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It seems to all of us, I suspect, that attacks on our infrastructure do not simply constitute natural disasters such as floods and storms, or the pollution of main freshwater or sea water channels. We are talking about attacks on infrastructure in its widest sense—the definition given in the documents. I will not pursue my discussion of the lessons that the House could learn from the 2005 terrorist attacks, because that would fall outside your ruling, Mr. Speaker, but I ask Members—and particularly the Minister when he goes to Europe
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to have further discussions—to keep in the back of their minds when addressing this matter what I would have said.

I had intended to say that the matters that I may not discuss are of relevance to the matters before us today, as no discussion of critical infrastructure in the European context can avoid the real and present threat to our own infrastructure and the imperative for this Government to take all necessary steps to maintain it, to protect it, to repair it and, in so far as its degradation will affect our EU neighbours, to ensure that we liaise and co-operate effectively with them to plan for that contingency.

Not all EU states have been attacked by terrorists, but several have. Not all EU states have a growing number of immigrants from countries, societies and traditions that find our institutions, societal norms and national characteristics strange and even inimical, but several do. Not all EU states play a world, extra-European or extra-regional role in trading, diplomatic and military terms to the extent that our country does, but all of them, no matter how large or small, are potentially vulnerable to attacks on their infrastructures, and both individually and collectively we must pay heed to the attacks that we have endured over the past 40 years, in order to prepare for yet further attacks and be in a position to deal with them. In respect of such attacks, it is not a question of if, but of when. We would be foolish not to have contingency plans in place.

However, the documents imply a yet further increase in EU competence over the affairs of member states. The hon. Member for Linlithgow and East Falkirk and his Committee have done us a signal service by introducing this debate. In an intervention on the Minister, the hon. Gentleman referred pointedly—and with relevance and accuracy, which the Government should acknowledge—to crucial issues relating to qualified majority voting and absolute majorities in respect of the subject we are discussing. My right hon. Friend the Member for Wells, who was one of the two negotiators on behalf of this Parliament on the future of the EU, is only too well aware of such issues.

European critical infrastructure—ECI—degradation is covered by the proposals; the EU should govern matters if at least two members are affected, it is said. It is suggested that a European plan for critical infrastructure protection—EPCIP—should be drawn up which will identify, among other things, critical infrastructure and produce a common approach to its protection and information sharing.

Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: My hon. and learned Friend has referred to a voluntary approach. He will know—this follows from his earlier remarks—that there are security assets and facilities both in this country and in other countries that we would prefer not to declare, for security reasons. Is he aware that under the draft directive we would have to declare not only those assets, but draw up and operate a security plan and appoint a security liaison officer, all of which would presumably be public? Would it not be a grave threat to our internal security if all of that were known as provided for under a directive, and if the final arbiter of that were the European Court of Justice?


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Mr. Garnier: My right hon. Friend points to a matter that I hope will be thoroughly negotiated out of these documents by the Minister. [Interruption.] The Minister says from a sedentary position that my right hon. Friend is wrong. Well, my right hon. Friend has referred directly to the document in question. [Interruption.] He is now holding it up for the Minister’s edification. I shall allow my right hon. Friend and the Minister to have private discussions behind the Speaker’s Chair, but the point that my right hon. Friend makes is entirely valid. There are assets and infrastructures that we own nationally and there are assets and infrastructures that we jointly own or in respect of which we are tenants in common through, for example, NATO and certain aspects of the EU, and which should not become the subject of open-air discussion. It alarms me to think that our foreign policy and our counter-terrorism policy might be subjected to debate or decision of the ECJ, and I trust that that also alarms the Minister.

As I have said, it is suggested in the documents that a European plan for critical infrastructure protection should be drawn up and that it should identify, among other things, critical infrastructure and produce a common approach to its protection and information sharing. That is of relevance to the point my right hon. Friend made a moment ago. I might have misunderstood the nature of EU critical infrastructure while at the same time having a clear understanding of the delicate nature of our own national infrastructure, but it seems to me—I do not mean to sound complacent, as no one could be so given the attacks on our country over the past 40 years—that as we are an island we might have some geographical protection from attacks on other EU states’ water systems, electricity grids, telephone and communications systems and key Government services.

That point is not a case of relying on the sentiment behind the pre-war London newspaper headline, “Fog over channel: Europe cut off”, but I understand that in continental Europe other factors might apply. The Benelux countries, France and Germany, France and Italy, France and Spain and the Baltic countries—to give just a few obvious examples—will have integrated infrastructures that far outstretch the examples that apply to the United Kingdom, such as the channel tunnel, the shipping traffic between the UK and Europe, and the services shared by Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

The hon. Member for Linlithgow and East Falkirk mentioned the channel tunnel. It is a subject that will cause some debate. From one point of view the channel tunnel looks like a bilateral infrastructure between France and the UK, but the manufacturers of, for example, Belgium, Italy or Spain who wish to export goods from their country to ours via road or rail might say that it affects more than two countries within the EU, and that therefore it is an EU infrastructure asset which ought to come under the control of the directives. I foresee endless discussion in dark committee rooms in Europe of such matters.

