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Des Browne: The White Paper The Future of the UK's Nuclear Deterrent (Cm 6994) published in December 2006, makes it clear that we would only ever contemplate the use of our nuclear deterrent in extreme circumstances of self-defence. It also explains that we deliberately maintain ambiguity about precisely when, how and at what scale we might contemplate using our nuclear deterrent as we will not simplify the calculations of any potential future aggressor.
Des Browne: The White Paper The Future of the UK's Nuclear Deterrent (Cm 6994), published in December 2006, made clear that we are committed to retaining only the minimum capability necessary to deter potential aggressors.
The process by which we make an assessment of our minimum deterrent requirements is described in paragraph 4-9 of that White Paper. We make an assessment of the minimum destructive capability that we need to be able to deliver in order to outweigh the potential benefits a potential aggressor might believe they would derive from an attack on our vital interests. This includes an assessment of the decision-making processes of future potential aggressors and of defensive measures that a potential adversary might employ in an effort to reduce the impact of the UK's nuclear capability.
Mr. Caton: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence by what proportion the (a) numbers and (b) explosive capacity of the UK's nuclear weapons have been reduced as a result of multilateral disarmament negotiations since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty entered into force. 
Des Browne: The 1998 Strategic Defence Review White Paper (Cm 3999), set out the reduction in the total stockpile, the number of operationally available weapons and the reduction in the explosive power of the UK's nuclear weapons since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty entered into force in 1970. In December 2006, the Government announced in the White Paper, "The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent" (Cm 6994), that the UK will be reducing further the number of operationally available warheads to fewer than 160. This means that, since the end of the Cold War, we will have reduced the explosive power of our nuclear weapon stockpile by over 75 per cent. and we now have less than one per cent. of the total global stockpile. These reductions contribute to meeting our commitment to achieving the general and complete disarmament objectives of Article VI of the Nuclear Non Proliferation treaty.
Mr. Harper: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the effectiveness of the 3rd Battalion the Parachute Regiment post-operational stress programme; and if he will make a statement. 
The Decompression period (phase 1) undertaken by elements of 3rd Battalion the Parachute Regiment (3 PARA) was spent in Cyprus. It comprised briefings and an opportunity for personnel to relax prior to returning to the UK to allow them to adjust to non-operational working conditions. The majority who undertook the decompression saw it as beneficial.
The Normalisation period (phase 2) consists of post-operational tour leave. This is now complete for 3 PARA as all individuals have returned to normal in-barracks work (or to civilian life, for de-mobilised reserves and TA). Phases 3 and 4 (In-Service Support and Aftercare) continue throughout an individuals service career and into retirement.
Mr. Laurence Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when he expects to make a decision on the future of the Royal Air Force site at Innsworth, Gloucestershire, with particular reference to the possibility of basing the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (HQ ARRC), 1 Signals Brigade and 102 Logistics Brigade there; and if he will make a statement. 
The Innsworth site is one of several options being assessed as a potential UK base for HQ ARRC, but this work represents no more than a developing plan at this stage. Final decisions will not be made before the summer, and moves will not take place until 2009 at the earliest.
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when he expects the Mk 4A arming, fusing and firing system for Trident to enter service; what estimate he has made of the cost of the (a) development and (b) production of this system; and what impact he expects this procurement to have on the decision whether to refurbish or replace the Trident warhead. 
Des Browne: The Mk 4A arming, fusing and firing system is a non-nuclear component being introduced into the UK warhead to overcome obsolescence and ensure the existing warhead can remain in service until the 2020s. It will enter service over the course of the next decade. The overall cost to the UK of procuring the component is included in the estimated future costs of the Atomic Weapons Establishment set out in Chapter 5 of the White Paper The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent (Cmd 6994), published in December 2006.
Mr. Caton: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether the United States Administration has sought any (a) technical and (b) diplomatic reassurance that Trident D5 nuclear missiles provided under a leasing contract by the US Navy to the UK could never be targeted at United States assets. 
Des Browne: As long-standing allies with mutual defence obligations under the terms of the North Atlantic treaty, the United States Administration has not sought any technical or diplomatic reassurances that UK Trident D5 missiles would never be targeted against United States assets.
Jeremy Corbyn: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence for what reasons the Government agreed to participation in the life extension work on the Trident D5 missile in the Prime Minister's exchange of letters with the President of the United States in December 2005. 
Des Browne: I have nothing to add to the comments I made in my letter to the Chairman of the Defence Select Committee of 9 March 2007, which were reproduced in my written ministerial statement on 12 March 2007, Official Report, column 1WS.
Mrs. Curtis-Thomas: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what mechanisms are in place to ensure the retention of shipbuilding skills and expertise in the period between the construction of the last Type 45 destroyer and any future replacement for the current generation of Type 22 and Type 23 frigates. 
Mr. Ingram: On current plans we expect programmes such as Type 45 and the Future Carrier to ensure the retention of shipbuilding skills and expertise in the UK shipbuilding industry well into the next decade. However, we are also looking further ahead than this. The Defence Industrial Strategy defined the key maritime industrial skills and capabilities we need to retain on shore to support the needs of the Royal Navy in the longer term. We are therefore working with the shipbuilding industry to agree the core workload required to sustain these high-end design, systems engineering and combat systems integration skills across the maritime sector.
