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Session 2006 - 07 Publications on the internet General Committee Debates Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Bill |
Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Bill |
The Committee consisted of the following Members:John
Benger, Committee
Clerk
†
attended the
Committee
WitnessesPhil
Woolas MP, Minister of State for Local Government, Department for
Communities and Local
Government
Angela
E. Smith MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Communities
and Local
Government
Rosie
Winterton MP, Minister of State, Department of
Health
David
Prout, Director of Local Democracy, Department for Communities and
Local
Government
Paul
Rowsell, Deputy Director Local Democracy, Department for Communities
and Local
Government
Meredith
Vivian, Head of Responsiveness and Accountability, Department of
Health
Public Bill CommitteeThursday 1 February 2007(Afternoon)[Mr. Christopher Chope in the Chair]Local Government and Public Involvement in Health BillWritten evidence to be reported to the HouseLGPI 05 Electoral
Reform
Society
2
pm
The Committee
deliberated in
private.
2.16
pm
On
resuming—
The
Chairman:
Good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to this
sitting of the Committee. I remind participants that the acoustics in
the room leave something to be desired, so I encourage people to speak
up. I welcome three Ministers—I do not know what a collective of
Ministers is called: I suggest a mint of Ministers. Thank you for
coming along this
afternoon.
We
shall go straight into the first question from Alistair
Burt.
Q141
Alistair
Burt (North-East Bedfordshire) (Con): We have had a most
interesting opening to our proceedings on the Bill through the witness
procedure. I want to begin this afternoon with a general question
directed at the Minister for Local Government about what we have heard.
The Bill has been set in the context of the nature of government in
this country and the concerns that are expressed outside about the
powers that people have locally to make decisions and to make things
happen, and a recognition of the frustration that is sometimes out
there. We have seen the Government’s determination to do
something about it being challenged by some of the witnesses, who would
have liked them to go further. I would therefore like to ask the
Minister, in the context of listening to the evidence sessions and
taking part in them, have you changed your opinion on anything that you
have heard about? Have queries been raised in your mind about the
balance of devolution that you have reached? Does the witness procedure
mean that you will be thinking about the Bill in a way that you would
not have been without that
procedure?
Phil
Woolas:
First, Mr. Chope, I thank you and
wish you well in the Chair. We are very proud to be the first Ministers
to give evidence to a Standing
Committee.
Alistair,
could I say what a clever question that was? Government Departments
have relationships with each other, as well as with Parliament and, in
our case, with local government. Our strategy has been to ensure
that
Government across Whitehall come with us. We are trying to join up the
governance and delivery of services at local level, so it is necessary
that the consultation and the effort of that consultation are deep and
broad and real. By the end of the consultation on the White Paper, we
were being criticised for having taken too long. We therefore saw it as
a sign of
success.
It
would be inconsistent and dishonest to say that the evidence that we
have heard has not influenced thinking. There are a number of areas
where the Government genuinely have an open mind about how best to
achieve the objectives on which we think there is a consensus. We have
spent particular effort in building a consensus across the parties in
the Local Government Association. I was particularly pleased by its
representatives’ evidence on the first of their three major
points. I cannot say that, and then not take its second point
seriously. So the answer is yes. I personally think that it has been
valuable and I hope that this sitting is, too. I am conscious of not
wanting to take up all of your
time.
Q142
Andrew
Stunell (Hazel Grove) (LD): The invite or direct question
has been one on which witnesses have commented. You have commented on
it at different stages with perhaps slightly different voices. Will you
tell us where the Government’s thinking is now about
direct?
Phil
Woolas:
When we set out the invitation to propose, we
were—and we remain—committed to a genuinely permissive
regime. We did not wish to adopt a one-size-fits-all model because
there is a paradox between devolution and equal treatment. We cannot
genuinely say that we are devolving for local decision making and then
say, “This is how you are going to do it.” Previous
reviews, particularly the Banham review, had a role within that process
for the boundary committee, so that it could have the power of
direction to ensure that, if a proposal for unitary were to be adopted,
it was fair for the whole area that was affected—that is, for
the neighbouring councils—it was robust and it met the criteria
in the proposing area. It is clear that there is support for that power
among some of the people who are
proposing.
It is
equally clear that there is a suspicion—let me put it that
way—that that power could be used in a different way. The Local
Government Association made that point clear on an all-party basis. Our
policy intention was to allow a window of opportunity for proposals for
unitary, but to close that window, not in haste, but so as not to allow
an undue period of uncertainty. All local government knows that that is
damaging for
it.
Representations
have been made by the Local Government Association. We accept its
point. We are working on parliamentary counsel instruction to have a
power of direction that is defined in both geography and time to the
satisfaction of the LGA. Indeed, that was a major issue that came up on
Second Reading. It is not our intention to impose change. I think that
the evidence now backs up that point, although there is a raging debate
out there in some councils and motives are often ascribed that are not
intended. We intend to listen to the points that some hon. Members
madeon Second Reading and well as those made by the
LGA.
Q143
Alison
Seabeck (Plymouth, Devonport) (Lab): In the regulatory
impact assessment to the local government White Paper, the Government
accept that the costs indicated for restructuring are broad brush.
Obviously, we have seen some of the criticism produced by academics of
the way in which the costs are being assessed. Some interesting figures
have been bandied
about.
Do you accept
that some figures that are based clearly on what happened in and around
Banham probably cannot be moved across to the current situation because
local authorities are now much more under the microscope in terms of
their financial probity and so on. Therefore, those authorities that
are likely to be going forward will be doing so from a much better
informed position than some of those that had looked at it under
Banham.
Phil
Woolas:
There is a wide spectrum of opinion in
academia about costs. One of the obvious points in local government
finance is the ability to compare like with like. We set our policy of
inviting proposals within two frameworks. I described the first in the
previous answer. The second framework ensures that thenewly
created financial regime benefits the counciltax payer and
does not jeopardise but indeed supports the Government’s overall
macro-economic policy, particularly the famous golden rule.
The invitation therefore
contains five criteria, including that proposals must be self-financing
within five years; must be met from within the resource envelope of the
local authority or authorities concerned—in other words, they
must be self-financing through efficiency savings or through reserves;
and must result in a council tax that is equalised down if it is across
district borders, and cannot be greater if it is in a single transfer.
The context of that is that the up-front costs contribute towards local
government total borrowing because of their impact on reserves and
assets. When one asks, “How can you say that there can only be a
limited number and make sure that they are self-financing?” the
answer is that we have to look—as my colleagues and I do
anyway—at the total local government borrowing
position.
Q144
Alison
Seabeck:
Were the same constraints imposed on local
authorities after the changes from Banham? You are being quite clear
and tight about it.
Phil
Woolas:
From memory, they were not, but
I would like to seek expert
assistance.
Paul
Rowsell:
In the process of the Banhamreview,
the Local Government Commission made recommendations that were either
accepted or rejected on the basis of all the factors. Finance was just
one of the factors, and there were no requirements as now. Indeed, for
some of the new unitaries set up then, the payback periods were about
10
years.
Q145
Alistair
Burt:
I have a couple of questions. First, there have been
26 proposals for unitary status. The White Paper said that you were
looking for eight that you might have the opportunity to process. Are
you going to stick to eight, or are you going to try to make the most
of those 26? Surely the more there are to consider, the more
unacceptable it is in terms of public expenditure?
Phil
Woolas:
The 26 proposals are in some
cases mutually contradictory. Hence the first question on the power to
direct, the controversy and the point that although it is always
desirable to achieve consensus and have a permissive devolved regime,
the question always arises, “What do you do if people
disagree?” whether at ward level, neighbourhood level, borough
level, district or county level.
The eight figure comes from a
calculation of the potential impact on local government borrowing. If
assets and reserves are used to fund up-front costs, that has an impact
on the balance sheet and on the golden rule. That is where the eight
comes from. Without knowing where the eight, six or 10 proposals would
come from, and without having the analysis of that, it is impossible to
say exactly, which is why the Secretary of State used the phrase
“around eight”.
The constraints upon us are,
quite rightly, the viability of the proposals and the macro-economic
picture. The chances of there being more than eight are there, and the
chances of there being less than eight are there, depending on that
analysis. Once we had said that we were asking for invitations, apart
from the macro-economic context, we do not see that it is our role to
determine how many there should be.
