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The E3+3 has made clear that in order for talks to begin, Iran needs to address the requirements of the IAEA Board and the UN Security Council, including the requirement that it should suspend all uranium enrichment related and reprocessing activities. We have said that if Iran does so, we are prepared to suspend further action in the Security Council and the implementation of sanctions.
We remain committed to a negotiated solution and the E3+3's proposals remain on the table. At the same time, the Security Council has made clear that if Iran does not comply with its obligations, the Council will impose further sanctions.
Harry Cohen: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what assessment she has made of the new formula put forward by Iran in its formal response of 22 August 2006 to the European (EU-3) proposal; and if she will make a statement. 
Dr. Howells: Irans formal response to the proposals of the E3+3 (France, Germany, UK plus China, Russia, US) gave no indication that Iran would be prepared to meet the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors and UN Security Council requirements so that negotiations could begin. Nor has Iran given any such indication since then. The E3+3 continue to urge Iran to comply with the IAEA Board and UN Security Council Resolutions and to take the positive path on offer.
Dr. Howells: Iran's nuclear programme is of deep concern. We remain committed to a negotiated solution. The E3+3 (France, Germany, UK plus China, Russia, US) have made clear that for negotiations to begin on the basis of the proposals presented by the EU High Representative Javier Solana on 6 June 2006, Iran must address the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737, including by suspending all uranium enrichment related and reprocessing activities. Iran has so far failed to do so, in defiance of its legally binding obligations. We continue to urge Iran to take the positive path on offer.
Harry Cohen: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what response was given to Irans requests for clarification following the European (EU-3) proposal; and if she will make a statement. 
On 6 June 2006, the EU High Representative, Javier Solana, presented generous proposals to Iran on behalf of the E3+3 (France, Germany, UK plus China, Russia, US). The proposals would give Iran everything it needs to develop a modern civil nuclear power industry, as well as political and economic benefits. In return, the E3+3 asked that Iran should suspend all uranium enrichment related and reprocessing activities, as required by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of
Governors and the UN Security Council, until international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its programme has been restored.
Despite persistent efforts by Dr. Solana, the Iranians declined to engage substantively on the proposals during June and July 2006, including at a meeting in Brussels on 11 July 2006 between Dr. Solana (supported by E3 and Russian Political Directors) and the Secretary-General of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani (and the full Iranian negotiating team). Dr. Larijani did not ask any serious questions about the proposals and would not say whether Iran was prepared to suspend uranium enrichment activities. Iran formally responded to the proposals on 22 August 2006. The lengthy response did not indicate that Iran would be prepared to meet the IAEA Board and Security Council requirements.
The E3+3 continued to show flexibility. Despite the passing of the Security Council's 31 August 2006 deadline, Dr. Solana had a series of exchanges with Dr. Larijani in September 2006 to see if Iran could be persuaded to take the steps that would allow negotiations to begin. But Dr. Larijani made clear to Dr. Solana that Iran was not prepared to do so and President Ahmadinejad also said publicly that Iran would not suspend enrichment. The E3+3 therefore decided that there was no choice but to seek measures under Article 41 of the UN Charter, targeted on Iran's sensitive nuclear and missile activities. The Security Council adopted Resolution 1737, imposing such measures, on 23 December 2006.
The most recent report of the IAEA Director-General, issued on 22 February, makes clear that Iran has not taken the steps required by Security Council Resolution 1737. The E3+3's proposals remain on the table and Dr. Solana and the E3+3 continue to urge Iran to comply with IAEA Board and Security Council requirements, to enable negotiations to begin. The Security Council has said that it will impose further sanctions if Iran fails to meet its obligations.
Dr. Howells: Iran's nuclear programme is of serious concern. The nature of the programme, Iran's history of concealment, its failure to co-operate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its refusal to take essential confidence-building steps have added to international concerns that Iran's ambitions may not be, as it claims, entirely peaceful.
Iran continues to pursue uranium enrichment related activities, in defiance of the requirement of the UN Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors that it should suspend these activities fully. They would enable Iran to develop the capability to produce fissile material that could be used in nuclear weapons. Iran has produced small quantities of enriched uranium at its pilot fuel enrichment plant at Natanz, but is still some way from mastering the technology. Once it has
done so, the time it would require to produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon, should it go down that course, would depend on a variety of factors including the scale and efficiency of the centrifuge cascade being used.
It is imperative that Iran should take the steps required by the UN Security Council and the IAEA Board, including suspending fully all enrichment related and reprocessing activities. The Security Council made clear in resolution 1737, adopted unanimously on 23 December 2006, that if it failed to do so, the Council would adopt further sanctions. The latest report by the IAEA Director-General on 22 February shows that Iran has failed to do so; we therefore expect to discuss possible measures with other members of the Security Council shortly. We remain committed to a negotiated solution and continue to urge Iran to meet its obligations and return to talks on the basis of the generous proposals presented to Iran on 6 June 2006 by EU High Representative Javier Solana.
Derek Conway: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs how much and what proportion of the funds from her departmental resources dedicated to reconstruction, humanitarian aid and community relations purposes for Iraq have been allocated to the provision of security by private contractors for those implementing the programmes. 
