 House of Commons |
Session 2006 - 07 Publications on the internet General Committee Debates Offender Management |
Offender Management Bill |
The Committee consisted of the following Members:John
Benger, Committee
Clerk
†
attended the Committee
Public Bill CommitteeTuesday 16 January 2007(Morning)[Hugh Bayley in the Chair]Offender Management Bill10.30
am
The
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department
(Mr. Gerry Sutcliffe):
On a point of order,
Mr. Bayley. I want to clarify a point about written evidence
that was raised last week. The question was what constitutes written
evidence for the purposes of this Committee. I shall begin by
clarifying that this is a parliamentary matter, not a departmental one,
but I am happy to offer my assistance to the Committee. The power of
Public Bill Committees to receive written evidence is set out in
Standing Order No. 84A. What constitutes written evidence for the
purposes of the Committee is any submission sent to the parliamentary
scrutiny unit that is relevant to the topic of the Bill and which the
Chair of the Committee agrees to accept as evidence. Submissions
accepted through that process are then formally known as written
evidence to the Committee and will be made public and subject to
parliamentary
privilege.
Having
explained the process, I should like to return to the question of the
disc of evidence from an informal oral evidence session organised on 10
January that was handed to me last week. I am pleased to return the
said disc and a transcript of its contents. The transcript, I am
afraid, needs some further work to identify the speakers and so I will
it pass back to the hon. Member for Hornchurch, with an extra copy so
that he does not lose it and so that it does not get filed away. I am
sure that he will make the relevant additions. Clearly we are happy to
accept the spirit of what is on the disc, and I am sure that
appropriate amendments will be made and that the disc will then be
presented back to the Committee by the route that I have suggested. I
hope that that meets with the Committee’s
approval.
James
Brokenshire (Hornchurch) (Con): Further to that point of
order, Mr. Bayley. May I thank the Minister for arranging
the transcript and for dealing with the disc appropriately? We will
obviously revise the transcript, which he has now handed back to us.
May I put on record my thanks to the Minister, his officials and team
for arranging that for the benefit of the Committee as a
whole?
The
Chairman:
It is nice to begin this morning’s
proceedings with an act of theatre, complete with the casting of discs
across the Committee Room. As Chairman, I rule that the Minister is
right. The matter of determining what constitutes written evidence is a
matter for Parliament, and it rests with the Chair of the Committee.
The disc and transcript currently have purely informal status, but if a
member of the
Committee were to submit the transcript or other documents to the
scrutiny unit, it would be brought to the attention of the Chair, who
would determine whether it is formal, written
evidence.
<++++>
Clause 3Power
to make arrangements for the provision of probation
services
James
Brokenshire:
I beg to move amendmentNo. 11, in
clause 3, page 3, line 11, leave
out ‘The Secretary of State’ and insert
‘Probation Boards and
Probation Trusts.’.
No. 12, in
clause 3, page 3, line 25, at
end insert—
‘( )
Arrangements under subsection (2) shall not apply in respect of
functions specified in section 1(1)(a), 1(2)(a) and
1(2)(c).’.
No.
25, in
clause 3, page 3, line 35, at
end add—
‘(6) In carrying
out their functions under this Part, and in particular in providing any
assistance to courts and to the Parole Board, providers of probation
services and their officers shall ensure that such assistance does not
give rise to any conflict of interest between their obligation to give
such advice impartially and the financial interest of the
provider.’.
James
Brokenshire:
First, may I put on record the apologies of
my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough, who unfortunately
cannot be with us today? As you have said, Mr. Bayley, the
proceedings in Committee have involved some theatre so far. We now move
on to something that is certainly not theatre, but is one of the key
aspects of the Bill and the way in which it is intended to operate and
function. It is the concept of contestability or, as others have
variously put it, competition, privatisation or the greater involvement
of non-state providers in the provision of probation
services.
With your
permission, Mr. Bayley, I should like to have a fairly
wide-ranging debate on this amendment in the knowledge that it may
impact on our ability to have a stand part debate later on. It is
probably appropriate to put these issues on record now in the context
of the amendments, as I hope that it will assist the Committee to
highlight the relevant issues and matters that pertain to the
clause.
This morning,
I shall focus on three issues: the lack of robust justification for the
model to be adopted pursuant to clause 3; the lack of clarity about the
Government’s intended model; and how services would operate in
practice as a consequence of that model and of the structure and
provisions of the clause.
I turn first to the way in
which the Government have sought to justify their approach. In the now
infamous speech to a captive audience at Wormwood Scrubs on7
November, the Home Secretary exhorted the probation service
to
“Never
forget that your job is to protect the public and what the public wants
is outcomes: less crime, safer streets, not an outdated ideological
debate about inputs and who delivers them.”
There is some irony in that, because a
debate about ideological input is precisely what the Government seem to
want to provoke, particularly on their own side. If the Home Secretary
was trying to say that we need to examine all appropriate models for
achieving improved safety, reduced reoffending and greater
rehabilitation by sharing responsibility with a range of partners and
players, then, as we have said consistently, we welcome his conversion
to our way of thinking. The problem is that the Home Secretary is hung
up on who delivers the inputs. From our reading of clause 3, it is
clear that he wants to be that
person.
There is
little doubt about the top-down, centralist model that cedes control to
the Home Office rather than devolving authority to the local level,
where more tailored solutions could be provided. Clause 3 provides a
system under which contracts will be awarded centrally by the Home
Secretary or, at best, through the regional offender managers. The
Coalition on Social and Criminal Justice, which brings together
organisations from the public and voluntary sectors involved in
reducing crime and protecting the public, has said
that
“The
current commissioning and contestability model proposed for NOMS
affords a major role to the regional level, with ten regional managers
responsible for commissioning services for offenders in prison and the
community. A wholly regional approach to commissioning would run
counter to the aim shared by Government and the coalition of
strengthening multi-agency partnership working via local area
agreements and LSPs. There is a significant risk that a commissioning
system involving only regional commissioning via the regional offender
managers may not be sensitive enough to the specific needs of the
localities...It would be a perverse outcome if NOMS replaced the
current patchwork of voluntary local engagement and partnership with a
top-down, albeit regional,
system.”
The coalition
certainly has concerns about the proposed structure against a backdrop
of general acceptance that services are best provided locally, closer
to offenders’ families, where they are most likely to be
successful. One of the issues that came out in the evidence that we
received at the informal session, which I hope we will be able to share
formally with the Committee in due course, was that having offenders
close to the community, monitored in the community, supported by the
community and with their networks, families and other aspects of
rehabilitation within the community setting improves the likelihood
that outcomes will be positive.
So what are the Government
trying to do? The best that I can come up with is the following, which
the Home Secretary said on Second
Reading:
“I
agree that much of such work is better commissioned locally, but that
is not the question. The question is whether it should be provided only
by a local monopoly. We are creating the circumstances whereby it can
be commissioned locally, but its commissioning will not automatically
depend on an existing local monopoly, which will both commission and
provide the service that the commissioners are commissioning. We are
opening it up. In some cases, it will not be provided locally; it will
be provided in a larger area. However, for the foreseeable
future—for the next several years—the specific management
of offenders, particularly serious ones, as opposed to intervention to
provide educational programmes, will be done by the probation
service.”—[Official Report, 11 December 2006; Vol.
454, c. 589.]
The Minister has
chipped in and said, “Very, very clear,” but I wish that
I could agree with that reading of the quote. My reading is that it is
not about local commissioning; it is about local monopolies and local
services, but some services will not be local. It is about change, but
there will not be any change in a number of
areas.
Last week, the
Minister criticised me for asking for more details, but against the
backdrop of the Home Secretary’s comments, it is entirely
reasonable for the Committee to ask for further detail. Although I am
sure that he was quite clear about what he was trying to say on Second
Reading, I suspect that members of the Committee and many other people
may be confused and unclear as to his precise intentions. I hope that
we will be able to shed some light on them, if not achieve agreement,
during the course of this
debate.
We will
analyse the detail of the clause shortly, but it is hard to detect any
clarity of vision on how the outcomes will be improved by the clause.
Many questions need to be answered, and I hope that the Minister will
answer them in his response. How have the Government arrived at this
model as against any other model that they may have considered? It is
clear that they could have explored an arrangement within the existing
construct to try to promote competition and involve the voluntary
sector to a greater degree. They have decided that the current model
does not work for some reason, even though they introduced it as
recently as 2001. It would be helpful for the Minister to explain why
he feels that the existing model is
flawed.
When I analyse
the apparent structure, at least as it been explained in isolation from
the Bill, I see some striking similarities to the structure that is
used in the health service, in which services at the local level are
commissioned by primary care trusts, which are directed and controlled
at the regional level by strategic health authorities, which in turn
follow the targets, policies and diktats of the Department of Health.
Given the parlous state of NHS finances and the pressure that that is
causing, I hope that my understanding of how the model is intended to
operate is incorrect. If I have correctly understood and explained the
situation, it is a strange model to have
chosen.
10.45
am
It is
interesting that the Government decided on the model proposed in this
Bill and did not seek to change the existing model, which was adopted
only six years ago, even though there is a need to put a greater
emphasis on partnership. Will the Minister explain why the greater
partnership option has not been adopted? On Second Reading, various
hon. Members mentioned the Scottish model. As the Minister knows, it
involves the adoption of new community justice authorities, bringing
together local authorities, probation organisations, the Prison Service
and key partners in the voluntary sector to reduce reoffending, with
the target of a 2 per cent. reduction by March 2008. The structure is
in its infancy, with operations due to be launched in April, so it
would be premature to reach any conclusions on its
operation.
It is
interesting to note that the Government have dismissed the Scottish
model completely—that is how I have taken their
comments—without explaining why they believe it to be flawed or
why the model in the Bill
will better advance the issues that they have said underpin the Bill. On
Second Reading, the Home Secretary
said:
“On the
Scottish model, first, I have no vote in what the Scots decide.
Secondly, from time immemorial, the Scots have had a completely
different legal system, based on Roman law rather than case precedent.
Thirdly, I do not always agree that the Scottish Executive choose the
best way even for Scottish conditions.”—[Official
Report, 11 December 2006; Vol. 454,c.
587.]
We are celebrating 300
years of the Union today, but my reading of what the Home Secretary
said is that apart from a basic statement that “You are wrong,
but I cannot tell you that you are wrong,” the only substantive
point that he made was the distinction between Roman law and binding
precedent. That does not seem to be closely linked to probation, the
monitoring of offenders and making communities safer. While it might be
an interesting and arcane legal point, I do not see what it has to do
with the issue before us or the differences that make the Home
Secretary and, I am sure, the Minister, believe that the Scottish model
is inappropriate.
