Clause
28
Powers
to wind up companies etc: England and
Wales
Amendment
proposed: No. 36, in clause 28, page 16, line 28, after to, insert
‘—
(a)
’.—[Mr.
Coaker.]
The
Chairman:
With this it will be convenient to
discuss the following: Government amendments Nos. 37 to
49.
Government
amendments Nos. 200 and
201.
Government new
clause 15—Powers to wind up:
supplementary.
James
Brokenshire:
I rise briefly to seek clarification on
petitioning and the powers of winding up. From my reading of clause
28(1), those are intended to apply when an offence has been committed
under section 26 and the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Director
of Revenue and Customs Prosecutions or the director of the Serious
Fraud Office determines that it would be in the public interest to seek
a petition to wind up the company; in other words, an offence has been
committed and that is deemed the appropriate way to dispose of the
breach.
My question
about the amendments and how they apply relates to the factors that the
directors would take into account in determining what is in the public
interest. Are they intended to be as wide as possible? Can the Minister
give examples of what would be appropriate in the circumstances? We are
talking about corporate entities and there would have been some sort of
breach. In some ways, the issue goes back to my intervention during the
debate about the liability of directors during our discussion of clause
26. I want to gain an understanding of how the Bill is intended to
operate and how discretion is intended to be applied in allowing the
winding up of companies for such
breaches.
Mr.
Coaker:
The hon. Gentleman is right; as he says, the
clause deals with companies that have breached a
serious crime prevention order. In such cases, the applicant authorities
can go back to the court to seek a winding-up order against such
companies. The hon. Gentleman asks what sorts of offences the companies
would have to have committed. The obvious answer is that if the company
had not complied with the conditions imposed by the serious crime
prevention order, it would clearly be in breach of the order, and the
applicant authority would go back to the court to seek the winding-up
order.
James
Brokenshire:
I understand that point. Obviously, the
Minister has mentioned the first limb of the test for whether an
offence has been committed under clause 26. I was seeking to press him
on the second limb—the application of the consideration of the
public
interest.
Mr.
Coaker:
The hon. Gentleman should come back to me if I
have misunderstood his question. If he is asking me how we define
“in the public interest” in respect of determining
whether a company should be wound up, that would be a matter for the
court, which would determine what was reasonable and proportionate. The
public interest test is the prevention of crime and the reduction of
harm. The conditions placed on the company are about reducing harm and
preventing crime; if they are broken, the applicant authorities will
apply for a winding-up order. That is the public interest test, which
we want to be
observed.
James
Brokenshire:
I do not want to labour the point, but to be
clear, we are talking about the application rather than the discretion
of the court, and about the determination by the director, rather than
the court, on whether the application should be
made.
Mr.
Coaker:
The point is that the applicant authorities will
make a general
consideration—
It
being One o’clock,
The Chairman
adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant
to the Standing
Order.
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