Q146
Alistair
Burt:
My second question relates to
general costs. You listened to the evidence from the chairman of
Conservative district council groups. He said that in his experience no
restructuring had ever saved any money. Do you have any experience of
savings achieved through local government restructuring?
Phil
Woolas:
Personally? East Riding of
Yorkshire—that is one that I have studied. In my view—I
think it would be shared by my predecessors in all
Governments—when you make changes in local government finance,
there is normally a built-in creep upwards. It is therefore incumbent
on Government to make sure that that does not happen. For example, our
new burdens policy is a good policy, which rightly recognises that
councils may be given extra responsibilities and that it is incumbent
on Government to provide the resources to meet them. However, it is a
net new burdens policy—savings as well as costs are generated by
changes. Precisely because it is a bottom-up process that we are
proposing, it is incumbent on councils, and not the Government, to
prove the financial case, and we have built that in to the criteria.
That is how I see it.
Q147
Alistair
Burt:
Do you think that we would be right to wary of those
who wave cost savings at their electors as the potential good news
behind a restructuring, going by all our collective
experience?
Phil
Woolas:
The answer to that is
yes.
Q148
Andrew
Stunell:
I guess that that brings us logically to the next
point, which is about the broad cross-section of support that will be
taken into account. You heard some evidence from Unlock Democracy that
suggested a recall trigger, if you like, and plans that would allow for
referendums. What is your view on those suggestions? More broadly, what
will your approach be to developing knowledge of what a broad
cross-section of support really is?
Phil
Woolas:
Thanks for that question—it is very
important. We have tried to set out a timetable that meets the
objective of opening the window of opportunity and then closing it, so
that we do not get the uncertainties. The uncertainties can be very
real—they can be about staff deciding to move jobs or contracts
going unsigned. Although there are benefits from the process, there are
disadvantages, of which I am very conscious. On the other hand, public
support for change is the ultimate arbitrator. If there is no public
support, the question of how it could be done
arises.
We have allowed
in the timetable a window of opportunity, which closed on 25 January.
Only a council could propose change in that time. If a council has not
proposed change, there can be no change, other than by the direct
all-county solution that we have talked about. The second stage in the
process is the assessment of a proposal against the criteria, which is
subject to legal challenge should we stray—in other words, we
have to consider whether there is a prima facie case against the
criteria. The third stage is what is called, in the modern world,
stakeholder consultation, which will include all interested parties,
especially the public.
There are therefore two built-in
safety mechanisms. First, there has to be a demonstration of public
support. A feature of our permissive regime is that councils can go
about doing that in different ways. Secondly, the third period
coincides with local elections. I expect that local elections in those
areas where a prima facie case has been accepted will provide
significant guidance to the councils that are putting forward
proposals.
Phil
Woolas:
No, because the consultation of interested
parties—an expression I much prefer to
“stakeholders”—and the decision on whether the
proposals will go ahead, which is subject to our consideration of the
Bill, cannot happen until after that
date.
Q150
Patrick
Hall (Bedford) (Lab):
I want to give the
Minister an opportunity to be clear about the discussion that we have
just had about the understandable caution that we need to apply
regarding alleged savings—the issues that came out of
questioning from Alistair Burt.
Presumably, the Minister would
be prepared to consider the possibility that savings may be obtained if
a council can demonstrate that clearly. I know of one bid that claims
that the council concerned can meet quite a few of the costs from
reserves. It is self-financing not only in terms of long-term revenue
savings, but up front from reserves. That is a point that must be
considered. Is it not also the case that it is not just a question of
justifying possible unitary bids in terms of immediate or longer-term
savings but of making more effective use of what money there is? That
is what local government should be about too.
Phil
Woolas:
In answer to the previous question whether
there was evidence, I cited East Riding. It is clear that the potential
savings from going unitary are significant. We know that from closer
working now and from previous experience, but by putting the onus on
the council to show that the savings can be made and allowing interested
parties and then the Government to test that, we think that we can get
a much more accurate picture of the real potential savings than has
been the case in some of the previous local government
reorganisations.
Ultimately,
one would not be doing the exercise if one did not think that it was
necessary. The chairman of the Conservative district councils gave good
and strong evidence. He and I disagreed in that exchange on where the
pressure for the process was coming from. The pressure was coming from
local councils. The Municipal Journal reported a robust survey
of chief executives of district councils—I have no predilection
for districts or counties, but in this case it was a survey of
districts—that showed that 80 per cent. of chief executives
believed that significant savings could be made by the unitary process.
I think that figure was in the June 2005
edition.
Q151
Robert
Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con): I want to move on,
if I can, to joint waste authorities. We have not seen the amendment
yet, but I have seen the press release and read what was said on Second
Reading. I am just interested to know why the provision was not
originally in the Bill. What has changed
since?
Phil
Woolas:
The proposal stems from the question
“Why doesn’t the power already exist?” Most people
assume on a common-sense level that a group of districts in a county
could have a joint waste authority. Metropolitan areas have had joint
waste authorities for donkey’s years. We consulted
people—the Association of District Treasurers in particular had
strong views—and there are some strong examples of where it is
working in the real world. Hampshire county and districts is one of the
areas that we looked at in particular.
We will introduce the amendment,
therefore, in response to the work of local councils, particularly the
Innovation Forum, a group of the top-rated councils. Part of our
strategy is to build up expertise in local government that can be
shared. As the work was coming through—it published its report
in summer 2006—we were not quite
ready.
Robert
Neill:
That is fair enough. I had the pleasure of being a
member of a joint waste authority
once.
Phil
Woolas:
There was a report in a national newspaper
this Monday that said that the joint waste authorities were unelected
quangos that were going to fine you for throwing out your rubbish. I do
not think that that would be the view of the leader of Hampshire county
council.
Q152
Robert
Neill:
Mr. Chope, before we move on there is
one point I want to follow through specifically in the London context
of the joint waste authorities. The draft release from the Department
says:
“Any group
of two or more authorities will be able to apply”.
Is that constrained by county or regional
boundaries, or is it possible to have a cross-county or cross-regional
joint waste
authority?
Phil
Woolas:
It is possible to go across. Indeed, one of
the things that the Innovation Forum is pushing is co-operation across
the upper-tier boundaries, which already exists, of course, in the
large metropolitan areas. So, the answer is
yes.
Phil
Woolas:
Well, there is separate legislation in the
Greater London Authority Bill. It is a very important question, because
the LGA’s evidence and our own view are that, alongside social
care, waste and waste disposal is the biggest cost pressure on local
authorities, so we have an important duty to create a legislative
framework that helps to ease that pressure. Again, we have an open mind
on that. In harsh political terms I do not think that the subject turns
on the electorate, if I can put it that way, but it is
important.
Q154
Robert
Neill:
You can obviously see the situation in parts of the
Thames Gateway, for example, and in outer London boroughs and their
neighbouring
districts.
Phil
Woolas:
Yes, I studied the figures on disposal and
recycling rates and the fees regime for Greater London when we were
preparing the GLA Bill, and came to the conclusion that perhaps I
should get out more. But it is important, because in that instance you
have also got to ensure that you incentivise good practice and you do
not want to use structures to change. There are also strong
representations from local authorities across the spectrum in London on
that, and as we are a devolutionary Government I have to listen to
them.
Q155
Andrew
Stunell:
The proposals to give councils the flexibility to
move to whole-council elections have been welcomed by practically
everybody. I think there is surprise from witnesses—and
certainly from me—about why you have not made that a two-way
process. I should be interested to hear what the Government’s
approach to that
is.
Angela
E. Smith:
I think it comes back to the argument or
discussion that we were having earlier about the balance between
devolution and accountability and stability. The view of the Government
was that, once you had made a decision to have an electoral
arrangement, you should stick with those arrangements. To have the
constant switching back could undermine the process by which the
electorate know where they stand and who they are voting for. It will
be a matter for the council to decide which form of elections they
want.
Q156
Andrew
Stunell:
But it is not open to a council that has all-out
elections to switch to thirds or
halves.