In
our attempt to understand the Government’s approach, it would be
helpful to have more detail on why the Scottish model, which relies on
partnership arrangements, is not perceived as appropriate for England
and Wales and why the model set out in the Bill is believed to be so
much better. The Home Secretary might be right in his dismissive
approach to the model, but it is appropriate and reasonable for the
Committee to ask what models the Government have considered other than
the one set out in the clause, and why that one was felt to be the
best.
Mr.
Sutcliffe:
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving
way, because I do not wish to stop his flow. I will go into detail
about the Scottish model in my response, but is he saying that he is in
favour of it? It does not allow for commissioning, so I am not sure
whether he supports
commissioning.
James
Brokenshire:
As I said on Second Reading, I am certainly
in favour of the greater involvement of the voluntary and other sectors
in the provision of services. I raise the issue so that we can
understand why the Home Office and the Government have
dismissedthe Scottish model, and the Minister might well wish
to explain that in his response. It is important that we should raise
the matter in trying to understand the Government’s thought
process on how the arrangement in the Bill was reached. The Committee
needs to understand why the Scottish model, which is intended to
deliver a 2 per cent. reduction in reoffending, is considered
inappropriate. We want to put our concern about that issue on record
and to debate it this morning.
Clause 3 deals with the
commissioning and the provision of services. It appears to offer a
number of different models for the provision of probation services,
which the Home Secretary can adopt at his discretion. The models are,
first, that he will make provision for probation directly, by himself
or through his staff and other officers, by virtue of subsection (4);
secondly, that he will contract services directly with one named party;
thirdly, that he will contract a named
party to provide services, and that party would then commission its own
services through subcontracting arrangements; and fourthly, that he
will arrange for services to be provided by another person in an
unspecified way, other than by way of contract, as outlined in
subsection (2).
In
other words, clause 3 gives the Home Secretary complete discretion to
use any way that he decides, which seems extremely wide-ranging. In
Committee last week, it was noted that Parliament has been concerned
about allowing powers in a Bill that are so broad and wide that it is
difficult to see from the Bill where they end and what direction will
be taken. Those issues are not clearly addressed in the clause. There
are questions that need to be carefully considered about whether the
wide-ranging rights that the Secretary of State will have are
appropriate and whether there should be more structure in the Bill,
including restrictions on how the Home Secretary can
operate.
For example,
the Home Secretary could choose one single option for all probation
services, or he could go for a mix-and-match option. Despite the
description of how service provision is envisaged, he has wide-ranging
discretion, and service provision could be changed fundamentally
without reference to Parliament. There are questions about the
accountability of Ministers in connection with the provision of such
services, and I would be grateful if the Minister were to explain how
those questions will be addressed. I know that this issue was raised on
Second Reading, when the Home Secretary gave a fairly clear assurance
that this measure is not intended in any way to be a means of
obfuscation or of avoiding liability, questioning or accountability. It
is important for us to explore this area further to determine how the
Government intend to ensure that that type of protection is
provided.
At Wormwood
Scrubs, the Home Secretary, when discussing the current levels of
service provision that are contracted out, said that such services will
go further and compete a much larger proportion of probation service
work. He said:
“But I want to go
further. So from April 2008, once we have passed the necessary
legislation we will compete services with an annual value of up to
£250m — on a compulsory basis if
necessary.”
Now,
£250 million is quite a specific figure forthe contract
value that is envisaged. Therefore, the Minister must have a good idea
of the nature of the services that would be “competed”,
to use the Home Secretary’s term. I hope that the Minister can
share with the Committee the nature of these competed services, and the
mechanism by which they would be
competed.
The
fundamental problem with the arrangement envisaged in clause 3 is that
it would be top-down, which is why we have sought to clip the Home
Secretary’s wings by tabling amendment No. 21, which states that
contracts should be given at the local level, rather than being given
out centrally.
Mr.
David Kidney (Stafford) (Lab): The hon. Gentleman meant
amendment No. 11 when he said amendment No. 21. In tabling the
amendment, are Her Majesty’s official Opposition rejecting
wholesale the structure proposed by the Government, or are they putting
down a marker for there to be flexibility to
commission services locally? If the latter, does subsection (3)(c) not
already provide the flexibility that they
seek?
James
Brokenshire:
Subsection (3)(c) does not provide the
flexibility highlighted by the hon. Gentleman, because the whole
concept is for contracts to be provided from the centre, which seems to
undermine the whole purpose. I have already used the quote from the
Coalition on Social and Criminal Justice, which states that
commissioning was likely to come “at best” from the
regions rather than from the local level. I do not agree with the hon.
Gentleman’s
analysis.
We have
fundamental issues with clause 3 in its entirety, mainly because of the
vagueness and uncertainty that I alluded to this morning. We have
tabled the amendment because of a shared understanding that it is best
to provide contracts at the local level. However, I will wait to see
how the Minister responds to the debate and to the amendments before
drawing my
conclusions.
The
Government need to explain more clearly why the proposed contractual
structure will not be more costly and bureaucratic and what the glue is
that holds the service together in a co-ordinated way. Merely relying
on a contractual construct with a nexus of enforceable contractual
liabilities, but without a pivot around which the service operates,
would risk significant problems in how high quality services will be
delivered, measured and maintained. It is important for the Minister to
give the Committee, to the extent that he is able, greater clarity on
how sustainability will be delivered and maintained within the
provisions of clause 3. The Home Secretary appears to be talking about
moving to a dynamic and fluid situation of contracting, which raises a
whole host of issues about what that might
mean.
Subsection
(3)(a) concerns co-operation with various parties, and the question is
how that will be enforced. How will potentially competing parties be
obliged to share information? In that more dynamic
situation,it is reasonable to assume that competing parties
may not necessarily be too willing to share information, which they may
regard as commercially sensitive, as compared with
“sensitive” in the context of the running of the
probation service. Shedding some light on dealing with such a situation
would be beneficial, and there are also the associated cost
concepts.
Subsection
(3)(a) talks about the requirement to co-operate
with
“other providers of
probation services or persons who are concerned with the prevention or
reduction of crime or with giving assistance to the victims of
crime”,
which is, quite
rightly, a broad and wide-ranging duty for how services would be
provided and for ensuring a joined-up approach. If we look at how
contracts are drawn up, we have seen the Government become the victim
in the context of computer contracts. Getting the definitions, the
standard and type of service and what is envisaged right is extremely
difficult, particularly in a dynamic situation of change, where a
person might need to liaise with multiple parties. It is not
unreasonable to suggest that it may be difficult to draft such
provisions
appropriately.
What risk does the Minister
think there is of contracting parties renegotiating, on the basis that
the services that they were expecting to provide have been changed or
extended because of a dynamic situation? That is a crucial aspect of
how a contractual service would function.
11
am
Mr.
Sutcliffe:
I follow the hon. Gentleman’s
logic in respect of future contractual arrangements, but his point also
applies to the probation boards’ existing contracts, in which
the same difficulties
arise.
James
Brokenshire:
The distinction is that at present the
probation boards act as an anchor or focal point, a sort of glue, to
use an analogy. As I understand it, the clause is moving towards a more
dynamic contractual situation, in which there is no certainty that a
probation trust, if established, will remain in existence. The
contracts could ebb and flow around the system. The point is writ much
larger in this context because of the proposal continually to change
any existing arrangements. That would become more of an issue if the
model were to be
adopted.
On the
continuity of service, what would happen if a company or other provider
went bust or became insolvent? Although there are provisions in the
schedules for the transfer of property and employees, that deals only
with one aspect of what could be a very difficult problem. The most
direct parallel is the rail industry, which has a complicated network
of contracts. There is a concept of rail administration, which contains
various provisions to deal with situations in which a company or
provider gets into financial or other difficulties that mean that it
can no longer provide the
services.
It is
important to understand what will happen if things go wrong—if,
perhaps due to circumstances that are unconnected with its probation
activities, a provider is suddenly unable to continue to provide
services. The logic may be that the Secretary of State will step in,
but we need to understand what would happen in such circumstances,
because there could bea multiplicity of contracts and
subcontracts. Those problems need to be considered properly and
appropriately to ensure that if a fully contractual model is adopted,
continuity is maintained.
Subcontracting is a key aspect
of how the construct will work. The Minister indicated that, in respect
of the involvement of the voluntary sector, he did not want a panoply
of contracts that would be managed by the Secretary of State; he seemed
to want to subcontract to a body that would further subcontract to
other parties. How would that work in a situation of continual change?
Would the services be contracted to just one third party, or could
there be fourth and fifth sub-parties? The element of control obviously
dissipates the further the subcontracting goes.
The Bill refers to third
parties, but that could be read in different ways. Does it mean a
specific third party, or does it go further than that? What element of
control does the Secretary of State envisage being exercised through a
contract or other mechanism to ensure that the delivery of high-quality
services at subcontractor, or further subcontractor, level? What
happens to the
subcontracts if the head contractor—the main party with whom the
Secretary of State has contracted—disappears or if the contract
is terminated because the Home Secretary decides that it is not
performing
adequately?
Small
voluntary sector bodies may be involved in providing services through
that mechanism, and how the contracts are drawn up could potentially
expose them to greater risk. How might they be protected? Is it
envisaged in those circumstances that the Home Secretary could novate
those subcontracts up to a new provider, or indeed to himself? That is
a detailed point, but it is quite crucial in service provision to
ensurethat continuity is maintained in ever-changing
circumstances.
It is
also important to understand what the contract’s intended
duration is. If a provider is intending to invest, then a contract
needs to be of a suitable length to ensure, from a financial
perspective, that it can work. It must be sustainable and it must be
attractive to a service provider. Will the Minister help the Committee
by setting out what is currently envisaged regarding the awarding of
contracts, and in what circumstances he intends to tender? What
requirements does he envisage placing on contracting parties in the
voluntary sector? We talked at length on Second Reading—we will
surely come to it in this debate, too—about the importance of
involving the voluntary sector at a local level, to ensure that we have
a localised service to improve the outcomes that I already alluded to.
Does the Minister envisage the tender process somehow obliging or
requiring contracting parties to involve the voluntary sector in
providing maintained services?
