Schedule
1
Confirmation
hearings etc: Schedule 4A to the GLA Act
1999
Michael
Gove:
I beg to move amendment No. 50, in schedule 1, page
52, line 4, leave out sub-paragraph (2) and
insert—
‘(2)
The Mayor requires the consent of the Assembly to the proposed
appointment by a simple
majority.’.
The
Chairman:
With this it will be convenient to consider
amendment No. 51, in schedule 1, page 52, leave out lines 9 to
12.
Michael
Gove:
I confess that we would have been prepared to
withdraw the amendment had the hon. Member for Carshalton and
Wallington and my hon. Friends been successful in the previous debate.
We sought only to improve the scrutiny power of the GLA, and the option
in front of us was to ensure that confirmation hearings extend across
the piece. As I have outlined, the view of every party in the GLA is
that that should happen. Sadly, there is a split in the Labour ranks
between the parliamentary party, perhaps jealous of its privileges or
anxious to shield its old friend the Mayor from scrutiny, and those in
the GLA actively engaged in scrutiny work, who have been deprived of a
valuable scrutinising
power.
What can
Conservative Members do to help the GLA enhance its powers of scrutiny?
We have outlined how another weapon can be placed in its hands by
ensuring that its existing scrutiny power on appointments has teeth. We
originally wanted to ensure that the confirmation process involves
probing the views of those appointed to functional bodies, assessing
their suitability and ensuring that their fitness for office and the
views that they carry forward to the discharge of their duties are
examined appropriately and transparently. We have been denied that
opportunity, but we can ensure that the Mayor thinks twice before
making appointments to the crucial roles of chairman or deputy
chairman, because the assembly can block them by a
majority.
One of the
points about requiring a simple majority in the assembly, as I am sure
the Committee will grasp, is that because it is elected under the
proportional representation additional member system, it is extremely
unlikely that any political party could ever get a simple majority. The
only way in which a Mayor’s unsuitable nominations could be
blocked would be if there were an effective coalition. The electoral
system governing the composition of the GLA means that the tool we wish
to provide the assembly with could not be fashioned into a partisan
billhook. It would give the assembly, or responsible parties within it,
the opportunity to block a future Mayor who wished to exercise his
powers
irresponsibly.
As the
hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington has pointed out, chairmen or
deputy chairmen of the various functional bodies have at their disposal
millions of pounds of public money. Through the amendment, we suggest
that before the Mayor appoints individuals to those posts he should
know that if he recommends people who are either politically
convenient or to whom he owes a debt for some reason, and who are not up
to the task, the GLA’s capacity to recommend that they not be
appointed will force him to appoint individuals of real
calibre. I mentioned
in the previous debate that in the United States the Senate has the
power to recommend refusal in confirmation hearings. In the past, it
has ensured that certain individuals who were inappropriate, either
because of their ideology—such as the Supreme Court nominee
Robert Bork—or because of other executive failings, could not be
appointed. The Senate exercises that power with a degree of
deliberation and an absence of partisanship in most circumstances,
which bolsters its standing. For a simple majority in the GLA to
prevent the Mayor from making an appointment is the most effective
safeguard that we can think of against the frivolous, capricious,
partisan or ideological or the brazen preferment of individuals who are
unsuitable for the serious offices in question.
Given the failure of the
Government to accept the amendment, I hope that they will look
favourably on ensuring that the reserve scrutiny power can be exercised
by the
GLA.
11.30
am
Stephen
Pound:
The hon. Gentleman reminds me of a saying of Ernie
Bevin, one of my great heroes, though a trifle left-wing, I have to
say, for modern Labour
tastes:
“If we
had a little less democracy and a little more trust, we could get a lot
more done in this
country.”
I would not
subscribe to Ernie Bevin’s dictum, but nor would I subscribe to
the Boss Prendergast machine that we seem to be hearing about from the
hon. Gentleman. We seem to be hearing a description of a city
Administration that is more akin to James Michael Curley in Boston in
the 1930s—a gloriously, magnificently corrupt Administration, it
has to be said—than what we are actually faced with. There are
checks and balances within this. Our duty as a Committee—it is
an extraordinary privilege to sit for the first time on a Committee
that contains four Fulham season ticket holders, particularly as that
represents about 50 per cent. of the attendance—is to
allow the disinfectant of sunlight to enter in while still allowing the
smooth running of the operation of the GLA.
