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One of the key skills that we must give our TA soldiers is basic skill at arms, especially if they are going to be sent on operational service in Afghanistan or Iraq. However, as a direct result of the £5 million of cuts, all divisional skill-at-arms meetings have been cut and will not be reinstigated for the foreseeable future.
Employer support of the TA is often taken for granted. I would not have been able to take part in my first two mobilisations, to Kosovo and Bosnia, without the support of my employer. I recognise that it might be easy to sell to employers the idea that if they send their TA soldier employee away for six months he will return a far better employee; he might be employed as a storeman in the TA, but he will come back capable of being a stores manager, such is the benefit of his experience. The Reserve Forces Act 1996 rightly protects TA soldiers and reservists by ensuring that they get their job back, but it does not guarantee them a promotion when they return. That must be looked into.
Because so many TA soldiers have been deployed time and again, employer support is beginning to be lost. We had one measure in place to repay employers: exercise executive stretch. It was run regionally, and every year there was an opportunity for employers who had supported the TA to send their non-TA employees to take part in a team-building exercise over a weekend. The employees would participate in a series of military activities, such as assault courses and command tasks. It was an ideal way to thank employers and to offer them a service by putting their non-TA employees through a team-building exercise. It was greatly valued by employers across the country. Yet as a direct result of the proposed £5 million of cuts, it will not happen next year.
The biggest impact of the cuts will be on recruiting. I understand that the recruiting element of the cuts will be about £2.5 million. The directive has been handed down that all recruiting for units that are not directly supplying soldiers on mobilised service in Afghanistan and Iraq is to stop next year. That is incredibly short-sighted. I speak as a former squadron commander who had 120 soldiers in my unit. The average length of service for a TA soldier is only 3 years. Therefore once every three years, a third of the unit will leave. To turn off the tap and not recruit in one year might create a saving in that year, but it will have an incredibly dramatic impact in years two, three and four.
TA units simply will not recover. A TA unit by its nature can only do one thing at a time. It may have 124 soldiers, but some of them—probably at least 20 at present—will be away on operations, and at least 30 will be recruits who can do nothing other than their recruit training. That leaves a possible total of about 60 who could turn up on any given Tuesday; and of those 60, perhaps only 20 will come in. It might therefore be possible to achieve only one project on a Tuesday or a weekend.
When I was a squadron commander, I was fortunate in inheriting a squadron that was 90 per cent. recruited because it had done a lot of recruitment activities in the two previous years to increase its numbers. The mistake I made was that as soon as I inherited that squadron I focused on genuine training—the Minister will appreciate that bomb disposal experts need a lot of training—and we did not focus on recruiting for six months. The
impact was felt the next year and the year after, when my numbers went down by 20 per cent. That was a tough lesson to learn.
The decision to turn off the tap for recruiting for all non-TA units not directly delivering to Afghanistan or Iraq is, therefore, possibly the most damaging measure in the proposals. I urge the Minister of State to look again—
Mr. Ingram: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way and I am sorry that I was not in my place for the opening portion of his remarks. I have listened to the latter portion and he makes a strong case. As ever, I will take stock of the points he has made and set them against the advice that we have received from others in the chain of command. I can give him the commitment that I will give due consideration to the weight of his arguments.
Mr. Lancaster: I am grateful to the Minister, who has a reputation for being very fair-minded. He has demonstrated that once again this afternoon, and I have great respect for him.
I have one concern with which the Minister might be able to help me. I asked a series of parliamentary questions this week, and one of the answers revealed that not a single representation had been made to the Minister—he is nodding in agreement—and that concerns me. So the Commander, Regional Forces, the ultimate head of the TA, made no representations about the proposed £5 million cuts? Did the assistant Chief of the Defence Staff, the senior two-star TA officer, make no representations about those cuts? Did the Deputy Inspector General TA, a TA brigadier, make no representations about those cuts? If that is the case, I find it very sad. It is a sad state of affairs when lowly Major Lancaster has to stand up in Parliament to argue the case for the Territorial Army. I urge the Minister to look again at the announcements that are being made today, because the long-term impact on the TA will be very severe.
3.7 pm
Mr. Bernard Jenkin (North Essex) (Con): It gives me great pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for North-East Milton Keynes (Mr. Lancaster), who has made an important and impressive contribution to the debate. I am delighted that the Minister responded in the way that he did. I shall come to the question of budgets, as my hon. Friend’s speech was a microcosm of the great debate about budgets and the way in which that is affecting personnel policies in the Army.