Will the Home Secretary reserve
change of control provisions to cover a takeover situation, whereby
ownership of a contracting party may be changed to a person that he
subsequently considers to be unsuitable? Would contracts be capable of
assignment or novation in these circumstances? Indeed, would they be
personal, such that they could not be transferred to another party?
Again, it is important to understand the contractual nexus and what the
Government intend through this framework that they are setting
out.
Another crucial
aspect in ensuring both service delivery in which the public is
protected and the maintenance of high quality standards is the
performance criteria. How will these be set, and what measurements will
be put in place to ensure that a particular party performs? How will
they be measured, and who will monitor their performance? What
sanctions would be imposed for breach? Obviously, the ultimate sanction
might be termination or the taking away of a contract, but does the
Minister yet envisage financial penalties to ensure that particular
contractors, of whatever nature, perform according to the tender and
contract documents?
I
have raised an extremely important concern about continuity of service
and the maintenance of qualified and skilled probation staff. The Home
Secretary assured the inmates of Wormwood Scrubs
that
“good probation
services and probation officers have nothing to fear and everything to
gain in this new world”.
Part of that is down to investment in
education, training and continued professional development. How will
the cost of training, and investment in continuing training, be met?
That issue needs to be clearly explained in the context of the Home
Secretary’s brave new world and the Bill’s framework.
Will that cost be shared in future? Who is to bear it? Is it intended
that it should form part of a contracting company’s bid, in that
it should feature in what it says in its tender documents about how it
will retain highly motivated, qualified and supported staff?
Concerns have also been
expressed about the risk of services being cherry picked, in that if
the services that are perceived to be low risk or easier to deliver
were contracted out, highly qualified and experienced probation
officers and other staff might be attracted to those services, where
they would be well remunerated. What would the impact of that be on the
services that remained within a probation trust or were provided
directly by the Secretary of State through some other
mechanism?
That type
of approach seems to have been envisaged by the Home Secretary in his
comments about the maintenance of certain services “within the
probation services”, which I quoted earlier. That prompts the
question, what did the Home Secretary mean by “probation
services” in that context, given the revised construct that we
are debating and the fact thatclause 7 envisages the abolition
of local probation
boards?
The Home
Secretary also said that one of the key aims of the reforms is to
provide every offender with a seamless package of supervision and
support from the start of his sentence to the end, overseen by a single
offender manager working off a single case record shared with everybody
in the system. That, too, raises the issue of the potential
multiplicity of providers. We will come on to probation trusts, which
are not, it seems, to be arranged on a geographical basis—a
number of them might have to compete with each other.
How will the single system be
delivered, how will the end-to-end management be operated in that sort
of framework, and what sharing of computer systems and computer records
will be necessary? Will compulsory adoption of standard IT packages and
systems across the whole of the probation service be required, and how
will the individualisation of support be achieved? NAPO has highlighted
the fact that there are some parallels with unpaid work and community
service. It says:
“Last year 55,430 people
were sentenced to Unpaid Work...and they completed 461,000,000
hours of work. Many placements were environmental, decorating and
cleaning, including litter removal and graffiti clearance. However,
over 35% were individual placements. These placements have involved
working in charity shops, working for churches, maintaining gardens for
the elderly, supporting adults with learning difficulties, working in
day centres for the elderly and for the homeless, working in a wildlife
centre, working at a lifelong learning centre, working at a retreat for
disadvantaged children and working with
Oxfam.”
I use
that quote because it highlights clearly the different types of
community service that might be provided and the fact that 35 per cent.
of placements were individualised. The Home Secretary talks about
trying to provide an individualised service, but that
might be difficult to achieve in practice. Certainly NAPO has expressed
concerns about the risk that individualisation might be watered down;
the fact that the Criminal Justice Act 2003 increased the minimum group
size to six, which might militate against an individualised service;
the need to ensure that offenders are re-educated so that they stand as
good a chance as they can of getting jobs, getting back into the
community and stopping reoffending; and the need to provide the
facilities for all those things to be achieved. Does the Minister agree
with those concerns? What measures are intended to ensure that the
standard of provision on matters such as community service is
maintained?
11.15
am
The issue of
potential conflicts of interest also needs to be examined and
addressed, which is why we have tabled amendments Nos. 12 and 25.
Concerns have been expressed about the same party being responsible for
the provision of services and the writing of reports, because it might
be encouraged to support its own services and generate business in that
way. We need to address that important issue head on to ensure that
justice is seen to be done and that there is integrity within the
service. In the interests of justice and the confidence of the system
as a whole, it is important to put that in the
Bill.
Three more
agencies spring to mind, the first of which is the Prison Service.
Subsection (4) states that the Home Secretary has the power to provide
services and envisages that prison officers and prison employees may be
involved in carrying out those services. The explanatory notes
state:
“In
most cases, it is anticipated that the Secretary of State will make
arrangements with others to deliver probation services but this makes
it possible for prison staff, for example, to deliver probation
services in the community. This could be helpful in terms of bridging
the gap between custody and the
community.”
The question
that obviously arises is what role is envisaged. Is it envisaged that
there will be an increasing role for the Prison Service in probation,
rather than the other way around?
James
Brokenshire:
If the Minister is saying that it is
basically a free-for-all, it is an interesting comment about the
discretion that is being allowed. It is that sort of detail that is
appropriate.
Mr.
Sutcliffe:
I have been listening to the hon. Gentleman
with great interest, and I hope to respond to all of his points. It is
not a free-for-all. The objective is to cut reoffending rates, to
protect the public and to make sure that we have a system that works.
We do not want to stifle innovation. When I say that it could be, it
depends on what is put to the commission as the best way to achieve the
objective of reducing
reoffending.
James
Brokenshire:
That is an interesting indication of the
mindset. The Minister has suggested thatthe commissioners,
whoever they may be, could commission services directly with the Prison
Service itself. I would be interested to know what discussions
he has had with the Prison Governors
Associationand the Prison Officers Association. He seems to be
envisaging a step change in the manner in which the services are
provided. In fact, all probation services could ultimately be provided
by the Prison Service, if that is the fluid environment that he seems
to be talking
about.
Mr.
Sutcliffe:
I do not want to concentrate too much on that.
I just give it as an example of what innovation could come forward. I
certainly have no plans for the Prison Service to take on all the
probation work. We want the Bill to enable thinking outside the
existing boxes and to tackle the important issues of reoffending rates
and the better management of offenders in our
communities.
James
Brokenshire:
I certainly hear what the Minister has said
about the desire that underpins the provision, but there is a huge
amount of uncertainty for the probation service, its employees and
officers as to what the future might hold for their work of ensuring
that the public are protected. The last thing that anyone wants to see
is qualified probation officers and staff leaving the service because
they do not know where it is going or whether they will get the
necessary back-up and support. It is essential for morale that we
maintain the continuity of service and do not lose experienced people.
It would be damaging to the provision of services and to the attempt to
rehabilitate people and cut reoffending if we were suddenly to lose a
lot of qualified staff because of a lack of clarity and
certainty.
I note
what the Minister has said about looking outside the box and thinking
outwards. However, the Home Office does not seem to know where it is
going and does not have a sense of purpose or direction in telling
outside bodies what the changes might mean. It is interesting that the
Minister does not seem to have a problem with that, but I will let him
respond to the point and provide what clarity he can—we will
listen intently.
I
recently visited Belmarsh prison. Nobody in the Committee will be
surprised to learn that I was struck by the need to focus on basic
skills and the employability of offenders. One of the fundamental
causes of crime and reoffending is the fact that offenders drop out of
the system and cannot find employment and get their lives back
together. The failure to provide basic numeracy and literacy skills,
and the social exclusion that that creates, must be addressed. Steps
must be put in place to ensure that we cut reoffending and, ultimately,
cut crime and make our communities safer
places.
I was
interested to note that Belmarsh has a relationship with a local
college to ensure that training is provided within the prison
environment to give prisoners basic or vocational skills to help them
back into work and prevent them from reoffending. It was explained to
me that the help continues afterwards—the link is maintained
once an offender leaves prison, which is an important model and
provides consistency in rehabilitation.
That highlights the role of the
learning and skills councils, which commission various services for the
probation system and prisoners. What flexibility will
the National Offender Management Service and the
learning and skills councils have jointly to commission end-to-end
management in attempting to cut reoffending and to rehabilitate
offenders? The Home Secretary said in his comments on the contracting
arrangement that educational provision is key. I know that the Minister
and the Home Office have criticised the probation service for the lack
of involvement with outside bodies and of commissioning voluntary
organisations, but a lot of contracts are given to outside bodies,
particularly those for educational services through the learning and
skills councils. It would be beneficial if we could understand how the
councils have been factored into the revised construct in the key
matters of education, basic skills, basic vocational training and
cutting
reoffending.
The final
agency that I will mention is local government itself. How is it
intended to fit in? How will the arrangements in the Bill fit in with,
for example, crime and disorder reduction partnerships or local area
agreements? The Local Government Association has made a relevant point
in its briefing on the Bill. It believes that a local approach offers
the best prospect of improved offender management. Any new arrangements
must be locally accountable and properly integrated into local area
agreements and local strategic partnerships. LAAs need to be developed
in particular as the primary means of achieving joined-up working
across agencies within and beyond the criminal justice system. On the
basis of the bare framework in the clause, it is difficult to
understand how that might be
achieved.
A number of
organisations have raised concerns about how everything will join up
given the problems with contracting. Such problems could be
addressedin a suitable system, but how would they fit in
withthe local government arrangements and local area
agreements? The Prison Reform Trust has made a similar point:
“There is considerable
scope to amend the Bill to allow for the increased involvement of local
councils and an expansion of their responsibilities. Local area
agreements could be used to develop preventive work and community
solutions to crime, on the one hand, and to resettle ex-prisoners in
the community on the other. Locally accountable chief officers and
strengthened Probation Boards will also provide a sound basis for
closer links between Probation and the courts. Such a link is essential
in building the trust and understanding necessary to win the confidence
of magistrates and judges in the delivery of community
sentences.”
That point
relates to the structure that has been
adopted.
In many other
aspects of criminal justice, the Home Office has set a great deal of
store by local area agreements and the delivery through local
government of local services. I am sure that we will hear more of that
in the next week with the relaunch of the respect agenda and further
proposals that may result from it. We are closely considering the
involvement of local bodies and local government as we develop our
ideas on the delivery of services and local accountability, which would
allow a local community to hold people to
account.
