Clause
48
Common
provision of administrative, professional and technical
services
Mr.
Andrew Pelling (Croydon, Central) (Con): I beg to move
amendment No. 68, in clause 48, page 48, line 16, at end
insert—
‘(8) Any constituent
body proposing to enter into any arrangements under subsection (2)
shall have regard to the needs and requirements of any constituent body
with which it proposes to enter into such an
agreement.
(9) In making any
arrangements under subsection (2) above the Mayor shall ensure that the
Authority secures adequate resources from the constituent body
proposing to enter into any agreements under subsection (2) to fulfil
its functions.
(10) For the
purposes of subsections (8) and (9) the Mayor and the Assembly shall be
treated as if they were constituent bodies separate and distinct within
the
Authority.’.
It
is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once again, Lady
Winterton. The position that the London assembly took on clause 48 was
that it was very supportive of the principle behind the provisions and,
clearly, there are many efficiencies to be secured by sharing services
within the GLA group. I take this opportunity to put on record the
credit that is due to the chief finance officer of the GLA, Anne
McMeel, for the very good work that she is undertaking in that area to
secure the best efficiencies, by the working together of the GLA family
constituent bodies.
The assembly is concerned to
ensure that it is not denied access to resources that are currently
shared by the Mayor and the assembly. That covers a range of important
support services, such as financial, legal, procurement and human
resources advice, together with information and technology services
and, indeed, library services. If some of the services are undertaken
for the strategic GLA by a constituent body, such as Transport for
London, there is a risk that sufficient safeguards would not exist to
ensure that the assembly continues to be provided with adequate support
services.
We have
discussed putting a cap on the assembly’s budget, but amendments
have also considered a floor. I know that the Government did not accept
them, but it seems a reasonable idea. The amendment would
mitigate the risk to resources expected to be
applied to the assembly and ensure that they are safeguarded and
guaranteed.
Yvette
Cooper:
The Government recognise the intentions behind the
amendment, but we believe that the changes are unnecessary. The
amendment would place additional duties on the GLA and any other
constituent functional body in delegating back-office functions to each
other and would require those constituent bodies to have regard to the
others’ needs and requirements. Proposed subsection (9) would
require the Mayor to ensure that the GLA secures adequate resources
from a functional body before entering into an arrangement with
it.
Subsection (10)
defines the Mayor and assembly, rather than the GLA as a whole, as
constituent bodies. We do not think that its overall impact is
necessary to the Bill. For a start, any arrangement between the
constituent bodies concerning back-office functions would be made only
with the agreement of those bodies, so they will be able to take into
account each others’ needs and ensure that their own
requirements are properly
safeguarded.
Equally,
we find it hard to envisage that the Mayor would agree to take on a
functional body’s back-office functions without securing
adequate resources to do so from the body concerned. In any event, it
is the Mayor and assembly who set those bodies’ functional
budgets, and they will be able to take into account any transfer of
back-office functions in doing
so.
Mr.
Pelling:
I am grateful to the Minister for accepting many
of the points made, although she does not consider it necessary to make
the change. The circumstances are particular because of how the
budgetary process is agreed in the assembly, as we have discussed
during debate on other clauses. Because the assembly must decide by a
two-thirds majority, it is possible for the assembly’s budget to
be decided by the blocking third minority. It is therefore likely that
any Mayor supported by that blocking minority could direct that
significant resources should be withdrawn from the assembly while
securing efficiencies by working with GLA family
bodies.
Yvette
Cooper:
We have discussed the nature of the
assembly’s role and the Mayor’s role in determining the
budget. The Government think that there are adequate safeguards to
ensure that the assembly has the resources it needs and can exercise
its scrutiny function
properly.
With
reference to the proposals, we should recognise that back-office
functions at city hall are already usually shared between the Mayor and
the assembly. The clause will require the Mayor to consult the assembly
before entering into any arrangement for the GLA to delegate or take on
functional bodies’ back-office functions. The assembly will also
be free to agree protocols or service level agreements with any
functional body that provides a back-office function for the
GLA.
We think that
the amendment’s intentions are already captured in the Bill. A
series of appropriate mechanisms—protocols, existing
arrangements, the budget and the Mayor’s requirement to
consult—will provide the kind of safeguard that hon. Members
require.
Robert
Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con): I shall be brief.
We have already discussed the assembly’s situation in relation
to consultation. Provided that the Mayor meets the requirements of the
other clauses that we have agreed will stand part of the Bill, the
Mayor can ignore the assembly. So the safeguard is not much of a
safeguard. Does the Minister accept that when one is dealing with, for
example, the assembly’s ability to access human resources advice
and support, or legal advice—which is particularly
important—or financial advice, it is important that the assembly
have some guarantee of access? There is already discussion—in
broad terms I support it—on consolidating the legal arrangements
under Transport for London rather than under the core GLA. It would
make sense if the assembly had more than the right to be consulted, if
it is to guarantee itself access to legal advice on the functions of
the organisation of which it is
part.
Yvette
Cooper:
We think that the existing arrangements will be
sufficient, although there are additional proposals on protocols and on
the budget. What we are discussing is merely the ability to combine
back-office functions to deliver services, rather than proposals to
reduce, change or amend the services that are provided. The measure is
simply a practical one and we do not believe that the additional
amendments are required. On that basis I ask the hon. Member for
Croydon, Central to consider withdrawing his
amendments.
Mr.
Pelling:
I am grateful for the Minister’s
conscientious response. Nevertheless I feel that it would be helpful if
the matter went to a
Division.
Question
put, That the amendment be
made:—
The
Committee divided: Ayes 4, Noes
10.
Division
No.
17
]
Smith,
Ms Angela C.
(Sheffield,
Hillsborough)
Question
accordingly negatived.
Clause 48 ordered to stand
part of the
Bill.
