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“We believe the relationship the Joint Committee describes is one which should apply to any differently composed chamber.”
That must be wrong. Over time, a differently composed Chamber will want to re-examine its own conventions, and may decide to change them. No amount of passing resolutions or codifying conventions can alter that. However, I feel that the Government should not protest too much. They did not really need to include paragraph 9, for two reasons.
First, it would be ludicrous to reconstitute the Cunningham Committee and have a “Cunningham 3” on the first day of a reformed House of Lords. Any sensible person would agree that a passage of time—which should perhaps be measured in Parliaments rather than years—should elapse before that becomes necessary. Secondly, in any case, if we have—as I sincerely hope we will—a more democratic second Chamber, the key powers and restrictions that it tests will be not the conventions but the Parliament Acts.
A reformed House, unlike the current House, may have the courage to use some of the real powers that it already has, particularly its power of delay and its power to reject statutory instruments. It does not use those powers now, for the simple reason that it does not have the moral authority to use them. A reformed House will have enough legitimacy to exercise the powers provided for it under the Parliament Acts, while also being restricted by them. I think it right—here I strongly agree with the hon. Member for Cannock Chase—for the House of Lords to be given that moral authority.
I shall end by developing that point further, but first I want to make one more general point about the House of Lords as currently constituted, which I hope the other place will not consider offensive. I have enormous respect for Members of the House of Lords, a large proportion of whom are loyal and dedicated public servants, but it is an inescapable fact that whenever their Lordships debate themselves, Dr. Pangloss is out and about. He was certainly
stalking the other Chamber yesterday. There was a great deal of talk about how effective the second Chamber already is, what a great job it does, and, by implication, how everything was already for the best in the best of all possible worlds. The truth is much more prosaic. We have the illusion of two-Chamber democracy, but we have the reality of something that is little more than unicameralism: a consultative assembly which, when push comes to shove, is usually too scared—even in its somewhat reformed form since 1999, or whenever it was—to take on the Executive and use the powers that it currently possesses.
Mr. Cash: I also happen to be in favour of a more directly elected House of Lords, but I take exception to my hon. Friend’s implied comparison with the House of Commons, whose whipping arrangements, craven submission to Government and failure to scrutinise huge chunks of vastly important Bills suggest that, while we are perfectly entitled to criticise the other House, we ought also to consider the beam in our own eye.
Mr. Tyrie: I completely agree that we badly need reform of the way in which we scrutinise our House. One point that the hon. Member for Cannock Chase did not make that he might have made in talking about the balance between the two Chambers is that reform in the other place will probably stimulate reform here. I think that we will get a better working and functioning House of Commons, with those changes driven and forced through because of the fact that there will be some democratic competition between the Houses.
When I make the point to my colleagues that we do not really have bicameralism now, a number of them—I will not name them, but they are very thoughtful people—say to me, “Absolutely, and thank goodness. The illusion suits us; it means that we can keep the power here and have that consultative and advisory body there, and we can get unicameralism by the back door.” I vigorously disagree with that. I have always been in favour of having a strong Executive—a Government who can get on with their job, and not be hamstrung all the time by gridlock in Parliament—but I think that this Executive has become over-mighty. We must have some rebalancing of the constitution.
To do that, we must reform the Commons, as my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr. Cash) has just said, but we must also reform the Lords, and if we are to do that we must give the Lords some legitimacy. In the 21st century, only a largely elected Chamber can provide such legitimacy. That is why I will strongly support the Leader of House’s efforts to bring democracy to the second Chamber, if what he proposes is a majority-elected House. The public want that. I have been sitting in my seat from the beginning of the debate, and as far as I am aware the public and their views have not been mentioned even once. Every time they have been consulted, the public have said that they want such a Chamber—by majorities in the region of three to one or four to one.
