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Session 2006 - 07 Publications on the internet General Committee Debates Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill |
Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill |
The Committee consisted of the following Members:Alan
Sandall, Committee
Clerk
†
attended the Committee
Public Bill CommitteeThursday 25 October 2007(Morning)[Sir Nicholas Winterton in the Chair]Criminal Justice and Immigration BillFurther written evidence to be reported to the HouseCJ&I 376 The right
hon. David Hanson, MP
CJ&I
377 Dr. M.J. and Mrs. H.S.
Gould
CJ&I 378 Gender
Identity Research and Education
Society
CJ&I 380 David
Skinner
9
am
The
Chairman:
I welcome those Members who are here to the
seventh sitting of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Public Bill
Committee. We have made some progress. I call, yet again, the hon.
Member for Somerset—no, Somerton and Frome to move the
amendment.
Schedule 1Further
provisions about youth rehabilitation
orders
Mr.
David Heath (Somerton and Frome) (LD): I beg to move
amendment No. 121, in schedule 1, page 105, line 27, leave out
paragraph
35.
The
Chairman:
With this it will be
convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 134, in schedule 2,
page 106, line 40, leave out paragraphs 3 and
4.
No. 122, in
schedule 2, page 108, line 5, leave
out from beginning to ‘before’ in line
8.
No. 123, in
schedule 2, page 108, leave out lines 18 to
27 and insert—
‘(4A) Where
the offender does not appear in answer to a summons issued under this
paragraph, the appropriate court may issue a warrant for his or her
arrest.’.
No.
130, in
schedule 2, page 108, line 29, at
end insert—
‘(za) a youth
rehabilitation order is still in force,
and’.
No.
131, in
schedule 2, page 108, line 36, leave
out from ‘ways’ to end of line
37.
No. 124, in
schedule 2, page 109, leave out lines 1 to
4 and insert—
‘(ba) if the
youth rehabilitation order was made by a magistrates’ court, by
dealing with the offender, for the offence in respect of which the
order was made, in any way in which the court could have dealt with the
offender for that offence (had the offender been before the court to be
dealt with for it); or
(bb) if
the youth rehabilitation order was made in the Crown Court, by
committing the young offender in custody or releasing him on bail until
he can be brought before, or appear before, the Crown
Court.’.
No. 125, in
schedule 2, page 109, line 4, at
end
insert—
‘(2A)
Where the court deals with the offender under the previous
sub-paragraph, it must send to the Crown
Court—
(a) a certificate
signed by a justice of the peace certifying that the offender has
failed to comply with the youth rehabilitation order in the respect
certified in the certificate;
and
(b) such other particulars
as may be desirable.
(2B) Such
a certificate purporting to be so signed is admissable as evidence of
the failure before the Crown
Court.’.
No.
128, in
schedule 2, page 109, line 44, leave
out sub-paragraphs (12) to
(15).
No. 126, in
schedule 2, page 110, line 27, leave
out paragraph 7.
No.
132, in
schedule 2, page 111, line 2, at
end insert—
‘(za) a youth
rehabilitation order is still in force,
and’.
No.
127, in schedule 2, page 111, leave out
line 4 and insert ‘paragraph 6,
and’.
No. 133,
in
schedule 2, page 111, line 9, leave
out from ‘ways’ to end of line
10.
No. 129, in
schedule 2, page 112, line 10, leave
out sub-paragraphs (11) to
(14).
Mr.
Heath:
Good morning, Sir Nicholas. It is rare that any
Member of the House gets both parts of my constituency’s name
right. I regret that despite your correct strictures—your
strictures are always absolutely correct—the Government are
still in the dark. It is a great shame, but no doubt the lights will
eventually be repaired.
This is a
substantial group of amendments. Although they all cover the same broad
area—breach of youth rehabilitation orders—they can be
grouped into four subsidiary topics. I shall deal first with amendments
Nos. 121 to 127, which deal with the venue for hearing breaches of
rehabilitation orders. Such orders will be made in the magistrates
court, but on breach the case is to be returned to the Crown court.
Now, if the young person is aged under 18 the case will be returned to
a youth court; and for an adult over the age of 18 it will be returned
to the magistrates court. However, there is a lack of discretion in the
Bill’s provisions, which requires that a breach be returned
automatically to the Crown court. For a number of reasons, there are
question marks against that procedure.
A breach may take many forms.
It may be a deliberate breach, with the young person simply not being
prepared to accept the terms of the order; but it might be what I would
consider an inadvertent or an incompetent breach, at a much lower level
of culpability. The advice that I have received—again, I pay
tribute to the Standing Committee for Youth Justice for its
help—is that a young person on a standard six-month supervision
order might have kept 90 per cent. of his or her appointments but still
be in breach because of a third unacceptable failure to attend an
appointment. There may have been no intent not to comply with the
order, but a third failure to make an appointment during that period
would result in the young person coming before a Crown
court.
There
are a number of problems with that. First, in administrative and
resource terms, it does not entirely make sense for what one might
consider to be relatively trivial breaches to be heard by a Crown
court, with all the expense that that entails. Crown courts are
significantly
more expensive venues for hearing such cases than the youth court would
be. Secondly, a Crown court is essentially an adult court, and it could
be argued that a young person in such circumstances should not be put
before a Crown court unless there was a clear need to do
so.
Alun
Michael (Cardiff, South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op): I am
following the hon. Gentleman’s argument with some interest, but
the word that he seeks to remove is “may” not
“shall”.
Mr.
Heath:
The concern is that there is no provision for the
breach to be heard before a youth
court.
If
the Minister wishes to correct me, I am happy to take his assurances. I
would be delighted, as it would mean that the concerns raised by the
Standing Committee for Youth Justice would not have a bearing on the
Bill.
The
Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Mr. David
Hanson):
I hope that I can reassure the hon. Gentleman and
save him those concerns. If the Crown court makes the youth
rehabilitation order, paragraph 35 of schedule 1 gives it the power to
refer further proceedings to the youth court. If the youth court itself
makes the order, it will deal with the
breach.
Alun
Michael:
My point is fairly basic, in terms of the way
that the courts deal with things. Often, one of the great problems when
dealing with a breach is that all the events surrounding the original
decision may not be appreciated. It seems sensible to allow a direction
that a breach should come back in front of the more senior court,
because that indicates what the court in taking the original decision
would regard as the seriousness of a breach. Often such things become
lost in the legal system, and surely all that the wording in paragraph
35 means is that the court may take that sort of decision in light of
all the circumstances that are before it in making the original
order.