Clauses
49 to 52 ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
2.30
pm
Schedule
2
Repeals
Robert
Neill:
I beg to move amendment No. 48, in
schedule 2, page 53, line 33, at
end
insert—
|
‘Police
Act 1996
(c.16)
|
Schedule
2A (as inserted by the Police and Justice Act
2006).’.
|
The
Chairman:
With this it will be convenient to discuss the
following:
Amendment
No. 47, in
schedule 2, page 54, line 3, at
end
add—
New
clause 23—Greater London Authority to be police authority for
London—
‘(1) The Police
Act 1996 (c.16) is amended as
follows.
(2) After section 5A
insert—
“5AA
Police Authority for London
(1)
The Greater London Authority shall be the police authority for the
metropolitan police
district.
(2) All executive
functions in respect of the role of the Greater London Authority as a
police authority shall be carried out by the Mayor of
London.
(3) The London Assembly
shall have power to scrutinise the exercise of the Mayor’s
functions under subsection (2) above and to carry out all scrutiny of
the work of the police force as was previously carried out by the
Metropolitan Police
Authority.
(4) All references
to the Metropolitan Police Authority in this and any other enactment
shall be construed in accordance with this
section.
5AB
Budget
The Mayor shall set the
component part of the GLA budget previously set by the Metropolitan
Police Authority—
5AC
Assembly Police Committee
(1)
The London Assembly shall establish a committee to carry out its
functions under section 5AA(3)
above.
(2) Four Magistrates,
appointed in the same manner as Magistrate members of the Metropolitan
Police Authority were, shall be co-operated members of this
committee.”
(3) Leave
out sections 5B and 5C and Schedule
2A.’.
New
clause 24—Appointment of Commissioner of Police for the
Metropolis—
‘(1) The
Police Act 1996 (c.16) is amended as
follows.
(2) For section 9B(5)
substitute—
“(5)
Before recommending to Her Majesty that she appoint a person as the
Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, the Secretary of State shall
have regard to—
(a) any
recommendations made to him by the Mayor of London,
and
(b) any representations
made to him by the London
Assembly.”.’.
New
clause 25—Appointment of Deputy Commissioner of Police for
the Metropolis—
‘(1) The
Police Act 1996 (c.16) is amended as
follows.
(2) For section 9D(5)
substitute—
“(5)
Before recommending to Her Majesty that she appoint a person as the
Deputy Commissioner, the Secretary of State shall have regard
to—
(a) any
recommendations made to him by the Mayor of London,
and
(b) any representations
made to him by the
Commissioner.”.’.
New
clause 45—Removal of requirement that the Deputy Mayor be a
member of the Metropolitan Police
Authority—
‘Omit
paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 2A to the Police Act 1996(c.
16).’.
Robert
Neill:
I wish to express my pleasure at seeing you back in
the Chair for the remainder of the Bill’s progress, Lady
Winterton. I hope that the proceedings
will not take too long, but the topic under discussion is particularly
important. This package of amendments and new clauses, on which we
shall want to vote at the appropriate time, is central to
policing.
In
many ways, policing is one of the key areas of the GLA group’s
responsibility and the way in which it is handled at the moment is
needlessly diffuse. Policing is regularly in the top one or two worries
of Londoners. Polls regard it as very important. Successful policing in
London is vital to the future of the city and our amendments would
strengthen the role of the Mayor in it. I hope that our approach gives
the lie to earlier suggestions that we are opposed to a strategic
authority. We are not. We want to make sure that it and the Mayor as
its elected strategic head concentrate on matters that are genuinely
strategic and can clearly only be delivered sensibly on a pan-London
basis. Policing manifestly fits that bill. That is why we are worried
that the present arrangements are something of a
hotch-potch.
Everyone
expects the Mayor of London to have a keen interest and involvement in
policing. The Government have said before during our proceedings that
they are wedded to the strong mayor model. Looking at the experience
particularly of north America, a strong mayor model suggests to most
ordinary Londoners and observers a direct involvement in policing
matters. Everyone thinks of Rudolph Giuliani and Michael Bloomberg in
New York. What do they know about them? There was a problem with
policing in New York. Mayor Giuliani was elected; Mayor Giuliani was
the man who was credited with fixing it. Had he got it wrong, he would
have paid the penalty by losing
office.
It seems that
city-dwellers strongly link the idea of a strong, executive Mayor with
the idea that that person should be answerable for policing and
community safety issues. We should not think in terms of narrow
policing, but as a broader point, people expect that direct
linkage.
If we ask the
average Londoner what the Mayor should do, the answer would be that he
should certainly sort out transport and policing, and make sure that
the streets are safe. Worry about safety throughout the city is
regularly at the top of Londoners’ concerns; although we might
disagree about some of the detail, it is something on which there is a
consensus. Safety is vital to any civilised city and for London to
maintain its pre-eminence as a world city—some would say,
“the” world city—getting it safe is crucial.
People would expect that the Mayor should have direction of that key
policy, but in fact the system does not give him that clear and
transparent direction or a clear sense of accountability. That position
might have arisen, as is often the way, deep in the mists of the
discussions in the Government when the original scheme for the
legislation was pulled
together.
As I
observed earlier in Committee, there is no particular magic to the
composition of any of the functional bodies. They evolved perhaps for
historic purposes and for functional reasons. Nor is there particular
magic in the composition of the policy authority. The fact that we have
a police authority for London is, I concede, an improvement on the
position when the Home Secretary was the police authority. That is a
step in the right direction, which is why I was
willing to argue the case for a London-wide city governance when it was
not always fashionable to do so in my party. I do not criticise the
work of members of the Metropolitan Police Authority. I could hardly do
that, since I am one of its members. However, that does not alter the
fact that accountability is not straightforward, and not as good as it
could be. We are seeking to improve the means by which policing is
welded into the mainstream of mayoral functions and city
government. Tony
Travers, the academic to whom we referred earlier, said that the
structure that came out of the discussions between various Government
Departments on how the new Greater London authority should be set up
leaves something of a mangle. It is clear to anyone who has read the
literature, or who has looked at the history of the matter, that the
Home Office fought like a cat in a sack to avoid the handover of
significant policing powers to London.
