New Clause
32
Mayor
to set the performance priorities for London Development
Agency
‘The Mayor shall set
the annual performance targets for the London Development Agency after
consultation with the Secretary of
State.’.—[Mr.
Pelling.]
Brought
up, and read the First
time.
Mr.
Pelling:
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second
time.
I move the
motion with the experience of having sat on the board of the London
Development Agency, which sits in the wider regional development agency
family. The targets that are set for the London Development Agency
might be applicable to RDAs generally, but they have often been found
not to sit so
well with an agency that operates within a separate democratic process.
There is significant input from the Mayor and the Mayor’s
office. However, a lot of the reporting information that is required of
the London Development Agency has been quite irrelevant to the needs of
an agency that operates within the overall democratic structure of
London’s governance. It is also important that the
London Development Agency should be able to secure its direction from
the Mayor, in having targets set for it in respect of his or her
desires for the performance of the London economy, and for the
rejuvenation of those parts of London that are deprived and in need of
special support. In that respect, I am again grateful for the strong
support for the new clause from London First, which says that it is
appropriate that the Mayor should set such priorities, rather than
central Government, so that the work of the LDA is entirely consistent
with the overall economic development strategy for the
capital.
Our approach
throughout the discussions on the Bill has been, where possible, to
devolve powers from central Government to the Mayor, while also
ensuring that the Mayor does not secure powers up from local
government. The new clause therefore sits well within our overall
philosophy for the Bill—to be radical and positive about extra
powers for the Mayor, while ensuring that political decisions are made
at the lowest political level, in terms of their closeness to the
residents who elect the
politicians.
Tom
Brake:
I shall speak briefly in favour of the new clause,
which is a devolutionary measure that we support. We have taken
guidance from the Liberal Democrat members on the GLA throughout, to
ensure that what we say there is entirely consistent with what we say
here. That is something that other parties might envy, particularly the
Labour party, in that it ensures a consistent approach to such
matters.
The new
clause is important and would provide strategic direction for the LDA.
It is true that the LDA has a lot of targets, but they seem to change
with some frequency. It is not always clear from the agency’s
budget what precisely it is seeking to achieve. On the basis that the
new clause not only would give the agency greater direction and more
focus, but would be a devolutionary measure, I should be happy to
support the hon. Member for Croydon, Central, should he press the
matter to a
vote.
Jim
Fitzpatrick:
I am afraid that the Government cannot accept
the new clause, which would enable the Mayor, on a statutory basis, to
set the LDA’s annual performance targets, following consultation
with the Secretary of State.
The 1999 Act
amended the Regional Development Agencies Act 1998 to establish the LDA
as a functional body of the Mayor. The office of the Mayor was given
considerable statutory control over the agency—the Mayor
appoints its members, approves its strategy, decides its budgets and
can issue directions and guidance to it. The current Mayor has already
used those powers effectively to ensure that the LDA is supporting the
economic development and regeneration of London. Most notably, the
agency played a crucial role in supporting the Olympic bid and
assembling the land for the Olympic park. The
Government expect the Mayor and future Mayors to continue to shape the
agency so that it can better address the key challenges facing
London’s economy. However, the LDA is also an
integral part of the wider regional development agency network for
England, which receives considerable funding from the
Government—more than £2.2 billion of
taxpayers’ money this year, of which nearly £400 million
is for the LDA itself—to support regional economic development
and to contribute to national objectives such as increasing
productivity. Given that considerable Government funding, it is
important that the LDA, like other RDAs, supports underlying national
objectives when taking action to improve London’s economy, which
is why it is part of the wider RDA tasking arrangements. As a condition
of the LDA’s grant, the Mayor has been required since the last
spending review in 2004 to seek the Secretary of State’s
approval for the LDA’s annual targets.
Those arrangements have given
the LDA sufficient flexibility to develop its own programmes and
projects and to address London’s specific challenges, such as
affordable child care and the Olympic land assembly programmes. At the
same time, they provide assurances to Government and ultimately
Parliament that funding given to the LDA is contributing to underlying
national objectives.
By putting the LDA’s
performance targets on a statutory footing, the new clause would change
those arrangements substantially. The Mayor alone would be responsible
for setting the LDA’s performance targets following consultation
with the Secretary of State. That arrangement would be enshrined in
statute and would remove an important Government control that currently
ensures that the LDA and national economic policies are complementary
and mutually supporting. The merits of such a new clause must be
carefully considered, and we suggest that that would be done best not
as a last-minute change to the Bill but as part of a wider policy
review.
The
Government’s review of sub-national economic development and
regeneration is considering the role of RDAs and other sub-national
bodies involved in economic development and regeneration, and whether
the framework and relationships between them and with central
Government are the most effective for meeting the long-term economic
challenges. The review may have wider implications for the LDA’s
governance and performance arrangements, and we should not introduce a
statutory change to the LDA’s output target arrangements before
the outcomes of the wider review are decided. The sub-national review
will report to Ministers before the comprehensive spending review later
this year.