Mr.
Heath:
I do not disagree with the right
hon. Gentleman. The most important thing is that the breach is heard in
context, which enables a proportionate response to be made. If the
Minister assures me that that will be the case, I am happy to move on
to other
amendments.
Mr.
Hanson:
The hon. Gentleman will see that the point he
mentioned is covered on page 105, paragraph 35(1). I hope that he will
reflect on that as he
continues.
Mr.
Heath:
I shall certainly do so, and during the
Minister’s response I will consider whether I wish to proceed
with the amendments in light of what he has
said.
Mr.
Edward Garnier (Harborough) (Con): In part following on
from what the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth said,
when I have dealt with community sentences that have come before the
Crown court for breach, it is frustrating that often one has been
required to remit the case back to the magistrates
court, which creates a delay in the justice system. I should like to see
a degree of flexibility that would allow the court that is seized of
the matter to deal with it, rather than having to wait for further
proceedings in another
court.
The longer such
community sentences go on, and, particularly in youth cases, the longer
that there is a distance between the offence, the breach and the
disposal of the case, the more difficult they become to deal with. I do
not want to anticipate what my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield,
Southgate has to say, but I would welcome an efficient and reasonably
speedy way of dealing with that type of
problem.
Mr.
Heath:
The hon. and learned Gentleman is absolutely right.
My intention in agreeing to table the amendments was to find the most
expedient way of getting these matters before a court, at the right
level, without undue delay or expense, and without escalating a matter
that can be dealt with at a lower level. He is right that one of the
silliest things would be to put it up to a higher level in order for it
to be referred back down again. That would be a waste of resources
within the judicial system and one that I hope we will all try to
avoid, if
possible.
Alun
Michael:
The hon. and learned Member for Harborough has
rightly said that the timeliness is extremely important. Two things are
important in disposals: timeliness and appropriateness. Balancing those
two is quite difficult, but the clause does it. That is something that
we should bear in mind when considering amendments and clauses as we go
through the
Bill.
Mr.
Heath:
Happily, we are all in agreement. It is simply a
matter of ensuring that we are all satisfied that the clause does what
we have agreed. I do not think that there is any difference in terms of
what we are trying to
do.
Amendment
No. 134 was tabled by myself and my hon. Friend the Member for
Cambridge and has received the support of the Conservative Front
Benchers. Again, this matter was raised by the Standing Committee for
Youth Justice. It deals with the statutory arrangements for dealing
with breaches of
compliance.
The
Bill describes the circumstances under which the responsible officer
must issue warnings and initiate breach proceedings. It becomes a
statutory duty to deal with a breach and there is no discretion on the
part of the practitioner or manager at local level. That flies in the
face of good practice. Quite a body of good practice has been built up
over the years, which suggests that a degree of discretion and
flexibility in dealing with young people is often advantageous. That is
not to say that there should be a soft touch or that breaches should be
ignored. Breaches are very important and it is essential that they are
dealt with effectively. However, the effective way of dealing with a
breach might be not to escalate it to the point of a formal
breach.
Alun
Michael:
I am drawing on experience in two fields. One is
in terms of sentencing during my time as a juvenile magistrate and the
other is from working with young offenders.
Surely the hon. Gentleman is
arguing that a breach should be ignored. The schedule
states:
“If
the responsible officer is of the opinion that the offender has failed
without reasonable excuse to comply with a youth rehabilitation
order”.
Therefore, there
is an opportunity for a discussion to look at any excuses and to see if
there is a reason that obstructed compliance with the order. Surely the
hon. Gentleman is wrong in saying that the effect of this amendment is
not to excuse breaches. If you remove that paragraph, it would ignore
them. I think that he has missed the point of this
proposal.
Mr.
Heath:
With the greatest respect, I do not think that I
have. For instance, if a national bus strike that a young person is
unaware of prevents him from keeping an appointment, that would come
into the category of reasonable excuses. However, there should also be
a level of discretion on the part of someone who is managing a case in
assessing the overall willingness of a young person to make strenuous
efforts to comply with an order. I think that a margin of discretion is
of value. Even if there is no reasonable excuse, a breach could be
talked through with the young person in order to discover the reasons
and take appropriate action. In terms of good practice, I do not
entirely agree with what the right hon. Gentleman is
saying.
Alun
Michael:
Where does the schedule fetter the discretion of
the supervising officer in deciding what amounts to a reasonable
excuse? It might be family circumstances; it might be the development
that the young person has made; it might be that he has attended a
variety of things and that the breach is one little example of failure.
As I read it, the schedule does not fetter the discretion of the
supervising officer to act responsibly, but it does place a requirement
on him to make a judgment. That is surely
right.
9.15
am
Mr.
Heath:
I am sorry, but I simply disagree with the right
hon. Gentleman. I think that it does fetter the discretion of the
manager of the
case.
Mr.
Heath:
It does not just cause him to
think. It causes him to make an assessment, in the same terms that the
court would, of whether an excuse was reasonable or not. If it is not a
reasonable excuse, he or she is required to take the appropriate action
by statute. There may be circumstances in the good management of
individual cases in which an excuse for a particular breach is not
reasonable, nevertheless it is not appropriate to move to breach
proceedings. That is the discretion that should be built into good
practice, and certainly into management guidelines, but not constrained
by statute. That is a perfectly proper disagreement between us. No
matter how many times the right hon. Gentleman repeats his point, he
will not change my view, but I am happy to let him try
again.
Alun
Michael:
I am not going to repeat myself. I want to
invite the hon. Gentleman to give us an
example.
Mr.
Heath:
One of the key parts of managing people with
chaotic lifestyles is to establish a good working relationship with
them to help them manage the way they conduct themselves in their
everyday life. For example, a person who has strenuously attempted to
comply with all the terms of the order may, one day, oversleep. That is
not a reasonable excuse for not turning up to an appointment. No court
is going to say, “So, Mr. X, Master X, young X, you
overslept, did you, and you expect this court to take that as a
reasonable excuse for you not meeting your appointment?” Of
course it will not. However, a reasonable manager might say, “It
is not acceptable. Get yourself an alarm clock and sort yourself
out.” They will not consider it to be a breach of the
order.
Mr.
