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In the past 17 months, I have visited Iraq six times. There has been progress, but it has not been easy. However, we have remained true to our strategy of transition, building the Iraqis’ capacity to take responsibility for their own security. Frankly, this is the only sensible strategy, and I believe that the last year has shown that it is working. As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister confirmed last week, we have now transferred three out of four provinces in southern Iraq for which we had responsibility, and we are on track for Basra to follow suit before 2008. This represents very real progress, which is firmly driven by objective
assessments of the evolving situation on the ground. It has become manifestly clear over the past weeks that that is not only our assessment, but that of the Iraqi Government and of our principal ally—the United States of America.
It is our servicemen and women who have set the conditions to enable this forward momentum, often at great personal cost. The UK has trained more than 13,000 Iraqi soldiers, and I pay tribute to their achievements in what are some of the most difficult circumstances imaginable. Yes, there have been difficulties along the way, which it would be wrong to understate, but the handover of Dhi Qar, Maysan and Muthanna has shown that Iraqi security forces can cope. More recently, the successful handover of Basra palace has allowed our personnel to place more emphasis on training, governance and border security. In this context, we have been able to take the very welcome decision to plan to reduce our force levels in Iraq to 2,500 by the spring of next year. We believe that this is a measured response to the evolving security situation and the increased capability of the Iraqis.
Although we are seeing progress in the security situation, the political arena remains very difficult, with sectarian and regional interests still too often being put before national interests. Progress in Anbar province and negotiations between General Mohan and Shi’a militia groups in Basra show that the political landscape can change for the better, but that that takes time. We also welcome the enhanced role of the UN in that regard. Ultimately, it is for the Iraqi Government to formulate and deliver policies to help the Iraqi people, but we will do all that we can to assist them.
Mr. Jenkin: At the time of the invasion, British military forces comprised some 30 per cent. of the UN mandated coalition’s combat power in Iraq. The Prime Minister’s announcement envisages that we will now provide perhaps less than 2 per cent. of the coalition’s combat power. Do we still stand shoulder to shoulder with our American ally?
Des Browne:
We could not be closer. Knowing the hon. Gentleman’s interest in Iraq, I am sure that he will have pored over every word uttered by General Petraeus when he was here explaining how closely we had worked to achieve what we have achieved in southern Iraq. If that was not good enough for him, he probably pored over every word uttered by Secretary Gates on his visit here only last week, when he confirmed that what we are doing was entirely consistent with what the Americans are doing. We therefore could not be closer to the US, and that is to be expected, although I know that the reduction in British troop numbers is counter-intuitive, especially given that it happened when the numbers of US troops were surging. However, those who understand the diversity of Iraq and the extent of the differences between provinces know that our action was entirely consistent with what the Americans were doing, given the different environment facing our troops. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will accept that the people in the US who know best about these matters—and they include General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker,
who for some months now have been responsible for US policy in Iraq—have given evidence that confirms that.
Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab): In the summer, quite a few people argued that if we drew down our troops from Basra palace and handed it over to Iraqi troops, there could be a danger that the number of attacks on British troops at the air base would rise significantly, and that the security problems faced by civilians in Basra could get worse. Will my right hon. Friend confirm that exactly the opposite has happened?
Des Browne: I can, of course, confirm that exactly the opposite has happened—thus far. I make that qualification because I recognise that the situation is very fragile and that it is very important that the negotiations between General Mohan and those others who seek to exercise political power and economic influence in southern Iraq are sustained. We can create the opportunity for such negotiations and discussions to take place, but we cannot be a party to them, as they are for Iraqis to sort out between themselves. As long as progress is being made in that regard, the relationship that I have described will be sustained.
We hear constant predictions that things are about to melt down in Iraq, but it is always possible, at any stage in the transition, that things will go either right or wrong. Many people out there know that it is a fifty-fifty bet and so always opt for pessimism, on the basis that that gives them a 50 per cent. chance of being right, and being able to say, “I told you so.” Thankfully, however, our judgments are a bit more sophisticated than that. At the points of transition, we do not take any step unless we are assured that we are doing so in the context of preset conditions, measurements and tests that we have agreed with others.
