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The research by Kings College to gain further understanding of the extent of mental health problems encountered by those who have served on Op Telic showed the relation between mental health outcomes and deployment, stratified by regular/reservist status, to be as follows:
|Common mental disorder (GHQ-12)||PTSD (PCL-C)|
|(1) UK service personnel serving in the armed forces on 31 March 2003, but not in the Telic 1 group.|
The results of this research show the numbers who have self-reported indicators of mental ill-health. It does not mean that these individuals are severely ill, nor would necessarily regard themselves as being in need of treatment. Also, while more of those reservists who served in Iraq reach the indicator threshold than those who did not serve in Iraq, this should be looked at in the context of the general adult UK population where the same level of indicators of common mental illness have been detected in over 30 per cent.
Mr. Ingram: The department is currently investigating the feasibility of radio use for the transmission of routine information during parachute jump training. However no decision on suitability has yet been made.
Mr. Hayes: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many breakdowns there were in the military Land Rover fleet in each year since 1997; and what the average age of the fleet was in each year. 
Dr. Julian Lewis: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the strategic risks to the Royal Navy of future dependence on a single naval base in (a) Scotland and (b) England, with particular reference to the co-location of nuclear facilities and munitions stores. 
The Naval Base Review is considering a number of options ranging from do nothing to closing all three naval bases and building a new naval base at a single location. The review team is undertaking an extensive analysis of the operational
implications, including strategic risks, associated with all the options under consideration. Recommendations are not expected to be put to Ministers before spring 2007.
Normally, only one Trident submarine is on deterrent patrol at any one time.
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the implications are for the number of deployed warheads of the announcement in the White Paper CM6994 that the stockpile of operationally available warheads will be reduced from 200 to 160; and if he will make a statement. 
Des Browne: As set out in Box 2-1 of the White Paper The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent (Cm 6994), published on 4 December 2006, normally only one Trident submarine is on deterrent patrol at any one time, with up to 48 warheads on board.
Des Browne: We occasionally replace components of our nuclear warheads, if and when they become obsolete, but we have no plans to upgrade or refurbish our Trident warhead stockpile in the next five years. As was made clear in the White Paper on the Future ofthe UK's Nuclear Deterrent (Cm 6994), published on4 December 2006 (at paragraph 7-4), decisions on whether and how we may need to refurbish or replace the warhead stockpile are likely to be necessary in the next Parliament.
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what changes he plans to make in (a) the number of nuclear warheads carried on the submarine on patrol, (b) the total number of nuclear warheads deployed at sea on three submarines and (c) the number of operationally available warheads which are stored on land when three submarines are fully armed. 
Des Browne: The Government's policy with regard to the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent was set out clearly in the White Paper The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent (Cm 6994), which was published on 4 December 2006. The White Paper (paragraph 3-4) makes clear that
the UK's nuclear weapons are not designed for military use during conflict but instead to deter and prevent nuclear blackmail and acts of aggression against our vital interests that cannot be countered by other means.
We would only consider using nuclear weapons in self-defence (including of our NATO allies) and even then only in extreme circumstances. Any use of our nuclear weapons which may be contemplated would necessarily be strategic.
Mr. Gordon Prentice: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how much is planned to be spent on the public consultation on the future of the UK nuclear deterrent; and if he will make a statement. 
Des Browne: The Government published a White Paper on the future of the UKs nuclear deterrent on4 December. We have repeatedly said that there will be the fullest possible debate and a vote in the House. The publication of the White Paper is expected to cost £8,000.
Mr. David Hamilton: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) how many trainers will deliver Phase 2 training; and what the trainer student ratio will be in (a) five years, (b) 10 years and (c) 15 years time; 
The future Phase 2 supervisory requirement will depend on how training is to be delivered. Defence is constantly seeking to modernise the delivery of training taking into account options of distributed training, E learning and simulated training. Improved learning methodology may also determine how training will be delivered in the future. Future student to instructor ratios in 5, 10 and 15 years time
will be determined by the nature of the activity being undertaken and therefore it is not possible to anticipate what these will be. However, in seeking to partner with industry to develop innovative training solutions, the Defence Training Review programme includes the following requirement: In Phase 2 there must be sufficient military instructors so that at least 40 per cent. of the class contact time (combining specialist and non specialist training) is with military instructors, and a minimum of 25 per cent. of the specialist training programmed periods must be taught by a military instructor.
Data on geographic dispersal or the percentage of Phase 2 skills training delivered by military, ex-military and contracted instructors are not routinely held by the services and MOD does not have access to information on the background of contracted staff.
Earlier this year the MOD revised its supervisory care policy in order to focus attention on reducingthe risks to trainees. The policy mandates the determination of a supervisory care directive, underpinned by a Unit Commander's Risk Assessment. The policy mandates that minimum levels of supervision are determined from the Unit Commander's Risk Assessment and must be articulated against the relevant serials during the working day, out of hours, weekend and leave periods. The supervisory provision will change throughout the day and night dependent on the activities being undertaken. For example, in the classroom environment one instructor might supervise up to 30 trainees but this ratio could reduce to 1:4 for a higher risk activity or for practical reasons and down to 1:1 for flying training. While average weekday ratios are no longer centrally collated, training establishments are subject to audit and evaluation of their supervisory care regimes and implementation of the supervisory policy.
The implementation of supervisory policy is subject to audit and evaluation by service and defence teams and additionally the duty of care and welfare provision is currently subject to external inspection by the Adult Learning Inspectorate (ALI). The ALI is currently engaged in conducting a series of visits to training establishments.
Derek Twigg: We want to hear what people have to say about defence activities and policies and we carry out occasional public opinion research to this end.The research is subject to the usual strict rules that spending must represent good value for the tax payer and must not be used for party political purposes. Information on the total cost of public opinion research carried out by the Ministry of Defence and its agencies and non-departmental public bodies is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.
These costs are inclusive of VAT
|Financial year||£ million|
Derek Twigg: The positioning of the Padres flag is a matter for Westminster Abbey, as the guardian of this treasured memorial. I have been advised that to reposition the flag above the Tomb of the Unknown Warrior would cause it irrevocable damage due to the considerable movement of air in the Nave and the ultra-violet light that floods through the West Door. Westminster Abbey intend to keep it in St. Georges Chapel, which is as close as practicable to the Tomb.
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer from the Parliamentary Secretary in the Cabinet Office to the hon. Member for Blackpool, South (Mr. Marsden) of4 December 2006, Official Report, columns 189-190W, on the retirement age, what his Departments policy is for the setting of retirement ages for staff below the senior civil service under the Civil Service (Management Functions) Act 1992. 
Prior to 1 April 2006 the retirement age for civil servants in the MOD below the senior civil service (SCS) was determined by grade and ranged between age 60 and 65. With effect from 1 April 2006
and following a Departmental review the normal retirement age (NRA) was changed to age 65 for all MOD civil servants below the SCS. This is in linewith the National Default retirement age introduced on 1 October 2006.
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