Mental Health Bill [Lords]


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Ms Winterton: I am not clear whether sex addiction is a mental disorder. I suspect that it probably is. [Interruption.] I can see that we are getting into deep water. However, to return to the point about sexual deviancy, the problem has been that although various things, such as homosexuality, are not considered a mental disorder, nevertheless things such as paedophilia and paraphilia are considered a mental disorder. The danger is that it has previously been possible for a paedophile to argue, for example, that they were excluded from the Mental Health Act, as some might prefer a prison sentence to a hospital order. We wish to get rid of that in order to prevent such problems from arising.
James Duddridge (Rochford and Southend, East) (Con): It is a pleasure to serve under you, Lady Winterton.
What consideration did the Minister give to excluding paedophilia and any other acts that would be encompassed, instead of entirely removing proposed paragraph (b) to section 1(3) to the 1983 Act? Alternatively, instead of considering sexual identity and orientation, homosexuality could be specifically mentioned so that it was exempt.
Ms Winterton: I will come to that point. The Lords amendment does not restore sexual deviancy. I was trying to explain the background to our changing the exclusions. I was explaining why, because of the issues that I have just mentioned, we decided to exclude sexual deviancy. The amendment does not reintroduce it. There are different reasons why we believe that that is necessary. That is the background to the previous exclusions. I shall now deal with why we disagree with the exclusions that we are currently discussing.
Unfortunately, the other place introduced a new set of exclusions into the Bill. As hon. Members can see,
“sexual identity or orientation...commission, or likely commission, of illegal or disorderly acts”
and
“cultural, religious or political beliefs”
would be excluded. However, those exclusions have never been included and, as far as we can see, theyhave never been needed. Although I use the word “exclusions”, I am probably using it incorrectly, because the things that are listed are nothing of the sort. They are about conditions, behaviours and beliefs, but none of them are mental disorders.
Mr. Boswell: On a more substantive point thanmy earlier one, does the Minister appreciate that the background to this matter inevitably concerns not necessarily the practice in the United Kingdom, the good faith of Ministers or the system, but the fact that in certain countries there are chilling experiences of persons being singled out for mental treatment because their face does not fit? That may be because oftheir sexual identity or because they happen to hold political beliefs, which we might all find thoroughly objectionable, or they may be regarded as morally disreputable, but none of those things constitutes a mental illness on its own. Some other evidence would be required for compulsory treatment to be appropriate. If that evidence were available, these tests could reasonably be set aside.
Ms Winterton: I hope that as I go through the arguments I might be able to address some of those points. I understand what the hon. Gentleman is saying. If we want to guard against something happening in future, where clinicians suddenly wanted to lock people up because of their political beliefs, for example, we can say that that is an issue. However, being realistic, we have to say what such exclusions are meant to do. They are meant to be exclusions from provisions dealing with mental disorder, but as I said, the items are not considered mental disorders in the first place. As I said, the exclusions are unnecessary.
If somebody felt that they had been detained and given compulsory treatment because of their political beliefs, they would first have to get two doctors to sign up to the fact that they had a mental disorder. They would then be able to appeal to the mental health review tribunal and say, “I have been detained because these two doctors think that my belief in x, y or z is a mental disorder, but in my view it is not.” Even in the first appeal process that a patient would go through, we have built in safeguards in order to give a personthe ability to appeal if the basic criteria on which compulsion works have not been fulfilled. Somebody can say, “I do not have a mental disorder; therefore it is extraordinary that I have been detained simply because of my particular political or religious belief”. On the other side, having said why our safeguards make such exclusion unnecessary, there is immense potential to create confusion about the operation of the legislation and therefore to prevent people from getting the treatment that they need. It is not an enormous risk, yet it is there; we cannot avoid talking about that possibility.