I give credit to the right hon.
Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Mr. Raynsford) for his
work on the Greater London Authority Act 1999, because he managed to
fight off some of the rearguard action of the Home Office. Now, six
years after the event, weare seeking to go further toward the
logic that that right hon. Gentleman may have had in mind, namely that
people expect the Mayor to have executive responsibility for policing.
By executive responsibility, I do not mean operational control. In our
system, politicians do not have operational control of the police at
any level, and neither should they. Executive responsibility should be
executive in the sense that the Mayor should be intimately involved in
the appointment of the commissioner and other key staff, give the
strategic overview and thrust to policing in London, and be the person
who is politically accountable, who carries the can for policing in
London. That is what we are seeking to do here. The system, despite its
good intentions and its halfway move forward, is difficult.
Mr. Travers, in his
useful book, “The Politics of London”, refers to a
four-way split of accountability for policing, something that I think
no one would dispute. We have the Mayor, who has responsibility for
setting the budget, and for appointing some members of the Metropolitan
Police Authority. He is also consulted on the appointment of the
commissioner. The assembly has an involvement. Assembly members are
accountable, in a sense, because they set the budget. Of course,
without rehashing our earlier discussions, the assembly can only set
the budget on high-level terms, and cannot get into the detail. Some
members of the assembly serve on the authority and others do not,
meaning that the accountability of assembly members to their
constituents on policing matters varies. Because I happen to be a
member of the authority, it is much easier for me to take up issues of
policing in Bexley and Bromley than it is for, say, my hon. Friend the
Member for Croydon, Central, who does not have the same ease of access.
Is that situation logical?
The Metropolitan Police
Authority itself has responsibility. It carries out certain limited,
non-operational executive functions, and has a scrutinyrole.
In practice, however, the scrutiny role of the authority—its
members would concede—is much less developed than the scrutiny
role of the assembly. The
current chair of the authority, an old and respected friend of myself
and the Minister, is conscious of that situation, and has sought to
improve it since he took over. The fact is that the scrutiny role of
the MPA is much less than one might expect. The final strand of
accountability is the commissioner himself. He is responsible for
day-to-day operations and has a line of accountability not only to the
Mayor, the authority and the assembly, but to the Home Secretary, who
sits somewhere in all of this as well. That is inevitable because of
London’s position as the capital city, but we could make things
a lot easier with a little rationalisation, which is what we are
suggesting.
Against
the background of at least four and arguably five lines of
accountability for London, it is not easy for Mr.,
Mrs. or Ms Londoner to know who carries the can if anything
goes wrong with policing in London, or who should have the praise when
things go well. Who is ultimately accountable? It could, in theory, be
any one or any mixture of those. That does not sit well with the
Government’s apparent commitment to improving accountability and
transparency in service delivery, something that we agree with in
principle.
For that
reason, it is not surprising that the previous Metropolitan Police
Commissioner, Sir John Stevens, now Lord Stevens, has said himself on a
numberof occasions that he found the accountability
arrangements difficult to deal with. Once he said to the
assembly’s budget committee in some exasperation, “I
don’t know who I’m supposed to be accountable
for.” I do not think that it was entirely in jest. The situation
is needlessly confused. If Lord Stevens felt that, I suspect that the
average London resident does as
well.
Despite the best
of intentions in trying to find a compromise that would satisfy the
Home Office and the other conflicting Departments and could be
reconciled with the Government’s desire for city-wide
governance, perhaps part of the error lay in saying that the
Metropolitan Police Authority should try to replicate as far as it
could in London the Government system for police authorities
elsewhere—a certain number of “local authority” or
equivalent assembly members, some magistrates and some independents.
That is why it differs from the London Fire and Emergency Planning
Authority, which had an established model involving borough councillors
instead. One might think that LFEPA would have been a better model for
a separate functional body system in London.
The error was to assume that
what works and is appropriate elsewhere in the country should be
appropriate in London. We argue that it is not. London is unique in
size and complexity. It is not necessary to have the same governance
structure here as in the rest of the country for governing the city or
delivering services such as policing. The GLA was intended to be a
unique solution to a unique situation. London is by far the largest
city in western Europe and one of the largest in the western world, and
it needs its own tailor-made
structures.
Those
structures should have democratic accountability. That accountability
is provided by the Mayor and the assembly, both of which have mandates.
That is why we propose effectively to place the Mayor and the assembly
as the police authority for London,
and that is how the new clauses are structured. Executive power would go
to the Mayor, as most people would expect, as well as the MPA’s
executive functions. The Mayor would not gain any greater operational
control, but accountability would clearly focus on him. When he stands
for election saying, “I am going to do something about policing
in London,” it will be a pledge that he cannot get away from,
because it will be his legal
responsibility. Scrutiny,
which is vital and could be improved, falls to the assembly, which the
Government concede is a scrutiny body meant to deal with such issues.
Our proposed system fits very well with the Government’s own
rhetoric earlier in the Committee’s proceedings. It would mean
that all London assembly members could scrutinise the work of the
police. Every constituency member will have the same degree of access,
and members elected on a London-wide, non-constituency basis—the
argument being that they will be able to represent more broadly with a
non-geographic constituency—would have the same access and
ability. I submit that that would give much better and more logical
scrutiny, as the entire assembly would be
involved.
2.45
pm
We accept that
the particular role of magistrates should be preserved, so we have
provided for an entrenched committee, which I shall come to in a
moment. Under the current arrangement, the Mayor negotiates with the
MPA, which then makes a budget bid to the Mayor. We say that the Mayor
has the executive power—that is explicit in the new
clause—and he would set the policing component of the budget.