I start, as everybody else has started, by taking this opportunity to pay tribute to our armed forces, their professionalism and dedication, and especially to those serving on operations. I also extend my sympathies to those who have suffered injury or been bereaved, and I honour our fallen.
I wish to explain to the House the reason for the absence of so many members of the Defence Committee. Once again, somehow, one of the key armed forces debates has coincided with a long-planned visit by the Committee. Today, the majority of my colleagues on that Committee are visiting the military unit at the Selly Oak hospital. I would not dream of suggesting to the House that there is any intention on the part of the
Government to hold these debates while the Committee is on a planned a visit, but it does seem to happen remarkably often. We cancelled a trip to NATO for a debate earlier this year in order perhaps to wrong-foot the Government. I suggest that the House authorities could take a little care when planning these debates and liaise with the Defence Committee. We know quite far ahead when we will be abroad or on a visit. We have a heavy programme of work, and it would assist us and the House if greater co-ordination could be achieved. I appreciate that that is not a point directly for the Minister, but I hope that my remarks will be noted in other quarters.
This debate is about armed forces personnel. I was most impressed by what I heard about Combat Stress from my hon. Friend the Member for Woodspring (Dr. Fox), the right hon. Member for Islwyn (Mr. Touhig) and the hon. Member for North Devon (Nick Harvey). I should like to join them in expressing concern about the future of a charity that undertakes very important work. Just last week, the Defence Committee took evidence from representatives of Combat Stress and of other service charities including the Royal British Legion, the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Families Association, and the Army Families Federation. They all welcomed the fact that the Government had appointed a Minister for Veterans, but they expressed some disappointment that that had raised expectations that have yet to be delivered.
I make no criticism of the Minister for Veterans, but I agree with the right hon. Member for Islwyn, who is no longer in his place, that the MOD should have a department for veterans that can deliver something. In contrast, a Minister with that responsibility is just a conduit for information. It would help recruitment and retention if we could help people who have served in the armed forces to feel that they remain in that wider family. I do not think that that happens at present.
I want to concentrate on three main issues: overstretch, training and morale. As the hon. Member for North Devon remarked, no one can deny that our armed forces are overstretched. Indeed, when pressed, the Chief of the Defence Staff admitted to the Defence Committee a short while ago that the armed forces were stretched to the point where the elastic could stretch no further. Perhaps the elastic has to break before the MOD’s definition of overstretch is reached, but he was pretty blunt and forthright in saying that the situation could not be allowed to continue for more than 12 months.
If that is so, my sense is that the Government are gambling on being able to contain the overstretch by drawing down some of our present commitments. However, unless the new Prime Minister introduces a dramatic change of policy, I do not foresee that there is much prospect that we will be able to reduce our commitments. If we do so in Iraq, I fear that we will use the slack to increase our commitments in Afghanistan. Indeed, I understand that a further battalion has been deployed to Afghanistan, with not so much as a whisper of an announcement to this House. If that move is planned, or if the battalion has been deployed, I should be grateful for a response at the end of the debate.
Overstretch, of course, impinges on armed forces personnel. Earlier today, and at very short notice, I obtained what I believe to be the MOD’s latest monthly manning statement. Why cannot this report be placed
in the House of Commons Library automatically and as a matter of policy? I have asked that question before. In a written answer of 24 June 2002, the Minister of State told me that “UK Armed Forces Trained Strengths and Requirements”, which is a tri-service publication, was placed in the Library on a regular basis. The raw figures in the monthly manning statement are more useful, yet this morning I was told that I had to table a written question before the Ministry of Defence would put the information in the Library. When I asked the Library to point out to the MOD that there was to be a debate on armed forces personnel today so it might be quite useful to have the information beforehand, the MOD generously relented, but there is a degree of formality about the process that we could dispense with if the Minister ensured that when the statement is published a copy is placed in the Library. I am sure that would assist the librarians.
I shall refer only to the Army figures, but the same patterns are reflected for all three forces. The monthly manning statement shows that the whole trained Army strength stands at 99,030, which is 2.7 per cent. below the target of 101,800. When the strategic defence review was published, it was supported by the Adjutant-General, who gave evidence to the Defence Committee that the target trained Army strength was to be 108,500. That figure was never achieved, and armed forces personnel are taking the strain of manpower shortages—in undermanned units, undermanned battalions, shorter tour intervals and curtailed or cancelled training exercises.
