Clause
4
Non-executive
members
The
Chairman:
I am advised by my fellow Chairman, Sir John
Butterfill, that you may wish to move amendment No. 14 formally,
Mr.
Fallon.
Mr.
Fallon:
I do not wish to move amendment No. 14,
but I hope to catch your eye if there is a stand part debate,
Mr. Olner.
Question proposed, That
the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr.
Fallon:
I want to raise three technical, house-keeping
points about the clause. I fully recognise that the Minister might not
be able to respond to my points on his feet, so I should be quite happy
for him to answer them in the course of our proceeding. First, can
non-executive members of the board be reappointed? The wording of
subsections (1) and (6) leads me to conclude that they can be
reappointed, although on first reading of subsection (1), one might get
the impression that they can serve only a five-year term. I take it
from reading both subsections together that a member can be
reappointed, although it would be useful to have that clarified. The
explanatory notes on the clause refer
to
“the rules for the
appointment of, resignation or dismissal of, and reappointment of,
non-executive members”.
I
hope that I am correct in my assumption, although if I am not, I hope
that the Minister can clarify the
matter.
Secondly,
there is the issue that amendment No. 14 would have raised, and which
applies more generally, of dismissal under subsection (4) seeming to be
entirely summary. I assume that the non-executive members are not
employees. If they are, I am at a loss as to how to reconcile the
provision allowing them to be summarily dismissed—I shall not go
over the arguments about misbehaviour—without having the normal
recourse to the protection of employment law. Perhaps the Minister will
advise me that they are not employees, but enjoy a different employment
status.
6.15
pm
Finally, there
is the issue of compensation for dismissal under subsection (5). Having
set up the independent board and having been told throughout
the debate that it will be independent, that the Treasury will not be
running it and so on, I am disappointed to find out that the board is
not allowed to deal with compensation for summary dismissal, but that
it has to be approved by the Treasury. I understand the reason for
protecting public funds, but it does not say much for the independence
of the board if it cannot deal with employment matters, which all have
to be regulated and directed by the
Treasury.
Rob
Marris:
I want to tuck right in behind the hon. Gentleman
on this. Because of the compensation provisions in subsection (5), and
without rehearsing the debate on amendment No. 14, I urge my hon.
Friend the Financial Secretary to reconsider subsection (4)(d) and
adopt the Fats Waller approach—“Ain’t
Misbehavin’”. The word should be removed or changed to
misconduct. We referred earlier to misconduct. That is a potential
minefield, which could lead to the sort of compensation payments that
the hon. Gentleman mentioned. That word might be used in a railway or
energy Act. As a lawyer, I have to say that it is most unsatisfactory,
and I suspect that the hon. Member for South-West Hertfordshire would
agree. Misbehaved does not need to be in there; it should say
“misconduct” or nothing.
John
Healey:
Perhaps I can deal with the four points that have
been raised now, rather than in writing. On the first point made by the
hon. Member for Sevenoaks, yes, non-executive members of the board can
be reappointed. It is a feature of the guidance issued by the Office of
the Commissioner for Public Appointments. I have stressed that we will
follow the procedures and the guidance. If he will permit me to reflect
on the need for clarity in the legislation about the fact that
reappointment is possible for non-executive members, I shall do
so.
Mr.
Gauke:
For what it is worth, I agree with that
interpretation. Does the Financial Secretary share my concern that
where there is a power of reappointment, serving members of the board
might be perceived to feel some pressure to comply with the person or
entity making the appointment—in this case, as it is currently
drafted, the Treasury. The benefit of reappointment is that expertise
is retained. Does he recognise that
concern?
John
Healey:
I recognise it only in the most conceptual way. In
practice, there is a process for the appointment of board members
selected by the Treasury through the Office of the Commissioner for
Public Appointments, which is well established and well regarded. The
Treasury Committee has said that it will give sufficient independence
to those appointments. If we get those right, the composition and
conduct of the board will rapidly establish its authority and its
credibility, and will demonstrate the distance that it has from
Ministers—a distance at which it will be able to set the
statistical system. The conceptual problem that worries the hon.