The top-down
approach to contracting, with the Home Secretary at the top, militates
against the delivery of services at the local level, local
commissioning and local accountability. That underpins the comments from
the LGA and the Prison Reform Trust and re-emphasises the need for
local service provision. We are not getting that through this clause,
which is the central point behind our lead amendment. We still have
significant concerns about what the clause will mean for the delivery
of services, cutting crime and reoffending and the protection of the
public.
The
Chairman:
Having listened to the hon. Gentleman’s
remarks, and bearing in mind that the amendments are broad, I expect
that we will do without a clause stand part debate, unless I hear in
any further contributions the suggestion that there are matters that
ought to be raised that do not fall within the scope of the amendments.
If I do not hear such suggestions, I will move to clause stand part on
a formal
basis.
Mr.
Neil Gerrard (Walthamstow) (Lab): This clause is, in many
ways, the key clause in the Bill, because subsections (2) and (3) allow
competition in and privatisation of any part of the probation service.
I am not suggesting that the intention is to privatise the whole
probation service, but fundamentally that is what subsections (2) and
(3) allow. As the Minister knows, those provisions have caused concern
to a considerable number of Government Members. This was evident on
Second Reading, and I am sure it will be evident again when we get to
the later stages ofthis
Bill.
11.30
am
I have listened
to the hon. Member for Hornchurch speaking for the Opposition and I am
still not entirely clear what he is proposing. He seems to be arguing
that we should throw away the Bill completely yet he still seems to be
in favour of a contractual model, provided that the contracting is done
at a local rather than a national level. I am not necessarily convinced
of that either. If one moves to a model that is fully contractually
based, it does not seem to me to make a great deal of difference
whether that is done at a local or national
level.
Mr.
Sutcliffe:
Before my hon. Friend goes on to the substance
of his speech, I want to reflect on what was said on Second Reading
about what the hon. and learned Member for Harborough said when he
addressed the conference of the National Association of Probation
Officers. He gave the impression that the Opposition were going to
oppose the Bill and the spirit of the Bill. It might help the Committee
if that point were now reiterated.
Mr.
Gerrard:
It is certainly my impression that the hon.
Member for Hornchurch was arguing that contracts should happen at local
level rather than at national or regional level. When I look at other
aspects of public service that have gone down that road— where
trusts operate contracts for services at a local level—I cannot
say that that encourages me to believe that this is the road we should
be going down for probation. When we have had such a model for other
services, that has not led to a great degree of accountability. In fact,
I think exactly the opposite is the
case.
Parts of this
clause do not seem to cause any difficulty. There is the requirement,
for example, on co-operation with other providers of probation
services. References have been made already to the Scottish model where
co-operation is at the centre of the structure. The Minister may well
say to us later that he does not believe the Scottish model will
translate perfectly into an English context because we have to deal
with a different criminal justice system. I suspect that that may well
be true; we cannot simply transplant the Scottish model across. What is
at the heart of the Scottish model is a co-operative structure rather
than a contracting structure. That concept could be translated across,
whether we take the model as a whole or not.
There has been much discussion
around the Bill, as there was on Second Reading, about the involvement
of the voluntary sector. Some of that discussion has been rather
misleading. It has been presented as if those of us who are unhappy
with the contracting arrangements are somehow opposed to the
involvement of the voluntary sector when that is simply not the case.
We know that there are good examples, some of which were quoted on the
Second Reading, of work that is being done now by the voluntary sector.
This includes work that is done in education and skills training, the
provision of accommodation, work to deal with alcohol and drug problems
and voluntary mentoring—a whole string of services are provided
through voluntary sector agencies.
Unpaid work is organised and
supervised by the probation service but the main sources of that unpaid
work are the voluntary sector and local authorities. That is where much
of that work takes place. I am worried about private sector involvement
because there is a considerable danger that if private companies were
involved in dealing with unpaid work and it were not based in the
voluntary sector, it would become a source of cheap labour substituting
for what should be properly paid
work.
It has been
suggested that in recent years the probation boards have been backing
away from dealing with the voluntary sector and cutting the amount that
they spend. If one simply considers the budget of the probation boards,
that is true, but it is very misleading. What has actually happened is
that money that used to go through the probation boards for
accommodation, learning and skills and drug rehabilitation has been
top-sliced from the budgets. Other parts of the budget—property
management and IT, for example—have been centralised at Home
Office level, rather than going through the local probation boards. To
conclude that the boards have been backing away from involvement with
the voluntary sector simply as a result of looking at their budgets is
very misleading. At present, the figures are transparent and it worries
me that that transparency would be lost if there were private sector
involvement.
It is
very difficult to get to the bottom of what goes on in private prisons
and to know what the costs are, as the spending is not transparent. If
one asks the Home Office about the contract prices charged by the
private sector companies running prisons, the answer is usually that
the figures cannot be disclosed because they are
matters of commercial confidentiality. I do not want that lack of
transparency to spread to the probation
service.
Amendment No.
18 refers to race equality and we can learn lessons by considering what
has been happening on that issue in the private sector of the prison
service. The annual report of Her Majesty’s chief inspector of
prisons a couple of years ago expressed as a general matter of concern
that privately managed prisons were well behind public sector prisons
in establishing effective systems to grapple with issues of race and
diversity. The amendment is important, because on the evidence of what
has happened in the prison service, there would be increasing concern
about the issue if there was more private sector involvement in
probation.
The
argument for major alterations to a structure that has existed only
since 2001 when the national probation service was set up is that they
are necessary to improve performance and to reduce reoffending; but
there is no clear evidence that the structural changes are necessary to
achieve those aims. The Home Office performance reports on the
probation service in the last year or two have said that the probation
service is performing pretty well—not perfectly, but one would
not expect that. Achieving targets in this area is always going to be
extremely difficult. Probation officers have to deal with very
difficult and, in some cases, very dangerous people. They are not easy
to deal with or to make decisions about. I would not like to have the
responsibility of doing the job, with the possibility that my name
might be all over the national press if I made an error of judgment in
an individual case, but that is what we are asking probation officers
to do every single day of the week. However, there are a set of
performance measures and the last report on good enforcement measures
said that 91 per cent. were enforced within 10 working days in
accordance with the national standards. Compliance targets were being
reached, and the proportion of appointments that the offender attends
was being measured. In the analysis of high-risk cases, the target was
to complete 90 per cent. of harm analyses and risk management plans;
that was being exceeded between April and September 2006, the last
period for which we have figures. For unpaid work, the number of
completions was 6 per cent. over the target. There is also measurement
for drug treatment and testing orders, and one can go on through the
report and quote a stream of statistics showing that the service is
achieving the targets
set.
One of the
targets that is not there is reoffending. There has not been a target
specifically set on reoffending, although a lot has been said about
reoffending rates. Who is responsible for reoffending rates is a
complicated issue. It is not simply the probation service that does
what has to be done over what is happening on reoffending. The
probation service does not deal with every single person who has been
in and out of prison. Many other people and agencies are involved in
trying to deal with
reoffending.
Despite
some of the statistics being bandied around, the reoffending rates for
people who have been through the probation service compare very
favourably with those for people who the probation service has not
dealt with. There was an argument on Second Reading, which I am sure
that the Minister will recall, about the
details of the figures—some of the figures quoted as the
reoffending rate for people on probation appeared to include people who
had reoffended before they came under the supervision of the probation
service. That is hardly a fair
comparison.
Mr.
Sutcliffe:
I hesitate to say this, because we might end up
with an argument about reoffending rates, butI hope that my
hon. Friend is aware that there was and is a dispute between the
National Association of Probation Officers and the Department about the
figures. A number of meetings have taken place and I hope that they
will eventually agree, if possible, on the reoffending rates. The
underlying issue is that reoffending rates are still too high, however
they are
measured.
Mr.
Gerrard:
I know that there is the disagreement about the
source of the figures. Nobody is disputing that we need to do more
about getting reoffending rates down. The issue is whether structural
changes are the way to do it. Are they a necessary part of bringing
down reoffending rates? The big question is what is going to be
contracted out. If I look at what has happened in the prison service, I
see that the easy stuff—the brand-new, newly built prisons, with
relatively low-risk offenders—ended up being managed by the
private companies. I suspect that things will go that way in the
probation service, at least in the early stages, so let us look at some
of the work that has to be done through the probation
service.
11.45
am
There is the
writing of court reports, which are, as intended, there to help courts
make decisions, and that needs to be reliable and professional. There
is the supervision of people in the community: 130,000 people are now
on orders, and the probation service is currently supervising 47,000
people under the multi-agency public protection arrangements, with
another 30,000 on orders with conditions that they attend groups such
as sex offender treatment and anger management programmes. More than
100 hostels are being operated by the probation service—in a
recent case, a private company ran a hostel with rather disastrous
results—and there is the enforcement of conditions for people
who are on community orders and parole.
I am really not sure where the
people or the other organisations are who are supposedly capable of
taking over or doing some of that work. Where are the organisations
with staff who could write reliable court reports? I suspect the answer
is that if private companies thought that they could move into this
market, they would not set up and train staff, but poach people from
the national probation service. Their offer to people with such
experience would be, “Come and work for us. We’ll pay you
more. It’ll be better.” That will be the sort of line
pitched to those people to get them into
employment.
We have
seen that happen in other areas of work. I recall when a private
company was brought in by my local authority a few years ago to
administer part of the local education authority’s work. At the
first
meeting I went to with people from that private company—I had to
deal with them while running part of the council’s
services—they sat there and talked to me and my hon. Friend the
Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Harry Cohen) about their extensive
experience of working with local authorities. They had been poached
from those authorities to go and work in the private sector, and
exactly the same sort of thing would happen
here.
The private
companies would certainly not retrain people or provide them with the
opportunity to obtain professional qualifications, unless they were
forced to. They would simply rely on the public sector to do all that
work before creaming off the benefits. I am simply not convinced that
the people or organisations are there to deliver without fundamentally
ripping off the public
sector.
As far as the
voluntary sector is concerned, if we look at what organisations have
been saying to us—I am sure that other Committee members will
have seen the papers from the YMCA and from the organisation in York
called Clinks that supports voluntary organisations working with
offenders and their families—then, of course, they want to do
more of the sort of work that they have been doing.
The Clinks paper clearly states
that there are core areas of probation work that it considers that the
state should continue to undertake. In particular, it talks about the
writing of court reports and parole board or public protection work
with high-risk offenders, and it also mentions the potential conflicts
of interest that would arise from private and voluntary sector
providers. It states that the voluntary sector must be careful not to
become, or to become perceived as, another agent of the state. It
believes that if that were to happen, it would lose all that is most
distinctive and valuable about its
work:
“We do
not think that a series of competitions in which voluntary and private
organisations are pitted against the probation service is the best
model.”