Were we to enter the strange,
dystopic world described from the perspective of Surrey Heath, of
political pals and people to whom favours are owed and to whom nods and
winks are exchanged in the fetid walkways of the Thames side, people
who somehow have some sort of political debt that can be repaid only by
a position on the Museum of
London—
Robert
Neill:
I am following the hon. Gentleman’s point
closely, as ever, but would he not concede that it is sometimes
desirable to have a process such as that suggested by my hon. Friend
the Member for Surrey Heath as a safeguard to nominees who might
wrongly be the subject of such a suspicion as the hon. Gentleman
raises? Does he not concede that it could be thought, for example, that
a Mayor might appoint an old friend and former colleague from other
days as the deputy chairman of a significant functional body,
because he had signed his nomination paper and been expelled from his
political party for his pains in supporting the Mayor at an earlier
stage? Would it not be better for a nominee—an admirable
person—in such a situation to be able to say that he has the
confidence and support of the assembly in its confirmation of office? I
think that the hon. Gentleman gets my
drift.
Stephen
Pound:
One would have to be deaf, dumb and blind not to
have got that drift this morning; it is about as subtle as a
sledgehammer. I take the hon. Gentleman’s comment. We tend to
make mistakes if we see policy in terms of personality, and if we tend
to think of legislation in terms of individuals. What we are talking
about here is a system for all eventualities: a GLA for all seasons,
rather than a man for all seasons. The hon. Gentleman, who has at least
two jobs and earns twice as much as I do, is quite right not to apply
for yet another one. That would be erring on the side of greed, which
is an emotion to which he is a complete stranger.
The whole process and procedure
of the GLA could come to a grinding halt if there were political malice
and if people chose to oppose the appointments. At present, the Mayor
must have heed to the voice of the assembly. Let us not forget that the
Mayor must then notify the assembly, as page 52, line 12 of the Bill
confirms, of his decision whether to accept or reject the
recommendation. There is a strong element of public scrutiny. I have
sympathy with the hon. Member for Surrey Heath—that is not an
expression that I will ever repeat—in his wish to give the
matter teeth, and his own sharp incisors have already been in evidence
in the few hours for which the Committee has so far deliberated.
However, do we need those additional teeth? I think that were we to put
in this additional filter, it would inevitably slow down the process
unnecessarily. There is nothing wrong with slowing down a process if it
is a means to an end. In this case we have that procedure in the Bill.
We have that check and balance. We have that balance whereby the GLA
can operate and appointments can be made subject to scrutiny and
subject to verification and statement by the Mayor, who must explain
it. For us to go further would be a recipe for disaster.
Whereas I know that no men or
women in the Committee today are malicious or would in any way wish to
bring the whole process to a halt, there might at some stage be such
people. I am talking not about particular individuals, but about people
of that type. Let us stick with what we have got. If a relevant
situation occurs in the future, by all means let us look at it, but at
the moment the GLA is not Kansas city in the 1930s or Boston in the
1940s. The world would be rather more exciting if it were. Both those
Administrations had extremely good music, but they were fairly corrupt.
We are talking about a system that is accountable and transparent. We
know what is going on and we have more than enough in the provisions to
provide the essential balance between the legislative checks, the
scrutiny procedure and the smooth running of the
assembly.
Tom
Brake:
I am afraid that I oppose the amendment, although I
hate to part company with the hon. Member for Surrey Heath, as we have
been doing
so well so far. Whether one likes it or not, the model that has been
adopted for London government is very much a Mayor with a GLA to
scrutinise what he does. Our debate about confirmation hearings was
entirely appropriate because that is a way for the assembly to
scrutinise the Mayor’s appointments. This amendment, however,
which would give the assembly the power to block a mayoral nominee,
goes against the grain of what has been agreed in relation to the
GLA—the model of Mayor and a scrutinising assembly. Although I
understand the reasons for the proposal and why it might be appropriate
to have a fallback, on this one amendment I will have to part company
with the hon.
Gentleman.