Gentleman will prove not to be a problem in practice.
On the second point raised by
the hon. Member for Sevenoaks. Non-executive members of the board will
not be employees. In the event of a problem, they will have recourse to
a judicial review or, conceivably, the
ombudsman. The answer to his third question is that these are matters
not of employment, but of appointment. The Government rightly remain
involved in the appointment, as we have discussed, hence the wording of
subsection (5)(b). My
hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West has an endearing
habit of not giving up on something that he feels is not correct. We
had a full discussion this morning, but he is clearly not satisfied
with the fact that there are legislative precedents for the criteria
concerned. Neither is he satisfied that the provision is an attempt to
bring up to date some of the terminology that we use in legislation. As
a lawyer, he will know that the equivalent of misbehaviour is
malfeasance. Essentially, they mean the same thing. If he is disturbed
by subsection (4)(d), I will take a fresh look at it to see whether
there is a case for making amendments that could achieve precisely the
same effect but avoid the use of the term misbehaviour, which he does
not feel is appropriate for use in
legislation.
Mr.
Fallon:
I am grateful to the Minister for answering most
of those points. I hope that he understands our concern that we want
the non-executive members to be as independent as possible; they should
not have to be skating carefully all the time. I hope that he will
reflect on the drafting, which—I think
inadvertently—gives the impression that the members can be
reappointed only on the whim of the Treasury and can be summarily fired
for the slightest misbehaviour. I am grateful for his offer to
re-examine the
drafting.
John
Healey:
Does hon. Gentleman not recognise that the
examples that I suggested might constitute misbehaviour were certainly
not trivial or light? They were very serious indeed. The concept of
misbehaviour as framed in the Bill is by no means a light
offence.
Mr.
Fallon:
I understand that. As the rest of the Committee is
suggesting, it would have to be reasonably serious to justify summary
dismissal. I do not want to over-egg the issue, but when we pressed the
Minister earlier he went into the area of misconduct. We spoke this
morning of corruption and violence, in which case I do not think that
compensation would be paid for loss of office; it would be strange if
it were. Today, he has introduced the concept of malfeasance, the
proving of which leads down a tricky legal path. I urge him to have
another look at the drafting. He may be able to strengthen it in all
our interests.
Question put and agreed
to.
Clause 4
ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
Clause
5
Executive
members and other
staff
Mr.
Fallon:
I beg to move amendment No. 15, in
clause 5, page 3, line 13, after
‘Majesty’, insert
‘on the advice of the Prime
Minister’.
The
Chairman:
With this it will be convenient to discuss the
following amendments: No. 120, in
clause 5, page 3, leave out lines 14 and 15
and insert—
‘(b) employed to
operate independently of the Board with scrutiny and oversight of the
role provided by the
Board.’.
No.
188, in
clause 5, page 3, line 15, at
end insert—
‘(2A) No
appointment shall be made under subsection (2) until it has been
approved by the Commission established under section (Establishment of
a Commission for Official
Statistics).’.
No.
189, in
clause 5, page 3, line 15, at
end insert—
‘(2A)
Appointments made under subsection (2) shall be subject to review by
the Commission established under section (Establishment of a Commission
for Official Statistics) within one year of their having been
made.
(2B) The Commission shall
produce a report on any review carried out under subsection (2A) and
shall lay it before each House of
Parliament.’.
No.
16, in
clause 5, page 3, line 19, at
end insert—
‘(3A) The
National Statistician shall have right of direct access to the Prime
Minister on any matter involving dispute with a government
department.’.
No.
151, in
clause 6, page 3, line 34, leave
out ‘Board’ and insert ‘National
Statistician’.
No.
121, in
clause 8, page 4, line 35, at
end insert—
‘(4) The Board
shall have responsibility to monitor and assess the performance of the
National Statistician against the assigned
responsibilities.’.