That view is
reflected in the comments of the YMCA, which has said that it does not
wish to be seen as an alternative provider of public services—it
wants to do more of the sort of work that it has been doing for several
years—but that the Bill places the
sector
“alongside others
for services to be merely transferred, neglecting the particular
contribution that a voluntary relationship has on preventing
reoffending.”
Some
of the discussion that took place on Second Reading about the role of
the voluntary sector ignored much of what that sector is saying. I do
not believe that the contractual model is the route that we should be
taking. So far as the amendments are concerned, it would be better if
we were dealing with probation boards and probation trusts. I would
rather have the probation boards that exist now rather than something
at a national level, which amendment No. 11 refers to. However, I do
not want to go down that road if all that that would mean is that
instead of a national service based on contracting everything out, we
have a local service based on contracting everything out. That is not
the way to go. I have also touched on the possible conflicts of
interest to which amendment No. 25
refers.
If we are not
going to retain the national service, and if there is going to be
change because the Bill will go ahead in some form or other, we need to
consider the
limitations that will be imposed. Probation officers
are really scared about what is going to happen to their jobs. They
fear that they will soon face the possibility of having to compete with
a private or voluntary sector provider for their own jobs. Once that
sort of atmosphere starts to develop inside a service, not only is it
bad for morale, but it means that people start to leave—they
look for alternatives.
In the past few weeks, I had a
conversation with somebody whom I have known for a long time. He has
worked in the probation service for 25 years, and he told me that he is
getting out. One of his reasons for doing so is that he is worried
about the direction in which the service appears to be going as a
result of the Bill. We cannot afford for that sort of thing to happen,
and we need to be able to reassure people about their jobs. I trust the
Minister when he says that he does not intend to privatise everything,
but that is no guarantee for the future when we have what we have in
the Bill. In dealing with this clause, we have to look for something
that ensures that people in the probation service feel that their jobs
are safe. Yes; we expect them to deliver and nobody should expect that
their job will never change, but we should reassure them that they are
going to have jobs and that core probation work will be delivered by
the public sector. That is the direction in which we must try to
go.
Mark
Hunter (Cheadle) (LD): I want to make a number of comments
about the clause in general as well as about amendments Nos. 11 and
12.
Clause 3 goes to
the heart of the debate. It fundamentally changes the relationship
between Government and the probation service, and I want to challenge
some of the assumptions on which it seems to be based. Before I do so,
may I say that there is complete agreement on both sides of the
Committee about the need to reduce reoffending rates? I do not want the
Minister—I am sure that he will not do this—or anyone
else to interpret our concerns as anything other than genuine attempts
to achieve that objective. The difference between us is that some of us
are not yet convinced that the proposals in the Bill are the right way
to achieve that objective. Who knows? I might be persuaded by the end
of the
debate.
Amendment No.
11 seeks to return the responsibility that the Bill proposes to give to
the Secretary of State to probation boards and trusts, which would give
them the ability to make contracts or other arrangements to provide
probation. In effect, it would formalise the current position of the
probation service. We need to let the probation boards or trusts get on
with the job in hand, while accepting that improvement is necessary.
The Government argue that contestability, by opening up to new
providers, will create more effective case management and
better-targeted interventions. However, they are relying on the
argument that a regionally, not locally, commissioned
probationservice knows the needs of individual areas
tocreate better-targeted intervention, which seems
counterintuitive. Surely a locally run service would be more in tune
with the needs of each individual
area.
Locally
accountable chief officers and strengthened probation boards will also
provide a sound basis for closer links between probation and the
courts. That link is necessary to win the confidence of magistrates and
judges about the effectiveness of community
sentences. Locally commissioned probation services
can work closely with the local authority and can use established local
strategic partnerships between voluntary groups, local government, and
other relevant groups. They can also further develop the local area
agreements to allow joined-up working across agencies within and beyond
the criminal system. Those links allow the smooth interchange of
relevant information that allows the service to decide how, when and if
to change existing probation
arrangements.
Moving
to a nationally planned and regionally commissioned probation service
would mean that the ability to tailor the probation service to the
individual circumstances and needs of the local area would be lost. It
would also create an additional layer of bureaucracy with attached
costs. The amendment would let local boards and trusts decide their own
level of contracting out, which is a very positive thing, asit
will not lead to the total contestability that the Government
apparently seek and will not stop co-operation in the way in which I
fear. Centralising contestability will cause disruption, whereas
localising contracting will
not.
By introducing
competition into the probation service and creating probation trusts,
the Bill will introduce unnecessary disruption into a service which, as
other hon. Members have mentioned, was only established in 2000. The
Home Office’s own figures show that reoffending rates fell by
2.5 per cent. between 2000 and 2003, which was ahead of expectations
and predictions. That fall in reoffending occurred at a time when all
the predictors said that reoffending would
rise.
As I said at the
outset, there are always areas where improvements can be made. We all
agree that reoffending rates are too high, but we should be careful not
to throw the baby out with the bath water. I want to look at the
performance of the probation service against its performance indicators
and targets. The performance indicators show that the probation service
hit five of its nine targets in 2005-06. Let us look at that
performance, which, on the face of it, does not sound too good.
However, my contention is that it is better than it seems at first
glance. Two of the failed targets relating to the assessment of high
risk of harm and prolific offenders were set for the first time that
year and were exceeded by April
2006.
12
noon
The remaining
two targets related to drug treatment and testing order requirements
for which a target of 4,000 completions had been set and 3,997, or 99
per cent., were achieved, and compliance with supervision, for which a
target of 85 per cent. had been set and81 per cent. was
achieved. Figures show that enforcement of community penalties has
risen from53 per cent. in 2001 to 91 per cent. in
2005.
It is important
to note that the professionals involved—the probation
organisations including NAPO and the Probation Boards
Association—believe that if the clause were enacted as drafted,
standards would fall and the quality of supervision would deteriorate.
The Minister must address those concerns when he responds to the
debate.
We understand
that some changes need to be made, but they could be made by
encouraging work with the private and voluntary sectors, not through
wholesale
change that will possibly result in reoffending increasing, the opposite
of what we are keen to achieve. If work is organised through a local
probation board or trust it would encourage information sharing,
co-ordinate co-operation between all the agencies and improve
end-to-end
management.
As the
hon. Member for Hornchurch said, it isworth examining a system
similar to that in Scotland, which rejected the idea of competition and
opted for the establishment of a statutory duty for prisons and the
probation service to consult each other and the voluntary sector on the
provision of offender services. The duty to co-operate has been very
successful in England and Wales, for example in the youth offending
teams and the multi-agency public protection arrangements for dangerous
offenders.
Amendment
No. 12 specifies that some probation services such as advice to courts,
arranging community sentences and supervising those released from
prison on licence, cannot be contracted out. At present, the probation
service provides nearly 200,000 reports for the courts, including
pre-sentence and fast-track reports, which are normally provided on the
day.
If the court
report function of the probation service were to be privatised there
could be—many would argue that there would be—a clear
conflict of interest. The person writing the report may work for a
company that runs prisons or administers the electronic tagging scheme.
In such instances it could be argued that the writer of a court report
had a vested interest in the outcome. That might be challengeable in
that it would conflict with article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, on the right to a fair trial. In evidence to the Home
Affairs Committee, and on other occasions, members of the judiciary
have pointed out that such a conflict of interest would not be
acceptable, and would preclude them from sitting on probation boards or
trusts. I ask the Minister to comment on the issues that I have
raised.
Mr.
Sutcliffe:
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for raising
these matters, to which I will return in my response. I want to be
clear what is the Liberal Democrats’ position. Is the hon.
Gentleman saying that there is no role for the private sector in any of
this work?
Mark
Hunter:
I welcome the Minister’s intervention. No,
of course I am not saying that there is no role for the private sector.
I paraphrase the Government’s policy on probation: there is a
problem, we must do something, this is something, let’s do this.
The Liberal Democrats’ analysis of the Bill is that it may
indeed have positive parts, which will improve the sum total of the
operation, but we are not necessarily convinced about the entirety of
it. I merely take issue with certain parts of the Bill, I hope in a
constructive way to which the Minister can
respond.
The probation
board supervises 133,000 persons on order. To create a profit, private
sector providers would logically have to reduce the quality of the
service by either decreasing the number of staff involved in
supervision or increasing the size of the intensive groups that are
dealt with by each person. There are also, as hon. Members referred to
earlier, 55,430 people
sentenced to unpaid work—community service—at the moment,
over 35 per cent. of which are individual placements. The hon. Member
for Hornchurch made this point earlier on. One example is work in
charity shops. Those placements would almost certainly vanish under
privatisation because they are not classed as being
cost-effective.
Having addressed some issues
specific to the amendments, I conclude by saying that I continue to
have concerns over clause 3 in its entirety precisely because I am not
yet convinced that it will improve quality or indeed reduce reoffending
rates. It seems to me that the Government’s argument for
contestability, outlined in the document “Reducing Crime,
Changing Lives”, centres around,
“getting the most cost-effective
custodial and community sentences, no matter who delivers
them.”
It says
“the most cost-effective”, not the most appropriate, and
that is an important difference.
As evidence for the success of
contestability, the Government will cite the four private companies
that are already running, I believe, nine of our prisons. When asked
whether they have done any research on this matter—in a question
by the hon. Member for Stroud (Mr. Drew) to the
Minister—they answered that they estimated that the savings
would range between 3.5 and 8.5 per cent, in light of what they had
already managed to save in prisons. On any interpretation, it seems to
me that this is a best guess by Government rather than any
comprehensive and conclusive business case.
Although I accept that there is
a clear argument for how contestability could increase cost-efficiency,
the same is not true of quality. I am trying to make the point that
quality of service is every bit as important as the cost-efficiency
argument. Based on the non-strategic business case of October 2005, we
know that the Government are hoping to save £1.7 billion
annually from these changes. That indicates that when deciding to
contract out a service, it will be cost and not necessarily quality
that will be the absolute priority. As we know, no business case has
yet been produced advocating the introduction of market forces into the
system and how they would reduce reoffending. It is on that fundamental
point that those of us on this side of the Committee are still hoping
to receive some reassurance from the Minister when he responds to the
debate.
Mr.