That would be scrutinised by the assembly and the budget process would
then take place. Nothing would change in that respect. There would
still be a separate policing component within which the Mayor would
doubtless negotiate with the commissioner and the assembly’s
police committee.
New
clause 23 would set up a specific police committee. There are two
reasons for doing that: the particular importance of policing, which is
the No. 1 or No. 2 concern of Londoners, and the fact that policing is
the service that consumes two thirds of the council tax precept, so it
is particularly appropriate that there should be a specific safeguard
on police
scrutiny.
The assembly
has, voluntarily, a transport committee to scrutinise the work of
Transport for London, but under the proposal it would be obliged to
have a police committee, whose members would of course all have
democratic mandates. To preserve the particular, valuable insight that
can be given by magistrate members, we propose that that
committee—uniquely of those in the GLA—should have four
co-opted magistrate members who could be involved in the deliberations.
That would preserve an analogy with other UK practice, but tailor the
situation to the circumstances in
London.
We do not
propose independent members, because we think that the wide range of
experience of all25 assembly members adequately covers the
experience that might be required through independent members if there
was a narrower so-called political membership.
I respect the work of my independent colleagues on the police authority,
but the key point is that they have no mandate from anyone, other than
through a process of selection and appointment. Under our system,
everybody with executive control—the Mayor—or who was
involved in scrutiny in the assembly would have a democratic mandate,
which would make policing for London more transparent and accountable,
and reduce some of the bureaucracy that has resulted from the
compromise that we suspect represents the gestation of the current
arrangements. That is
the thinking, and we submit that it accords well with the
Government’s logic. We therefore invite them to accept the
amendment, which would enhance delivery of policing and allow Londoners
to feel that there was a clear chain of responsibility that they could
call upon when
necessary.
Mr.
Pelling:
I am happy to support my hon. Friend. It is
interesting to note the comments made by Tony Travers in the book to
which my hon. Friend referred; he is very critical of the assembly in
not scrutinising the work of the Metropolitan
police.
It is
important to pass on some recollections of how the assembly kicked off
on the issue of policing scrutiny, so that Committee colleagues
understand how the establishment of a separate Metropolitan Police
Authority made it difficult for assembly members to hold the police
service to account in the way that they would have expected a London
authority to do. The Metropolitan Police Service was very willing to
give an initial briefing to assembly members, but one of the key
messages from that briefing in the first week of the London
assembly’s existence in 2000 was that the police service did not
believe that the Greater London Authority Act 1999 provided the
assembly with any role in the scrutiny of police service performance.
As far as it was concerned, that was specifically the role of the
Metropolitan Police Authority and its board, not assembly
members.
That culture
was further enforced by the approach that the current Mayor took on
police service accountability, which may well have developed because it
was important to be able to create the political capital required for
his credibility. Bearing in mind his—and perhaps Lee
Jasper’s—alleged baggage in their approaches to the
police service, his style was that he had nothing to do with the
operation of the police service and was not accountable to the assembly
forit, because virtually everything that it did was an
operational matter on which he was not accountable. If London assembly
members want to ask questions about the performance of particular
borough commands or specific parts of the police service, the
Mayor’s response is that it is not his responsibility, but that
of the
commissioner.
My hon.
Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst also referred to the
first experience of the assembly’s budget committee in dealing
with the then commissioner, Lord Stevens. He turned up with as much
regalia as possible dripping from his uniform so as to intimidate
members of the assembly’s budget committee. More importantly, he
gave us a strong message that he was sick and tired of being
accountable to the Home Secretary, the Mayor, the London assembly, its
budget committee and the
Metropolitan Police Authority. Such a diffusion of
accountability means that there is no worthwhile accountability at
all.
Stephen
Pound:
Far be it from me to correct the hon. Gentleman,
but only those in the monarchy wear regalia. He may have been referring
to insignia. On the substance of his amendment, does he accept that
there was a time, when I was first elected to the House, when the only
opportunity to discuss these matters was in the annual debate on
policing in London, on a motion tabled by the Home Secretary? That was
outrageous. Therefore, there may be problems for people such as Lord
Stevens, but does the hon. Gentleman not at least accept that it is
vastly better to have a little too much democracy, rather than the
previous system, under which there was a massive democratic
deficit?
Mr.
Pelling:
My recollection is that not only royalty wear
regalia. I appreciate the royal nature of regalia, due to the very
definition of the word, but I understand that masons also would find
themselves
happily—
Jonathan
Shaw (Chatham and Aylesford) (Lab): Where are
they?
Mr.
Pelling:
I am sure, Lady Winterton, that there are none
here.
Stephen
Pound:
Maybe they are
royalty!
Mr.
Pelling:
The hon. Gentleman has been watching too many
films. I would accept that there was a significant democratic deficit.
Indeed, it led to a great deal of additional inefficiency in the
Metropolitan police, which was turning up to the Home Secretary every
year and saying, “Terribly sorry, we have overspent, so would
you mind making up that financial deficit?” However, it is not a
sufficient argument to say that there was a democratic deficit before
and that we should not close it entirely by having a more democratic,
direct fulfilment of that
deficit.
The response
given by Lord Stevens on that occasion showed just how ridiculous those
demands were in terms of the diffusion of accountability. It meant that
none of those groups was in a strong position to call for proper
accountability. Those issues are important when there are problems with
police service performance and, in particular, crime clear-up rates in
London, which unfortunately are spectacularly low. We cannot fulfil the
electorate’s desire to put direct pressure on those they elect
to increase the police service’s
performance.
So much
diffusion of accountability results in a feeling among Londoners that
they cannot hold their police service to account. An example that is
causing a great deal of controversy is the safer neighbourhood panels
being established in the context of the much-welcomed safer
neighbourhood teams. The police service itself is appointing
representatives to the panels that will hold it to account. I have been
so uncharitable as to describe the panels as unelected
soviets.