No.
100, in
clause 9, page 4, line 37, leave
out ‘Board’ and insert ‘National
Statistician’.
No.
101, in
clause 9, page 5, line 2, leave
out ‘Board’ and insert ‘National
Statistician’.
No.
102, in
clause 9, page 5, line 4, leave
out ‘Board’ and insert ‘National
Statistician’.
No.
103, in
clause 18, page 8, line 15, leave
out ‘Board’ and insert ‘National
Statistician’.
No.
104, in
clause 18, page 8, line 17, leave
out ‘Board’ and insert ‘National
Statistician’.
No.
105, in
clause 18, page 8, line 19, leave
out ‘Board’ and insert ‘National
Statistician’.
No.
106, in
clause 18, page 8, line 21, leave
out ‘Board’ and insert ‘National
Statistician’.
No.
107, in
clause 18, page 8, line 23, leave
out ‘Board’ and insert ‘National
Statistician’.
No.
108, in
clause 19, page 8, line 26, leave
out ‘Board’ and insert ‘National
Statistician’.
No.
125, in
clause 19, page 8, line 30, leave
out ‘Board’ and insert ‘National
Statistician’.
No.
126, in
clause 19, page 8, line 36, leave
out ‘Board’ and insert ‘National
Statistician’.
No.
109, in
clause 20, page 9, line 11, leave
out ‘Board’ and insert ‘National
Statistician’.
No.
110, in
clause 21, page 9, line 20, leave
out ‘Board’ and insert ‘National
Statistician’.
No.
111, in
clause 22, page 9, line 23, leave
out ‘Board’ and insert ‘National
Statistician’.
No.
112, in
clause 22, page 9, line 25, leave
out ‘Board’ and insert ‘National
Statistician’.
No.
113, in
clause 22, page 9, line 27, leave
out ‘Board’ and insert ‘National
Statistician’.
No.
114, in
clause 23, page 9, line 34, leave
out ‘Board’ and insert ‘National
Statistician’.
No. 115, in
clause 26, page 10, line 34, after
‘Board’ and insert ‘and the National
Statistician’.
No.
116, in
clause 26, page 10, line 35, after
‘Board’ and insert ‘and the National
Statistician’.
No.
197, in
clause 28, page 12, line 6, at
end insert—
‘(d) ensuring
that, where appropriate, official statistics provide evidence of local
variations and service
needs.’.
No.
97, in
clause 28, page 12, line 17, at
end insert—
‘(5) The
National Statistician shall be the government’s chief advisor on
statistics, including, inter alia, matters relating to the planning,
production and quality of official statistics, and shall provide
professional leadership to all persons within government who are
engaged in statistical production and
release.’.
No.
127, in
clause 28, page 12, line 17, at
end insert—
‘(5) The
National Statistician shall be the government’s principal
advisor on statistics and provide professional leadership to all
persons engaged in statistical production and
publication.’.
No.
80, in
clause 29, page 12, line 19, leave
out ‘Board’ and insert
‘executive office created under
the provisions of subsection (5)
below’.
No. 98,
in
clause 29, page 12, line 22, at
end insert—
‘(2A) The
National Statistician
shall—
(a) coordinate,
and promote coordination of, statistical production across government
and the devolved administrations;
and
(b) take steps to ensure
consistency in the production of official statistics across the United
Kingdom.’.
No.
29, in
clause 29, page 12, line 27, at
end insert—
‘(3A) The
National Statistician shall have responsibility for
promoting—
(a) the
co-ordination of statistical planning and production across government
departments; and
(b) the
production of statistics that are as consistent as possible across the
United
Kingdom.’.
No.
139, in
clause 29, page 12, line 28, leave
out from ‘Board’ to end of line 30 and insert
‘shall monitor the National
Statistician in the exercise of his functions in relation to official
statistics, inlcuding the duty set out in subsection (2A)
above.’.