Angela
E. Smith:
No, I think the Government’s
preference would be for all-out elections. Indeed, the Electoral
Commission, in its report back in 2004,
recommended all-out elections on a four-yearly cycle. But it is open to
councils that elect by thirds to go to all-out elections if they choose
to do
so.
Angela
E. Smith:
No, the Bill allows the process of change.
It is about accountability and transparency for the electorate and our
view is that all-out elections provide that in the best form. But for
councils that do not have that system and prefer to keep the
thirds—or, indeed, in some it is even halves—they can
retain that system if they wish to do
so.
Q158
Lynda
Waltho (Stourbridge) (Lab): The Bill gives councils the
power to create single-member wards if they move to a four-yearly
cycle. Concerns have been expressed about the possibility of that
deterring people from coming forward as candidates—perhaps if
they feel that the job is going to become far too onerous. What is your
take on
that?
Angela
E. Smith:
I do not think it will deter people. It did
not deter anybody in this room from coming forward for a single-member
division. I was a county councillor in a single-member division, and
the proposal will increase accountability and develop the relationship
with the electorate. Indeed, what we are trying to do through the
Bill’s devolutionary process is put a councillor at the heart of
their community, as a community champion. If you look at the processes
and the powers in the Bill, you will see that it creates a different
kind of role for a local councillor—a more elevated
one.
Therefore, my
view is that single-member wards would encourage more candidates to
come forward because of the nature of the role. If the council wishes
to have single-member wards, that is a different kind of relationship
with the electorate. Again, it will be up to the council to decide, but
I cannot see any reason why such wards would put someone off standing.
Indeed, it could enhance the desire of people to do
so.
Q159
Alistair
Burt:
Could I pick up on this? You
started by comparing the proposal for single-member wards with our
roles, but we are full-time and we are paid—the public would
consider perfectly handsomely—for what we do as single Members
in our own constituencies. However, the whole point is that most
councillors are not full-time. Many of them are carrying on another
role elsewhere. Even if they are retired, they are doing something
else.
The point is
that we if load more and more on to the shoulders of people who are
standing for a role in their local community for which financial gain
is not their primary motivation, are we making that role harder and
harder by putting more onus on them? That is the comparison. It is not
with us, but with people who are busy. Are you suggesting that there
should be more full-time, professional councillors? Is that what the
Government would
like?
Angela
E. Smith:
I think you might be misunderstanding what
I am saying. No one is suggesting that a local councillor should take
on the same kind of role that a Member of Parliament does. It is quite
clearly defined what the different roles are. The complaint that we get
from councillors is that they want more responsibility. You would not be
talking about replicating the current size of wards, which have three
members. They would be smaller, roughly a third of that size.
Therefore, I cannot see how the proposal would increase the work load
of councillors. What it does is balance the relationship between the
councillor and their division as it does with county councillors.
However, at the end of the day, it would be a matter for the council
itself to decide if it wants to go down that route or not. The
councillors, who know the work load in their areas, will make that
decision. Does that increase the work load and make it more difficult
to recruit councillors? I think the answer is
no.
Q160
Alistair
Burt:
If some of the districts go into larger unitary
authorities, I cannot imagine that there will be the same number of
councillors representing the area that there would have been in the
past. Therefore I think that some will find themselves with larger
electorates, but we will
see.
Angela
E. Smith:
But that would be a matter for the
council.
Q161
Sir
Peter Soulsby (Leicester, South) (Lab): In the Bill, the
Government are offering a very narrow range of governance options to
local government. Why such a narrow range? Why not allow a degree of
discretion beyond that range, particularly perhaps to adopt what we
have heard from the Members and indeed witnesses— namely the
option of going to a modified and modernised committee
structure?
Angela
E. Smith:
First, those councils with enhanced
committee structures—all but one of them are the small
councils—will be able to keep those structures. However, the
Government’s view was that you need strong leadership and all
the evidence suggests that the best councils have strong leadership.
There is a choice between the three different models that we feel can
best drive improvements and give the capacity and ability for the
leadership that local authorities
need.
Q162
Sir
Peter Soulsby:
I am very interested to hear the assertion
that there is clear evidence that the best councils have strong
leadership governance models. I am not quite sure where that evidence
is because it is certainly not evidence that I have ever
seen.
Angela
E. Smith:
There is clear evidence that strong
leadership is important to local authorities. The three models that we
have identified are ones that we think will provide strong leadership
for local authorities. It will be up to councils to choose which of
those models they feel best suits their circumstances and is most
appropriate to them. I think there is clarity. We are talking about the
accountability of place-shaping local authorities and the models
provide for all the things that we are looking for within local
authorities.
Q163
Alistair
Burt:
Minister, your answer comes to the heart of this
Bill and some of the comments that we have heard from the witnesses. In
its written evidence, Unlock Democracy says, “The Government
have made much of their belief in devolving power, but seem
unwilling in the last instance to actually let go.” I made
exactly that point during the Second Reading debate. As Tony Hancock
would have said, “That could have been me
talking.”
Your
answer just now was that the models are those that you feel give strong
leadership, and that the proposals are those that you feel to be best
for local authorities. Who cares? Why do no you not give people the
chance to say what they feel is good for them? There could not be a
clearer example of your retaining control than when you say, “We
will offer you only these models because”—as you rightly
say—“ they are the ones that we feel give strong
leadership.” Why should you not take the risk of allowing people
to decide? If electors have bad leadership, they will make that fact
plain. So why not allow them the further option of making their choice
about leadership? Why be so
prescriptive?
Angela
E. Smith:
We did not pluck the proposals out of thin
air, nor did we dream them up sitting around in Eland house. In 2005,
there was a survey of councillors, officers and others engaged with
local authorities—the word “stakeholders” was used
but I am trying to avoid it. More than half the councillors and nearly
three quarters of the officers considered that, under the new
arrangements, compared with the old committee structure, the executive
would be more effective in articulating a vision for the area. That was
in response to information that we got back from councillors and
officers of local
authorities.
Q164
Alistair
Burt:
Yes, but I submit to you that, even on the figures
that you have just given, 50 per cent. of councillors did not
agree.
Angela
E. Smith:
More than half
did.
Q165
Alistair
Burt:
There was a strong sense, from those who want the
proposals to proceed, that the measures are all about effective
leadership, as you say, but that is not the only purpose of being a
councillor, nor of a council. We heard from Back Benchers on Second
Reading and we have heard from witnesses the sense that councillors
feel that they are out of the loop and have lost their opportunity to
contribute. That was not necessarily discovered as a result of any of
the surveys; the surveys were all about how to administer power. But
ultimately you could get rid of all the councils and run everything
yourself, which would be very strong leadership, but not very
good.
If you are
convinced of what you say, and if the facts support you, let people
choose. If 95 per cent. of councils opted for one of the strong
leadership models that you are presenting, your point would be proved,
but why not allow them to
decide?
Angela
E. Smith:
Your point about the role of councillors is
interesting and one that we have taken on board. We should see it in
the context of the Bill as a whole, which will enhance the role of all
councillors. Many of us in this room have served as councillors, and so
I entirely take the point that nobody becomes a councillor because they
want to be more efficient and effective; people become councillors
because they want to shape, improve and contribute to their community.
A balance between a strong executive along the lines of the three
models that have been outlined in the Bill and
the White Paper, and the other measures on overview and scrutiny,
community call for action, and the role of the front line
councillor—taken together—gives the place-shaping role
that makes the proposals truly evolutionary. It takes power away from
the centre and gives it to local councils. I do not accept that,
because there is a choice of only three models, the Executive are
taking power away from local authorities.
Q166
Andrew
Stunell:
We heard evidence from the LGA that suggested
that the model of a directly elected executive was not exactly what
they first thought of. That model seems to have quite a lot of problems
and difficulties attached, and no doubt we shall explore them. Will the
Minister comment on how that model came to be included? Other evidence
that we have heard suggested that there should be a way to allow the
public to endorse a new governance model, whereas the Bill goes in the
opposite direction—for instance, by removing the right of
referendum on the creation of a mayor. It is about the model and the
endorsement.