Democracy in the second Chamber is long overdue. It will not challenge the primacy of this House; we can debate that at great length in the spring, but I disagree with those who argue that it will. In a nutshell, we have the Parliament Acts and we have the source of
government in this place, and the combination of those two forces will mean that this place will retain primacy. I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) that the nature of that primacy might change, but the fundamental elements of it will remain.
Most importantly of all, if we have reform it will change not only the relationship between the Lords and the Commons, but the relationship between Parliament and the Executive, and that is what Parliament as a whole now desperately needs.
5.47 pm
David Howarth (Cambridge) (LD): I am the first speaker in this debate who is neither a member of the Committee nor a distinguished Member of the House of long standing, so perhaps all that I can bring to our discussion—especially at a time when all the good points have been made several times—is a little naive radicalism.
I should start by saying that I was somewhat suspicious of the Committee, but I have been pleased by the result of its labours, especially on two points. The first of them is codification. I made my view on that clear in the debate in May, and I am glad that the Committee has reached a similar conclusion: that codification of conventions would rob those who wish to design new arrangements that work of an important tool that would allow flexibility in the development of the institutional arrangements that we need. Secondly, I am delighted with paragraph 61. In fact, it is that paragraph that will lead me to support the motion; if it had instead been on the Government response, I might have been in a different position.
Paragraph 61 makes it clear that the conclusions that the Committee have come to have no relevance to a future situation involving a reformed House of Lords with an elected element. All the Committee is putting before us is its view of what the conventions are now. It is in the nature of those conventions that even that view is applicable only to now; the conventions will develop, even if the House of Lords is not reformed. I fully support that conclusion of the Committee, to which all its other conclusions are subject. So if there is any part of the report that I do not fully agree with or accept, I can console myself with paragraph 61, which removes any great problem.
Other Members have said that in order to explain one’s position on the report, it is important to explain where one is coming from on House of Lords reform. I want to make it clear that I come from the position of naive liberal democracy. I cannot see how it is justifiable for people who have not been democratically elected to have any part in the legislative process greater than that played by ordinary citizens. The question is not necessarily expertise, but a different one: why these experts and not other experts? We all know a lot of experts, most of whom are not Members of the House of Lords, so the question that arises is: how does one become a Member of the House of Lords, even if one is an expert? The answer under the present arrangements is far from clear, and is certainly not sufficient to justify having a special part in the legislative process. It is true that it is not as important a
part as that exercised by those in this House; nevertheless it is a part, and one denied to the vast majority of citizens.
For me, the important part of the report is the one that demonstrates that, in the end, not only all the conventions but the Parliament Act itself derive their force, reason and justification from the undemocratic nature of the present House of Lords. It is the gap—the difference between the two Houses—that justifies what in reality are conventions that explain the House of Lords’ self-restraint. There is no doubt that the House of Lords has many legal powers that it does not exercise. That is because of the conventions, and because it accepts those conventions.
If we move beyond the current situation and consider a reformed House of Lords, the question that the Government have to answer is: what new reason, which has nothing to do with the gap in democratic legitimacy between the two Houses, would justify those conventions of self-restraint? It would be incredible—an amazing coincidence—if precisely the same conventions turned out to be justified by any new reason for a difference between the two Houses. I cannot see how that could be the case.
Mr. Cash: There is a potential reason, which I have given in the past. If the future House of Lords, albeit up to 80 per cent. elected, had different functions, particularly on the constitutional front, was elected through a different, regional arrangement and—as some might suggest—by a different system of election, there would be a sufficient reason for the exercising of self-restraint, which is a word that I would have used myself, had I had a chance to speak. That is the key element that would be necessary, precisely because the taxing powers—the fundamental governmental powers that the hon. Member for Cannock Chase (Dr. Wright) referred to—are the distinguishing feature that provide the basis for the primacy of this House of Commons.