Until now, we have managed to make the progress that we have planned for, and broadly within the planned time scale. At each step, we have told the House and the country what the next stage of the plan would be, but I am not complacent: I know that we face a volatile and fragile set of circumstances, and that many people do not have the best interests of the UK or the Iraqi people at heart. In their briefings to me about what is going on in the operational theatre, many military commanders have told me, “You have to remember, Secretary of State, the enemy get a vote too, and we don’t control that.”
Thus far, therefore, our actions have been correct, but we must not be complacent. In the interests of the Iraqi people, and of our people too, we have to recognise that we must take the same care when it comes to the next stage of the process.
We cannot debate defence without addressing the threat of terrorism, which can emerge from abroad or at home and manifests itself against both armed forces and civilians. Its method is indiscriminate killing. Its aim is to promote an extremist ideology. As a Government, we are committed to tackling that threat at every level—its fundamental values, its spread to the disaffected, its planning, actions and representation. To do so requires hard power, to minimise the actions of terrorists, and soft power to minimise intent and recruitment.
The military play an important role in countering terrorism and British forces are working to that end as I speak, both at home and across the globe. Through capacity building we help other nations bolster their defences and contribute to the international effort.
Dr. Fox: No debate about international terrorism would be complete without considering the question of Iran. Would it ever be an acceptable outcome for the British Government for Iran to become a nuclear weapons state?
Des Browne: The British Government could not make clearer their position in relation to Iran’s ambition to be a nuclear weapons state. As I have said from the Dispatch Box time and time again, my view is that Iran’s behaviour—its interference in a malign fashion in Palestine, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Iraq—suggests that the country poses a strategic threat to the peace of the region in which it wants to play an important role. The irony is that Iran could play a positive role in the region; the country has shared interests with the countries in whose internal politics it seeks to interfere. I am in no doubt that the international community has adopted the right position in relation to Iran, and also that we have to stay together and pursue the arguments with the Iranians. Most importantly, we have to recruit in support of the arguments as many of the regional partners as possible, because they are the people to whom Iran will pay the greatest attention.
I am conscious of the time, and of the fact that a significant number of people want to contribute to the debate, so I shall now sum up. It is the first duty of Government to protect their people and the national interest. The Government have a clear policy framework for delivering that duty. I have endeavoured in my speech to cover some of that broad front, but of necessity I have had to make discriminating judgments and have not been comprehensive. By working with friends, allies and international institutions to reduce threat and prevent conflict, and by ensuring that our forces have the capability to intervene around the world if necessary, we will achieve our objectives.
Lembit Öpik (Montgomeryshire) (LD):
The Secretary of State has given a comprehensive analysis
of the state of play in terms of defence. He is aware of my interest in the deaths at Deepcut army barracks. A memorial was recently dedicated to those who have died in the military, whether on active service or otherwise. It has been brought to my attention that the names of the four recruits who died at Deepcut have not been recorded on the memorial. The Secretary of State may not be able to answer the question now, but he will understand that the parents are eager to know the reasoning behind the exclusion of the names from that memorial.
Des Browne: I speak advisedly, but if the hon. Gentleman had been in the Chamber for the beginning of my speech, he would have heard me refer to that memorial, which was dedicated last Friday. I am sure he will join other Members who approved of my words when I said that it was a timely and appropriate memorial to those who have paid the ultimate sacrifice. I am aware of the issue that he raises but, entirely appropriately, decisions about the memorial do not lie in the hands of Government and it would be wholly inappropriate if they did—they lie in the hands of trustees. It is of the essence of such a memorial that somebody has to define the descriptive phase for those whose names are entitled to be put on the memorial. The trustees sought to do that—it is a difficult thing—and, almost by definition, it is the case that people will consider that some names are so near the margin of the definition that they would be offended if the names were not included. The trustees of the memorial recognised that.
I hope that the hon. Gentleman will visit the memorial, because if he does, he will see that it contains not only the names of approximately 16,000 people who have lost their lives, either on duty or to acts of terrorism, but an obelisk, which has been put there for the purpose of commemorating the deaths of those who do not fall within that necessary definition. If that is any comfort to the families whom he properly represents, that is the explanation, as I understand it. The decisions were made entirely in good faith and appropriately, but by definition, people will feel aggrieved because someone whom they consider to be very close to the description of those who are included cannot be included. That is probably an appropriate issue on which to end this speech.
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