What
is particularly galling to elected representatives, whether they be
London assembly members or Members of Parliament, is that when they ask
about particular priorities in their neighbourhoods, the response is
often
that those self-appointed panels will set the priorities for
neighbourhood policing in their wards. The elected representatives will
have no role or input. Indeed, the commissioner’s guidelines
state that politicians, whether councillors or MPs, should be
specifically excluded from the process. The accountability issues are
very real. One might
have expected the Metropolitan Police Authority to be effective in its
scrutiny role, but my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and
Chislehurst has referred to how the MPA has fallen short in that
regard. I am not surprised that that has happened. I have a great deal
of sympathy for my colleagues who have served on the MPA. Like
Ministers—who, weighed down by red boxes, might be distracted
from key issues—their agenda has often been set well in terms of
its weight and no end of visits to be made. In many ways, the MPA has
been happy to act as a loyal supporters’ club for the
commissioner rather than as an effective scrutiny
body.
We have taken a
radical approach to the Bill, and our amendments are part of that
process. Our proposals are democratic and fit in with the Conservative
party’s approach in other parts of the UK—we seek direct
election of chief commissioners accountable for policing. It is only
logical that the Mayor should provide that role in
London.
I shall make a
brief detour by saying how muchwe value your chairmanship,
Lady Winterton, and contrast it with that of the chairman of the
assembly, who has recently joined us and who has a direct approach with
witnesses before the assembly, as was shown yesterday. Conservatives
support that strongly. It shows the robustness of the democratic
process in the London
assembly.
We have
sought to maintain responsibilities for planning and housing at the
local government level, the lowest level of government, and to devolve
powers from the Government office for London and from the Government in
areas such as learning and skills and the national health service. The
amendments offer the Committee the opportunity to secure a radical
reform of London’s governance that would provide for direct
accountability for performance in the police
service.
3
pm
Tom
Brake (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD): It isa
pleasure to see you here this afternoon, Lady Winterton. Given
Mr. O’Hara’s departure, I was worried that the
Committee might be left rudderless, but clearly that is not the
case.
Some amendments
and new clauses in the group are interesting. The worry about the
amendments tabled by the hon. Gentlemen who have just spoken is that
they are perhaps a step too far in the direction of giving the Mayor
executive power. Their argument suggested that the Mayor would simply
become the person who was accountable for, rather than having
operational responsibility for, the Metropolitan Police Service. There
is anxiety that, by their very nature, Mayors might be interested in
more power, not less. I can foresee circumstances in which a Mayor who
feels the pressure of an underperforming police service might consider
that he or she wants to grasp more operational control over the service
than people deem to be acceptable.
The new clause tabled by the
hon. Member for Surrey Heath about the appointment of seven borough
representatives has been withdrawn. The only point that I would make
therefore is that, had it been discussed, we would have supported it.
The move towards borough-based policing with safer neighbourhood teams
with active involvement of the boroughs on the ground suggests that it
would be entirely appropriate for borough representatives to be part of
the Metropolitan Police Authority, although I recognise the important
role that independents have played. There is an issue about the
democratic deficit that applies with the role of independents on the
police authority.
With
the withdrawal of new clause 9, I shall touch briefly on new clause 45.
I have not withdrawn it, unless someone else has done so without my
knowledge. The hon. Member for Surrey Heath talked earlier about how
his mother was watching his progress carefully in this place and said
that he wanted to give her a concrete example of his achievements since
his election, such as an amendment that was his own. Well, my mother
also follows carefully my progress in Parliament. She has done so
during the past 10 years and I think that she probably has a more
realistic view than the hon. Gentleman’s mother about the
success of Opposition Members in identifying amendments that they can
claim as their own. However, new clause 45 may give me the opportunity
to do so. It has the unanimous support of assembly members and I hope,
therefore, the support of the Government.
Mr.
Pelling:
That is not the
case.
Tom
Brake:
Perhaps the hon. Gentleman who spoke from a
sedentary position might like to intervene at some
point.
Mr.
Pelling:
The new clauses are excellent, but they do not
have the London assembly
blessing.
Tom
Brake:
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his brief
intervention. It did not give me much meat with which to work, but I
hear his point.
New
clause 45 would make a simple change. I hope that the Government will
consider that it is reasonable. It is entirely in keeping with our
debate about giving the Mayor greater control over things for which he
is rightly responsible. Under the 1999 Act, the deputy Mayor must be a
member of the Metropolitan Police Authority. We must question why that
is the case. It would be appropriate for the deputy Mayor to be a
member of the Metropolitan Police Authority, but I do not understand
why it is a
requirement.
Michael
Gove:
The hon. Gentleman is making an excellent speech in
pursuit of his analysis of our amendments and new clauses. In the
unfortunate absence of the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hillsborough, the
traditional role of Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Minister of
State has now passed to the hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and
Shepherd's Bush, who will no doubt construe that as a reward for his
loyalty in the debate about a single waste authority for
London.
I can tell
from the downcast looks on the faces of the hon. Members for Mitcham
and Morden, for Ealing, North and for Battersea that their energetic
support for the Government has not yet been rewarded as the hon. Member
for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd's Bush has shown it can
be.
Tom
Brake:
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention,
although it bears no close relation to new clause 45. I shall take it
as an endorsement of what I am
advocating.
The
serious point is that there is no strong argument for the deputy Mayor
having to be a member of the MPA. As my colleagues on the GLA have
pointed out, in the past six years or thereabouts the deputy Mayor has
not been able to play a greater role than she might have on the MPA
because she has had other significant interests. The fact that the
Police Act 1996 requires her to be a member of the MPA has stopped the
Mayor from having a third active member representing the Labour party
on that authority. That is one simple reason why I hope that the
Government will support the amendment, which would enable the Mayor,
their supporter and fan, to have a third active member representing him
on the MPA. This straightforward proposal would create an opportunity
for someone who has time and commitment to focus on the role and is not
distracted by other important
matters.