David Howarth: The key point—this comes back to comments made by the hon. Member for Cannock Chase (Dr. Wright)—is that we need to explain why we have different Houses. The hon. Member for Stone (Mr. Cash) has given some possible reasons for having different functions in different Houses. When we have established those reasons, the conventions of self-restraint, or otherwise, between the Houses will flow from them. The conventions that we have now are the result of the difference in democratic legitimacy.
It has been interesting to hear accounts of the 1911 Act, which was passed to achieve the primacy of this House. That was the historic achievement of that Government and that Parliament. However, the intention was not to leave the situation as it was. The intention was to return with democratic reform of the House of Lords. The preamble to the Act made clear the need to start anew in thinking about what conventions—what form of self-restraint—would be necessary for the new situation.
One thing that has bothered me during the debate—I suppose that it is the result of being a new Member of Parliament who is not used to the conventions of thought in the House—is the apparent assumption that
being elected to form a Government automatically entitles the people who are so elected to have their way, above any other body that stands in their way. That doctrine should be thought through, especially if the other House were to have any democratic legitimacy.
Given the nature of the electoral system used to elect this House, under which Governments can have overall majorities with 36 per cent. of popular support, it would be as much of an affront to the democratic ideal to say that the Government in this House should automatically get their way over the other House—if that were elected by a proportional system—as it would be now for the House of Lords to claim primacy over this Chamber. The difficulty is one of legitimacy, which can be resolved in the long term only by ensuring that this House retains, if not an edge, at least an equality of representativeness with the other place.
Mrs. Gwyneth Dunwoody (Crewe and Nantwich) (Lab): There may be a misunderstanding here. What is important in any Parliament, especially an elected Parliament, is that the Government of the day have the right to introduce their major Bills and to press the issues that they think are important. However, in this House as in any other, it is essential that we understand that Governments do not automatically have the right to put them on the statute book. The whole purpose of both Houses is to try to prevent bad laws. That is why the majority of elected Members have a responsibility to scrutinise closely not only the legislation introduced by their Government, but the suggestions of others. If we deny that, we deny the whole purpose of a Parliament coming together.
David Howarth: I fully accept what the hon. Lady says, but as the hon. Member for Cannock Chase said, we have to accept the limitations of this place. There is a fundamental problem with having high expectations of scrutiny and deliberation in a House whose main function is to make or break Governments. What appears on the surface to be this House’s great strength—its very power to make or break Governments—is also a source of weakness. The strength of the whipping system comes down to the power that the Government have to take away all our jobs by calling an election.
The problem is that scrutiny in this House often falls short. It goes a good distance, but in the end stops short of saying no, because ultimately, the only way to do that is to destroy the Government. Normally, no one on the Government Benches would be prepared to do something that has happened only once in my lifetime, at the end of the 1970s.
That problem can be resolved by establishing a new set of reasons for having a bicameral legislature, which would be compatible with having elections for the membership of both Chambers. That solution is very similar to the one proposed by the hon. Member for Cannock Chase, but it would be essential to ensure that the ability to make or break Governments was concentrated in one Chamber. It must not infect both.
That function of making or breaking Governments belongs in this House. It is our main and fundamental function, and it justifies giving more scrutiny of legislation and spending to the other place, as long as it is elected. What form of relationship will develop
between an elected Chamber whose main function is the making and breaking of Governments, and another elected Chamber whose main function is to scrutinise legislation and policy? The answer to that question will not emerge today, but only at the end of a long historical process.
To what extent do a Government need to get their way in the face of an unpopularity that can be expressed in a more representative House? How effective do a Government need to be when an opinion poll might show that a certain Bill would not get through? That is the balance that we have to strike.
The hon. Member for Cannock Chase also mentioned manifestos and mandates, and what he said about package deals was absolutely right. We do not know why people vote for particular parties, but we do know that they do not know much about manifestos. Some of the academic evidence given to the Committee suggested that, when people are asked under what circumstances they think that an unreformed House of Lords should be entitled to throw out Government proposals, they do not respond by asking about what was in the manifesto. They do not care much about that; indeed, they do not respond in political terms, but purely according to whether the measure involved strikes them as good or bad. In other words, their answer depends entirely on the popularity of a particular provision.