Kidney:
I want to ask the Minister two questions relevant
to amendment No. 11. They are both slightly too long to deal with by
way of
intervention.
Like
other Members, I have read and received a large number of
representations from a wide range of organisations and individuals. My
judgement is that the centre of gravity indicates that there is a part
to be played by a national direction of an offender-management service,
including probation. There is a role for regional involvement and,
crucially, there is a need for local provision and some commissioning
of services. At the moment the Bill tells us about a national
contracting system; the explanatory notes, not the Bill, tell us about
the regional involvement; and the Bill and the explanatory notes are
entirely silent about what the local arrangements will eventually look
like. It is that local part that everyone is concerned about.
Many of the briefings that lead
me to that conclusion about the centre of gravity talk about the need
for reference to the local strategic partnership for local governance.
They also refer to the new system of local area agreements for the
delivery among a range of providers at the local level. I can see that
the Minister would instantly reject putting on the face of the Bill
references to LSPs and LAAs as being far too specific. They would not
be durable and they would exclude other arrangements that would be
relevant at some times in some places.
I found useful the publication
by the Probation Boards Association, “Five Principles for a
Modern Probation Service” because, instead of the words
“local area agreement”, it says
that
“it is important
that probation should increase its involvement with other local
agencies, using common targets and shared
resources.”
That is a
good general statement of what people want by way of local area
agreements. On local strategic partnerships, it
says:
“Local
governance is central to increased democratic involvement and
determination.”
That,
too, is a good general
comment.
Mr.
Sutcliffe:
Perhaps I can help my hon. Friend, before this
point gets lost in my wider response. I refer him to the Local
Government Bill, which was introduced on 13 December and is a
legislative vehicle for measures proposed in the Department for
Communities and Local Government White Paper, “Strong and
Prosperous Communities”. It aims to strengthen partnership
working by placing a new duty on the local authority and named local
partners, including chief constables, police authorities and, more
importantly in this context, the providers of probation services, to
co-operate with each other in agreeing the relevant targets in the LAA.
I shall say more about that later, but that is how the LAA will be
involved in the provider role in relation to the probation
service.
Mr.
Kidney:
I am grateful to my hon. Friend. That answers the
questions of hon. Members who have asked about a duty to
co-operate—it will come under another Bill. However, will he not
consider, instead of amendment No. 11, including a reference in clause
3 to a requirement for local probation services to increase their
involvement with other local agencies, for example by using common
targets and shared resources where appropriate? That is my first
question, and I would say the same about local governance.
The second is on the point made
by the. Member for Hornchurch, with which I very much sympathise, about
the clause giving far too free a hand to the Secretary of State. That
echoes our previous debate, but in another form. I accept the generous
and kind words that my hon. Friend will say in a moment, and the
assurance that he will give us about the reasonableness of the
Secretary of State’s actions. However, I still feel that
something is missing. I am not a free marketeer, and I do not
necessarily swallow the statement in the briefing from the
CBI:
“To
achieve better services, a clear purchaser-provider split is
vital”,
but the briefing
does call for
“a full commissioning and
market-management
strategy”,
which would,
it says, give “a timetable for progress” and enable all
parties that want to play a part to get ready to play their parts to
the full. That echoes our debate last Thursday about the need for a
business plan. Does my hon. Friend plan to publish something along the
lines of a commissioning and market-management strategy, which would
help to reassure people about what the future holds for them,
especially given that we have heard about existing probation officers
who are worried about their futures? Would he consider it helpful for
there to be a reference in the Bill to the need for a strategy that is
updated from time to
time?
Mr.
Sutcliffe:
I thank the hon. Members for Hornchurch and for
Cheadle and my hon. Friends the Members for Stafford and for
Walthamstow for their contributions. They have clearly put a great deal
of thought into considering what the Government are trying to do and
expressing their concerns. They have asked detailed questions and I
shall try to address the issues that they have raised. It is important
to set out at the start the context of our discussion on clause 3. I
agree that it is fundamental to the direction of the Bill, but I do not
accept that it proposes a top-down structure.
It is useful to try to outline
the position of each party. The official Opposition agree with the
principle of opening up the sector to various providers, but are not
happy about the proposed way of doing it and have questions about that.
My hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow, whose stance on such issues
I have admired greatly over the years, has no problem. I think that his
message is that he sees no role for the private sector in any area of
probation work. I am not sure what the position of the hon. Member for
Cheadle is, which I suppose is not surprising in the case of the
Liberal Democrats. I tried to elicit his views on the involvement of
the private
sector.
12.15
pm
We all agree
that the status quo is not good enough in relation to reoffending
rates, however we measure them. Something needs to change—that
has been the tenor of all the representations that we have received,
apart from one. The one organisation that says that the status quo can
continue is NAPO, the probation officers’ union. As a former
full-time trade union officer myself, I fully respect and understand
its position: it wants to protect its members and believes that the
change will be detrimental to their opportunities. However, I do not
accept the scaremongering about what we are trying to achieve. Our aim
is not wholesale privatisation, which was the fear mentioned by my hon.
Friend the Member for Walthamstow. It is to ensure that we have the
best providers of offender management, whether they come from the
voluntary, the private or the public sector.
The Government did not pluck
the issue of offender management out of the air. It was carefully
considered, which was why in December 2003 we had the Carter report,
“Managing Offenders, Reducing Crime”. That is where the
recommendation to establish the National Offender Management Service
came from, with the intention of introducing end-to-end offender
management, on which we all agree. It also recommended the introduction
of commissioning and contestability. We have had almost four years of
discussion about where we need to be. I agree with my hon. Friend that
it is time that probation officers—when we say “probation
officers” we include probation support officers, who have
different roles and responsibilities—are given certainty about
what the future holds. It is important that we consider the issues that
have been raised and give them that
certainty.
The
Government’s fundamental position is that the probation service
does not have to do everything that it does now. In fact, it is not
consistently achieving what needs to be achieved across the 42 board
areas. That is not an attack on the credibility of probation officers:
I, perhaps more than most because of how close I have been to the issue
in the past six months, have seen at first hand the tremendous work
that probation officers do in the extremely difficult circumstances to
which my hon. Friend and others have referred. In some cases, they deal
with very difficult people who live troubled lives and are dangerous,
from whom the public need to be protected.
The hon. and learned Member for
Harborough and the hon. Member for Hornchurch keep mentioning the Home
Secretary’s speech at Wormwood Scrubs. They do not believe that
that environment was appropriate, but they should put that to one side
and examine what my right hon. Friend said in subsequent speeches.
Nobody would take issue with the fact that we must move forward and
that the probation service should not do
everything.
James
Brokenshire:
The Minister says that negotiation and
consideration have been going on for about the past four years. The
most recent changes were brought in only in 2001. The fact that it is
now 2007 suggests that it became apparent almost immediately that the
2001 changes were fundamentally defective. How was that situation
allowed to
arise?
Clause 2
gives the Secretary of State responsibility for ensuring sufficient
provision of probation services. Clause 3, as hon. Members have said,
sets out how he may go about that. It enables him to
make
“contractual or
other arrangements with any other person for the making of the
probation provision.”
We
envisage that, in most cases, the Secretary of State, through the
regional commissioners, to whose role I shall return in a moment, will
enter into contracts with the probation trusts and providers from the
voluntary, charitable and private sectors, as appropriate. There are 42
local boards, each of which is required to make provision for all
services in their areas. In future, providers will be able to focus on
their strengths and what is expected of them will be clear. The 42
boards are not uniform: there are differences in their performance. I
do not believe that the proposed change will lead to the fragmentation
that some have
predicted.
Subsection
(3)(a) expressly enables the Secretary of State to authorise or require
providers to co-operate with one another and with other agencies
involved in
crime prevention, crime reduction or work with victims. Those
expectations will be clearly set out in the contracts and will be one
of the criteria against which successful delivery of the contract will
be judged.
Paragraph
(c) expressly provides for subcontracting on the part of providers. We
do not envisage regional commissioners directly holding myriad small
contracts. Instead, the commissioners will agree contracts directly
with a small number of providers who, in turn, will subcontract aspects
of delivery to other providers. The extent to which bidders have
established relationships with other providers is likely to be one of
the criteria that commissioners will consider when awarding the
contracts. We believe that that will help reinforce partnership working
and guard against fragmentation, as well as help to safeguard the role
of smaller, locally based providers, especially in the voluntary and
charitable
sectors.
Paragraph (b)
simply enables the Secretary of State
“to designate individuals as
officers of a provider of probation services”.
We will discuss that further under clause
6.
Mr.
Nick Hurd (Ruislip-Northwood) (Con): The Minister opened
by claiming that the process is not a top-down process that is being
engineered, but I have not heard any argument to substantiate that
claim. It certainly cannot be found in clause 3. What is the
argument?
Subsection (4)
allows for a further option for the provision of probation services:
that of the Secretary of State making provision directly through his
own staff rather than through contract with other providers. The
subsection does not restrict which staff that might be, but makes it
clear that what we have in mind is the possible provision of probation
services by prison staff, as said earlier. For example, in some
circumstances it might make sense for prison staff who are delivering a
programme in custody also to deliver the same programme in the
community to offenders with similar needs to those in custody. That
might enable some offenders to continue after release a programme
started in custody, which could be very helpful in supporting the
end-to-end management of offenders. The clause sensibly sets out the
options for arranging the delivery of probation
services.
During the
debate, hon. Members made a number of points, and I shall take them in
no particular order. Scotland was the first key opportunity that they
offered, and we discussed how we could apply the Scottish model across
the UK or to England and Wales. The answer given in the debate came as
no surprise: there are long-standing differences in the legal position
in relation to Scotland and its law. The Scottish system also has a
different set of relationships that could not be applied to the UK as a
whole. We do not believe that introducing the Scottish system across
the UK would succeed in driving up
performance.
James
Brokenshire:
Will the Minister be more explicit? He says
that there is difference in the systems and, obviously, as highlighted,
in the law itself.
However, as I said in my speech, once an offender is convicted, under
whatever form of law, they are convicted and require rehabilitation
services. Would the Minister explain a little more clearly what the
further distinctions
are?
Mr.
Sutcliffe:
It is to do with the relationships that exist.