It is also important to recognise that we particularly need to look at whether the amendments that have come from the other place contribute anything in making the Bill more effective in usage for clinicians. I understand that the Royal College of Psychiatrists has argued that it will make psychiatrists think twice. Well, I would have hoped that they were thinking twice in the beginning and that the approach was not, “Well, let’s really think this through” after the event. We have always said that psychiatrists should examine whether they are judging somebody else from their particular cultural stance; they should make sure that they understand them. If they do not agree with someone, it does not mean that that person is mentally disordered. That should be part of best clinical practice. We should not be using legislation to say to people that they must think about someone’s cultural beliefs, when that should be part of how they work.
Dr. Doug Naysmith (Bristol, North-West) (Lab/Co-op): It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Lady Winterton.
Does the Minister not agree that all the things listed by the hon. Member for Daventry are examples of abuse of psychiatry and mental health legislation? I understand exactly why the hon. Gentleman is making these points, but if such things happened in this country, we should have sufficiently well regulated medical and psychiatric professions to ensure that they stop. I agree with the Minister that it is much better not to have all these things outlined individually; for a start, we do not want to put ideas into people’s heads.
Ms Winterton: I agree absolutely with my hon. Friend; to go down such a line would almost be dangerous for us, because we would be taking away the expectation that the clinician should be making a proper judgment. The idea that this is somehow an excellent thing, because it would make them think twice, is deeply worrying.
Ann Coffey: And offensive.
Ms Winterton: As my hon. Friend says, I am sure that it is quite offensive to a number of rather good psychiatrists.
Mr. Boswell: On that point, while I understand the purity of the Minister’s argument, can she explain something that is puzzling me? Why is it necessary to effectively ring-fence substance and alcohol abuse? If she really wants to stand by her conviction, why does she not simply strike out all exclusions and leave the matter to the clinical judgment of practitioners?
5 pm
Ms Winterton: Again, that goes back to the long-standing agreement that we must be careful in saying that we could detain somebody solely on the grounds of their addiction to drugs and alcohol. It has been said that someone who is an alcoholic has a mental disorder. However, there has been a desire not to want to detain someone who, for example, might get drunk on a Friday night and as a result becomes violent. We have said that there would have to be an underlying or resulting mental disorder for that person to be detained.
The treatment of the person simply for their alcohol problem should probably be the responsibility of the addiction services. However, if we want to treat someone who has an alcohol problem and underlying severe clinical depression that makes them detainable, that is why have said that, in those circumstances, alcohol and drug dependency are mental disorders. The other conditions are not mental disorders, which is why we must have the exclusion provision for drugs and alcohol unless we decide to detain people for drug and alcohol addiction alone, which is something that Parliament has never said that it would do.
Chris Bryant: The Minister has referred almost exclusively to alcohol dependants. Clearly, no psychiatrist in Britain will want to detain someone for getting drunk on a Friday night. It would be a very big job detaining everyone who did that. The Lords amendment referred to substance misuse, including dependence, whereasthe Government amendment refers only to dependence, not misuse. If they want to stick with that idea, wouldit not be more sensible to refer to misuse anddependence?
Ms Winterton: Until fairly recently, it was not clear to us what was meant by misuse. I now understand that the Royal College of Psychiatrists has clarified the meaning. Apparently, the idea is to cover what might be called binge drinking. I referred to someone who drinks every day, but on a Friday night may become very drunk and violent. At the same time, certain people might get very, very drunk and, for a few days, hallucinate and become delusional because of the extent of their drunkenness. That might be an appropriate point at which to detain them because they had become so severely delusional that the Act would be necessary for a limited time. That is why we have not covered that situation by “substance misuse”, but as dependency.
Hywel Williams (Caernarfon) (PC): It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Lady Winterton.
The Minister suggested earlier that it would be patronising to the practitioners to draw their attention to certain things. I draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that, in other aspects of law, such as child-care law, it seems to be entirely appropriate to draw practitioners’ attention to the need for them to give due regard to children’s background, ethnicity, language, culture and a whole long list of matters before taking children into care. Should we be arguing against such provisions in that other context? Would the Minister apply the principle across?