In the end, we must move towards the balance that is necessary in all political systems. It is a balance between the ability of a Government to govern, and the ability of a people to prevent that Government from carrying forward policies with which they fundamentally disagree. To my own surprise, I support the motion. I thank the Joint Committee for saving us from going down a number of routes along which we certainly should not travel.
6.4 pm
Mr. Richard Shepherd (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con): I am pleased to follow the previous three speakers, and I am grateful to them for elevating this debate. The teasing amendment on the Order Paper was tabled because we felt that the Government were complimenting the Joint Committee through gritted teeth, as it did not produce the result that they wanted. That is why I cheer.
Anyway, I cheer any Joint Committee that refers to Hood Phillips and to “Constitutional and Administrative Law”. It reminds us that this and the other House are ancient—the very foundations of our constitution. Even those of us who half-heartedly studied university courses on the constitution know that its fundamental purpose and statement is the sovereignty of Parliament. Of course people such as me say that that is a valid and virtuous doctrine, because in the democratic age the sovereignty of Parliament is shorthand for the sovereignty of the people.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth) for putting the Parliament Act 1911 into perspective. It was a temporary measure. At the time, it was clear to everyone that the Lords would move to a democratic basis.
I think about the course taken by this country, of which we are the representative voice. Its history is ancient. There have always been two Chambers and they have always tussled and fought, but the balance, over a long time, came to this Chamber—the Commons—to the people of England, as opposed to a landed interest, a dynastic system, a creation of patronage and a hereditary principle. The primacy of the Lords became constitutionally indefensible. Popular feeling and the ability to reach people to make arguments and to affect Government grew. We accept no divine right of kings. This House brought to an end the concept that a person can by right of birth be a member of a legislature.
It seems absolutely extraordinary that anyone could countenance the fact that a legislator in a democracy is not accountable to the people for whom they make laws. The people who bear the laws must be able to hold to account those who make them. That is such a fundamental point that I am startled that a Labour Government—as Mr. Kinnock would have said—could countenance even the thought of the sidelining ways in which the Prime Minister frustrated Robin Cook’s genuine attempt to move towards a largely elected second Chamber. It was almost a repudiation of the genesis of the Labour party.
The conflict between the two Houses does not chill me. It is a dynamic that reinforces the people. We all have different views about what public policy should be—there is nothing unusual about that. I lived under a Conservative Government who used to chant the mantra of the mandate. I live under this God-awful Government—if they will forgive me saying so—who also chant the mantra of the mandate. As the hon. Member for Cannock Chase (Dr. Tony Wright) said, the manifesto is a curious document. None of us reads it from cover to cover, apart from those who wrote it. The public at large are unaware of it, but it provided the justification for the Lords’ acceptance that the legitimacy they lacked resided elsewhere and that in the end they should defer.
I look forward to seeing whether the Leader of the House’s White Paper is a virtuous document, but if the Lords are to have legitimacy, on whatever basis, of course it will reconfigure the relationship between here and there. In truth, I look forward to that.
The public are disengaged because, somehow, we beat a drum to a tune that they no longer hear when it comes to the issues that they wish to challenge and the importance of Government. We have become machines of spin and manipulation. Where is the blockage? Most of these arguments have long been discussed and reasoned through. We have only to think of Montesquieu’s misunderstanding of the British constitution, of those English gentlemen in the United States in revolt against the Crown, of the Federalist papers, and of the long debate over the very issues that trouble us now. Those arguments are there, and yet here we are talking, and the Government insist—the mantra is still heard—that they must get their business. That has never been a constitutional principle. It is an argument of Government, of course. The Government may get their business if they are supported by Parliament. That is the function of Parliament.
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