The hon.
Member for Croydon, Central has raised the question of land disposal
several times. I can advise him that TFL and the LDA have a different
statutory disposal of land consent regime. Under section 5 of the 1998
Act, the LDA needs to seek the Secretary of State’s consent for
the disposal of land only if that land is being disposed of at less
than market consideration. Following the Government’s decision
in the 2005 Budget to give the LDA more freedoms and flexibilities,
that consent is only required for the
disposal of lands worth more than £2 million on the open market.
Local authorities are subject to a similar statutory consent
regime. I hope that
that clarifies the position and assists the hon. Gentleman. However, as
I have explained, the Government cannot accept the new clause as it
stands and urge that the motion be
withdrawn.
Mr.
Pelling:
I am grateful for the support of the hon. Member
for Carshalton and Wallington. I know that the issue is well considered
by his colleagues in the Liberal Democrat group on the London assembly.
I hope that as the debates continue elsewhere, the Government will give
clear cognisance to the value of such a devolutionary approach, which
seems after all to be the theme that they also wish to pursue. With
those comments, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the
motion.
Motion and
clause, by leave,
withdrawn.
New
Clause
46
Budget
and Performance Office (London
Assembly)
‘(1) There shall be
an office to be known as the Budget and Performance Office (London
Assembly) to be headed by a Director who shall be appointed by the
Assembly on a simple majority vote upon the recommendation of an
independent Budget and Performance Office Advisory
Board.
(2) The Director shall
be appointed without regard to political affiliation and solely on the
basis of fitness to perform the duties assigned by the Assembly. The
terms of office of Directors appointed shall expire upon each general
election of the Assembly. Any individual appointed to fill a vacancy
prior to the expiration of a term shall serve only for the unexpired
portion of the term. An individual serving as Director at the
expiration of a term may continue to serve until a successor is
appointed.
(3) The funds
available to pay for the expenses of the Budget and Performance Office
(London Assembly) during each financial year shall not be less than the
equivalent of 10 per cent. of the annual expenditure of the Greater
London Authority Finance
Department.
(4) The Director
shall appoint such personnel and procure the services of such experts
and consultants within the funds available as may be necessary for the
Director to carry out the duties and functions assigned herein. Such
personnel and experts shall perform such duties as may be assigned to
them by the Director.
(5) The
Director shall be authorised to secure such information, data,
estimates and statistics from the functional bodies of the Greater
London Authority as the Director determines to be necessary for the
performance of the functions and duties of the office, and such bodies
shall provide such information, to the extent that it is available, in
a timely fashion.
(6) The
Director shall not be entitled to obtain records which are protected by
commercial sensitivity or material prepared for
litigation.
(7) There shall be
an independent Budget and Performance Office Advisory Board consisting
of 10 members appointed jointly by the chairs of each of the
Authority’s functional bodies and the
Mayor.
(8) The members of the
Budget and Performance Office Advisory Board must have extensive
experience and knowledge in the fields of finance, economics,
accounting, public administration and public policy analysis, and must
include at least one former Finance Director of the Greater London
Authority or of a comparable office in another local
authority.
(9) It shall be the duty of the Budget and
Performance Office (London Assembly) to provide to Assembly Members
information which will assist in the discharge of their
responsibilities which are related to the budgetary process,
including—
(a)
information with respect to the budget, consultations, strategies and
policies with financial
implications;
(b) information
with respect to estimated revenues and receipts and changing revenue
conditions; and
(c) to the
extent practicable, such other information or analyses as may be
requested.
(10) The Director,
upon the request of Assembly Members, shall complete a financial impact
statement of such proposed consultation, strategy and
policy.
(11) The Director shall
from time to time publish such reports as may be appropriate to enhance
official and public understanding of the budgetary process and of the
budget documents published in accordance with current legislation. The
Director shall from time to time publish such reports as may be
necessary or appropriate to provide such information, data, and
analysis as will enhance official and public understanding of matters
relating to expenditures, financial management practices and related
matters.
(12) The Director
shall publish an annual report on the performance of the Greater London
Authority and the functional bodies of the Greater London
Authority.
(13) The Director
shall make all information, data, estimates, and statistics obtained in
pursuance of subsection (5) and all studies and reports prepared by the
office, available for public inspection, both in person and
online.’.—[Mr.
Pelling.]
Brought
up, and read the First
time.
12.45
pm
Mr.
Pelling:
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second
time.
The new clause
is very important for the operation of the London assembly.
Analysing the overall performance and the budgetary performance of the
GLA family and its functional bodies should be at the very heart of the
scrutiny role.