Heath:
The right hon. Gentleman says from a
sedentary position that it is a warning. He would move directly to the
hierarchy of breach measures that are set out in the Bill. Under the
circumstances that I have outlined, I would not. I would hope to be
establishing a better relationship with the young person, and would not
be entirely bound by the letter of the order but rather by the outcome
of improving the person’s lifestyle and a hope that the
supervision will have the desired effect. We must simply disagree. The
right hon. Gentleman would be a harder taskmaster than I would be under
those circumstances. There are practitioners around the country who are
quite capable of using discretion. That does not make them a soft
touch, but an effective manager of the young person. That is what
amendment No. 134 seeks to
do.
Amendments
Nos. 130 to 133 originate from the Standing Committee for Youth Justice
and are amendments to which Conservative Members have added their
names. Again, they allow a discretion to the court. That discretion,
which covers a breach of community orders in the first place, already
exists, but is removed by the current provisions. If a court is
convinced that it is in the interest of maintaining a young
person’s progress towards the path of not reoffending,
discretion effectively allows it to take no action other than issuing a
warning, or perhaps guidance to the young person in the context of a
breach.
The right
hon. Gentleman may have decided that he has intervened enough on me,
but I anticipate that he would say that he would not do that and that
he would always take
action—
Alun
Michael:
The hon. Gentleman wishes to
provoke me. My wish is not to be unreasonable, but to set clear
boundaries so that young offenders know exactly where those boundaries
are. The distinction, I suggest to the hon. Gentleman, is between the
reasonable and the woolly.
The
Chairman:
Order. I wonder whether the
right hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth is referring to the
image of the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome and describing him as
woolly.
Alun
Michael:
On a point of order, Sir
Nicholas—one provoked by the Chair. The hon. Gentleman’s
appearance is attractively woolly, but some of his thinking is
unfortunately
woolly.
The
Chairman:
I had hoped that my
intervention, which was quite wrong, would not generate any response.
Mr. David Heath, please continue with your
speech.
Mr.
Heath:
I am most grateful, Sir Nicholas,
but being barracked from the Chair really
is—[
Interruption.
] As has been pointed out,
my constituency has now at least been referred to correctly, so let us
look on the bright side—and this, literally, is the bright
side.
Let me,
however, return to the very important amendments before the Committee,
which simply allow the court the discretion to take no action, and the
right hon. Gentleman agrees with that in this instance. Instead, the
court can set appropriate boundaries by means of warnings, if that is
the appropriate disposal in the particular circumstances described in
submissions to the court.
Amendments
Nos. 128 and 129 deal with the question of proportionality on breach.
We have discussed whether an intensive supervision and surveillance
requirement is appropriate in cases where the original offence would
not imply a custodial sentence. The curious thing about the schedule is
that a court can impose an intensive supervision and surveillance
requirement on breach of an order and, if that requirement is breached,
impose a custodial sentence, even if the original offence would not
usually receive a custodial sentence.
There is therefore a question
of proportionality at one remove. Is the breach of the order sufficient
to elevate the original offence to the level of requiring a custodial
sentence? There is at least a question mark as to whether that is
appropriate. I understand why the Minister would want a strong sanction
against those who breach an order, but considered in the round, it
would seem disproportionate for a young person who has committed a
relatively minor offence—one that would not usually attract a
custodial sentence—to find themselves in prison simply because
the process of order and then breach brought them back before the
courts. I therefore ask the Minister to consider whether that is his
intention.
“wilfully and persistently failed
to comply”,
which I
understand to mean that the behaviour is wilful and persistent. The
custody element is there at the end of the process to deal with
somebody who wilfully and persistently refuses to comply with the
order. Does the hon. Gentleman believe that the courts should simply
ignore such behaviour, or should the custody be there to prevent such a
wilful and consistent failure to
comply?
Mr.
Heath:
I entirely understand the Minister of
State’s point, but the question is about whether custody is the
right sanction for a wilful breach of an order in
respect of a non-custodial offence. That is something that the Committee
should explore. The Minister believes it to be right, and in the case
of an adult I have no doubt that it is correct as we have parallel
provisions within the adult criminal system. However, I question
whether this is the right disposal when compared with other similar
measures.
There are
clear disposals within the rehabilitation order that do not put someone
in a young offender’s institution or a prison, but which still
take them out of their environment. We have, for example, the intensive
fostering requirement, which the Minister of State has argued very
strongly in favour of. Perhaps we should consider whether those are
better provisions than effectively admitting defeat and saying that the
young person should end up in prison.
It is an arguable case, and I
would be interested to hear what other members of the Committee feel on
the matter and in particular how the Minister justifies it. I expect
that he will do so on the grounds that he has just used, and claim that
there is no other sanction available and that this is the end of the
road.
Mr.
Hanson:
It is also there on the grounds of deterrence. The
custody option is there to prevent wilful and persistent breaches of
the order.
Mr.
Heath:
That is interesting because if
there is one thing that all the evidence clearly shows, it is that
short-term imprisonment of young people has no deterrent effect. One
only has to look at the rates of recidivism for prisoners released from
short-sentences—I stress short—to know that it is an
ineffective deterrent. Saying that that acts as a deterrent is an
arguable point—there is abundant evidence to suggest that it
does not. However, that is an argument for another
day.
Mr.
David Burrowes (Enfield, Southgate) (Con): Welcome back to
the Chair, Sir Nicholas. Hopefully my opening remarks will not be too
challenging.
I want to
look at the question of discretion, which is the broad theme of the
amendments. In previous discussions we have looked at interesting
reading material that we may wish to consider further over prorogation.
Perhaps I could make one recommendation to the Minister for some
bed-time reading. It comes from the Prison Reform Trust
“Mitigation: The role of personal factors in sentencing”
and uses research from Jessica Jacobson and Michael Hough.
I would like to draw the
Minister’s attention to page 56 which deals with the
sentencers’ responses to policy developments and is relevant to
our discussions. The report highlights the need to consider the
sentencers, who are at the forefront of the legislation that will be
enacted and who will then have to implement it. They are concerned not
only about being properly consulted, but also about possible
interference in their sentencing. To put the concerns of the judges in
context, they feel that the measures may deny the sentencer the
capacity to deliver genuine justice. One said that,
“the more judges’ hands are
tied, the less justice there
is”.
Two
judges used almost identical turns of phrase to stress the need for, in
their words, “humanity” in sentencing. One commented that
judges are encouraged to sentence
by following a “kind of mathematical model” in the search
for consistency. However, if sentencing takes this approach, in their
words,
“you take out of
the process any kind of
humanity”.
The other
judge complained that sentencing policy encourages sentencers to act as
“robots” and that
it
“should be more to do
with educating the bench than tying our hands too
much”.