Jim
Fitzpatrick:
My hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, North
eloquently put the case on which I am about to elaborate. He was
supported by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington; I hope that
it will not be the only time that he will join the Government during
the Bill’s passage.
As I have already indicated, I
believe that confirmation hearings provide the assembly with an
important new power. They will enable the assembly to carry out a
rigorous public scrutiny of candidates whom the Mayor wishes to appoint
to the offices specified in clause 4 and to recommend to the Mayor
whether the candidate should be appointed to the office. That is the
crucial point.
The
role of the assembly is to scrutinise the calibre of candidates and
their suitability for appointment to the office in question, but it is
right that the Mayor, as the executive of the GLA, should retain the
final say over the statutory appointments he is required to make.
Accepting the amendment would give the assembly the final say over
which candidate should be appointed. It would risk blurring the
currently clear lines of accountability for these appointments. We
believe that it would compromise the assembly’s scrutiny role
and it could lead to deadlock between the Mayor and the assembly over
whom should be appointed. I hope that hon. Members can agree on the
importance of retaining the distinct roles of the Mayor and the
assembly in the confirmation hearings process, and that they will not
seek to press the
amendment.
Michael
Gove:
I am grateful to all the hon. Members who have
spoken in the debate because I feel that all of them, in their own way,
have only reinforced the case for the amendment.
Let me first
touch on one of the points that the Minister made. He talked about the
doctrine of accountability and the way in which the amendment would
blur accountability. Let us consider that thought for a moment. In the
Bill as it stands there is provision for confirmation hearings: the
assembly could express itself not content with an individual who has
been put forward for office, and the Mayor could say, “Do you
know what? That is a very good point, and I am afraid that this
individual, now that you have cross-examined them and we know a little
more about their record, is unsuitable. I withdraw the
nomination.” He is perfectly at liberty to do that as part of
the confirmation process. Indeed, it is explicitly made clear in the
Bill that the Mayor will give his reasons for either going ahead in the
event of GLA disquiet, or withdrawing.
The
legislation therefore already allows for the fact that, following
assembly representations, the Mayor would withdraw a nomination, so the
principle of sole mayoral appointment, unfettered by any level of
scrutiny, has already been conceded. In that respect, the Mayor remains
accountable. It is always his decision as to whom he puts forward. The
assembly has no right of nomination; it simply has a right to say,
after scrutinising an individual appointment, that it thinks it
unsuitable. Our amendment would ensure that the Mayor could not ride
roughshod over the assembly’s
view.
I agree with the
hon. Member for Ealing, North that we should not build legislation
around existing personalities. One of the points about this Mayor is
that he is an inevitably controversial figure. I am sure that we can
all agree that he has done some good and some bad things in office, and
that it would be wrong to paint every one of his actions in deepest
black. Nevertheless, so far he is the only person to have occupied the
role of Mayor of London, so we must use some of his actions as a
precedent when scrutinising new powers or new limits on the power of
the Mayor. One of the interesting things about the way in which the
Mayor has handled his power—I suspect that we will return to it
later—is his handling of the congestion charge. I am sure that
we will hear some interesting comments on
that.
Mr.
Andrew Slaughter (Ealing, Acton and Shepherd’s Bush)
(Lab): I have been ruminating on the comment that has just
been made— [Interruption.] I have it with me. The hon.
Gentleman raises a point of general interest. He says that the current
Mayor has been the only Mayor, so we should take heed of what he has
done. However, as he is the only Mayor to have held the
post—there will be others in future—would it not be
sensible, rather than rushing to judgment and to legislation, to leave
in abeyance the point that the hon. Gentleman makes, which he might
advance many times during the Committee’s proceedings, and wait
until we have three or four Mayors under our belts before we start
tinkering around with possibly unnecessary
legislation?
Michael
Gove:
I am grateful, as ever, for the hon.
Gentleman’s intervention. It is interesting, because its premise
is that we should wait until we have had three or four incumbents of
the office before changing the powers of the incumbent. That is an
argument against the whole Bill; it is an argument against bringing
forward legislation. If I remember the Division lists correctly, the
hon. Gentleman voted in favour of the Bill. In fact, I remember his
speech in favour of it. He now seems to be disavowing that principle. I
should be grateful if he clarified his position. Does he believe that
it is appropriate, now that we have had a Mayor for several years, to
consider the extent of his powers and influence, and amend it
appropriately? I assume that he thinks that that is appropriate and,
given his earlier vote in favour of limiting confirmation hearings
simply to chairs and deputy chairs, that he accepts that there should
be a new constraint on the Mayor’s capacity to appoint officers.