Phil
Woolas:
Thank you for that question; it
gives us the opportunity to clarify things. As has just been described,
we discussed different leadership models. There was a debate in the
country on whether it should be possible to impose a mayor. We decided
against that because it was inconsistent with our general policy, and
Alistair Burt has probed us on the boundaries of
that.
The consultation
with councils, which as I said was deep and broad, asked councils what
they thought. They asked us for this model. Part of the debate on
Second Reading and elsewhere has criticised the Government for the
potential pitfalls, and some have pointed out the advantages. That may
be true—this Committee must discuss how we can ensure that the
rules work—but whether a council chooses that option is up to
the council knowing the pros and cons. The model came from councils
such as Stockton, and other councils are discussing it in quite
exciting ways.
The
point is that if we are genuinely devolving power—we believe
that we are, particularly through the local area agreement
process—we must ensure on behalf of Parliament that that power
is handled responsibly. We did not create the Scottish Parliament and
say, “You guys can decide the structure of government.”
We said, “We are devolving power on these functions, but we
think that there have to be some boundaries to how you do
it.”
On the
mayoral appointment and the referendum, our policy is that the route
through which a governance structure was created is the route through
which it can be got rid of, except of course that the public always
have the final say. In other words, if a mayor was created by a
referendum, that mayor can be got rid of by referendum. We are not
removing the right of referendum. At the moment, one can have a mayor
either by the council proposing it and putting it to a public
referendum that says yes, or by a trigger taking place through the
petition process, after which a referendum says yes. Under the new
proposals, you will still be able to petition to trigger a referendum
for mayor; what will change is that a council will be able to create a
mayor by resolution without having to go to a referendum. That is the
change, and it will give greater freedom to
councils.
Q167
Andrew
Stunell:
The Minister has just said that a mayor can be
created and removed by referendum. Is that the situation with existing
mayors?
Phil
Woolas:
Yes, but do not take me to Stoke-on-Trent,
although I will go there if you want. Actually, that principle applies
in Stoke-on-Trent as
well.
Q168
Alison
Seabeck:
A very quick point on the executive slate model
and the potential for nine by-elections to follow a local election.
Were you concerned, when you were considering whether to put it in,
about the implications for public confusion and potential public
apathy? Having been asked to vote for one lot, the public would be
asked a few weeks later to vote again. Were you also concerned about
the implications for the political parties in terms of the cost of
running another set of
elections?
Phil
Woolas:
I am now being quizzed from the opposite side
of the argument. The proposal and the idea—to which I personally
see some advantages, in terms of leadership—came from local
councils. Why not havea one-size-fits-all approach? The answer
is partly devolutionary and partly to ask why that would be desirable.
The geography of our councils is so different. One councillor said to
me in the consultation that it took him a 120 mile round trip to chair
a council meeting. That makes a directly elected executive model, if
one does not want to directly elect a mayor, a more attractive
proposition. That is one of the points about the evidence on which
Alistair Burt quizzed us—whether we had an open mind on that. We
genuinely want the Committee’s views and experience in order to
see how we could ensure that it works, but ultimately, if the model is
there and a council wants it, the council can have
it.
Q169
Tom
Levitt (High Peak) (Lab): I understand that the three
models that we have just been talking about do not apply to small
councils—I think Angela used that phrase. Could you tell us what
is a small council? Is it based on the number of councillors or the
number of
electors?
Angela
E. Smith:
The population. The small councils with a
population of 85,000 or fewer currently have what is called the
enhanced computer
system.
Angela
E. Smith:
It was 85,000 population or
fewer.
Angela
E. Smith:
They that had that system already. I think
there are—[Interruption.] I am informed that the figure
is
83.
Q171
Tom
Levitt:
On the directly elected executive—following
from Alison Seabeck’s question—why is it that members of
an executive cannot be councillors as well? What sort of message does
that send out about accountability? Why should not members of an
executive have responsibility for direct involvement in their own
wards?
Phil
Woolas:
What we are trying to do is to say,
“Look, we want councils to have more powers over
their areas and in conjunction with their partners.” The
statutory duty to co-operate creates a whole new legal climate for
local authorities. Within that climate, there has to be clear executive
power and executive accountability. We think, as Angela has said
before, that the double devolution—the third bit of the
relationship change; the devolving down—should be done through
the elected councillor. We are not devolving outside the democratic
structure. We believe that our proposals enhance the status as well as
the role and function of local ward councillors. That is really to say
that the executive role and the scrutiny role are separate and the
executive role and the community champion role are separate as
well.
What we are
trying to do is to radically change the status and importance of the
councillors, because the overview and scrutiny function, which we may
come to, will allow local councillors to scrutinise the whole of their
area, not just the institution of the council. We believe that changes
things radically. So that isthe political theory behind the
executive and the accountability
function.
I emphasise
again that the councils will have to look at the implications for their
areas, which will be widely different in, say, a relatively small,
urban district and a large county or
met.
Angela
E. Smith:
Just to add—if it helps—that
you would have an elected councillor holding themselves to account
through overview and scrutiny. If they were part of the executive, they
would be fulfilling two roles at the same time and would be holding
themselves to account, in
effect.
Q172
Tom
Levitt:
That is not wildly different from what can happen
now, with cabinet members in councils. When it comes to a mayor or a
leader appointing cabinet members, is it the case that they must not be
councillors, that they can cease to be councillors, or that they may be
councillors—if they are appointed to a cabinet by a directly
elected
leader?
Angela
E. Smith:
They must be councillors—I am being
advised.
Phil
Woolas:
We are hesitating because of
Stoke.
Q174
Lynda
Waltho:
May I take you back to Stoke?
Your statement on 19 January indicated that a referendum on council
structures could take place in Stoke before the elections that are due
in 2009. I am wondering whether I can tease out a possible
inconsistency with the retrospective extension of the minimum time
between referendums from five to 10 years, which is proposed in clause
50. Will you need to make special provisions for Stoke to hold a second
referendum within 10 years of the first one, which was in
2002?
Phil
Woolas:
Stoke is the only authority in the country
that has the elected mayor/city manager model. For those not familiar
with that, it puts significant executive power in the hands of the
senior official—what elsewhere would be known as the chief
executive. Stoke is the only council in the country that
has that model. Because we decided that that model was not one of the
options that we wanted to make available, and because there is a strong
consensus in Stoke itself, we do make an exception. But, of course, the
mayoralty in Stoke was created by referendum and can be undone only by
referendum. The mayor will stay in office until the end of his period
of office, whatever happens, because that has been decided by
referendum and election. So the answer is yes, we will make an
exception.
Q175
Robert
Neill:
The Ministers from the Department for Communities
and Local Government will have heard the evidence that has been given,
particularly on the concerns about parishes in the London context. I
would be interested to hear your response to that. A number of bodies
seem to be flagging up concerns. There is confusion about how parishes
in London fit with enhancing the role of the ward councillor as the
local champion, and about accountability and responsibility and how
that fits with a strong leadership model. As we have discussed, there
is also the risk of extremists or other interest groups hijacking the
parish council. Has that had any influence on your thinking as to how
you might go
forward?
Angela
E. Smith:
It has been very interesting
taking evidence from the different bodies and hearing the different
information that they have come up with. Unlock Democracy was very
different from some of the other groups that have spoken to us. There
may be some teething problems in London, but given that we already have
about 9,000 parish councils across the country, there has not been a
great confusion over accountability and the electorate recognising the
respective roles of parish councils and district councillors.
I do not anticipate an enormous
problem in London. There may be some initial teething problems, but all
parishes operate in a two-tier or single-tier authority area at
present. In some areas, that is dealt with by the parish charter, which
outlines the respective roles and responsibilities. As I say, there may
be some teething problems, but I do not anticipate an enormous
problem.
Special
interest and extremist groups have been mentioned. The issue of
community cohesion is very important here. It is up to the district or
the borough councils to make a decision on whether or not it is
appropriate to have a parish council in their area. Community cohesion
is one issue that will be taken into account when the council is making
that decision. So I think that the problem of extremism or a group
setting itself apart from the rest of the area can be dealt with in the
guidance to the council on the criteria for making a
decision.
Q176
Robert
Neill:
Can you tell us when we are likely to have that
guidance? The Secretary of State, responding to a comment of mine on
Second Reading, said that there would be guidance. Obviously, we want
to know when we are going to have it and what form it will
take.