Of course, we know that attacks on food supplies, or attacks on, or interference with, the internet and electronic communication systems or the banking and financial sectors at a strategic level can have a cross-border effect, regardless of whether they are the result of terrorist
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activity or natural causes such as storms and floods. To destroy the London stock exchange is to damage the global trade in financial instruments; to poison the Rhine is to damage the natural environment—river, sea and land based—in many countries; and to corrupt the immigration authorities of one member state will have a knock-on effect on other EU states. However, I question whether we need to raise the need for sensible, thoughtful, well planned international co-operation at a multilateral or bilateral level to the level of having an EU institution with all the expenditure, directives, regulations and bureaucracy—and infrastructure—that these documents urge upon us.

How, for example, do we define whether a particular piece of infrastructure is critical to the EU as a whole, or to at least two states, or only to one? We cannot do that without creating endless directives following endless committee meetings in several locations, at which the representatives of member state Governments and the Commission argue about whether country A’s sewerage system is of European significance whereas country B’s telephone system is only of national significance.

The documents tell us that EPCIP

We need have no doubt of that. We are also told that its action plan will have three work streams, that there will be a critical infrastructure warning information network or CIWIN, and that there will be expert groups. There will be a CIP—critical infrastructure protection—information-sharing process and an identification of interdependencies. There will be national critical infrastructures, contingency planning and an external dimension, and there will be an “all hazard” approach—which would be a fitting description of the present jostling for the leadership and deputy leadership of the Labour party.

There is no doubt that those matters, when stripped of the jargon, are sensible things to think about and deal with, but I am concerned that we should not as a country or a Government allow ourselves to be distracted with yet further EU navel gazing when we have plenty to do at home to provide better national security of all types and when there is so much that we can do bilaterally and multilaterally in discrete areas to protect our vital infrastructures.

Terrorism, even outside the confines of the Crevice trial, is universally to be condemned and all of us, in and out of the EU, must take steps to prevent it and to create conditions that do not allow it to thrive or to take hold. However, we should not allow these documents and the policies that lie behind them to dilute our resources and efforts, no matter that we are acutely aware that an approach that goes beyond terrorism is in other jurisdictions appropriate, and more immediately so.

Our primary, if not our total, focus must be on counter-terrorism and on protecting our constitutional framework, national institutions and liberties, as citizens of this parliamentary democracy. We must have the confidence to realise and understand that, despite the attacks we have seen from the IRA, al-Qaeda and so-called animal rights activists, the systems of Government, Parliament and local authorities and our emergency and public services are
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resilient and robust and, more importantly, democratically accountable. I do not denigrate the motives behind the policies outlined in these documents, but I do question their utility.

I urge the Government to be strong in their EU discussions, and to ensure that we arrive at a scheme that is relevant, proportionate and cost-effective. The concerns outlined by the Minister, which we share, should be taken on board by his counterparts when he travels to Europe to meet them.

1.31 pm

Michael Connarty (Linlithgow and East Falkirk) (Lab): I have to tell the Minister that my one disappointment with the motion is that, at a time when there is so much to be negotiated and so much is left unanswered in our correspondence—and will remain unanswered even after today’s debate—it does not simply say that we “take note” of the documents and of the Government’s position. Rather, it says that this House

Despite the work of my European Scrutiny Committee, which took this issue very seriously, and the Minister’s original, very detailed explanatory memorandum of 12 February, there remain many unknowns regarding what the Government will cede. They have certainly moved from their original position when we first looked at the directive, having, of course, considered the Green Paper for almost two years. In the explanatory memorandum of 19 February, they seemed to be adopting a firm position. However, a letter of 9 March to the Committee in response to our further inquiries appeared to indicate what I define as Government slide—a phenomenon that I have noticed repeatedly through my work on the Committee. That is in contrast to the original directive, which was an example of Commission creep. The Commission wants to creep into power; meanwhile, between 19 February and 9 March the Government appear to have shifted position, and to now be willing in their negotiations to slide out of power.

I come to the reasons why the Committee wanted this issue to be debated on the Floor of the House. Our main concern was that what is proposed is the adoption of a legally binding European Council directive in what we consider a sensitive field. We felt that this was legally doubtful and questionable in principle. Our second concern was the extensive role that the Commission has allocated to itself. As has been said, neither the so-called counter-terrorism co-ordinator’s name nor his position was included in the Commission’s proposal. It intends that it shall put together a committee of the Commission to oversee this process. That concerned us greatly.