If he wishes to disavow those votes, I am sure that the Committee will
be very interested in his arguments.
Mr.
Slaughter:
I made the mistake, which I shall never make
again, of not being back in the Chamberfor the hon.
Gentleman’s winding-up speech, for which I apologised to him at
the time. Had I been present, I should have been able to correct him
when he said that I spoke in an unqualified way in favour of the powers
that the Mayor had been exercising thus far. He is right that I voted
in favour of Second Reading, but he is generalising from a particular
point that I made. Clearly, it is important after six years to consider
how the job is being done and how the post is going. However, some of
the amendments appear to indicate—as the intervention of the
hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst suggested—if not
vindictiveness, at least personal interest in what the current Mayor is
doing. I am simply advising the hon. Member for Surrey Heath, if I may
be so bold, to steer clear of
that.
Michael
Gove:
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that
clarification.
I, too,
am sorry that the hon. Gentleman was not present to hear my summing up,
not because it was a triumph of oratory—far from it—but
because in the course of my remarks, I committed a terrible
solecism—at least one. When I referred to comments made by the
hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd’s Bush in the debate,
I called him the hon. Member for Hammersmith and Fulham. I would hate
anyone to think that it is possible to confuse my hon. Friend the
Member for Hammersmith and Fulham with the hon. Member for Ealing,
Acton and Shepherd’s Bush. The reason why I made that mistake is
partly that the hon. Gentleman was in a previous life leader, I
believe, of Hammersmith and Fulham council, when it was led by the
Labour party, before the Conservatives took over and reduced the
council tax by a whopping 3 per
cent.
11.45
am
In those
benighted days, the hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd’s
Bush developed something of a reputation. It was because of that
reputation that the mistaken title was indelibly branded on my mind, so
apologies to him for that. I also apologise if I have misunderstood the
burden of his remarks on Second Reading. My understanding was that he
spoke in favour of all the provisions in the Bill. While other Labour
Members who had concerns about key aspects of the Bill are not,
amazingly, on the Committee, the hon. Gentleman, as someone who spoke
in favour of every aspect of the Bill, finds himself here. I do not
know how the process works because, as I explained earlier,
Mr. O’Hara, I am new to these things.
The hon. Member for Ealing,
Acton and Shepherd’s Bush has made an important point. It is
true that we should not attempt to legislate for the Mayor’s
office on the basis of the current Mayor’s personality. However,
we cannot ignore how the Mayor has used his powers, because it suggests
how a future Mayor, who may be less responsible or conscientious, might
exploit the loopholes. I note that the Minister for Housing and
Planning is shaking her head at the thought that any future Mayor could
be less responsible or less conscientious than the incumbent, but I
will pass over those internal Labour matters.
I was due to mention the
congestion charge, to which I know that we shall return on its own
merits. I have mentioned it now because when the Mayor was consulting
on the westward extension of the congestion charge, he gave the
impression that the process would be transparent and accountable, that
there would be scrutiny of the new power that he wished to exercise and
that there would be an informed debate. At the end of the consultation
process, the Mayor basically said, “Look, I’m in charge,
I’m the Executive, I’ve got responsibility. We’re
extending it. Fiat, let it be.” And so it was. My concern is
that when it comes to appointments to functional bodies, a future Mayor
will be able to say to the assembly, “Look, you made a very good
case as to why I should not appoint this person but, frankly,
I’m in charge. I’ll do what I like”, which is what
the current Mayor did with the westward extension of the congestion
charge. That would unfortunately discredit the GLA and the whole
process of confirmation that the Government are seeking to include in
the Bill.
Martin
Linton (Battersea) (Lab): The hon. Gentleman has omitted
to mention the fact that after the Mayor stated that he was in favour
of a westward extension of the congestion charge, he was re-elected by
the people of London.