Angela E.
Smith:
I am just checking on the
timing.
Q177
The
Chairman:
Mr. Prout, do you want to
speak to the Committee in your own right? You are perfectly entitled
to.
David
Prout:
We published an implementation plan for the
White Paper, which I think gives a date for the publication of guidance
on parishes. The guidance will be in place before the legislation comes
into force. I simply cannot remember off the top of my head the precise
date that it is due to be
published.
Q178
Alistair
Burt:
In looking at the criteria for parish
councils in relation to the granting of the power of well-being, what
criteria are you going to use? There is a sense that we want as many
parish councils as possible to be involved. Will the criteria be very
restrictive or quite
wide?
Angela
E. Smith:
I think that we could use as a
starting point the quality parish scheme that we have at present,
although it will be adapted and updated. The things that we will be
looking for will be that they are representative and engage all parts
of the community, that they give vision and a sense of identity to the
community and that they are effectively and properly managed councils.
Those criteria are currently in the quality parish
scheme.
Q179
Alistair
Burt:
As far as I am aware, that is a very small number of
councils—something like 3 per cent. That seems quite tight. It
would be interesting to know whether you intend to widen it
significantly beyond that, even though you want to keep some degree of
control.
Angela
E. Smith:
I would want to widen it
significantly in terms of numbers, but I do not think that we would
want to reduce the capacity of a council in that sense. Having the
power of well-being is something that extends the role of the council.
We would need to be sure that the council had the capacity to manage
that. So yes, we would like to see the number of councils significantly
increased, but not by reducing the criteria or the ability of the
council to manage its own
affairs.
Q180
Alistair
Burt:
Do you think the likelihood of parish councils
surviving in large numbers is good? There are no proposals within the
Department to reduce significantly the number of parish councils over
the next few
years?
Angela
E. Smith:
To reduce? No, not at
all.
Q181
Andrew
Stunell:
The Bill contains a proposal that people can be
appointed to parish councils as well as elected and co-opted. What led
the Government to think that such people should not get on to parishes
via the election route? What was the thinking
there?
Angela
E. Smith:
In the first place, it is the choice of the
parish council but, in some cases, people may not feel that they want
to go via the election route. It may be someone involved in the local
church or the head teacher of a school. It is a matter for the local
parish council. If it wishes to appoint members, it can do so if it
thinks that it is appropriate.
Q182
Andrew
Stunell:
The Government comment that many parish councils,
in fact, are not contested and that there is a shortage of candidates.
Community leaders seem to be the obvious people to go through the
electoral route to get on to parishes. Can you elaborate on why you
think that they should have a by-pass past the electoral
system?
Phil
Woolas:
Common sense is the answer. An appointed
member cannot take part in a decision to co-opt a member. As members of
the Committee know, at the moment when a vacancy exists a co-option can
take place because of the problem that Mr. Stunell outlined.
The National Association of Local Councils reports that it is useful to
be able to have members with particular standing in the community or
expertise. The head teacher whom Angela mentioned is a good example. In
my constituency, one of the museum chairs is a member of the parish
council. The safeguard is that they are not allowed to take part in the
decision to co-opt
others.
It is common
sense really. The 8,600 and so parish councils range from some that are
an annual dinner through to some that are bigger than the smallest
districts. A desire to empower communities and build a sense of
community is behind the ability to appoint such
people.
Phil
Woolas:
Yes.
Q184
Andrew
Gwynne (Denton and Reddish) (Lab): I have a number of
questions. First, strong leadership models require equally strong
scrutiny functions. As a former scrutiny committee chair, I certainly
agree that that is the case. Part 5 sets out the new powers for
scrutiny committees. Some of the criticism of the 2000 Act was that
scrutiny took time to bed in. Support from many authorities was not in
place for members, and members did not have the necessary skills. Do
you accept that the original scrutiny proposals were flawed? How do you
see the Bill making them
better?
Phil
Woolas:
The scrutiny role is working very well in
some areas, but not so well in others. The best scrutiny committees
involve consensus across parties, rather like our Select Committee
system. They task and finish reports. They examine areas of policy.
They bring forward solutions, just like Select Committees, as well as
highlight problems. It is an evolving process. The criticism that was
aired on Second Reading and elsewhere of not having the old committee
system was, “How do you get councils involved? How do you bring
them up? How do you give them experience? How do you involve them in
decision making?” We think that to enhance overview and scrutiny
is a very important way of doing
that.
I personally
think that the idea that being a member of the housing sub-committee is
a tremendous insight into the loop of power in authorities is
stretching it a bit. The overview and scrutiny committee conferences in
local government—the national events—are a substantial
part of the calendar. In essence, we want to be place-shapers in
respect of the performance regime,
the accountability regime and the way in which councils are judged. We
want the overview and scrutiny committees to be able to hold to account
the whole place, as far as is possible like a Select Committee. The
parallel is not too strong because, of course, there are legal
differences. We think that that will radically change the way in which
public services are delivered and the responsiveness of not only
councils but public institutions and
others.
Q185
Andrew
Gwynne:
That takes us to the next question very nicely.
Earlier, and you have just reiterated it, you said that you wanted to
see councils scrutinise the whole of the area, not just the functions
of the council. Would you expect all local partners, housing
associations, housing trusts, sports trusts and arm’s length
companies to co-operate with the council? If they were to refuse, how
would you enforce that?
Phil
Woolas:
Where the power applies—I will talk in
a moment about the limits—there is an obligation to appear or
present evidence and an obligation upon that body that it must pay
regard, under law, to the findings of the overview and scrutiny
committee. That, we think, is a significant change. Now of course, the
number of bodies that are included within that is where it gets
difficult because registered social landlords are not statutory public
sector bodies in the sense, for example, that a PCT is. We believe that
the fact that the overview and scrutiny committee has got that power
will create not just a legal framework but a climate in which that is
expected, and that will greatly enhance the status of the councillors
and of the local council
itself.
Q186
Andrew
Gwynne:
However, one of the keys to
effective scrutiny is having access to information. Access to
information from the partners is going to be crucial if these enhanced
scrutiny powers are going to work. This is particularly an issue for
public services that were previously provided by councils, where, for
example, the Local Government Act 1972 access to information
regulations applied. Now, if services are run by trusts or private
companies, not even the Freedom of Information Act 2000 applies in a
number of cases. So will scrutiny be relying on good will or are we
going to beef up the access to information
regulations?
Phil
Woolas:
The obligation will be on the commissioner of
the service that is under scrutiny. That is an important point because
say, for example, you had a private company or a charity delivering a
particular service and it refused to co-operate—the law as we
propose will allow it to refuse to co-operate—we believe that
the power of overview and scrutiny and the ability to call in and quiz
the commissioning officer and officers, would have a powerful effect
and improve the current
situation.
Q187
Dr.
Roberta Blackman-Woods (City of Durham) (Lab): I wonder
whether the Department has given any consideration to having a formal
role for MPs in the overview and scrutiny process or in the
implementation of local area agreements?
Phil
Woolas:
I know that this is a historic Committee, but
we are not proposing a statutory role for Members of Parliament.
Outside of the legislation, we do see a very important role for MPs,
particularly in the development of the new performance regime. In two
cases, Members of Parliament chair—
The
Chairman:
I am going to stop you there because we are only
concerned with what is in the Bill rather than what might be in another
one.
Phil
Woolas:
Consideration was given to that, but we ruled
it out given the unique status of Members of Parliament as
legislators.
Q188
Robert
Neill:
I was interested in why primary care trusts are
among the list of authorities under a duty to cooperate in clauses 79
and 83 but not the other trusts—not the acute trusts or
foundation trusts. Why? That seems
anomalous.
Phil
Woolas:
We are thinking about
it.
Robert
Neill:
Given the LGA’s evidence that they are
concerned about it, I hope that you are thinking positively about
it.
Phil
Woolas:
Yes. Trusts and foundation trusts are
different from the other main partners, but we recognise that there is
a powerful argument and I think that the LGA gave evidence in favour of
that, did they
not?