Mr. McNulty: The Home Office has received six representations concerning the mosquito device; four were from hon. Members on behalf of their constituents, one from a member of the public and one from a local authority. Of those six representations received, two were concerned with the legality of the device and another two questioned whether the device might breach a person's human rights. In addition, the Home Office has received eight items of correspondence referring to the mosquito device which did not take the form of a representation, but was either a question about the device itself or a request that the Home Office provide guidance on the use of these devices. The Home Office has not received representations on the mosquito device from any civil liberties groups.
Mr. Anthony Wright: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what recent assessment he has made of the effectiveness of antisocial behaviour orders in reducing antisocial behaviour. 
Mr. McNulty: Antisocial behaviour orders (ASBOs) have been thoroughly examined on numerous occasions over the past few years, including by the Home Affairs Select Committee in April 2005. The effectiveness of the Governments antisocial behaviour policies has been assessed in two key independent reports published last year, by the National Audit Office and by the Youth Justice Board. Both confirmed that our twin track approach of support and enforcement is effective in protecting communities from antisocial behaviour. This is bringing resultsnationally, the percentage of people who perceive high levels of antisocial behaviour has fallen from 21 per cent. in 2002-03 to 17 per cent. in 2005-06. We are due to commission an evaluation of various interventions (including ASBOs) designed to tackle antisocial behaviour. This proposed research is likely to explore what impact these interventions can have on tackling antisocial behaviour problems.
Mr. Austin Mitchell: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether applicants for asylum may be questioned by officials from the embassy of their country of origin; and whether such embassies are given information about applicants. 
Mr. Byrne: The Border and Immigration Agency does not arrange for asylum applicants with outstanding claims to be questioned by embassy officials from their country of origin. However, all asylum claimants are informed that should their claim be unsuccessful, it might be necessary for the Border and Immigration Agency to contact the authorities in their country of origin, to obtain travel documents for their journey home.
In cases where a travel document is required information is exchanged with embassies and it may also be necessary for officials from those embassies to interview an individual in order to establish their
nationality. Information relating to any asylum claim is treated in confidence and is not disclosed to the authorities, unless the claimant has given his consent for the transfer of the data.
Mr. Clappison: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department pursuant to the answer of 19 December 2006, Official Report, column 1944W, on asylum seekers, what checks he is making with international authorities in respect of convictions for offences committed abroad by applicants for the family indefinite leave to remain exercise, including applicants who have committed offences in the UK. 
Mr. Byrne: The details of applicants who may be eligible for settlement under the Family Indefinite Leave to Remain Exercise are checked against the Police National Computer records, which record domestic criminal convictions. The watch lists may also indicate if an applicant is wanted for criminal activity outside of the UK. The Home Secretary has announced a review to consider how information about criminality is recorded and shared both within the UK and between the UK and other countries as well as how such information is used to protect the public.
Mr. Austin Mitchell: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether supporting evidence from a family member and relevant documentation was obtained in the initial assessment of the asylum claim of Mr. Subtain Bokhari. 
Damian Green: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what his estimate is of the number of people who have exhausted all appeals against removal and are still in the UK (a) in detention and (b) not in detention. 
Mr. Byrne: As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary set out in his evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee on 23 May 2006, no government has been able to produce an accurate figure for the number of people who are in the country illegally, and that remains the case.
Information relating to the number of persons currently held in detention who have exhausted all rights to appeal against removal is not available; it would be available by examination of individual records at only disproportionate cost.
David Davis: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many Government attempts to deport asylum seekers failed due to disruptive behaviour by the passenger resulting in the airline refusing to take the passenger in (a) the last six months and (b) the last two years. 
John Reid: During the past six months there have been 321 occasions when attempts to remove detained people have failed due to disruptive behaviour on their part that either did, or would have, led to the airline refusing to carry them. This figure constitutes 3.2 per cent. of the total number of removals for the period.
During the past two years there have been 1,173 occasions when attempts to remove detained people have failed due to disruptive behaviour on their part that either did, or would have led, to the airline refusing to carry them.
Damian Green: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many failed asylum seekers had their removals from the UK stopped because their country of destination was deemed too dangerous in each of the last five years, broken down by country of destination. 
Removal of persons from the United Kingdom takes place in accordance with country and international law, including human rights legislation, and all immigration decisions made by the Border and Immigration Agency can currently be tested by the independent judiciary by means of recourse to the courts.
Mr. Gerrard: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what package of assistance measures is made available by the Government to failed Iraqi asylum applicants under the UK voluntary returns programme; what changes have been made to this package since 2004; and how much has been allocated to providing such assistance in each year since 2004. 
Mr. Byrne: Reintegration assistance became available for those returning to the three Northern Governorates in October 2005 with a financial package of £1,000 in kind assistance for setting up a small business, vocational training or education.
Following the introduction of the enhanced package on 1 January 2006, returnees to all areas of Iraq were then able to obtain up to £3,000 of assistance. For those returning to the three Northern Governorates, this assistance was available as in kind assistance. However, £1,500 of this amount was also available as a cash option. For those returning to other areas of Iraq, the assistance was transferred as a whole via Western Union as in kind assistance is not available.
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