Finally, one
judge said:
“If
you take away discretion completely, then you end up taking the
humanity out of
sentencing.”
One of the
more vociferous critics
said:
“We all
resent the ever, ever-encroaching bounds on our discretion in
sentencing”.
Well,
Sir Nicholas, I would not want to use any intemperate language, but an
expletive is then
mentioned:
“We
are the people looking
so”—
expletive—
“silly
in court, when we can’t sentence properly because some civil
servant has second-guessed
us.”
9.30
am
The report
makes interesting reading, and it goes on and on. There is an important
theme of discretion, which the amendments touch on in different ways.
Amendments Nos. 121 to 125, which are tabled in the name of the hon.
Member for Somerton and Frome, are well motivated. We all recognise the
need to ensure that Crown court appearances for young people are
limited because they are not always appropriate. When dealing with
minor breaches of order, one would not want to provide more
opportunities for youths to come before a Crown court and one wants to
reduce costs in relation to Crown court appearances.
I commend the arguments made by
the Standing Committee for Youth Justice and the organisations that are
part of the Standing Committee. Its concern, in one sense, relates to
discretion. It is concerned that the Bill would make it automatic for a
youth who breached an order imposed by the Crown court to be returned
there, unless the Crown court judge stipulated that the breach could be
dealt with by the youth court. The concern of the hon. Member for
Somerton and Frome is that matters of minor breaches should be dealt
with in the first instance by the youth court, and it is suggested that
90 per cent. of breaches fall within that
category.
Alun
Michael:
The hon. Gentleman seems to be making the same
mistake as the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome, unless I am
mistaken, which is to think that the clause says “shall”
when it says “may”.
Mr.
Burrowes:
The right hon. Gentleman
intervenes too early—I am still setting out the context of the
amendment. The theme is discretion, and had he waited, I was to come on
to the fact that the Bill does provide for a discretion that does not
currently exist. It allows the Crown court judge to direct that such an
order be dealt with by the youth court, which I commend. That is why
the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome would
not necessarily bring an improvement in the area of
discretion.
Alun
Michael:
I may have misunderstood this, but I thought that
the default setting was for a youth to be dealt with by the youth
court, although the judge may direct that a case go to the Crown
court.
Mr.
Burrowes:
The right hon. Gentleman’s helpful
intervention allows me to move on to some of the problems with the Bill
that the amendment would not deal with. The discretion lies with the
Crown court judge, but at the early stage, so he must make a call
before any breach has occurred. The judge must decide, based on the
nature of the case and the offender, whether he will put within the
order a discretion for the youth court to deal with the breach. The
concern is whether that discretion should be more devolved and whether
it should be dealt with wholly by the decision of the Crown court
judge. I would not go along with the amendment because the Crown court
judge is dealing with a case that is, naturally, a serious one. For
such a case to have come before a Crown court, the offence would be
likely to carry a sentence of more than two years’ detention.
Naturally, any such case is serious and would only exceptionally be
dealt with using a youth rehabilitation order, so we are talking about
the exceptional cases that can be dealt with in the community rather
than about someone who has been convicted of a serious offence and
dealt with by imprisonment. We are concerned that in such cases, the
sentencer should have full control of the order and be involved in its
enforcement. We therefore welcome paragraph 35, which gives the Crown
court discretion and allows it to be involved in the order’s
enforcement. Indeed, it could be taken further.
I opened the innings for the
Conservatives in the Committee on the draft Community Order (Review by
Specified Courts) Order 2007, which enabled courts in a pilot scheme to
review orders and be much more involved in their review before they are
breached. That proactive involvement was to ensure that the orders were
properly complied with before that person went down the road of
breaching the order and there being a subsequent sentencing. During
discussions on the order, the hon. Member for Cambridge and I were
informed that the evaluation of the pilot scheme was due to be
published by October, but I have not seen it. The Minister of State
gave a clear indication on that, given that we had previously been told
that the evaluation would be published by May. We are now coming to the
end of October, and he has every opportunity to publish it, so that we
can consider it.
The
essence of the 2007 order was to allow reviews to take place. When the
evaluation is eventually published, after much anticipation, the pilot
projects that are making progress in evaluating the orders might well
be rolled out not only to local magistrates courts in Haringey and
Enfield, but to Crown courts. That is anticipated within the order.
However, the very principle behind that proactive involvement is that
the sentencer sees the person who received the sentence, who comes back
before the court, to check how well they are complying with the
sentence and to ensure that compliance continues. The principle within
the Bill allows that, but we must allow full discretion.
When it comes
to how the Crown courts deal with drug treatment and testing order
reviews, it has been said, and I have certainly seen this with clients,
how
much people have been affected by having to go back before the judge who
sentenced them to explain whether they are making progress. That has a
significant impact on preventing them from breaching the order and on
ensuring that they take it seriously. That should be the case when a
Crown court makes a youth rehabilitation order, which would no doubt
involve a serious offence.
We are concerned that there
should be flexibility and discretion. When a youth breaches an order
and is in custody at Edmonton police station, for example, the custody
officer often does not know what to do. He calls around trying to find
out whether the youth should go to the youth court or the Crown court,
but no one is able to give an answer. People look through the different
orders and statutes that have been introduced over the years and try to
work it all out within the confines of the custody suite. That is often
a dilemma for custody officers, and they often make the wrong call. The
youth then goes to the wrong cells, has to be transferred and ends up
being ping-ponged between Wood Green Crown court and Enfield
magistrates court.
Although the amendment does not
deal with the proposal, I invite the Minister to consider whether
probation officers assigned to young offenders should be able to
recommend where breaches are dealt with—in the youth court or
the Crown court—provided that a direction has not already been
made on venue. That might be particularly appropriate when one is
dealing with minor breaches which, as we have heard, might constitute
the majority of infractions. There could be an administrative process
for reaching a realistic view on whether to deal with a breach in the
youth court, although there would obviously need to be liaison with the
sentencing
judge.
Mr.
Heath:
The hon. Gentleman makes a
persuasive case—even in relation to my own amendments. He is
making the same point as me on flexibility but with the further
suggestion of a reserve mechanism. It would exactly meet my
requirements, as well as those that the Minister has outlined, if there
could be an executive decision to put the matter before a youth court,
with a report to the Crown court such that the Crown court would always
have a calling power to intervene if it so
wished.
Mr.