The new
clause is about devolving power to the Mayor, and the Government say
that they want to take power from central Government and hand it to the
Mayor. Allowing the Mayor to determine the responsibilities of his or
her deputy would be entirely straightforward. For once, I am absolutely
convinced that when the Minister responds and clarifies the
Government’s position on new clause 45, it will turn out that I
have their full
support.
Yvette
Cooper:
I welcome the debate that we have had; hon.
Members have argued their cases well. I should like a clarification
before I continue. Am I right in thinking that Opposition Members have
withdrawn new clause
9?
Michael
Gove
indicated assent.
Yvette
Cooper:
As the hon. Gentleman is nodding, it seems that
they have. That is some relief to me, as I was trying to work out how
hon. Members could vote on both the new clauses at the same time, given
the contradictions between
them.
New clause 23,
the central one, would subsume the MPA into the Greater London
authority, and other amendments are in many ways consequential on it. I
shall come back to new clause 45, which the hon. Member for Carshalton
and Wallington raised in the interests of his
mum.
Policing
in England and Wales is managed through a tripartite arrangement that
assigns a national strategic role to the Home Secretary, operational
independence to chief constables—or, in this case, the
commissioner—and accountability for the performance and setting
of local
priorities to police authorities. Police authorities
have a statutory responsibility to consult local people on their
priorities for local policing and to reflect them in the local annual
policing plans for the chief officer of police to deliver. They are
distinct from local authorities; that delineation was brought more
sharply into focus under the Police and Magistrates’ Courts Act
1994, through which the then Conservative Government cut
muchof the link between local government and
policeauthorities.
Tom
Brake:
I wonder whether the Minister has noticed, on the
subject of magistrates, that proposed new section 5AC(2) of the Police
Act 1996, as laid out in proposed new clause 23(2)
states:
“Four
magistrates...shall be co-operated members of this
committee.”
Does the
Minister have the same difficulty as I do in understanding what a
“co-operated member”
is?
Yvette
Cooper:
I am sure that the official Opposition Members who
tabled the new clause will be happy to tell us what
“co-operated” means. I congratulate the hon. Member for
Carshalton and Wallington on spotting the term
“co-operated”, and suggest that perhaps I did not read
the small print of the proposed new clause quite as closely as I should
have done to spot it myself.
Robert
Neill:
I thank the Minister for giving way as it enables
me to congratulate the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington on
having read the detail of the amendment paper with the tenacity of
which Billy Bonds would have been proud. There is a typological error:
the proposed new clause should, of course, refer to
“co-opted” members, which was the phrase that I used in
my speech, but which did not find its way into print. If there is a
means of rectifying that, I will be guided as to how it might be
done.
Yvette
Cooper:
I thank both hon. Members for their questions,
tenacity and clarifications.
Mr.
Pelling:
It is always important to look at the detail of
such things. By way of clarification, when I referred to a lack of
assembly blessing, I was not talking about proposed new clause 45,
tabled by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington, which has
assembly blessing. I was referring to the proposed new clause tabled by
myself and my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and
Chislehurst.
Yvette
Cooper:
It must be of some disappointmentto the
official Opposition Members who are also members of the assembly that
the assembly is not prepared to back their new clauses, and is instead
prepared enthusiastically to endorse the new clauses tabled by Members
on the Liberal Democrat Front Bench.
The composition of police
authorities currently reflects an historic balance, between local
councillors and magistrates. More recently, there has been an injection
of independent members of the community. The model for police
authorities is set out in the Police Act 1996. The Metropolitan Police
Authority has23 members, including a majority of one from the
Greater London assembly.
Independent members of police
authorities were introduced as part of the last Conservative
Government’s reforms, and were first appointed in 1995.
Independent members were introduced to provide a greater skill base to
police authorities, and to increase the diversity of authorities. I
recognise the important points made by hon. Members on the diversity of
GLA members and council members throughout the country. The points were
well argued and I have some sympathy with them. Equally, hon. Members
will understand that there are other arguments in favour of having
independent members of police authorities. Looking across the country,
we see that independent members offer greater diversity and a wider
range of skills. Of the last appointment of independent members to
police authorities in 2003, 21.5 per cent. were from minority ethnic
groups, compared with 4.2 per cent. of councillor members and 4.6 per
cent. of magistrate members. Women made up 46.3 per cent. of
independent members, compared with 23 per cent. of councillor members
and 28.5 per cent. of magistrate members. That is an important
consideration.
Michael
Gove:
The Minister made an important point, and we are all
committed to greater diversity when it comes to executive and
legislative bodies. However, the logic of her point is that it is not
for parties and those that compete for elected office to look to their
own diversity policies to provide redress, but for legislators’
powers of executive appointment. Would the Minister say that that is an
argument for the continued exercise of appointment, rather than
election, to the House of Lords? Would she not agree that the real way
to resolve the problem is not through the continued use of patronage
but through political parties paying closer attention to the need for
diversity?
3.15
pm
The
Chairman:
Order. Before the Minister responds, I remind
her that the Committee cannot debate the composition of the
Lords.
Yvette
Cooper:
Thank you, Lady Winterton, but tempting as it
might be to have a wider debate about the composition of the House of
Lords—
Yvette
Cooper:
As my hon. Friend reminds me, I should resist
it.
As I said, they
are important arguments, and I have some sympathy with what hon.
Members have said, because democratic accountability is important.
However, I point hon. Members to the fact that greater diversity is
being added by independent members. I strongly believe that the
obligation on political parties is greatly to increase diversity. That
is exactly what the Labour party has done both nationally and locally,
with particularly strong action to increase representation of women in
elected positions. I would strongly urge Opposition Members, who do not
have such a strong record in that area, to follow suit.