Michael
Gove:
I take the point that the Mayor was re-elected but,
as we know, it was with a reduced majority. More importantly, if one
disaggregates voting in London, one can see that in those areas
affected by the westward extension of the congestion charge,
particularly the area represented by the leader of the Conservatives on
the GLA, Angie Bray, the Conservative vote went up while the Labour
vote went down. In the subsequent borough elections in Kensington and
Chelsea and in Hammersmith and Fulham, which are the areas affected by
the westward extension of the congestion charge, the Labour vote was
further depressed and the Conservative vote was significantly
increased, which led to the transfer of control in Hammersmith and
Fulham from Labour to Conservative.
Martin
Linton:
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way
again. We seek your indulgence, Mr. O’Hara, to pursue
the point, if it is relevant to the debate.
The
Chairman:
Order. I am giving very close consideration as
to whether the topic is becoming an end in
itself.
Martin
Linton:
I seek to make two points. First, the westward
extension of the congestion charge affects many more people than the
residents of Kensington and Chelsea who are within the zone. It affects
the whole of London and the traffic going through it.
Secondly, in my constituency
there were many strong, articulate opponents of the western extension
of the congestion charge, with whom I have every sympathy because it
adversely affected them. The Mayor nevertheless won a majority in the
mayoral elections, even in Battersea.
Michael
Gove:
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his point,
but given the point that you made, Mr. O’Hara, I
suspect that if I were to pursue this transport question further I
would be going down a cul-de-sac and would be given a penalty notice. I
give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst, who
I suspect will make a point about the broader principle that we are
discussing.
Robert
Neill:
The hon. Members who have intervened on my hon.
Friend have overlooked the broader principle, of which the congestion
charge is but an example, that the imposition of the congestion charge
required a resolution of the board of Transport for London. As the
executive body, Transport for London imposed the charge to reflect the
will of the Mayor, which we accept. Is that not a strong argument for
the boards of all the functional bodies that carry out significant
executive functions being subject to the scrutiny function? That is why
this strengthened measure is the appropriate means by which to compel
the Mayor to refrain from appointing people who may demonstrably not be
up to the discharge of those executive
functions.
The
Chairman:
Getting back to the
point—
Michael
Gove:
Thank you, Mr. O’Hara. My journey
back to the central point was helped by the intervention from my hon.
Friend, who has made the key point about Transport for London. We can
debate which is the most important functional body, but Transport for
London is certainly one of the most important. The question who fills
those posts matters to Londoners, because the individuals who do so
have key executive
responsibilities.
The
hon. Member for Ealing, North, quoted Ernie Bevin—I think it was
him rather than Aneurin Bevan—saying that what we needed
was
“a little less
democracy and a little more
trust”.
It is
unsurprising that someone who had been in charge of the Transport and
General Workers Union should have asked for less democracy and more
trust. It is also unsurprising that Ernie Bevin, a classic old Labour
figure who became addicted to the power of the Executive and
increasingly distrustful of scrutiny, should have taken that position,
but I am sorry to hear those words repeated in tones of reverence by
the hon. Gentleman. I would have thought that one of the key legacies
of Tony Blair’s years in power, which Labour party members
should want to celebrate, is the principle of devolution and the idea
that new gusts of accountability are going through previously closed
corridors of
power.
Stephen
Pound:
In quoting the great Ernie Bevin, who thought that
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was a breakaway branch of the T
and G, I was not endorsing the view. I was simply giving an example,
and I specifically stated for the record that I was not endorsing those
comments, sympathetic though I may
be.
Michael
Gove:
I grateful for that clarification. Whether or not
the hon. Gentleman endorses all Ernie Bevin’s sentiments, my
concern is that if the
Government were not to accept the amendment, we would see a flawed
confirmation process. I accept the hon. Gentleman’s point that
we do not have government in London that bears comparison with the boss
culture in the United States during the 1920s and 1930s, but we are all
aware of the lesson that it is only through the maintenance and use of
effective scrutiny mechanisms that we can avoid the descent into rotten
borough-ism. We have here a power that any responsible Mayor would
welcome. Any responsible Mayor would be happy to see any of his
nominees to these key posts go through a confirmation process and
secure the additional support of an open vote in the assembly, which
would underline their appropriateness for the job. The Mayor has been
perfectly happy to accept that the principle of election is the basis
of the authority on which he operates. Why should there not be a
similar vote for his
nominees?