Burrowes:
I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s
comments. When considering proposals such as these, it is always
important to consider what is happening on the ground. There should be
a proper consultation with the people who actually deal with things so
that there is appropriate flexibility and discretion. That way, there
will be an expeditious process for dealing with cases in the right
setting, as we all wish, which nevertheless ensures that justice is
done and that there is neither any continued breach nor any
reoffending.
The next
set of amendments likewise deal with discretion, although in the
context of the probation service. Resources are important to that. We
should take account of the comments made in the annual report by Her
Majesty’s chief inspector of probation, who referred to concerns
about overload in the probation service, and to the number of cases per
offended manager with which it has to deal. In the words of the chief
inspector, Mr. Bridges, that can
range from some 25 to 70, with the higher caseloads often being
exacerbated by freezing of posts. He has said
that
“it is clear to us
that when the costs of new work, new requirements and new
infrastructure have been taken into account, resources have in practice
still not kept pace with the increasing
demands”.
The
new raft of generic orders might draw on the existing orders, but
further requirements are made in the Bill, and it is important to heed
Mr. Bridges’ words on behalf of the probation
service. He has also said that the new demands
include
“new Orders or
requirements for drug treatment and testing, for accredited programmes
and for managing prolific offenders, extended periods of post-release
supervision, increased public protection expectations, enhanced
standards of quality for unpaid work and other supervision
requirements.”
The
probation service is concerned that, despite the increases in resources
in recent years, resources might not match
demand.
The crucial
point is that resources might be directed to the warning and breach
processes, rather than primarily on ensuring that young people under
the supervision of probation officers are not committing further
offences and that the requirements of orders are fulfilled, which is
what people want. The particular complaint is that there is too little
discretion in relation to breaches, so will the Minister reflect on
whether the Bill provides sufficient
discretion?
Paragraph
3(1) of schedule 2 states
that
“the responsible
officer must give the offender a
warning”.
They may well
give a warning currently, but that is subject to national standards; it
is not on a statutory basis. That is the difference: it will be on a
statutory basis, under schedule 2, that the warning must be given. That
warning would then be a record of non-compliance, and that would go
down the route towards breach of proceedings. The fact that it is
placed on a statutory basis is
key.
The concern is
that the measure may tie at least one hand behind the back of a
probation officer. The concern is whether the removal of discretion
flies in the face in many ways of the proposals to give the probation
service quasi-judicial powers in relation to dealing with breaches. On
one hand, there is a concern to ensure that, in appropriate cases,
breaches can be dealt with away from court and that there is sufficient
flexibility, but on the other hand, the proposals in schedule 2 are
designed to take away what may well take place under national
standards, and put it on a formal, statutory setting. The concern is
that when probation officers want to deal with matters flexibly, they
may well be precluded from doing
so.
9.45
am
One example, to
which the Standing Committee referred, is the programme piloted by the
Youth Justice Board, which no doubt the Minister supports. It involves
a scaled approach that is to be rolled out nationally alongside the
youth rehabilitation order. We referred in earlier debates to minor
breaches when someone fails to attend an appointment because their
alarm clock does not go off at the appropriate time. Probation officers
can take part in a buy-back scheme under which young people who are
deemed to have failed to attend appointments without a reasonable
excuse are given the opportunity to avoid breach action by subsequent
compliance. Their later attendance can cancel out earlier failures
after designated
periods.
That flexible
approach is about implementing national standards and it is an
effective mechanism. It provides positive motivation for young
offenders to ensure that they set the alarm clock and cancel out a
minor breach, rather than go through the formal process that would be
undertaken under the Bill whereby they must have a warning, and then we
are talking about non-compliance and
breaches.
With the
amendments, we are calling for the discretion that is in the system and
needs to be developed through such innovative pilot programmes not to
be in any way restricted by what is required on a statutory basis. I
invite the Minister to provide evidence for why we have to move to a
formal, statutory basis involving mandatory
warnings.
The next
sub-group of amendments, including amendments Nos. 130, 131 and 133,
also relates to the concern that the courts should be able to deal
properly with the issue of discretion. The concern is that the Bill
will preclude an approach that enables courts, when an offender is
before them in relation to a more minor breach, to deal with the case
in a reasonable way, to have flexibility, to be allowed, as the Prison
Reform Trust document says, to have humanity rather than just acting as
a robot, which will be the case if they are told by statute that when
an offender comes before them because of a breach, they need to up the
scale of the order, impose further requirements, impose a
fine.
Sentencers want
the freedom to be able to look at the offender before them to take
account of the circumstances not only of the breach but of the young
person, to enable them, in some circumstances, to take no further
action but to ensure, with assurances on the circumstances of the
offender, that they will be able to continue with their order with no
further penalty. That may be the case for only certain offenders.
Others may well need to be given the stick rather than the carrot, but
the call from sentencers and others is for the stick and carrot to be
in the hands of the sentencer, rather than to be taken away from them
and to be only in the hands of the statute. Flexibility should be
provided to enable the courts to deal with matters in an appropriate
form.
Amendments
Nos. 128 and 129 deal with the ISSP. We are all concerned about the
number of young offenders and adults in our prisons; the estimate is
that 20,000 across the board in the prison estate are in prisons due to
sentencing behaviour, which is something that everyone wants to change.
The amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome are
designed to ensure that in the hierarchy of sentencing we do not
unnecessarily put young people into custody for breaches of the
ISSP.
The
Minister has constantly used the phrase “wilful and persistent
non-compliance” with the order. The reality is that it may well
be the case for any sentencer that if someone wilfully and persistently
does not comply with an order they have come to the stage where the
court has to show that orders need to be complied with and on that
basis a custody sentence is the only option available. Obviously, that
is in extreme cases and it is important, in response, to emphasise that
any order involving intensive surveillance and supervision is made only
when an offender is on the cusp of custody.
In present pilot programmes of
ISSPs it is available for those cases in which the offender has been
through all the levels of community orders and failed to comply and,
sadly, the only option left is for a more intensive programme which, if
the offender breaches it, may lead to that offender being over the cusp
of custody and receiving a period of detention. Although I am with the
hon. Member for Somerton and Frome in respect of the motivation of the
amendment, I would not support him in regard to its
reality.
Finally, I
want to reflect on concerns that sentencers generally are increasingly
being second-guessed by statute and the need for both them and
professionals and probation officers to have the full discretion to
achieve the objective that we all seek: that young offenders should be
kept out of courts and prisons.
Mr.
Hanson:
We have had a useful debate and
I am grateful to the hon. Members for Somerton and Frome and for
Enfield, Southgate for tabling the amendments and speaking to them. I
fear that there will be disagreement on some of the issues but I am
grateful for the support of the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate in
voicing concerns that I will articulate about some of the amendments
tabled by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome. I hope that at the
end of the debate we will have a clearer picture of where we
are.