My hon. Friend the Member for North-East Milton Keynes discussed the cuts in the Territorial Army. It is ironic that the situation is exactly the same as in the regular Army. My hon. Friend the Member for Woodspring pointed out that although it has been implied that the SDR was duly funded, that was not the case. We know from the biography of the former Chief of the Defence Staff, now Lord Guthrie, that he never received the money that he felt had been implicitly promised at the time of the SDR. He even went to see the Chancellor about the matter—the language was florid, we understand.
As the Government make more commitments for equipment programmes, operations and support for operations, manpower suffers, so unfortunately I am not surprised to learn that the TA has suffered yet another cut with no complaint from any of the service chiefs. They all have budgets to protect. If one of them were to complain about the TA cut to which my hon. Friend the Member for North-East Milton Keynes referred, the first question would be, “What other cuts will you offer?”
Our defence policy is determined not by what is required to support military operations but by the limitations on resources. That is why the manning statement shows that the soldier strength of the Territorial Army stands at 30,550, which represents a shortage of 6,300 men and women—a shortfall of 15 per cent. It obscures the fact that the SDR target strength for the TA was between 41,000 and 45,000, which is considerably more than the current target.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Woodspring pointed out, we are spending less on our defence than our commitments demand. The budget is determined by spending limits, not by the military requirement. In
particular, whatever increase in budget has been delivered, it does not reflect what is widely regarded to be the inflation rate for defence costs. The Select Committee received evidence that the defence costs inflation rate is somewhat in excess of 8 per cent. per annum. Therefore, given less-than-inflation increases in the defence budget year after year, alongside a heavy equipment programme that looks as though it cannot be funded and which escalates in cost as the years go by, the only way to fit our defence activities into the budget envelope is by cutting personnel. The headcount is such a high proportion of the cost in the armed forces; that is why the target size of the Army, the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy is reduced year on year.
The graphs presented in Ministry of Defence briefings to Members of Parliament show sliding, declining numbers of personnel employed in the armed forces year on year. They show those numbers declining below the actual target. I do not think that we shall ever see fully trained, fully manned armed forces under this Government, even according to the target figures that they now give us. This is a serious situation. It is quite obvious that all three services are extensively deployed on operations and all three are suffering the kind of overstretch that we have been talking about. That is as much true of the Army as any of the other services.
Mr. Eric Joyce (Falkirk) (Lab): May I help the hon. Gentleman by pointing out one detail? He mentioned the manning requirement and targets. As I recall, during the ’90s, when his party was still in power, it was fairly normal to have a manning requirement of, let us call it, 99 or 100 per cent. and a manning target that was a lot lower—about 90 per cent. That meant that the targets were quite readily hit, but those targets were a great deal lower. They were simply based on what it was thought could be practically achieved. Does he recognise that the manning requirement and the manning target are now something like 96 and 97 per cent.? They are very close, or, at least, they are an accurate reflection of the situation—unlike in the early ’90s.
Mr. Jenkin: The manning requirement has been reduced to reflect what the Government can afford. Quite early on in my defence career, when the Government were something like 6,000 or 7,000 men short in the Army, I said at a meeting in the Ministry of Defence, “If you could recruit 6,000 or 7,000 extra men, where would you get the money from?” In our 2001 election manifesto, we said that recruitment should be carried out to allow the Army to reach its fully trained requirement. The Government immediately said that that was a £1.6 billion defence commitment—until we pointed out that it was their own target and they were publicly pledged to achieve it. That £1.6 billion never existed.
The tragedy that we face now—perhaps tragedy is too strong a word; I shall use the word “challenge” instead. The challenge that we face now is that the situation is different. In the ’90s, a larger gap might have passed without comment. In 1990, one would have been hard-pressed to find one in 10 armed servicemen who had ever fired a shot in anger. We are now living in a different world and one would be hard put to find any armed serviceman or woman who has been in the armed forces for any length of time who has not served on operations. I put it to the Minister that the Government are not fulfilling their obligations to the people upon whom we depend for so much.
That is reflected in the tour intervals. I attended Colchester military festival in Colchester, which my constituency circumnavigates, a few days ago. It was an impressive display.