There are wider issues,
however, to do with skills and the need for a mix of different
experiences. Indeed, the
Police and Justice Act 2006 provides for regulations on the selection of
independents; they need to be drawn up, but assembly members will play
an important role in the appointment of additional independent members
to the MPA. That reflects the point that Opposition Members
made—that additional diversity that can be gained from
co-opting. That approach is in some ways already reflected in the 2006
Act. The 2006 Act
also made a series of other changes, providing for more flexibility in
how members of the MPA and other police authorities in England and
Wales are appointed. In particular, it provides that the MPA is to
consist of the Mayor, if he chooses to be a member, and those members
of the London assembly appointed by him, and others, including at least
one lay justice. The Mayor and the members of the assembly must
constitute the majority of the members of the authority. The Mayor of
London is to chair the authority should he choose to be a member
ofthe authority; if not, he must appoint a chairman from among
the members of the authority.
The provisions of the 2006 Act
clearly strengthen the mayoral role; it gives the Mayor the important
role of chairman, which strengthens his position. As I said, the
non-assembly members will be appointed by the existing members of the
MPA from those on a shortlist prepared by a selection panel.
Those measures, made under the
2006 Act, were debated by both Houses and approved relatively recently.
That is why we are resisting the amendments. We believe that there has
been considerable discussion, although I recognise that there is always
the wider issue of the accountability of the police in a democracy. We
will need sophisticated arrangements to ensure proper accountability
and scrutiny, but also to allow complete operational independence for
the police.
I hope
that hon. Members will forgive me a slightly sceptical moment. Had the
Government proposed the amendments, I suspect that Opposition Members
would be leaping up to argue against them, as they have done with parts
of the Bill, whether it be on planning, museums or any other area. They
might be saying that the interests of the boroughs were not
sufficiently protected or that the Mayor had too much scope and might
start intervening in all kinds of detail, which they would not want to
happen. I congratulate Opposition Members on their dexterity and
nimble-footedness in leaping swiftly to the other side of the argument.
It is the strength of a good Opposition—what we would normally
think of as a good Liberal Democrat approach—although perhaps
not on this occasion.
The House has obviously debated
the matter before, and I am sure that it will be debated again in order
to ensure the accountability of police forces. However, we do not think
that it is right to change the arrangements for the MPA and make them
separate from those that apply to police authorities across the
country. That is why we are resisting the amendments that
woulddo that.
New clause 45 has been tabled
by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington in the special
interests of his mum. I am terribly sorry to have to disappoint his
mother. We agree with the intention behind the
amendment—so much so that we have already introduced and
implemented it as part of the Police and Justice Act 2006. The relevant
requirement has already been removed, so that the deputy Mayor does not
have to be a member of the MPA—although the Mayor will still be
able to include the deputy Mayor in the appointments to the MPA should
he so choose. We could certainly put it on record that that aspect of
the 2006 Act should be seen with due respect and recognition to the
interests of the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington, but I
apologise that I cannot support the addition of his name to the statute
book on this
occasion.
Mr.
Pelling:
Quite clearly, that is going to be a black mark
for the parliamentary draftsman working on behalf of the London
assembly. Does the Minister think that the assembly may not be aware
that that piece of legislation has been introduced, and that that may
reflect the problems that occur when this place is such a legislation
factory?
Yvette
Cooper:
I would not wish to cast aspersions on any
draftsman working for the GLA. If the GLA wants to make further
representations, having looked further at the 2006 Act and at the
point, we would be happy to consider them. I considered whether it
might be possible to help the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington
with his family relationships by accepting the amendment anyway, even
though it was unnecessary, but we concluded that that would probably
not be the most sensible thing to do. On that basis, I ask that the
amendment be
withdrawn.
Michael
Gove:
It is a pleasure to rise to speak on this occasion.
Sadly, I have to express my regret at the Minister’s response to
the points made by my hon. Friends and by the hon. Member for
Carshalton and Wallington. I am disappointed that she has once again
been a cause of disappointment to an hon. Member’s mother. Not
since the days of Don Giovanni have so many mothers been disappointed
by someone who still manages to maintain their poise and smile even as
they are breaking hearts.
Mr.
Pelling:
Did he play for
Newcastle?
Michael
Gove:
Don Giovanni did not form part of the midfield
line-up for Newcastle United FC.
Stephen
Pound:
He plays for
Chelsea.
Michael
Gove:
He is almost certainly going to be the new manager
of Chelsea. He certainly stands comparison with Jose Mourinho when it
comes to off-the-field athletics. In the same area, I am disappointed
also that the hon. Lady, again with a twinkle in her eye, suggested
that our position was too flexible. She seemed to suggest that we were
playing in two different positions at once; that we were, in
ideological terms, adherents to the Dutch theory of total
football—simultaneously taking a forward line on granting powers
to the Mayor when it suited us and a defensive position when it did
not. For the benefit of the House, I shall repeat the philosophical
point that
has guided both us and, in almost every case, the Liberal Democrats
throughout the debate. Wherever possible, we want to see powers being
devolved to the Mayor. We have not wanted the powers of the Mayor to be
at the expense of the boroughs. And we have wanted to ensure that the
Mayor’s extra powers are balanced by an enhanced role for the
scrutiny of the assembly. The amendments conform to every one of those
tests. There are three tests, rather than the Treasury’s
favoured five, but they apply nevertheless. Are powers to be devolved
to the Mayor? Absolutely. Is there to be an enhanced scrutiny role for
the assembly? Absolutely, because the GLA acquires extra powers that
the MPA currently exercises. Will there be any costs to the boroughs?
Not at all. In fact, overall Londoners gain through greater
accountability.
However, to be fair, I noted
that the Minister betrayed more sympathy with the spirit of the
amendment than with many of our others. I hope that that suggests that
any change in Government policy on the part of Ministers as a result of
any change at the top will be more in tune with the principle of
greater police accountability. A consistent theme of my party, both
when my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Mr.