The third problem is that there is not just a possibility but a probability of the extension of Community competence into the field of national security. There is no doubt that if that proposal goes ahead, it will affect bilateral agreements and infrastructures; in fact, it is Commission creep into the field of national security. We felt that that proposal should not be agreed to before being debated in the House.


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In the February explanatory memorandum, the Minister discussed the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection, which will probably be referred to for ever by Eurocrats as EPCIP; as a result, no one will know what it means. The memorandum recognised that bilateral co-operation between states was to be encouraged, but we shared the Government’s concern, which they expressed strongly, that EPCIP should not cover bilateral arrangements. In that regard, the Government referred to the channel tunnel and to cross-border co-operation between the UK and Ireland, as the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) said.

Our Committee felt that there was no reason for the Commission to be involved in these matters. However, its starting point was that bilateral agreements were not outwith EPCIP. The Government are resisting that view, but they are asking us today to approve their signing up to the document, subject to negotiations. However, the Minister has said nothing today that would satisfy my Committee that lines in the sand have been drawn that we will not allow the Commission to cross. That is very worrying, given that we have been asked not just to note that the Government are negotiating, but to support them.

We have debated this issue and we have given the House its best chance to influence the Government. The Government will then be left to negotiate whatever they wish to negotiate at the final stage in the European Council.

Mr. Garnier: Does the hon. Gentleman find this situation perhaps a little disappointing? Assuming that his Committee had reached a completely different conclusion from the content of the documents and had advised the House to vote against the “take note” motion, it would have made little difference. The Government are independently able to carry on doing what they think best, irrespective of the advice of his Committee.

Michael Connarty: I hope that we do not get to the point of voting. I hope that the Government will take on board the fact that when we say we support them, we support them. Hopefully, the House will support them too, on the basis that the motion includes the phrase

Those concerns are those expressed in February’s explanatory memorandum, and not the weaker position that, sadly, seemed to be indicated by the Government’s strong support for proceeding with the directive, as expressed in the letter of 9 March. As I said, we sensed Government slide, of which the explanatory memorandum gave no indication. I hope that the Government will vigorously defend their position as outlined in the February explanatory memorandum, and that they will not perform an about-turn on any of these issues when they enter into negotiations.

The Committee also asked whether the adoption of the directive is necessary or justified. The arguments for a legally binding directive under the terms of article 308 of the European Community treaty are
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unconvincing. We studied that article extensively and we will publish a report on it shortly. We are clear that in our view, there is no need for legally binding rules in the sensitive area of designating infrastructure; however, and as I pointed out, that is what will happen. The Government said that they want the proposal to be dealt with through commitology, and in such a way that it is passed by qualified majority voting in the Council. If there was a dispute, the matter would then be ruled on by the European Court of Justice. Our Government would be unable to go against that ruling, and they could be forced into positions that they did not originally wish to adopt, and to which they did not originally think that they had ceded.

We believe that it is wrong for the Commission to be allowed to use infraction procedures in respect of any European country, and particularly this one, which has a highly developed national security policy. However, the Commission would go to the European Court of Justice if there were any dispute. Why could the objective of creating a common procedure for designating critical infrastructure not have been achieved by voluntary co-operation between member states? That is how we have advanced in the past. It is a good idea to have guidelines, benchmarks and some form of sanctions or penalties. It is also a good idea to have incentives throughout the EU. We may have reservations about some of the countries in the EU and their ability to meet the standards, but we should be aiding and abetting them, not giving power to the Commission to rule over our standards in the future.

We will always dispute with the Government, the Commission and the Council the legal basis of article 308, because on many issues it has nothing to do with the common market. Our Committee was certainly concerned by the throw-away lines about competitiveness and cost at the end of certain sections, so that it could be argued that it was a competition question: it is not. It is a justification for using an original clause that was entirely about the common market to force through several items so that the Commission gets its way.

We questioned the consequences of adopting a legally binding European directive on this issue in our report on 21 March. We were worried that it would lead to unpredictable legal obligations being imposed on the UK. The Minister questioned the definition of European critical infrastructure, the disclosure of information, and the legal obligations imposed to produce operator security plans and appoint security liaison officers. In the explanatory memorandum, the Government appeared to take a firm stand against all of those issues, but each would fall to be determined and interpreted by the European Court of Justice. In other words, every objection that the Government have put up could be overruled by the ECJ. That could happen if the Commission took infraction proceedings against a Government who are resisting the imposition of the Commission’s will, which could lead to very unpredictable results. We question whether the Government should make any concessions that would take risks in that area. In security terms, we need to be firm, to be sure of our ground, to know where our authority lies, to know that we can call on that authority at any time and that it has not been given to another party. That is another reason why we wanted the debate.


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