Ms Winterton: I am not sure that I caught everything that the hon. Gentleman said. I think it important for clinicians to operate in a non-judgmental way, while looking at people’s background or culture. The viewpoint should be that people do not have a mental disorder just because their ideas might not seem absolutely normal—to use a phrase. Our reason for thinking that such people should not be in the clause is because everything listed there, apart from dependence on drugs or alcohol, is not a mental disorder. Theyare being excluded from “mental disorder” for the purposes of the Act.
Ann Coffey: It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Lady Winterton.
Does my hon. Friend agree that there is a world of difference in talking about what constitutes a mental disorder in terms of substance misuse or dependency—because of the inter-relationship between alcohol and drugs and mental disorder—and in terms of putting in exclusions such as cultural, religious and political beliefs that have nothing to do with mental disorder but with a state of society that might or might not come about with the overthrow of the democratic Government? If that happened, having that in would not help any of us, because we would all be in jail.
Ms Winterton: I am glad that my hon. Friend makes that point. I was wondering about hiding behind the Bill in the circumstances where everyone was being locked up for their cultural, religious or other beliefs. Holding up the Mental Health Bill would not necessarily help.
Tim Loughton: There are many points on which I would be grateful for greater definition between what the Minister regards as misuse and what she regards as dependence. For example, what about the person who goes out and gets drunk on a Friday night and then becomes violent? What about the chap who gets severely drunk every Friday night? Is the latter to be hauled off to a mental hospital or will he be recommended to Alcoholics Anonymous and given hospital health treatment or whatever?
Ms Winterton: We have been very clear about the legislation continuing to operate as it does as the moment. We will have the status quo when the new legislation comes in with respect to drug and alcohol dependencies. There will be no difference in how the legislation operates now. If somebody has drug and alcohol dependency, that is not the only thing that they can be detained for. I want to come on to a couple of other points, but I can go over the issue of misuse if the hon. Gentleman did not pick it up the first time.
The Royal College of Psychiatrists, which suggested an amendment, has said that that interpretation of misuse is needed to stop binge drinking or the casual consumption of illicit drugs being the basis of compulsion. As I said, there is no such exclusion at the moment; it is simply in respect of dependency. That is about a one-off misuse of alcohol or drugs. It is true that, at the moment, we do not have wards full of binge drinkers or casual drug misusers. That is anticipating something that does not happen at the moment. There is nothing in the Bill that would change the current position, but it is important to ensure that in certain cases there is scope for dealing with people who might have become extremely delusional for a time, and the Bill allows for that.
Sandra Gidley (Romsey) (LD): I am confused. The reason for the exemptions is that there is now a much broader definition in some respects.
Ms Winterton: No there is not.
Sandra Gidley: We can argue that point, but we have finished clause 1 and I do not want to revisit it. If mental illness is considered as a condition under ICD10, the definition covers acute intoxication, harmful use of a substance, dependent syndrome and withdrawal state, which is a whole range. It is difficult to try to comprehend the precise circumstances under which alcohol and drug misuse would be completely ignored, and those under which it could just be convenient to use the new legislation to lock somebody up because they were extremely drunk. There is potential for abuse in interpretation of the rule.
I want also to make some points on the exclusions themselves. We agree that sexual orientation is not a mental disorder, and nor is sexual identity, if it is assumed to mean a person’s own identification of their sexual orientation. Breaking the law and acting in a disorderly manner are not of themselves a mental disorder, nor are political, cultural or religious beliefs, however curious or unpalatable they might be to some people.
Mr. Charles Walker (Broxbourne) (Con): It is a pleasure to serve in a Committee that is chaired by your good self, Lady Winterton.
I think that the Lords inserted the exclusion on cultural, political or religious beliefs, not to help guard against overbearing clinicians, but perhaps to protect against overbearing Governments that might lean on clinicians. Before the Minister dismisses my concerns, let me say that I do not think that anybody in the room thought three years ago that the prevention of terrorism legislation would be used haul off from the Cenotaph a woman reading the names of soldiers fallen in Iraq.
 
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