Dr. Howells: For the period April 2006 to March 2007, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has spent £40.4 million on programmes in Iraq, focusing on supporting the police and rule of law. Of this total, £12.5 million has been spent on providing security to these critical programmes, representing 31 per cent. of overall spend.
Mr. Francois: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what the names are of Kazakhstans honorary consuls in the UK since 2002; and where each honorary consul was located. 
Mr. Moore: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what recent assessment she has made of the Serbian Government's policy towards the recommendation of Special Envoy Ahtisaari for the future status of Kosovo; and if she will make a statement. 
Mr. McCartney: The United Kingdom fully supports UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari and welcomes his draft proposals, presented to Belgrade and Pristina on 2 February. We are confident that his draft proposals can form the basis for a fair and sustainable settlement for all of Kosovo's communities.
My right hon. Friend the Minister for Europe, and separately the EU Ministerial Troika, visited Belgrade on 7 February. Both President Tadic and Prime Minister Kostunica pledged their commitment to Serbia's participation in consultations to be led by Ahtisaari over the coming weeks. The United Kingdom encourages both sides to engage constructively and positively with the Special Envoy.
Mr. Hoon: The United Kingdom fully supports the UN-led final status process for Kosovo and the efforts of the UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. We welcomed the Special Envoys decision to put his draft proposals to the parties on 2 February. At the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 12 February, EU Foreign Ministers agreed that the Special Envoys draft proposals promote a multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo based on the rule of law and strengthen the stability of the entire region.
Anne Main: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what discussions she has had with the Lithuanian Foreign Minister on Lithuanias possible membership of the International Whaling Commission; and if she will make a statement. 
Our embassy in Vilnius sent a diplomatic note to the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in November 2006 encouraging IWC membership. The embassy will be lobbying the Ministry in advance of this years IWC meeting (in May).
Mr. McCartney: For national security reasons, details of individual intelligence agency budgets are not disclosed. The Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) is funded through the Single Intelligence Account (SIA). The comprehensive spending review (CSR) 2004, announced to Parliament on 12 July 2004, provided additional resources for the SIA to support significant expansion of the agencies' counter-terrorism capabilities. A further £85 million for the SIA for the period 2005-08 was announced in the pre-Budget report on 5 December 2005. The SIA's budget provision up to 2010-11 will be announced once the outcome of the CSR 2007 is known.
Mr. Clifton-Brown: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what reports she has received of the escape of political prisoners from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK); and what estimate she has made of the number of political prisoners who are incarcerated in the DPRK. 
Mr. McCartney: We have seen reports by a South Korean based defector organisation of the escape of 120 prisoners from a political prison camp in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The reports are as yet uncorroborated, but we will continue to monitor the situation.
Harry Cohen: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what the UK Government's policy is on (a) uranium enrichment and (b) plutonium production by foreign countries; and if she will make a statement. 
Dr. Howells: The UK's policy on civilian production of fissile material is based on Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The UK works closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in promoting the secure use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as set out in the Treaty and the strengthened processes for its implementation detailed in the 1995 and 2000 Final Documents of the NPT Review Conferences.
In the case of Iran, the nature of Iran's nuclear programme, its history of concealment, its failure to co-operate fully with the IAEA and its refusal to take confidence building measures have added to international concern that Iran's ambitions may not be,
as it claims, solely peaceful. The IAEA Board and the United Nations Security Council have required Iran in successive Resolutions to take certain steps including to suspend all uranium enrichment related and reprocessing activities. As the report of the IAEA Director-General issued on 22 February makes clear, Iran continues to defy its legally binding obligations in this area.
Mr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs pursuant to the Prime Minister's oral answer of 21 February 2007, Official Report, column 260 to the hon. Member for Sunderland South (Mr. Mullin), which article of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty gives the United Kingdom the right to possess nuclear weapons. 
For the purposes of the Treaty, a nuclear-weapon state is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January, 1967.
The UK successfully tested its first atomic bomb in October 1952 and is therefore classified as a nuclear weapon state under Article IX of the NPT. The NPT remains the principal source of international legal obligations relating to the possession of nuclear weapons. It is entirely lawful for the UK to possess nuclear weapons.
Mr. Hague: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs pursuant to the answer of 29 January 2007, Official Report, column 664W, on the Autumn Performance Report, whether officials who have held a series of meetings to examine the possible use of financial measures against proliferators have held discussions with representatives of other countries. 
Dr. Howells: Yes. Officials have held a series of discussions with international partners, including US, France and Germany, in a variety of international forums, to examine the possible use of financial measures against proliferators.
Mr. David Hamilton: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if she will assess the effect of renewing the UKs nuclear deterrent on each of the 10 priority areas outlined in the Active Diplomacy for a Changing World: The UKs International Priorities, White Paper, Cm 6762. 
Dr. Howells: As stated in the 2006 White Paper on the Future of the UKs Nuclear Deterrence, the UK is committed to helping to secure international peace and security. Since 1956, the nuclear deterrent has underpinned our ability to do so even in the most challenging circumstances. This is fully compatible with the International Priorities set out in the White Paper Active Diplomacy for a Changing World.
Mr. Hague: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what conclusions were reached at the Quartet meeting of 21 February 2006 on EU proposals to transition the Temporary International Mechanism to deliver to the Palestinian people to a long-term measure; and if she will make a statement. 
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