There are accountability problems in the Scottish model. The chief
officer of the criminal justice authority reports on his own
performance to a Minister and it is for the chief officer of the
authority to report failure to Ministers. There is no scope for
Ministers to look elsewhere for services. The Scottish model is
therefore restricted. That route and responsibility, and the cultural
differences between Scotland and England and Wales, mean that the
Scottish model would not be appropriate for England and Wales. That is
not to say that we cannot learn anything. As the hon. Gentleman says,
the Scottish model is now coming into effect, so there may be
opportunities to observe best practice and the performers that come
forward which we can use when trying to achieve our overall target of
reducing reoffending and cutting
crime.
The hon. Member
for Hornchurch asked me why we set up the national probation
directorate in 2001 and then made changes so quickly. We believe that
was a step change on the journey that we have taken from 2000 on how to
give greater clarity to the role and performance of the probation
service. The change has brought greater co-ordination in the direction
of services and has achieved a great deal. The directorate was not
unsuccessful, but we can build on that success now with the new
framework that we are introducing, and go further, as we all agree we
must if we are to meet our objectives.
The hon. Gentleman asked me
about court services and what will be outsourced as a result of this
programme. That will depend on the performance and outcome of the
tendering processes. The “Improving Prison and Probation
Services: Public Value Partnerships” document committed NOMS,
once the legislation was in place, to increase competition to provide
services, up to an annual value of £250 million. That is not the
same as contracting out. What we are clearly saying is that, if the
public sector can demonstrate that it is able to deliver the best
service, it will win the contract. That is a point that my hon. Friend
the Member for Walthamstow keeps coming back to. We are not saying that
everything needs to be contracted out; if the public service improves
its performance, it will win the contract, on the basis of that
improved performance.
On the figure of £250
million, we have put some aspirational targets in place. However, we
are certain that the process will not be a “big bang”. We
are not in a position such that, once the Bill is passed, from day one
we will have 40 new trusts delivering services through the private
sector. The process is about creating the scope, the framework and the
opportunity to develop into the brave new world that I believe most
probation officers want to see.
How will private providers of
probation services be held accountable for performance? The
requirements placed on private providers to report their performance
will be the same as those placed on public sector providers. Private
sector providers will report to the
regional and national commissioners in the same way that public sector
providers do and as private sector prisons already do quite
successfully.
Procurements and contracts will
be structured in such a way that providers will not be able to
cherry-pick the more attractive areas of business. We are working on a
programme of market development and engagement to ensure that services
are packaged in a way that is attractive to potential suppliers. We
plan to use the implementation of the national and regional commission
strategies as an opportunity to begin that process of engagement. The
national provider network will help to inform that work from the
perspective of both purchasers and
providers.
Ian
Lucas (Wrexham) (Lab): Will my hon. Friend say something
about the relationship between the Home Secretary as a contracting
party and the inspectorate, including the role that the inspectorate
will play in assessing the delivery of services by private sector
providers?
Mr.
Sutcliffe:
My hon. Friend makes a good point. As he knows,
the Government examined the role of inspectors under various
legislation. We have retained the independence of the individual
inspectorates, although they have been asked to work more closely
together on the joint services that they may be able to provide. He is
quite right that the inspectorate regime will be that of Her
Majesty’s inspectorate of probation. Andrew Bridges, the current
chief inspector, has made it clear that his role is not to determine
who provides probation services, but to ensure the quality of those
services. I am quite confident that the fears that have been expressed
by hon. Members about the quality of service can be allayed by the
presence of the
inspectorate.
The hon.
Member for Hornchurch asked me what would happen in future if companies
go bust, and what would happen then in terms of subcontracting. Things
can go wrong and companies can become insolvent or go bust now. The
existing arrangements and insolvency laws would apply if the same thing
happened in future.
James
Brokenshire:
I hear what the Minister says, but does he
accept that the increased scope of contractual arrangements, and
therefore the multiplicity of providers and subcontracting
arrangements, may highlight a need to focus on that issue more clearly
if we are to ensure continuity of service? For example, if a head
contractor fails, what does the Minister envisage will happen in
practice?
Mr.
Sutcliffe:
I do not see any need for new measures. There
has to be consistency in examining all contracts and all performers of
contracts to militate against such a situation arising; it is also
necessaryto monitor the performance and well-being of
contractors. I do not see any need for greater involvement. The
framework is in place: in exceptional circumstances—for example,
if a probation board goes out to the private sector and problems
arise—the Secretary of State has powers to deal with the
situation.
12.30
pm
The length of
contracts would be a big issue. If the private sector were to be
involved, it would take aview about the length and viability
of a contract. Contracting already exists; there is currently a
multiplicity of contracts between the different boards. We believe that
replacing annual funding regimes with multi-year contract terms, to
develop and maintainthe longer-term capacity, will help to
increase sustainability and achieve some of the things that we want to
see.
Budgets have
been top-sliced and that has affected subcontracting figures. Probation
boards can still do more, however. My hon. Friend the Member for
Walthamstow said that boards worked with the voluntary sector and other
providers. They do, but not with the right level of consistency. One
board has contracted out 1.29 per cent. to the voluntary sector;
another has contracted out 5.6 per cent. When we had a target, it was
reached. When it was removed, the work was not contracted out. There is
currently no consistency in working with the voluntary sector. My hon.
Friend talked about community work and the payback scheme, which is an
excellent scheme of which I have seen wonderful examples throughout the
country. Community sentencing is not work on the cheap; it is testimony
to how we can tackle
offenders.
In Salford,
the community has identified projects that they want carried out, the
magistrates have sentenced offenders to work on those schemes and they
have been delivered. Everybody wins and the community sees that the
work has improved the area. Such schemes do not provide jobs on the
cheap, but I question whether trained probation officers have to follow
them all the way through. Cannot NACRO, or some other body, deliver
that service? NAPO seems to be saying that a probation officer has to
deal with
everything.
The hon.
Member for Hornchurch raised an important point about staff and staff
training. We expect every organisation that employs staff to work with
offenders to invest in skills and professional development. All
providers will have to provide sufficient training for the services
that they deliver. We will ensure that they do so through a process of
accreditation appropriate to the type of service and contractual value.
We need to continue to develop staff to deliver services in the new
offender management environment, which is why NOMS is examining
training provision to ensure that offender managers are able to deal
with the types and range of offenders that we are talking
about.
I am sad that,
after 25 years, people feel that there is no future for the probation
service, as in the example given by my hon. Friend the Member for
Walthamstow. It is a tragedy that a person with that much experience is
leaving because there is a lack of clarity about what the future holds.
I want to say loud and clear that the future for probation workers,
whether probation officers or probation support officers, should be
rosy, because the Bill will raise the profile of their jobs and
responsibilities. We know that they do a difficult job, but when it
comes to dealing with offenders they do not have the public confidence
that I would want them to have. That point goes
right
to the heart of why we are creating the probation trusts rather than
keeping the existing boards. Offender management affects all our
communities. Reconviction rates cost the country almost £11
billion. We should respond to that with a holistic solution. I am
grateful to the hon. Member for Hornchurch for reading out the LGA
letter to hon. Members about how it sees things. The
“Neighbourhood by Neighbourhood” document is the first
time in my recollection that local government has accepted its
responsibility for dealing with offenders.
It is only by widening
participation, whether in business, in the private or voluntary sectors
or in the wider community sector, that we will answer the problems of
offender management. Probation officers will then be held in the esteem
that they should be and will not be subject to scurrilous attacks from
the daily newspapers when something goes tragically wrong. The clause
sets out our opportunities: we want to see the probation service grow
and we want to offer opportunities to a wider range of
providers.
I turn now
to the amendments. The implication of amendment No. 11 is that
contracts should be made by probation boards or trusts rather than the
Secretary of State. In fact, probation boards are already able to
subcontract and there is no need to create probation trusts for that
purpose. There are several difficulties with the current arrangements,
as I have made clear. The first difficulty is that, although probation
boards are legally able to subcontract at the moment, in practice they
do not do so enough and insufficient use has been made of what other
providers have to offer. That is why probation boards now have a target
of subcontracting 10 per cent. of their budget by 2008. That is crucial
to developing partnership working and a better fit with local needs.
However, we need to go further than that. We need to be able to
commission across geographical boundaries and across the prison gate.
We need an element of choice to ensure that we have the right provider
for the job. Restricting contracting to probation areas would remove
those options.
Amendment No. 12 would restrict
the services that can be contracted out to providers other than through
the public sector. I understand that hon. Members are concerned to
ensure that those services, which are so important in reducing
re-offending and protecting the public, should be delivered to the
highest standards. I am surprised at the suggestion that the
continuation of a public sector monopoly is the best way to achieve
that. I do not understand why we should use primary legislation to say
that only one provider may deliver a particular service, regardless of
what other options might exist. That is an outdated argument, not only
in theory but in practice, given that up to 25 per cent. of prison and
probation services are already provided from outside the public sector.
However, public protection is our No. 1priority and we will proceed
cautiously.
I
envisage that the work relating to the management of
offenders—the work of advising courts and supervising
orders—will remain for the next two or three years in the public
sector, which has inherited the expertise in the field. We will
increase the involvement of the charitable and voluntary sector and of
the private sector, especially in interventions, which will
work alongside the public sector to develop expertise and strengthen
partnerships so that a more diverse range of provision is available in
due course.
Finally,
amendment No. 25 would place a statutory duty on providers to avoid
conflicts of interest. I do not believe that that is a matter for
legislation, although I understand what the amendment is driving at.
The issue has been raised with me on several occasions. I find it hard
to see why hon. Members find it so problematic. There is already
potential for a conflict of interest, and with the current monopoly
arrangements the public sector is responsible both for advising courts
on sentencing and for supervising the sentences that are passed. Boards
have targets to meet, for example in the numbers of offenders who
undergo certain interventions. Strict guidelines are in place to deal
with that, and nobody has suggested to me that they do not work.
Ultimately, decisions on sentencing remain entirely at the discretion
of the sentencer. If concerns are raised, they can be appropriately
dealt with.
We have
had a good opportunity to consider all the issues. I am interested by
the suggestion made by my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford in the
second half of his speech about what we should consider. I am prepared
to consider that and I shall come back at a later stage in the Bill to
see what detail we can put forward.
We have had an important debate
that goes to the heart of what we are trying to achieve. The measure is
not about privatisation but about expanding the range of providers to
ensure that we tackle re-offending, and I hope that the hon. Member for
Hornchurch will withdraw his amendment and support the
clause.
James
Brokenshire:
I thank the Minister for his response and the
hon. Members for Walthamstow, for Cheadle and for Stafford for their
contributions.