I
will first speak to amendment No. 21, which would prevent a Crown court
that makes use of a rehabilitation order from directing that any
subsequent breach action be dealt with by a youth or magistrates court.
I listened to the hon. Gentleman, but I do not agree that the amendment
is either desirable or necessary. The hon. Member for Enfield,
Southgate will support me in that assertion, if I interpret him
correctly. When the Crown court has decided that a youth rehabilitation
order is an appropriate sentence, it is wholly appropriate and
reasonable for the court to have the power to refer any further
proceedings relating to that order to the youth court, because the
youth court or magistrates court can, in itself, then deal with those
further proceedings accordingly. They have sufficient powers to deal
with the breach of the youth rehabilitation order and, of course, the
youth court has some modicum of specialist knowledge in dealing with
young people. It is a clear preference for me and, I hope for the
Committee, that in the circumstances the Crown court should have the
power to direct that the youth court should deal with those proceedings
that may result in a breach, which also means that there are no burdens
on the Crown court in dealing, potentially, with minor
breaches.
Mr.
Heath:
The Minister is making my argument rather than his
own. We are not saying that it should not go to the youth court or
magistrates court, but that it should always go to the youth court or
magistrates court in the first instance before being referred up to the
Crown court, rather than going to the Crown court and being referred
down.
Mr.
Hanson:
The amendment would prevent a Crown court that has
made a YRO directing that any subsequent breach action be dealt with by
the youth court or magistrates court.
Mr.
Hanson:
That is a fairly significant bit of the amendment,
as my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth has
indicated. My main objection is that that would place an unnecessary
burden on the Crown court and limit the flexibility of the higher court
to refer cases back to the magistrates court for appropriate action in
those circumstances. I thank the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate for
his support for the view that we have taken on that
issue.
Amendment No.
134 has also given us an interesting debate. My right hon. Friend the
Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth was particularly sparky this
morning when challenging the assertions of the hon. Member for Somerton
and Frome on those matters, and I am grateful for that support because
it exposed some of the arguments that I am sure we will touch on in the
debate.
The amendment
would remove the provisions in the Bill that set out the breach
proceedings to be followed by the responsible officer. Those provisions
set a limit of two format warnings that may be issued to a young
offender in a twelve month period, following which, on a third breach
during that period, proceedings must be instituted. That is a
reasonable approach to ensure that young people are formally encouraged
through a series of warnings before a third breach in that period, to
comply with the order. The provisions reflect the Youth Justice
Board’s national standards for breaches and have been put in the
Bill specifically to ensure that there is clear evidence that breaches
will be pursued rigorously and consistently, with national standards
applied on a national basis. The breach procedure will codify the Youth
Justice Board’s national standard, which will continue to
provide more detailed guidance on managing breaches effectively while
retaining the discretion that my right hon. Friend the Member for
Cardiff, South and Penarth wishes there to
be.
Alun
Michael:
I endorse what my right hon. Friend is saying.
The problem with those sort of tariff ideas is that, although they are
meant to guarantee a degree of proportionality, too often they bring
about drift. Drift is not clarity, and a lack of clarity is bad for
encouraging young offenders out of a pattern of criminal
activity.
Mr.
Hanson:
I thank my right hon. Friend for
his intervention and agree with him. I hope that the whole Committee
agrees that, if we are to have community sentences that are intended to
keep young people out of custody, it is essential that they are
meaningful, respected in the community, have some powers for dealing
with breaches in a positive way and are codified in a national standard
under the guidance of the Youth Justice
Board.
We
should be determined to ensure that YROs, and indeed all community
penalties, are rigorously enforced. I am determined to see them widely
used by the courts, accepted by the public and considered robust
alternatives to custody. If we do not have those powers to warn or a
strong codification of compliance with the orders within the 12-month
period, we will undermine that order and, ultimately, the public will
regard it as meaningless. The public need to respect the orders, regard
them as a penalty and see that they will be enforced. The community at
large will want to have some reparation made for the crimes committed
against
it.
10
am
Harry
Cohen (Leyton and Wanstead) (Lab): I agree with my right
hon. Friend that there must be a punishment for a breach of the order,
but during the earlier discussion, it struck me that you could have an
original youth rehabilitation order with an education requirement as
one of its subdivisions; and if the order were breached because, after
all the warnings, the youngster would not attend the sessions, he would
be taken into custody and he still might not receive any education,
owing to the state not providing it when they were in custody. That
would be a nonsense, so will my right hon. Friend insist that the state
apply the education aspect of the order to the young
offender?
Mr.
Hanson:
There is a mutual responsibility, both to
make provision to meet the obligations of the order, and for the
individual to undertake and meet those obligations. That is the key
aspect. I draw colleagues’ attention to the use of
“reasonable” in the legislation before us, because I
recognise that, occasionally, young people will find it a challenge to
meet some of the basic compliance requirements of the community order,
such as being in a certain place at a certain time. If attendance at
this Committee were a community order, having commenced at 9
o’clock this morning, some Members may have been breach of it by
turning up at 1, 2 or 3 minutes past 9. I was here on time—I
managed to do it today—and so were you, Sir Nicholas; but it is
possible to turn up slightly late for an appointment. It was reasonable
of my hon. Friend the Member for Tooting, the Whip, to exercise his
discretion in respect of colleagues who were one or two minutes late
today. He has been reasonable about the matter.
The simple point is that there
are flexibilities allowing the responsible officer to decide what is
reasonable. To use the Committee analogy again, if a Member were due to
attend but did not stay for the whole Committee, my hon. Friend the
Whip, if he were the responsible officer, might not regard it as
reasonable, but he would consider the excuse. There is discretion for
local officers to take those points into account. We have set national
standards through the Youth Justice Board to provide more detailed
guidance, and the key point is what is reasonable and what is
unacceptable. However, the bottom line is that in any organisation,
such as the Whips Office, or in the operation of a youth rehabilitation
order, there must be some discipline and an understanding that at the
end of it, action will be taken. Amendment No. 134 would remove that
provision, and I support my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff,
South and Penarth in his challenge.
Mr.
Burrowes:
I wonder whether the Minister has considered the
evidence that NAPO submitted in a letter dated 16 October, highlighting
its concerns that, given the way in which it had been consulted, there
had been insufficient time for it to consider matters in detail. It is
also concerned about breaches. It said that
“one of the reasons why the prison
population is growing disproportionately is because of increasingly
strict interpretations of breach procedures within the Probation
Service and the
Courts.”