Phil
Woolas:
And it has been made by others. Because of
our history, all these relationships are complicated. If you look at
the police and to whom the police are accountable, it is not as
straightforward as elsewhere. Foundation trusts and trusts do present a
different model and have different models of accountability. On the
other hand, the sorts of things we need them to co-operate with in
local areas is a very important part of the picture, so the views of
the Committee will be sought on
this.
Q189
Alistair
Burt:
The White Paper mentions an upper limit on targets
of about 35, but when it comes to the Bill, you just cannot quite bring
yourselves to put down a number, just in case it is too binding. Why
did not you put a number in the Bill? Would you be minded to accept a
number in the Bill if somebody suggested
it?
Phil
Woolas:
There might be circumstances where you would
want less, or there might be more. We think that that
approach—
Phil
Woolas:
We think it is too prescriptive and too
untrustworthy—can I say that, Mr. Chope?—but
not by the hon.
Gentleman.
Q191
Alistair
Burt:
No. But the trust thing goes the other way. The
experience of local government and others is that central Government
comes along with more and more. The purpose of having the upper limit
in the Bill is that that makes sure that there can be no breach of
trust on your side. They will know how many targets there are going to
be. Otherwise, the concern will be simply that there will be more and
more added as Ministers get put under pressure on different things and
it will, therefore, become an easy way to increase the burden on local
government once again.
Phil
Woolas:
Perhaps it would be helpful
if I explain where this came from and what regime this is trying to
create. At the moment, there are between 600 and 1,200 indicators. It
sounds a terrible amount, but it is mitigated by the fact that that is
across the whole range of local government functions, which is
substantial. But it is clearly a lot. Our justification for that is
that it has helped to drive improvement. The number of councils that
have improved under the Audit Commission measurement has got there. But
our analysis is completely different from the one that has been
expounded on Second Reading. Our analysis is that local government has
improved and is taking more place-shaping powers. The reforms that we
have put into place in other areas of public services can at times, I
admit, look piecemeal and like a kaleidoscope rather than a jigsaw
puzzle. We see this as putting together the jigsaw
puzzle.
The
Chairman:
I think we are going to call a halt to the
answer there. Alistair, do you have any more
questions?
Q192
Sir
Peter Soulsby:
I am interested in the responsibilities
that might be included in the Bill for local authorities to co-operate
with others beyond their boundaries. That is particularly a problem for
those urban authorities with very tightly drawn boundaries, because the
solutions to their problems often lie beyond those boundaries. What is
included in the Bill appears to be fine in terms of requirement to
co-operate within the boundaries, but what is, or what might there be,
in the Bill to enable a requirement for co-operation beyond
boundaries?
Phil
Woolas:
Conscious of your strictures, Mr.
Chope, the policy on multi-area agreements enhances what the Bill
provides. The process that we are going through in the comprehensive
spending review, the process that we are going through in this Bill and
the change in the legislative framework that it puts
forward—particularly on the duty to co-operate in the
relationship across boundaries, which we mentioned before—we
believe is, again, a permissive arrangement in respect of
cross-boundary co-operation, of which there is, of course, already a
lot. The second bit of the architecture is the commissioning role,
which changes that relationship completely, because one can commission
outside
boundaries.
Q193
Alison
Seabeck:
Are you confident that the safeguards set out in
clause 59, which are designed to prevent community calls for action
being abused by special interest groups or extreme groups, are strong
enough? Have you considered the implications of allowing greater
freedom for the public to take part in the decision-making process and
the potential for two CCFAs with directly opposite aims to be running
in parallel with each other, and what that could do to some
communities? In Tower Hamlets, you might have the British National
party running one and the rest of the community running one entirely
counter to that. It could be quite an interesting situation. It could
be damaging to community
cohesion.
Angela
E. Smith:
In a sense, there are two gateway
processes—two gatekeepers. The first is a local
councillor. If a matter is brought to a local councillor through a
community call for action which should be dealt with in the course of
the councillor’s normal role, that would not necessarily be fed
upwards to overview and scrutiny. But if there were two opposing issues
and a referral to overview and scrutiny, it would be for overview and
scrutiny to decide how to deal with the issues, and how much time to
give them. So the second gatekeeper is the overview and scrutiny
committee—that is its role.
Q194
Andrew
Stunell:
The other part of that is how a legitimate call
for action gets some action from external bodies and partners. For
example, a dentist might no longer be taking NHS patients, in which
case one can easily imagine that there might be a call for something to
happen. What responsibility has the outside body—in that
instance it would be the PCT—to respond to that
call?
Angela
E. Smith:
In that case, PCTs are listed among the
bodies that should co-operate with the local authority, and they would
have a duty to have regard to the views of the committee. That would
assist in action being taken. If asked, the PCT would be required to
appear before the committee, as well have a duty to have regard to the
views of the
committee.
Q195
Lynda
Waltho:
You mentioned overview and scrutiny taking on the
work from a community call for action. The weaknesses have been
discussed, and there is concern about whether such work will make it
even more difficult for overview and scrutiny to develop appropriate
time and resources to perform its functions and hold the executive to
account on policy decisions. Will you comment on
that?
Angela
E. Smith:
The work will enhance the role of overview
and scrutiny. It will be for the overview and scrutiny committee to
work out its work plan and how it will deal with these issues. In time,
the committees might find that there is a need for additional support,
but I do not think that we are imposing an overly onerous burden on
them by asking overview and scrutiny to look at community calls for
action. They will have to plan how much time and effort is put in. If
there are frivolous issues of the type that Ms Seabeck mentioned, I
assume that those issues will be dismissed. Others might require more
time, and might involve a similar process to that involved in calling
the executive to account, and be part and parcel of it. But it will be
the responsibility of the committees to plan their workload and manage
the issues with which they have to
deal.
Q196
Alistair
Burt:
We had a couple of discussions on crime and disorder
issues being excluded from community calls for action. I know that that
is covered by a different provision, but based on the discussions, the
witnesses’ evidence and the briefings, are you in any way moved
to have a single system and include that area?
Angela E.
Smith:
I listened carefully to the discussion on this
subject during the evidence sessions. We considered having a single
route. However, if a community call for action is presented to a local
councillor, it is presented to an elected member of the
body to which it is going, whereas police authorities are indirectly
elected, so they cannot take matters up in the same way. The
circumstances are different. I am not sure whether having a similar
process would work. I think the proposal we are making is the more
appropriate one for local authorities. We considered the matter and I
am not minded to look at it again to open up the argument, but I have
taken the comments on
board.
Q197
Tom
Levitt:
In many parts of the country,
community sector and voluntary sector organisations are closely
involved with local authorities through local strategic partnerships,
local area agreements and so on. In many other parts of the country,
such co-operative arrangements are sadly lacking. Can you assure us
that the Bill will promote active involvement of community and
voluntary sector organisations through dissemination of good practice,
to ensure that they are recognised as true partners in community
development?
Angela
E. Smith:
The guidance will say that there must be a
statement of community involvement, and I do not think that true
community involvement can be shown without engagement of the community
and voluntary sector. So yes, that will be covered by the
guidance.
Q198
Mr.
David Burrowes (Enfield, Southgate) (Con): Given the
proposals to extend local authority capacity to create byelaws, why not
allow local authorities the power to enforce those byelaws with fixed
penalty notices, without the say-so of the Secretary of
State?
Angela
E. Smith:
I am sorry, I did not quite
hear.
Mr.
Burrowes:
There is provision for extending local
authorities’ powers to create byelaws, but I understand that
enforcement of those byelaws is subject to the Secretary of
State’s
approval.
Phil
Woolas:
One witness said that this is one of the most
welcome bits of the Bill. I cannot tell you how welcome it is from my
point of view. At the moment, a byelaw that is set by a parish or
council has to be ratified by the Secretary of State. The most recent
one was in the case of Carrick district, which is in Cornwall, I am
informed. It was to do with—Mr. Rowsell?
Paul
Rowsell:
It is to do with the use of land near the
coast and deals with how people should behave properly on that land in
relation to parking cars, resting overnight, and similar issues. That
piece of land is near the coast for surfing, so that byelaw is about
good behaviour.
Phil
Woolas:
At the moment, the Secretary of State has to
sign that off. You might have got the impression that she herself has
not been personally involved in that
decision.