In
making my initial comments on amendment No. 11, and, more
generally, on the clause, I highlighted three specific elements: the
lack of robust justification for the model adopted in the Bill,
particularly in clause 3; the lack of clarity about what the
Government’s alternative model would actually deal with; and the
impact on how services would be provided. We have perhaps a little more
light on the first one, in that we have had an explanation as to why
the Government are taking this route. I heard what the Minister said
about the approach in 2001 being some sort of stepping stone, or step
change, to assist in reaching this position. Although I have not had
the pleasure of reading the Hansard report of the debates, I
suspect that that was not how it was set out at the time. I suspect
that it was said that the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000
would provide all the changes that were required to sustain progress in
the probation service. Therefore, it is interesting that the
legislation is now regarded a step change and that it was imagined all
the way through that we would seamlessly end up precisely where we
are.
I take the
Minister at his word, but I seek to characterise the Bill as arising
from a sudden realisation on the Government’s part that the 2001
moves did not achieve what they wanted quickly enough. As we were told
this morning, they have been considering the change for some four years
now. It
seems that they realised almost immediately that the 2001 change was a
big mistake. If that was the case, the probation service, officers and
staff who had to go through significant change at the time will
certainly feel badly let
down.
On clarity as to
what is involved, I would like to say that the Minister’s
comments informed me as to the strategy and direction, but, if
anything, they have added to the sense of, “We could do this, we
could go that way, we could maintain certain bits here.” It
seems that all sorts of different aspects could flow from the Bill.
Rather than giving clarity to the Committee and probation services and
their staff, he may have added to the uncertainty. I respect what he
said about keeping certain key aspects as they are, at least for the
next couple of years, but what will happen after that? What will be the
direction at that time? I suspect that we will return to that issue
during our debate in clause 4 on probation
trusts.
It was
interesting that the Minister said that the Bill would not produce a
big bang; that it is intended to be part of a steady and incremental
change. However, that seems to run against the arguments that the
changes are intended to bring about cuts in reoffending, and greater
public protection. His comments seem to suggest that there will not be
much significant change for several years, even with the Bill. I may
have paraphrased him incorrectly, but it seems that there will not be
much significant change in the near future. He seems to want one thing
on one side but another thing on the other
side.
Mr.
Sutcliffe:
No, it is not that. The Bill offers an
opportunity for the first probation trust to be in place by 2008. What
I am saying is that on day one in 2008 we will not move to 42 probation
trusts. Good workis already being carried out by regional
offender managers in consultation with trusts, local area agreements
are in place, and we are listening to people’s concerns. All
that the Bill does is set out the framework for trusts to be
created.
12.45
pm
James
Brokenshire:
The Minister says that the Bill is about
creating a framework, and that it is intended that the first probation
trust will be introduced in 2008, but it is unclear what will happen
thereafter. The framework is being set up, but that seems to underpin
the fact that what is happening will not necessarily change
significantly, at least in the next few years. As I see it, from what
the Minister said, even if the Bill were enacted, we would not
necessarily see a significant improvement in the reoffending rate,
which is one of the key aspects of the need to introduce the Bill and
create the framework and structure in the first
place.
Mr.
Hurd:
Will my hon. Friend join me in believing that the
phased approach to the implementation of the schemes carries with it an
opportunity to address one of the fundamental problems underlying the
Bill, which is the lack of hard evidence for a causal link between
increased competition and reduced offending rates? Will he join me in
pressing the Government to think a little harder about how data could
be made more transparent as we climb the curve of
adoption?
James
Brokenshire:
I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention.
He rightly underlines the lack of a business case or financial model
underpinning the structure. Although I understand what the Minister
said about the phased approach and the introduction of the first
probation trust in 2008, we do not get a sense of where the system will
flow after that. Is it intended, for example, that there will be only
one trust, as the Minister was implied, in 2008, and that others will
roll out thereafter? Will he wish to see how that first probation trust
operates before creating or empowering further trusts? Although a
plethora of powers is invested in the Secretary of State, there is a
lack of framework and structure, and even today we have no clear
direction as to where that may take us. That may well be deliberate;
the Minister may say that that is the Government’s intention,
and that they are trying to create as much discretion as they can.
However, I return to the issue of accountability and holding Ministers
to account. I know that the Minister did not directly address that in
his comments, although I raised the matter earlier. Perhaps he will
reflect on that, and intervene before I sit down. What protections will
continue to be afforded to ensure that accountability is
maintained?
Mr.
Sutcliffe:
I apologise to the hon. Gentleman. We can
return to the IT element in the debates on later clauses. The Secretary
of State has to report to Parliament, and there is a statutory duty on
offender managers to consult a number of people. I will set out the
details about that accountability in a letter to the hon. Gentleman,
and to the
Committee.
James
Brokenshire:
I am grateful to the Minister, as having that
sort of clarity and reassurance to back up what the Home Secretary said
on Second Reading—and probably what the Minister said
too—is important. There is concern that there is some
obfuscation about liability or some stepping away from that
responsibility. We need to see clearly what the Government are
intending to ensure that that will not happen.
The Minister re-emphasised in
his contribution this morning the point that the Bill is about giving
power to the Home Secretary to decide how he—or she,
ultimately—may want to do things. It seems to be about vesting
power in the Home Secretary to say, “We thought that it was
going to go this way, but in fact, we are nearer that way. I am going
to provide a lot of the services directly, or I am going to get the
Prison Service to do it. Or we’ll go down the probation trust
route, or another route.” The difficulty is that we do not know
what the direction will be and how the strategy will be delivered. It
is the sheer uncertainty that is the problem.
I respect what the Minister
said—that he fully recognises the work of probation officers,
the need to retain staff and the need to ensure that the integrity of
the system is maintained—but the lack of a clear direction of
travel creates a significant risk that probation officers who have been
in the service for many years will say that they have had enough. The
hon. Member for Walthamstow made that point about the person to whom he
spoke. It would be a tragedy and calamity for the service if highly
qualified, good
staff were to leave because they did not know where it was going or what
the future held. The Government have the opportunity to be more
specific and set out their intentions more clearly. They should provide
in the Bill their intended structure for the service.
We have discussed the delivery
of services, and I raised the issue of insolvency. I hear the
Minister’s point that the risk of insolvency already exists and
that there should be no problem dealing with it in the ordinary course
of things, but the Bill means that there could be a much broader
contractual arrangement with a plethora of contracts, subcontracts and
sub-subcontracts. If the protection of the public is our primary goal,
it would be a dereliction of duty if that possibility were not properly
considered and addressed.
In other Bills there
have been specific frameworks to address such issues. We need to
understand what would happen if a head contractor were to become
insolvent and what right to step in the Secretary of State would want.
The Minister might say that that will be specified in contracts, but
there must be greater clarity and an assurance that the continuity of
service will be maintained and the emphasis on public protection will
not be compromised. We could end up with a complex arrangement, and it
is possible to address that. It needs to be considered properly and
formally if the system is to be robust and effective, and I am not
comfortable about that as the clause
stands.
I hear clearly
what the Minister says on training, which is important. I welcome his
indication of the importance of clarifying how the tendering and
contracting arrangements will work. I am comforted to know that their
operation is on the Home Office’s radar
screen.
The Minister
said that conflicts of interest such as those covered by the amendments
could exist today so there was no need to mention them in the Bill.
Just because something happens today, that does not necessarily mean
that protection is not appropriate for the future. If we are to enter
into a more dynamic and fluid arrangement for the probation service,
building blocks of protection will become essential. The risk of
problems occurring needs to be properly addressed in the Bill, and I
find it a little surprising that the Minister is not prepared to accept
that point and ensure the robustness of the system and the protection
of the service by accepting an amendment.
We come back to the nature of
the arrangements. The Minister has said that this is not about
centralising. Nothing that I have heard from the Minister today has
made me change my view that this is a very centralising measure, which
is about ceding power, authority and control to the Home Secretary over
the manner in which services are to be directed.
There is a common argument that
I have come across in my short time in the House where the Government
always say, “Well, even though the Bill looks as though it is
about centralisation, it is not at all. In fact it will deliver more
local services, even though it seems to suggest that the contracting is
from the centre and it is all about centralisation.” I have not
been persuaded in those debates before and I am not persuaded in this
debate that this measure will ultimately have the effect that is
claimed. Whatever the Minister has said and
whatever the intention may be about providing services more directly at
the local level, I do not believe that that will happen.
There are issues about local
government. I welcome the positive notes that the Minister struck about
the LGA and the Coalition on Social and Criminal Justice regarding the
role of local area agreements and the acceptance by local government of
its role. This is all about shared responsibilities and it is something
that we on this side of the Committee recognise very
clearly.
Mr.
Hurd:
My hon. Friend has been generous in giving way and I
rise to echo his concern about the Government’s lack of clarity
not only over the specifics of the Bill but in the wider context of
centralism and localism. I asked the Minister when he was going to get
round to making the argument that this is not about top-down politics.
He never did get round to it because the argument cannot be made in
this context. What puzzles me is how we set this in the context of the
wider sense of direction of the Government set by the Chancellor in a
speech on 6 June called “Building 21st-century Public
Services” in which he
says:
“In the
new century people and communities should now take power from the
State. A re-invention of the way we govern is required. Local councils
and people should have more power over the things that matter to their
community.”
How do we
square that with the Bill before
us?
James
Brokenshire:
My hon. Friend has given us a real nugget
there regarding the apparent direction of
policy and the reality of the Bill, which does not take us in that
direction. The LGA made the point thatthe Bill goes in the
opposite direction: rather than sharing responsibility and embracing
the fact thatlocal government and other bodies accept their
responsibilities and the fact that they have a very important and
significant role to play, we have in clause 3 the Secretary of
State effectively saying “Thanks, but no
thanks”.
The
Home Secretary says that contracting will be through the centre. At
best, it is about regionalisation and regional commissioning, as the
Minister accepted. Commissioning was intended to be done through the
regional offender managers. Although there may be certain arrangements
that could then be contracted down, and not, as he said, a panoply of
different contracts coming out at that level, there is a risk that,
rather than allowing that local dynamism that he himself said he wanted
to create, the process could be stultified.
Regarding contract delivery, I
made the point, asdid the hon. Member for Walthamstow, about
the individualisation of services and how unpaid work would fit
in.
It being One
o’clock,
The Chairman
adjourned
the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing
Order.
Adjourned
till this day at half-past Four
o’clock.
|
| |
| ©Parliamentary copyright 2007 | Prepared 17 January 2007 |