Its general
concern was about the need to exercise appropriate
discretion.
Mr.
Hanson:
I have seen NAPO’s evidence and discussed
those concerns with its representatives in meetings. The my hon. Friend
the Under-Secretary of State for Justice was at NAPO’s annual
conference in Scarborough on Friday discussing similar matters. The
hon. Gentleman knows that some 4,500 individuals are in prison as a
result of licence breaches. Again, there should be flexibility and
discretion, and we are discussing those matters with NAPO, because
reasonableness must be built into the system. I trust local officials
to make those decisions, based on national standards. As my right hon.
Friend the Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth said, we need some
element of understanding that in the event of persistent breaches,
action will be taken. I am satisfied that there are sufficient
safeguards to avoid returning young offenders to court for minor
infringements, because it is right and appropriate that the clear
standards set out in the Bill are examined, and that discretion is used
at a local level.
On
probation, the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate discussed some of the
pressures on the probation service. I have discussed the concerns about
those pressures with Andrew Bridges, following the production of his
annual report earlier this year. Obviously, there are resource
implications arising from a number of matters, and there are pressures
on resources at all times. I must say to the hon. Gentleman that
resources provided for the probation service have increased by some 72
per cent. since 1997, which is well ahead of inflation. I accept that
the demands on the probation service have also risen in that time, but
I believe that there is scope within the funding elements that we have
to ensure that we can meet the needs of the probation service for the
future.
Amendments
Nos. 122 to 127, 130 and 132 would limit breach proceedings to the
specific type of court that sentenced the young offender to a youth
rehabilitation order. For example, where a Crown court has sentenced
the young offender to a YRO, it is appropriate and sensible for the
Crown court to have the power to refer that breach back to the youth
court, for the reasons that I mentioned earlier. The reasons why we
have given the Crown court such power is that it would be
disproportionate in every instance for the case to be retained at Crown
court. Indeed, it would also impose a burden on that higher court when,
in fact, youth courts have expertise in dealing with young people. If
the Crown court decides to refer the matter to a youth court, I believe
that it should have the power to do so and I cannot see a problem with
that particular
issue.
Amendments Nos.
131 and 133 would completely remove the measures in the Bill that would
require a court to impose a specified penalty on a young offender who
is found to have breached their YRO while it was still in force. Again,
we return to a general point, which is that it is essential that
community sentences are subject to rigorous enforcement when breaches
occur, and that the action that is taken is appropriate.
The point has been made about
sentencer freedom to decide the appropriate punishments that should
apply, but it is necessary that the Government set some national
standards and give a clear indication of what measures should apply, to
help build confidence in the community. The measures that would be
removed by
amendments Nos. 131 and 133 are, in fact, trying to achieve that aim;
they are designed to give some indication of what the sanctions would
be in the event of the young offender breaching their rehabilitation
order. The measures are about building public confidence, including
public confidence in the courts, and it is right and appropriate that
we set baselines in the Bill for dealing effectively with those
national standards.
Amendments Nos. 128 and 129
would remove the court’s power to deal effectively and robustly
with persistent and wilful breaches of the YRO. Under the Bill, when a
young offender wilfully and persistently breaches their YRO, the court
is able to impose a YRO with intensive supervision and surveillance,
without the need to meet the custody threshold. If the young offender
is already on a YRO with intensive supervision and surveillance,
imposed as an alternative to custody where the offence was
imprisonable, the courts have the power to order custody for wilful and
persistent
breaches.
Where
the original offence was not imprisonable, custody is only available in
certain circumstances. I come back to the phrase that we have used a
couple of times today: “wilful and persistent”. There
must be a wilful and persistent breach of the first YRO. The court can
then impose a YRO with intensive supervision and surveillance because
of that persistent and wilful breach. Custody is not available at this
point if the original offence was not imprisonable. However, I believe
that, if the young offender has wilfully and persistently breached that
YRO with the intensive supervision and surveillance provision, custody
must be available to the court both for the deterrent effect and to
allow punishment.
I
am grateful for what I interpreted as the support of the hon. Member
for Enfield, Southgate for that approach. Like him, like the hon.
Member for Somerton and Frome, and I suspect like every member of this
Committee, I do not wish to see young people sent to custody for no
good reason. However, there must be some national
standards—there must be some bottom line or baseline. If there
is an original order and a supervision and surveillance order, and if
there are persistent and continual breaches and the court finds them to
be wilful, it is entirely appropriate that the custody option should be
available at that stage to the court, to use at its discretion, because
such breaches will be seen as a snub to the court and to the penalty
imposed. It is essential for the orders’ integrity that we have
robust enforcement options to deal with wilful and persistent
breaches.
I hope that
my hon. Friend the Member for Leyton and Wanstead understands that the
measures will not be used on those who turn up five minutes late, or
cannot meet the obligations in an order because the state has not
provided some element of it. They will not be used for minor
infringements; they will be used for wilful and persistent
breaches—for worst cases in which a young offender is clearly
challenging the court.
Harry
Cohen:
I agree with that, and my hon.
Friend makes a good point, but when the state takes control and puts a
youngster into custody, it also takes responsibility for fulfilling the
conditions of the youngster’s YRO. I gave the example of an
education order. That education must be provided by the state. That is
what I take issue with.
Mr.
Hanson:
I do not believe that any court
would say to an offender that they were wilfully and persistently not
achieving an order’s objective because the state itself had not
provided the mechanisms to achieve it, whether through courses or other
provided activities. I hope that my hon. Friend accepts that
assurance.
David
Howarth (Cambridge) (LD): I do not think
that that was the point that the hon. Member for Leyton and Wanstead
was making. It is not about whether that would constitute a breach.
What he was saying—it is an excellent point—is that the
responsibility for ensuring that the purposes of an education order,
for example, are fulfilled will shift to the state if the young person
is taken into custody. The state’s obligation is to ensure that
education is available. He is making the point that unfortunately, it
is frequently not
available.
Mr.
Hanson:
In the event of a custodial sentence for wilful
and persistent breaches over time, I hope that provision of education
or any other requirement would continue in custody. That is
important.
