less rather than more harmfulor individuals at the
premises having less than legitimate motivations and the scientific
expertise to reverse the process, where possible, to make pathogens
more rather than less dangerous. So the order will deal with
individuals as well, but it is absolutely right that such things are
done on a case-by-case basis. That is what has happened until now in
respect of the existing list in schedule 5, and that will
continue.
I agree with
the hon. Member for Taunton that there are many ways in which we can
run ahead of ourselves in terms of expertise. We are called upon to
discuss detailed, complex matters that require a great deal of
expertise. I shall not pretend that I am a scientist, anymore than I
shall pretend that I am a lawyer. I am happy not to be
lawyer.
None the less,
I have been told that there are many manipulations of micro-organisms
that can render them less dangerous, or even harmless. The local
councils terrorism security advisers will have to assess those
dimensions when they visit sites. They will have to assess not just the
site or the security required for it, but what processes and
manipulations are carried out on it. They will take into account all
the information provided by the laboratory staff. In some cases, a
pathogen or toxin may be stored in a relatively harmless state, and, in
some cases, it may be difficult to return the substance to its more
volatile origin. Advice will be given on procedures and any minimal
cost measures that might be requiredagain, on a case-by-case
and, by definition, a light-touch
basis.
The order is
not intended to capture and place undue burdens on those who go about
legitimate activities with pathogens. I believe that everyone in the
Committee recognises that pathogens may be involved in entirely
legitimate exercises. That is not the focus of the orders. Instead, it
is to deal with those who would use them for other
purposes.
We have
taken seriously the ABPIs concerns but believe that it should
not be so concerned about the wording. On balance, I would say that the
wording in the order achieves what the ABPI wants. It is not a matter
of delaying or wanting to get on with this. Little more would be
achieved by reviewing the specific
concerns dealt with in the ABPIs wording than is achieved, I
freely admit, by the wording of theorders, plus the guidance,
plus the monitoring of implementation. I believe that those three
elements together cover the points that have been raised, and it is
important to say that. Again, it is entirely legitimate and right for
the ABPI to express its
concerns.
I accept the
point of my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne, Central
about Newcastle fever disease, or whatever it was. His general point
about animal pathogens goes to the heart of why the second order exists
at all. Until now, animal pathogens have not in any way been prescribed
by order. In 2001, provision was made to go down that route and,
following advice, that is what we are doing. We are not doing so on
plant pathogens for the reasons that he teased out during my
contribution.
My hon.
Friend is also right that many of the laboratories covered are in the
public sector. I take his point very seriously about the diagnostic
facilitiesthat are exempted from this order. If we need to
take that further, we shall and I will write to him andthe
Committee if we do so. I am happywhether the Committee wishes
it or notto ensure that the Committee gets full details of
whatever process unfolds in terms of issuing guidance to and consulting
with the industry and others about how to implement the orders. The
Committee should feel free to engage in further correspondence with me
if it thinks that areas have been missed by that guidance. I am sure
that the ABPI and others will let us know if that is the
case.
On the question
of whether all labs have been visited, they have all had contact with
their local counter-terrorism security advisers. Some labs have been
visited and some lab representatives have attended meetings where
issues have been discussed. That is more or less the reason why, as my
hon. Friend quite rightly says, there are two or three different
descriptions of the whole process. It is not the case that every single
lab has been visited, but they have been contacted or representatives
have attended meetings as appropriate. That process will continue as we
move towards the implementation of the
order.
The point has
been made, which entirely sumsthe matter up, thatthis
is not meant to be contradictorywe wish the orders to cover in
a narrow way the maximum number of pathogens, viruses and other
substances that we are concerned about, within the context of imposing
the minimum burden on those who legitimately go about their business by
utilising such agents and materials. That is entirely what the orders
are about. They are not about placing unnecessary burdens on the
industry; they are about, as all hon. Members have in some way said,
ensuring that we get the balance right between legitimate activities
and protecting the public from what those of a twisted nature and an
evil mind would do with these pathogens, viruses, toxins and other
substances. We have already seen examples of ways in which they can be
used by such people, as the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs
suggested, and I fear that if preventative measures were not in place,
we would make it easier for such actions to be repeated. It is not
about omniscience or about knowing where the next threat might
potentially come from in terms of general or plant pathogens; it is
about saying that, in the
context of the 2001 Act, we need to go further. We have held discussions
with those involved and recognise that we must maintain a lightness of
touch for those who need legitimately to carry out their business.
However, the orders and the extension they provide to the lists and to
animal pathogens is an absolute necessity if we are to do what we need
to do for public safety and counter-terrorism. I commend the orders to
the
Committee.
Question
put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That the Committee has
considered the draft Part 7 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security
Act 2001 (Extension to Animal Pathogens) Order
2007
Resolved,
That
the Committee has considered the draft Schedule 5 to the
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (Modification) Order
2007.[Mr.
McNulty.]
Committee
rose at nineteen minutes past Five
oclock.