One criticism
of the GLA budgetary process made by academics—most notably by
Tony Travers—is its tremendous weakness in not providing a
separate and independent office with the ability to provide advice to
the GLA and to Londoners on the performance and the financial
activities of the GLA. It is difficult to progress a budgetary process
when one relies on officials who are intimately involved in the
production of the Mayor’s budget, and are required to maintain
complete secrecy about what is enclosed within that budget, while at
the same time giving advice to the London assembly on the construction
of an alternative budget.
Tom
Brake:
I seek clarification on one point. Is the hon.
Gentleman proposing that we use the New York model, which I understand
has an office distinct from both the mayor and the assembly? However,
the relationship in the new clause between the assembly and the budget
office seems to be much closer than in the New York
model.
Mr.
Pelling:
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for
mentioning the New York City charter. He is a little unfair in
suggesting that the process I have outlined departs very far from the
New York charter. While I would not wish to be charged with plagiarism,
the structure of the new clause relies heavily on the
provisions in that charter. Indeed, I positively decided to use that
model because it has been so successful in the governance of New York
city.
One of the
benefits of that approach is that it will give ownership both to the
assembly and to the Mayor by allowing the Mayor and the chairs of the
functional bodies to appoint the board, which will appoint a director
of the budget and performance office. There will be that involvement
and support through that appointment process. Under the new clause, the
director would be appointed in such a way that he or she was an
independent person, free from party political affiliation, who had the
particular qualifications to support that office.
The new clause would promote
good discipline as regards the £11 billion that is spent
annually on the London Assembly, £44 million for every sitting
between election cycles of the assembly. Money would be directed to an
effective budget and performance office that Londoners were able to
recognise as an excellent and independent source of information on the
performance of the functional bodies of the Greater London
authority—an office that was free from the spin of the politics
of the assembly or of the Mayor through The London
Paper—so that people could feel confident that they were
making a real judgment on the quality of the performance as regards
£11 billion of public
expenditure.
Tom
Brake:
In case the hon. Gentleman was about to conclude
his comments, I just wanted to seek some clarity. The new clause refers
to the office receiving the equivalent of 10 per cent. of the annual
expenditure of the GLA finance department. My understanding is that
there is no such thing as the GLA finance department, so did he mean to
refer to the finance and performance department, which is a very large
department? Is he including in his figures the people in the different
functional bodies who work on financial matters? Will he give us an
idea of the scale of the funding to which he is
referring?
Mr.
Pelling:
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving me
the opportunity to provide further colour to the new clause. I was
indeed referring to the finance and performance department within the
strategic body of the GLA, and most definitely not to the finance
departments and organisations within the functional bodies. There would
be some significant expenditure involved, but the most important thing
in that provision is that it ensures that there is some protection for
the amount of money—serious money—given to that
office.
In
conclusion, the new clause offers the prospect of providing a strong
discipline to the assembly, so that its resources are deployed on its
fundamental role of scrutinising the budgetary process. The ability to
vote down the Mayor’s budget on a two-thirds majority is the
only real executive power that the assembly has. That is important. The
proposals would ensure that resources are not unnecessarily applied in
respect of the political interests of assembly members. Rather, they
would be applied to hold the Mayor to account on financial and overall
performance, in line with the model that has worked so successfully in
New York city.
The
Chairman:
Before I call anyone to speak, I think it would
be helpful for the Committee to know that it is my intention to allow
the sitting to run on a little longer if necessary. As Chairman, I have
discretion to be able to do that, and I felt that it would make people
feel more comfortable to know.
Jim
Fitzpatrick:
On a point of order, Lady Winterton. I advise
you, Lady Winterton, as our referee, that in professional football
there are now men who come out and hold up a board to indicate the
amount of time remaining.
Tom
Brake:
We will not go beyond the agreed time as a result
of my intervention. I rise simply to confirm that my earlier
interventions were of a sympathetic nature, probing the new clause.
Should the hon. Member for Croydon, Central have the time to press the
motion to a Division, I will be inclined to support
it.
Yvette
Cooper:
The hon. Member for Croydon, Central’s
approach is based on models from the United States. Bodies such as the
congressional budget office perform important functions in US political
life and there are similar examples throughout the American political
process, but he will appreciate that the structure and process are
different here. From a legal perspective, it is possible for the
assembly to set up its own budget research unit or office under its own
ambit, using powers given by section 34 of the 1999 Act. The assembly
can also use its scrutiny powers. The proposal in the Bill for the
assembly to have its own budget could make it easier to fund a budget
research unit.
The
reason why the Government think that the new clause would not be
appropriate is that, unlike America, we have a common legislative
framework for local government finance and performance, to which the
GLA and its functional bodies are subject. The GLA group’s
financial performance and accounts are independently scrutinised by the
Audit Commission. The group is also subject to the provisions of part 2
of the Local Government Act 2003, which mean that the GLA’s
chief finance officer is under a duty to report to the Mayor and the
assembly on the robustness of the authority’s draft final
consolidated budget calculations.