Mr. Ingram: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. I am intrigued by his earlier argument. He seemed to be saying that we should have a much bigger Army, and much bigger armed forces overall. I set out in my contribution the difficulties that we face in trying to recruit to current levels. Can he tell me what magic formula he has that would allow us to grow, assuming that such growth was necessary, by the thousands that he thinks are required? He is arguing for a figure bigger than we are able to attain.
Mr. Jenkin: I put it to the Chief of the Defence Staff in the Select Committee that as a “back of a fag packet” figure, if it were to meet the harmony guidelines set out in the strategic defence review and the requirements for tour intervals and so on, the Army would be about 130,000 to 135,000 strong. I am sufficiently realistic to recognise that that will not be the case. However, I suggest to the Minister of State that where there is a will, there is a way. If there were resources, it could be done. As in every other branch of military activity, there is probably not enough money in recruitment.
I know that strenuous efforts have been made. I have had meetings in the past with the director of Army recruitment, who has taken me to task about how difficult it is to attract and recruit people in today’s labour market. Where unit-led recruitment is properly incentivised, and where a commanding officer of a battalion makes it his job to ensure that his battalion is fully recruited, it can be done. There is not the will to recruit those numbers, because if they were recruited, the money would have to be found from other budget headings, and that would be a painful process.
I was speaking about tour intervals. It is surprising— [Interruption.] I hear the Minister of State muttering in frustration at my comments. We have incredibly talented and able people, who could run the fire service and who sorted out the foot and mouth crisis. They are extremely capable. Is the right hon. Gentleman seriously asking the House to believe that it is beyond the wit of any general in the British Army to work out how we could recruit to strength, if the money were available? I am sorry—I do not believe it.
Mr. Ingram: That is not what I asked the hon. Gentleman about. I asked him to say what his magic formula would be to get the figures that he had in mind. The notional figure—not the defined figure in the SDR—was 108,500, which was reduced to 105,000. The present figure is 101,800. That is an Army strength that we find it hard to achieve, no matter what resources we throw at the market. It is not just a matter of good will or determination. There must be something else that the hon. Gentleman is holding back from us. If he can give me that formula, I will make sure that it is applied.
Mr. Jenkin: I understand the question from the Minister of State. I reiterate that with resources and willpower, the necessary numbers could be recruited.
Mr. Mark Harper (Forest of Dean) (Con): One factor that will not make things any easier is the cutting of excellent products such as the defence schools presentation team and replacing them with an internet-based tool. I know that it is not a recruitment vehicle, but it goes into our schools to tell our young people exactly what the Ministry of Defence and our armed forces do, and it has excellent resources and excellent feedback from those schools. It is madness and very short-sighted to cut that, and it is such lack of thinking that leads to the problem.
Mr. Jenkin: I welcome that comment. I draw attention also to what my hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer) has regularly pointed out. If a commanding officer sets targets for all his officers to recruit and to achieve recruiting targets, it can be done. His former battalion, the Sherwood Foresters, was very well recruited as a result of that philosophy.
Let me move on to training. When I visited the Colchester military festival, I found 16 Air Assault Brigade already starting its training for its second tour in Helmand, where I believe it will be deployed some time in the spring of 2008. That brought home to me how the commitments that our armed forces face today produce a relentless treadmill of operations for our front-line infantry battalions.
The Defence Committee recently visited Helmand province, where we were immensely impressed by Brigadier Lorimer’s 12 Mechanised Brigade. It is doing a marvellous job, although it has its work cut out and is insufficiently supported by some of our NATO allies. Overall, there are not enough troops in theatre. NATO’s combined joint statement of requirement for Afghanistan has not been fulfilled by all the NATO nations that signed up to the principle, and once again British armed forces personnel are taking the strain. Incidentally, it is striking to see a man wearing naval uniform in the middle of the desert, but it underlines the tri-service nature of operations and how the three armed forces have integrated so well.
As 16 Air Assault Brigade is commencing its training to return to Afghanistan, I asked someone, “What equipment are you training with?” The mobility and firepower of a vehicle known as WMIK, which is an open Land Rover with a .50 calibre machine gun strapped to its top, are vital to operations in Afghanistan. Almost all the vehicles are deployed in Afghanistan, so the entire brigade has one WMIK vehicle for training purposes in the UK, and will not be able to do any training until it returns to Afghanistan.
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