Letwin) was shadow Home Secretary and subsequently, has been that the
police in this country suffer from a confused and tangled system of
accountability. We need a clear and more transparent link between
public wishes, the priorities that they set, the elected
representatives of the public and how the police discharge their
functions. The hon. Member for Ealing, North pointed out in his
intervention that we already have a more democratic system, but I felt
that he uncharacteristically misunderstood my hon. Friend the Member
for Croydon, Central. The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis at
the moment being accountable to a plethora of bodies does not make him
more accountable. The confusion of accountability means that the public
do not know which levers need to be pulled or which buttons pressed in
order to get the commissioner to take account of public
opinion.
My hon.
Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst pointed out the important
example of New York. Mayor Giuliani was conspicuously successful
through his appointment of commissioners such as Bill Bratton in
bringing down the crime rate. Indeed,the New York experience
probably shames the performance of the Metropolitan police by
comparison. Clearly, a city that has been Democrat throughout much of
its history has now got into the habit of electing Republican mayors,
if not Republican Senators or congressional figures, precisely because
Republican mayors have been able to deliver policing changes. They have
not interfered in the nooks and crannies of policing operations, but
they have used their mandate to choose an appropriate commissioner to
set an appropriate strategy. Our amendment is the closest that the
Government could come effectively to enthusing the policing of London
with the Giuliani
spirit.
I am sorry
that the Minister has not seen fit to accept our amendment today. I
hope that there will be an opportunity, perhaps if the Minister rises
to become the first female Home Secretary in a future Administration,
to ensure that police accountability
and the link between public priorities and the
effective discharge of police commissioners’ and chief
constables’ roles become closer and more
transparent.
Tom
Brake:
Clearly, at this point, my sensible course of
action is not to press for a
vote.
Yvette
Cooper:
I must clarify my earlier remarks. I have just
remembered that we have not yet implemented the measures removing the
requirement for the Deputy Mayor to be on the MPA. The legislation to
do so has been passed, but has not yet commenced. We expect
commencement to occur alongside the rest of the provisions in 2008. The
current deputy Mayor will not be removed inthe meantime. That
would probably account for the different understandings of the
Government andthe
GLA.
Tom
Brake:
I thank the
Minister.
Mr.
Pelling:
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the
parliamentary draftsmen for the GLA are perhaps more astute than
expected?
Tom
Brake:
That may well be the case. The sensible course of
action is not to press for a vote on new clause 45 later in
the proceedings, although, presumably, if I did, Government Members
would be required to support me, given that the new clause is existing
policy. I could therefore present something framed to my mother, which
she could hang on her wall. I will not press new clause 45 to a
vote.
Robert
Neill:
Someone has to say something on behalf of my poor
mother as well, in all these
circumstances—
Stephen
Pound:
She certainly has our
sympathy.
Robert
Neill:
The feeling is mutual. She has sympathy for me
having to endure the good comradeship and amusement of the hon.
Gentleman. He is clearly well aware that the first time my mother saw
me on television in any political role was when I was leading a
delegation looking at reform of the Street Offences Act. Somebody came
and told her, “Bob’s on the television talking about
prostitutes in Amsterdam.” Against that background, she was
pleased to see me take my seat in the House. Next time she comes, I
shall point her in the direction of the hon. Member for Ealing, North
and she can discuss with him her intimate interest in football, which I
am sure will be greatly edifying to both of
them.
3.30 pm
Having protected my
mother’s position, I must say that I am disappointed by the
Minister’s response, grateful though my hon. Friend the Member
for Surrey Heath was for the tone of her comments. My hon. Friend the
Member for Croydon, Central and I endeavour to be nimble. I accept that
we are not yet at a Carlos Tevez and Yossi Benayoun level of
nimbleness, but we are working on it. I see that the hon. Member for
Ealing, North blanches at the thought of our rising through diligent
training to those two players’ degree of skill.
I appreciate the
Minister’s point on diversity. It was well met by the comments
of my hon. Friend the Member for Surrey Heath, but I am concerned. She
went into some detail, for which I am grateful, about the attempt to
mirror the situation elsewhere in the country, but we pressed the
matter to a Division because we argue that the whole point of
devolution is that it is not necessary to mirror national templates in
a devolved situation. Undue weight has perhaps been given to that
desire in the Government’s decision to oppose the amendments. We
have sought to tailor make a different situation for London because
London’s needs are
different.
I am
grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon, Central for
referring to the democratic deficit in policing, not just at the
strategic level but in how safer neighbourhood panels operate. I hope
that the Minister will take those comments on board and speak to her
friends in the Home Office. It seems strange that local ward
councillors should be prohibited from involvement in safer
neighbourhood teams in their areas. All of us in London want
neighbourhood policing to work, but it will work better with a closer
collaboration between the safer neighbourhood teams and panels and
local ward councillors. I hope that that message can be taken back
constructively from this
discussion.
I note the
comments about the boroughs’ involvement, and I hope that that
can be developed. One reason why we thought it useful for the assembly
to be the scrutiny body is that, although it would not go as far as new
clause 9 and put borough representatives on the police authority as in
the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority model, every borough
would have a directly elected constituency representative in the London
assembly, so there would be a direct borough-constituency link. We
think that that is a virtue of our
system.
When I visited
New York with cross-party assembly colleagues and looked at the working
of the New York city council police committee, it was interesting that
it had the ability to scrutinise in considerable detail without going
into operational matters, drilling down to performance at precinct
level, which I suppose is the equivalent of our borough operational
command unit. The committee did so intensely and effectively. Perhaps
that is a lesson for us to take on board. With those comments of
disappointment, we will press our
amendment.
Question
put, That the amendment be
made:—
The
Committee divided: Ayes 5, Noes
10.
Division
No.
18
]
Smith,
Ms Angela C.
(Sheffield,
Hillsborough)
Question
accordingly negatived.
Schedule 2 agreed
to.
Clause 53
ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
| 