Q199
Patrick
Hall:
The White Paper flagged up the idea of securing
public participation in councils’ best
value reviews. First, since there have been some question marks around
this, is the best value process set to continue? If so, how might the
public be involved, particularly on an informed basis?
Phil
Woolas:
We see the proposal as a crucial part of the
legislative changes. I talked before about the duty to co-operate; this
is about the duty to involve, devolve and consult, and how one makes
that real. The legislation creates a framework where the three
documents for each local authority are three essential pillars of the
strategy: the sustainable communities policy, the local development
framework and, now, the local area agreement. In those, and in the
meeting of targets, we are building in this legal duty to devolve. So,
the best value regime certainly does develop.
We are proposing to put in a
number of check mechanisms to monitor whether that duty is being
implemented. That relates, in part, to the voluntary sector point that
Tom Levitt made. Those are annual risk assessments, the audit and
inspection itself, which will have a greater focus on the
citizen’s role, the annual publication of national performance
indicators including citizen satisfaction, which I believe will be part
of quite a change in the way people view councils and in the way they
are reported, and the new overview and scrutiny arrangements. So we see
this as the bottom-up bit of the new legislative
framework.
Q200
Alistair
Burt:
The Local Government Association would have
preferred what it calls “a more forward looking approach”
to inspection, giving authorities a clearer idea of what they might
expect over a two or three-year period. Were you not moved by their
evidence and proposals to think the matter through again and introduce
that?
Phil
Woolas:
Sorry, Alastair, can you repeat the
question?
Alistair
Burt:
I am sorry. This is about local services inspection
and audit. The LGA has proposed what it called in its brief “a
more forward looking approach”, in which the Audit Commission
and other inspectorates would “set out a forward programme of
inspections for a locality over a 2/3 yr period”. That is not
what is in the Bill, but would you not be minded to move toward
that?
David
Prout:
The proposal set out in one of the schedules
to the Bill is that the Audit Commission should, effectively, act as a
gatekeeper for the other inspectorates, so when the inspectors are
planning their work plans, normally on an annual basis, they will get
together to co-ordinate any inspections of individual local
authorities. We think that that will do the job that has been asked for
by local government, of ensuring that we do not have one inspectorate
after another piling into a local area. We expect that system to work
perfectly adequately without further
provisions.
Q201
Andrew
Stunell:
Will the Minister have a second go at answering
the point I made on Second Reading about the reduction in the powers of
the Audit
Commission to take on commissions from local government?
Phil
Woolas:
The point that the hon. Gentleman made on
Second Reading is, as I think I indicated from a sedentary position,
correct. This is about the role of the Audit Commission. Our concern is
that at the moment a council can commission the Audit Commission to do
a report, but the Audit Commission is also the inspectorate, so we
think that there is a potential conflict of
interest.
Q202
Tom
Levitt:
In the absence of an overriding national body of
last resort for investigating and upholding standards in public life
for councillors, what is to stop different councils adopting their own
standards and leaving us without national standards at
all?
Phil
Woolas:
First, the revised code of conduct, which is
a national requirement. Secondly, we again strike to the heart of the
philosophical debate over the Bill: if we devolve, how do we ensure
equity? That must be through the guidance and the training. There is a
debate about financing, of course. There still will be the national
board. We are proposing to revise the code of conduct, but we have to
bear in mind the point that has been made.
Q203
Andrew
Stunell:
There is clearly an area of difficulty about the
degree to which the code should apply to members when they are, so to
speak, on duty and when they are off duty. The Bill proposes to change
that boundary. Will you say something about why you want to do
that?
Phil
Woolas:
Because we think that the situation at the
moment is too authoritarian. We think that the judgments in some cases,
particularly one involving the Mayor of London, require us to clarify.
The purpose of the conduct regime is to ensure good conduct for
propriety reasons, but also to give public confidence, and we think
that the balance on the second is out of kilter. We are trying to
define more clearly the role of the councillor as a councillor and that
of a private individual, so that only criminal conviction in terms of
private behaviour can be subject to the regime; and outside of that
rather like—someone made this point earlier—with Members
of Parliament. That is what we are trying to
do.
Q204
Patrick
Hall:
The Minister of State for Health and her colleague,
Mr. Vivian, will know that for some time I have been
involved in patient and public involvement matters through the
all-party group. I have met a lot of members of patients forums, so
there are many issues that I would like to raise in Committee when we
come to part 11, but will restrict myself to just four today—if
there is time for four.
First, there
is a pressing need for a clearer picture to emerge on how LINKs will
look and work. I understand that the Government do not want to impose a
detailed
structure for the many different parts of the country, but I think that
the Bill is too vague. As a result, there is a great deal of concern
and speculation.
Patrick
Hall:
Yes indeed, but I had not finished
that point, Mr. Chope. To address that gap, would Ministers
consider, during the next couple of weeks, letting the Committee have
sight of some draft guidance for councils on how they would commission
the host organisations to set up LINKs in their own
areas?
Rosie
Winterton:
Thank you for the opportunity to talk
about how we envisage LINKs working, Mr. Chope. I am aware
that, even though we tried to set that out in our response to the
consultation, people might still have questions.
At the moment, we have a draft
model contract that we would issue to local authorities to enable them
to procure the host organisations. I am more than happy to consider
whether we could pass that on, as long there are no commercial
difficulties. It might also be helpful if I were to give the Committee
an idea of what would be in the regulations which would establish the
LINKs from the primary legislation. If that would be helpful, I would
be more than happy to look at it, as long as I am not advised that
there are any commercial difficulties that would arise from
that.
The
issue of independence has been raised a great deal by current members
of patients forums. How does the Minister think that the independence
of LINKs will be secured? There is a concern that they will end up as
the creatures of local government—that is to say, the
controlling political
group.
Rosie
Winterton:
As I have said, LINKs will be established
by the local authorities putting out a contract, which would perhaps be
run by voluntary organisations as happens at the moment. At present,
the Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in Health puts out
the contracts to local citizens advice bureaux and other organisations,
which service the patients forums. The system will be exactly the same.
Local authorities have quite a lot of experience of letting and
monitoring contracts in that way. I am quite confident that the
independence can be preserved.
Q206
Mr.
Hall:
The Bill does not propose a national organisation or
a national voice for LINKs. We might not want a top-down, expensive,
national organisation, but I think that sooner or later we will require
some national co-ordination, a means of communication between LINKs and
a means of learning from best and worst practice. That calls for some
form of national organisation. Will the Minister give that some
consideration?
Rosie
Winterton:
Through our NHS Centre for Involvement,
which is a centre of excellence, we are able to exchange best practice
and to work with LINKs organisations to pass on that sort of
information. If LINKs wish to set up a national body, there is nothing
to stop them from using their funding to do that. If
they all wish to get together to form a subscription organisation, in
rather the same way that community health councils used to, there is
nothing to stop them, but we do not want to have funding tied up in a
national body that could otherwise go directly to the LINKs
organisations. We are very keen that funding should go to the front
line, so that LINKs can operate as effectively as
possible.
Q207
Mr.
Hall:
I am sure that we will return to that, because LINKs
will want to do something along those lines, I am sure, but will need
resources to do so.
As
we all may know, the Select Committee on Health today opened its
inquiry into PPI, which will include the Government’s LINKs
proposals in the Bill. The Select Committee is due to report at the end
of March, so a parallel process is going on, which is rather unusual.
It would be a shame for this Committee, the Bill and the House to miss
out on the points that the Select Committee raises. How do Ministers
think that those deliberations can help to inform the
legislation?
Rosie
Winterton:
I am not exactly sure about
thedate on which the Select Committee is going to
publish—
Rosie
Winterton:
By the end of March is it? I suppose that
it is in this Committee’s hands to decide whether it can ask a
Select Committee for the evidence it has been
given.
Q208
Tom
Levitt:
“Abolition” is a very definite and
emotive word that some people have found frightening in the context of
the measures in the Bill. To what extent do you expect LINKs to start
from scratch when they are established? To what extent can there be a
seamless merge from the present arrangement of forums to the new
LINKs?