I know that
the fact that the Liberal Democrats have deserted us on this occasion
may appear to weaken the force of our
argument.
Jim
Fitzpatrick:
I am interested that the hon. Gentleman has
said that the absence of Liberal Democrat support weakens the force of
his argument. Did he not start this debate by saying that had we not
defeated the last amendment, he would not be proposing these
amendments? The hon. Gentleman did not have a very strong argument to
start
with.
Michael
Gove:
No; I was making a point. At first glance, to the
superficial observer of our deliberations, it might seem as though the
desertion of the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington weakens the
force of our argument. In fact, his conscientious objection strengthens
it, because for any majority to exist within the GLA, Conservatives and
Liberal Democrats, for the sake of argument, need to work together.
Those people who think that we are joined at the hip and that we are
one unified, raucous, populist caucus intent on subverting the power of
the executive will have been disabused by the hon. Gentleman’s
decision not to vote with us. That Tories and Liberal Democrats
disagree emphasises the point that when it comes to the appointment of
individuals, one cannot expect all the Opposition parties to unite
against the Mayor.
By
declining to support the amendment, the hon. Member for Carshalton and
Wallington has underlined the fact that the parties operate
independently in the GLA and that our requirement for a simple majority
for confirmations is an effective new scrutiny weapon which, in the
absence of the previous amendment, can only enhance trust in the
Mayor’s appointments. I therefore hope that the Government will
accept it.
Question put, That the
amendment be
made:—
The
Committee divided: Ayes 4, Noes
11.
[Division
No.
3
]
Smith,
Ms Angela C. (Sheffield,
Hillsborough)
Question
accordingly negatived.
Question proposed, That
this schedule be the First schedule to the
Bill.
Jim
Fitzpatrick:
Schedule 1 inserts a new schedule 4A to the
GLA Act 1999, setting out the procedure for holding confirmation
hearings for the assembly to make a recommendation to the Mayor on
whether a candidate should be appointed to one of the offices listed in
clause 4.
Paragraph 1
exempts the Mayor from the confirmation hearing process should he
decide to appoint himself to any of the offices listed in clause 4.
That is because the assembly already has opportunities to question the
Mayor at, for example, the monthly
meetings.
Paragraph 2
prohibits the Mayor from making an appointment until the end of the
confirmation process, which is either when the Mayor has notified the
assembly of his acceptance or rejection of its recommendation or if the
assembly has not made a recommendation to the Mayor within three weeks
of being notified by him of the candidate whom he proposes to
appoint.
Paragraph 3
specifies what the notification should include and requires the Mayor
to give reasons why he wishes to appoint the candidate to the office.
Paragraphs 4 and 5 set out the key outcomes of the procedure. Paragraph
4 requires the assembly to recommend to the Mayor whether he should
appoint the candidate to the office within three weeks of receiving
notification from him. Paragraph 5 allows the Mayor to accept or reject
the assembly’s recommendation. The Mayor must notify the
assembly of his
decision.
Paragraphs 6
to 9 set out the detailed procedure for holding confirmation hearings.
Paragraph 6 allows the assembly to decide whether to hold a
confirmation hearing before making a recommendation to the Mayor, and
it defines a confirmation hearing as a meeting at which the candidate
is requested to appear to answer assembly members’ questions
relating to the proposed appointment. The candidate may either attend
the meeting in person or communicate with the assembly remotely. The
assembly may ask candidates to produce documents in their possession or
under their control that relate to the proposed
appointment.
Paragraph
7 sets out the procedure for requesting the candidate’s
appearance at a confirmation hearing. Paragraph 8 allows the Secretary
of State by order to make provision for any order in force under
section 63 of the Greater London Authority Act 1999 to have effect in
relation to a candidate. Such an order may prescribe categories of
information that a person summoned to give evidence to the assembly may
refuse to give and categories of document which they may refuse to
produce.
Finally, paragraph 9 provides
for the assembly’s functions under the schedule to be undertaken
only by the assembly as a whole or by an ordinary committee of the
assembly. I beg to move that this schedule be part of the
Bill.
Question put
and agreed
to.
Schedule 1
agreed
to.
Clause 5
ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
12
noon
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