A statutory budget
and performance office would cut across those existing provisions,
potentially leading to duplication and confusion in the audit and
scrutiny processes. For that reason, the Government are not convinced
about the need for a statutory budget and performance office, and so
ask the hon. Member for Croydon, Central to withdraw the
motion.
Mr.
Pelling:
It is with some regret that I feel that I have
not been able to make my case sufficiently well to persuade the
Minister. However, I shall not detain the Committee by pressing the new
clause to a Division. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the
motion.
Motion and
clause, by leave,
withdrawn.
Yvette
Cooper:
On a point of order, Lady Winterton. May I thank
you and your co-Chairman for the professional and effective way in
which you have refereed, supervised and assisted our scrutiny of the
Bill? I thank you for your tolerance of some of the flights of fantasy
and fancy in which we have engaged at times.
I also thank
the Clerks, Hansard Reporters and Doorkeepers for helping to
make the business of the
Committee smoother than it might otherwise have been. I particularly
thank my hon. Friend the Minister for London for his hard work and
support. I thank all my hon. Friends for their contributions and
enthusiasm. I also
extend thanks to the Opposition spokesmen, the hon. Members for Surrey
Heath and for Carshalton and Wallington, and their Opposition
colleagues, for the way that they have made their points. This has been
one of the most cheerful and entertaining Committees on which I have
had the pleasure to serve; given some of the others, I am not sure how
strong a compliment that is. This Committee has been cheerful and
amiable throughout. I hope that on Report things will continue in that
spirit.
Michael
Gove:
On a point of order, Lady Winterton. I associate
myself completely with the remarks made by the Minister for Housing and
Planning. It has been an absolute pleasure to serve under your
chairmanship and that of your co-Chairman, Mr.
O’Hara. The Committee has been an education for me and although
it may have been a trial for you and Mr. O’Hara, I am
grateful for your forbearance and patience.
I am also
grateful to the Clerks for their guidance during the
Committee—and before it, when my hon. Friends and I were framing
our amendments. I thank the Doorkeepers and Hansard Reporters
for their kindness and support. I completely associate myself
with the Minister’s remarks about the good humour and amiability
with which the Committee has conducted its business. That is due in no
small part to how she, the Minister for London and the hon. Member for
Chatham and Aylesford have combined a firm hand on the Executive tiller
with an indulgent smile for the Opposition’s
sallies.
Before I came
to this House, I paid close attention to comments made by the right
hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr. Straw) when he was Home
Secretary. He said that there had never been a Bill for which he was
responsible that had not been improved by its passage through the House
of Commons, in particular the Committee stage. I rather admired his
saying that, because it suggested a degree of open-mindedness that did
him and his office credit.
However, I should like to place
on the record that although I admire the Government’s generosity
of spirit in their handling of this Bill, we have put forward a string
of amendments and new clauses, not a single one of which has been
accepted by them. We have laboured in vain, but I hope that on Report
and on Third Reading the opportunity to reflect on the arguments that
have been so faithfully committed into Hansard by the
Reporters’ hands will lead the Ministers to think again. They
may recognise that many of the arguments put forward by my hon.
Friends—and, indeed, the hon. Member for Carshalton and
Wallington—deserve to be revisited and perhaps incorporated at
one of those later
stages.
Tom
Brake:
On a point of order, Lady Winterton. I thank you
for your chairmanship and echo the thanks of the Minister and the hon.
Gentleman to all those involved in ensuring that events have run
smoothly. I agree that the debate has been good humoured, and I am sure
that that approach will be maintained on Report and in the other
place.
I have only one regret: that
both the hon. Member for Surrey Heath and I will leave this Committee
with no successful amendments to present to our mothers. However, we
shall return to the issues
later.
The
Chairman:
Before I put the question, I should like, on
behalf of my co-Chairman Eddie O’Hara and myself, to respond to
the kind remarks made by the Minister and the Opposition spokesmen. The
Committee has debated some weighty matters constructively and
good-humouredly. I say without contradiction that it has been the best
and most
interesting Bill that I have had the pleasure of chairing. I thank all
Committee members for
that.
I, too, thank
the Doorkeepers, the police, the Hansard Reporters and in
particular the Clerks, without whose expertise we would not be so well
placed to debate and carry the Committee stage through in the
traditional manner.
The great thing is that I get
to blow the final whistle.
Ordered,
That
certain memoranda already reported to the House be appended to the
proceedings of the Committee.—
[Yvette
Cooper.]
Bill
to be reported, without
amendment.
Committee
rose at two minutes past One
o’clock.
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