We are
straying into separate territories, but my view is that we must raise
the level of support for young people in custody with education,
training and a range of provision. When visiting establishments for
young offenders, I have been impressed by some of the education work
going on. The purpose of custody, like that of community orders, is
ultimately to prevent reoffending. Education is one of the best ways to
do that. As hon. Members know, improving numeracy and literacy is key
to preventing reoffending. Offenders under 16 sentenced to custody
continue to receive education while in custody. We must ensure that it
is the best that we can supply, so that we improve their literacy and
numeracy and help them to overcome the challenging behaviour that lead
to offending in the first
place.
You
will have gathered from my comments, Sir Nicholas, that I hope that the
hon. Members for Somerton and Frome and for Enfield, Southgate will not
press their amendments. I believe that the Bill supplies a framework
for enforcing existing national standards through the Youth Justice
Board, provides community confidence in community sentences and ensures
that we have a backstop by stating that where there are persistent
breaches, the Government, through the courts, will take action to
enforce sentences properly. The sole intention is ultimately to keep
people out of custody, but we will have the option of custody if people
wilfully and deliberately breach court orders and associated
regulations. I hope that that is helpful to hon. Members, and I urge
the hon. Gentlemen not to press the
amendments.
10.15
am
Mr.
Heath:
We learned several interesting
things from that valuable debate. We learned that the engagement of the
more poikilothermic members of the Committee is directly proportional
to the temperature. We had an excursion into the practices of the
Government Whip and his light-touch approach to members of the
Committee. I thought that that example amply illustrated my point. It
is precisely because the Government Whip is not bound by statute in his
dealings with errant members of the Committee that he has discretion to
use his undoubted intelligence and common sense to deal appropriately
with the abundant shortcomings of his colleagues. That is precisely what
I was suggesting might be appropriate for probation officers: they
should have the same level of discretion to use their intelligence,
common sense and professional training when dealing with troublesome
youngsters.
I am not
suggesting that probation officers do not have a palette of sanctions
available, or that there should be no sanctions for breach of a
community order. Of course there should be, and they should be clearly
set out. But discretion on the part of the practitioner is a crucial
element of applying sanctions sensibly. That is what I was seeking to
ensure, but the Minister argued against
it.
I have to say that
the focus of the Minister’s argument on the first group of
amendments was directly in opposition to what the amendments were
intended to achieve. He addressed only the leave-out elements and not
the insertions, and of course the argument was distorted because of
that. He made great play of the fact that one of my amendments would
leave out the current provision for the Crown court to devolve the
decision downwards. Of course I do not intend that there should not be
devolution downwards. All my amendments are designed to create the
circumstances in which breach of orders are first considered in a youth
court or a magistrates court, and only those that are serious are
referred to the Crown court. I thought that that was clear from what I
said in my opening
remarks.
As I said
during his remarks, I found the comments of the hon. Member for
Enfield, Southgate very persuasive. He argued the case extremely
well—much better than the ministerial briefing on the subject.
In some instances, there is some merit in getting people who are in
breach of their orders back before the Crown court, but there is an
administrative issue with such disposal in the first instance. His
suggestion is one that we might explore at a later stage of the Bill.
The Minister failed to respond cogently to my argument simply because
he did not listen to it. I am sorry about that; it is
unfortunate.
There was
no reference at all in the Minister’s response to the capacity
of the court to take no further action other than to issue guidance. I
wonder why he did not respond to that amendment. That was the one for
which I believe I had not only the engagement, but the support of the
right hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth. He recognises the
fact that there are occasions when the bench, having heard all the
circumstances, will wish to set boundaries, as he put it—that is
entirely right—and so ensure that the offender knows exactly
where he or she stands in respect of the order, but will not wish to
take action beyond that. That is an important part of the
court’s armoury in dealing with breaches. It allows for the
judicial discretion of the court that we are all supposed to recognise,
and enshrines it in the orders. I hope that, after today’s
proceedings, the Minister will reflect on matters and consider a
response.
The
hon. Member for Leyton and Wanstead was spot on. When a young person
has been subject to a rehabilitation order that lays down various
requirements, which are tailored to his needs prevent him from
reoffending, it would be wrong if those considerations went by the
board if the person was taken into custody. Rather than
simply hoping that the provisions of the order will be complied with by
the state in respect of the young person in custody, it should be a
duty on the Prison Service in such circumstances to comply with the
original terms of the order inasmuch as they still apply to a young
person in
custody.
There is
abundant evidence that in many places, provision is unlikely to be
made, certainly in the case of older teenagers. Those aged 17 and 18
are not receiving the level of support in education and other matters
that they ought to receive from the system. Before we discuss the Bill
on Report, I shall consider whether it is possible to ensure that the
subject of a rehabilitation order that is still relevant in a case of
custody in breach forms part of a duty on the Prison Service. The hon.
Gentleman made an important
point.
Mr.
Garnier:
I do not want to delay the
closing of the hon. Gentleman’s argument, but there is a problem
with lots of different publications. The Prison Service no longer seems
to have immediate control over physical and mental health services
within its estate, or over education. Such services are imported from
local education authorities or other bodies. Although some people are
employed by the Prison Service to teach or educate, it is a difficult
in an organisational sense to impose a duty on the governor of the
relevant institution if he does not employ those who are providing the
teaching.
We
need to work our way through the administrative problem. I applaud the
hon. Gentleman for highlighting the issue. We will not solve it today,
but I encourage the Government to think carefully about how we impose
the duty on people who have no control over the providers of the
service.
Mr.
Heath:
The hon. and learned Gentleman has made an
extraordinary and valid point. It is one that is of concern to me. I do
not want to enter into a whole new debate, but mental health and
general heath provision is extremely patchy. It is hard to persuade
local PCTs that they have a duty to those in the prison estate in their
area. Some do understand that, but others make less provision than is
appropriate. I do not agree with the implication that matters should
revert to the Prison Service for organisational reasons, because the
service is not a health authority or an education authority. However,
there needs to be better co-ordination between the Prison Service and
the providers.
We have
had a long and interesting debate. I do not intend to press the
amendment to a Division, but the Minister and others have given us food
for thought for amendments to be tabled on Report. I beg to ask leave
to withdraw the
amendment.
Amendment,
by leave,
withdrawn.
Schedule
1, as amended, agreed
to.
Mr.
Garnier:
As clause 2 merely brings schedule 2 into effect,
I suggest that we discuss it when we reach the schedule, Sir
Nicholas.
Clause 2
ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
It being
twenty-five minutes past Ten o’clock,
The
Chairman
adjourned the Committee without Question put,
pursuant to the Standing Order.
Adjourned till this day at
One
o’clock.
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| ©Parliamentary copyright 2007 | Prepared 26 October 2007 |