Rosie
Winterton:
We envisage that when Royal Assent is
given, we will be able to send out our model contracts to local
authorities and to get the regulations through Parliament to enable
that to happen. We envisage that patients forums will cease to operate
at the end of December 2007, and that LINKs will start from January
2008. We think that the process should be seamless.
I would like to take this
opportunity to say that the Government feel very strongly that
everybody who is currently a member of a patients forum should be on
the new LINKs. We value very much the work that those people have done,
but because of the way in which the NHS is changing—we have
something like a £90 billion budget, 80 per cent. of which is
devolved to local level, and PCTs have much stronger commissioning
powers—we need a strong organisation at local level that can
contribute toward the PCTs’ role of defining local health needs
and how they will prioritise their spending. We need a strong body that
is able to scrutinise decisions and increase patient and public
involvement rather than organisations that are, in a sense, tied to
institutions, as patients forums are. We want the members of the forums
to be involved in the new
LINKs.
Q209
Alistair
Burt:
Even the stoutest ministerial heart will have
blanched at some of the evidence that we heard on Tuesday. You will
have been made aware of it or will have read the evidence given by the
people from Health Link. On Tuesday, Elizabeth Manero said, “The
other day, I met someone from my local patient and public involvement
forum who was involved in mental health and who talked about the
despair and disillusionment of the forum members, many of whom are
mental health service users. They had found, yet again, that they were
told, ‘You are really great; you are doing a great job, but we
are going to get rid of
you.’”——[Official Report, Local
Government and Public Involvement in Health Public Bill Committee,
30 January 2007; c.
56.]
Sally Brearley was
moved to quote Bertold Brecht’s piece, “The
Solution”, saying that when the people forfeited the confidence
of the Government, it would be easier for the Government to dissolve
the people and elect another—it was strong stuff. I asked her
why she thought the Government are doing what they are doing, and she
did not have an answer. Those people have been right at the heart of
patients forums and understand the health service, but they have no
idea why—yet again—the Government are scrapping one thing
and setting up something new. What is your answer to that?
Rosie
Winterton:
Mental health is a very good example of
how, under the new system, we will beable to scrutinise and
improve services for mental health service users. The problem that they
have often faced is that mental health is considered to be, in a way,
over there. Under the new system, PCTs havestrong
commissioning powers. It is important that when services are being
scrutinised and decisions are being made, the mental health voice is
there at the table.
The other thing that mental
health service users will often say is that their mental health needs
might be looked after, but their physical health needs are not. We are
asking what happens to a patient in their pathway. A mental health
service user will very often also need support from, for example, local
authority social services. The LINKs will have new powers to look at
the joint commissioning that often occurs already in mental health and
be able to scrutinise both the health side and the social care
side.
There is nothing
in the LINKs to stop specialisms. If people want to specialise in
mental health aspects of service provision, there is absolutely no
reason why they should not. If they want to have a special relationship
with a mental health trust, they can, but the discussions about mental
health will be brought to the wider table. There is also the
possibility that organisations could be joined to the new LINKs, so
that every local member of Mind or Rethink, for example, could become a
member of the LINK. That is just not possible at the moment. I see it
as widening patient and public involvement. Mental health is a very
good example of a service that would benefit from wider
scrutiny.
Q210
Alistair
Burt:
Mental health was just the example that was given of
a forum, but the complaints that we heard the other day were about the
forums themselves being abolished. There is a sense that the
Department said that the forums do excellent work, but, if they do, why
are they going? Why do people who ought to be able to understand your
points seem so unaware of the benefits that you spelled out and so
hostile to the change being imposed on them?
Rosie
Winterton:
I have written personally to all forum
members twice to say that we value their work and hope that they will
become involved in the new LINKs. I was trying to send the message that
we see the measures as adding to the existing powers of patient
forums.
An example is
a LINK that wants to look at what happens to people who have had a
stroke. Somebody who has had a stroke will probably enter through
accident and emergency. They might go into a specialised stroke unit,
then into a rehabilitation unit and then back into the community.
Again, they will need the services of social care. As services
increasingly come out of the hospital setting into the community, we
want a LINK to have the ability to scrutinise all those services and
not be confined, as many are at the moment, to making reports about
their own institutions and not necessarily about what happens to the
patient. We do not say that they will not be able to look at particular
institutions, as I have said, but we want to widen their remit to give
them more power to find out what exactly happens to patients and what
patients’ experiences are in accessing health and social
care.
The
Chairman:
The Minister’s response has provoked a
lot of interest among Members, and I will try to fit them all in before
the 4 o’clock
deadline.
Q211
Sir
Peter Soulsby:
Despite the reassurance that the Minister
has given today and by letter to members of the existing forums, they
remain considerably concerned that their engagement and expertise will
be lost in the transfer to the new LINKs. What mechanism does she
envisage to ensure that it will not be lost, and that they will have
the opportunity to participate if they wish to?
Rosie
Winterton:
I do not think that I can do any more than
to say that there is absolutely no reason why they should not
automatically just join the LINKs
organisations.
Q212
Sir
Peter Soulsby:
It is that “automatically”
bit that is perhaps the key. What does that imply in terms of a
mechanism that it is indeed automatic and
guaranteed?
Rosie
Winterton:
When the host organisation is awarded a
contract by a local authority, it will ask, “Who would like to
join the LINK?” I should think that every patient forum member
will say “I would like to join it.” That is not like
patient forums, for which there was a process of appointment. People
can automatically become members if that is what they wish to do. I
imagine that patient forum members will be among the first who want to
become involved in the new organisations.
Q213
Mr.
Burrowes:
It is appreciated that LINKs will be allowed to
enter NHS premises. However, the
words “inspect” and “inspection” do not
appear in the Bill. Why
not?
Rosie
Winterton:
Because we want to be sure that
organisations such as the Healthcare Commission carry out inspections.
One of the things that patient forum members told us was that they felt
that their inspections were considered to be secondary to the
inspections carried out by the regulators. Patient forum members were
anxious that they should continue to be able to go into
premises—again, I use the example of a local stroke
unit—if LINKs say that they wanted to see how it worked, and to
report on it. We would expect them to be able to go in and do
that.
We have to be
careful. At the moment, all patient forum members are checked by the
Criminal Records Bureau, but we do not believe that that will be
possible for everybody on a LINK if, as we hope, many more people
become involved and, possibly, whole organisations join. We expect a
number of people to be given the right to go into hospitals, for
example.
Q214
Tom
Levitt:
Carrying on the same theme, I welcomed your
example of being able to follow the whole patient experience—if
I can use that phrase—in terms of monitoring and scrutiny. So
far as social care is concerned, that is a welcome extension into the
health forum business. Clearly a lot of social care is provided in the
private sector. Does that present particular difficulties and what
discussions haveyou had with private sector care providers in
that
respect?
Rosie
Winterton:
It will extend to the private sector. Let
me go back a little to the discussion on inspection. We will have to be
careful about who has the ability to enter people’s homes; we
must be sensitive about that. We will continue to discuss how that
should take place, but it is right to say that a lot of social care
services are commissioned from the private sector. We expect that to be
an important element when considering whether local patient needs are
satisfactorily met by what is commissioned.
Q215
Robert
Neill:
I was just interested, in terms of your earlier
answer, in the growing links between social care and mental health, for
example. Is that not another strong argument for the mental health
trusts to be under a duty to co-operate in the same way as primary care
trusts?
Rosie
Winterton:
They will be.
Meredith
Vivian:
Mental health trusts will
be.
Phil
Woolas:
You are right; it is an argument. I want to
underline what we said before,
because—
Chairman:
We have to stop now because we are not allowed to go on beyond Four
o’clock. Perhaps the Ministers might respond to that last
question in writing.
Rosie
Winterton:
Clause 155 specifies the duty to
co-operate.
Chairman: Because we have
to stop at four, I should like to thank everybody for coming along and
for answering the questions. Because this is the last evidence-taking
session—unless we have more later on—I should like to
thank particularly the Committee Clerks and those in the Clerks
Department. Without
their assistance, we would never have been able to make as much progress
as we have done. Thank you, also, to all the witnesses for coming along
today.
Further
consideration adjourned—[Jonathan Shaw.]
Adjourned accordingly at Four
o’clock till Tuesday6 February at half-past Ten
o’clock.
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