No.
128, in
clause 29, page 12, line 28, after
‘may’ insert
‘not’.
No.
129, in
clause 29, page 12, line 29, leave
out
‘not’.
No.
117, in
clause 31, page 13, line 26, leave
out ‘Board’ and insert ‘National
Statistician’.
No.
130, in
clause 36, page 14, line 35, leave
out ‘Board’ and insert ‘National
Statistician’.
No.
132, in
clause 36, page 14, line 40, leave
out ‘Board’ and insert ‘National
Statistician’.
No.
133, in
clause 36, page 15, line 4, leave
out ‘Board’ and insert ‘National
Statistician’.
No.
134, in
clause 36, page 15, line 23, leave
out ‘Board’ and insert ‘National
Statistician’.
No.
135, in
clause 36, page 15, line 25, leave
out ‘Board’ and insert ‘National
Statistician’.
No.
136, in
clause 36, page 15, line 27, leave
out ‘Board’ and insert ‘National
Statistician’.
No. 137, in
clause 36, page 15, line 30, leave
out ‘Board’ and insert ‘National
Statistician’.
No.
138, in
clause 36, page 15, line 31, leave
out ‘Board’ and insert ‘National
Statistician’.
Mr.
Fallon:
You have conveniently grouped together a large
number of amendments, Mr. Olner, only three of which stand
in my name. I wish to speak only to amendments Nos. 15, 16 and
29.
The
provisions relate to the status and role of the National Statistician.
Amendment No. 15 deals with the way in which the National Statistician
is to be appointed. I have tabled the amendment because it is still
slightly unclear to me exactly how that appointment is going to be
made. The Minister may recall that I pressed the matter twice on Second
Reading, and I have still not had a specifically clear
answer.
If we look at
current practice, the National Statistician, Karen Dunnell, was
appointed in August 2005, and the press release from National
Statistics described her appointment
as:
“The Prime
Minister, with the agreement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, has
approved the appointment of Karen Dunnell as National
Statistician”.
Subsection
(2) is clearly an improvement on that; that is an administrative
statement, and we now have in the statute a Crown appointment. However,
like all Crown appointments, that appointment can only be made on
advice, and the issue with which amendment No. 15 deals is on whose
advice the appointment is to be made.
Lord Moser—the
doyen of statistics, the man who served three Prime
Ministers—was very clear in evidence to the Select Committee. In
answer to question 213, he
said:
“If it
was left to me, I would have the Prime Minister being given that
responsibility.”
That, of
course, means not the Chancellor of the Exchequer. In fact, even if one
agrees with the Financial Secretary, as the Committee has had to do
today, that the residual functions should stay with Treasury Ministers,
even as the Treasury Select Committee recommended, there is still a
case for making the appointment of the National Statistician a prime
ministerial appointment.
If we are serious about
restoring trust to the office and its holder, we should be boosting it.
It should become one of the big offices of state. I should like the
National Statistician to become more of a household name—a key
public figure in leading the profession and championing the public
interest in statistics. It is worth emphasising the importance of the
office and making a distinction in statute about the appointment being
in the end the primary responsibility of the Prime
Minister—although, of course, the Chancellor of the Exchequer
would be consulted.
The Prime Minister makes a
number of appointments. I have been checking the people whom he has
appointed over the last year and it includes a number of appointments
of people who we might not think of as being in the front rank of
public figures: the first parliamentary counsel; members of the
Judicial Appointments Commission; the non-executive member of the
Forestry Commission for Scotland; a member of the Royal Commission on
the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Wales; together with perhaps
more
central public figures, such as the permanent secretaries of the
different Departments. When the last permanent secretary to the
Department for Education and Skills was appointed, the wording was as
follows: “The
Prime Minister, with the agreement of the Secretary of State for
Education and Skills has approved the appointment of David Bell to be
Permanent Secretary”.
The
same wording was followed for the permanent secretaryship to the
Treasury itself. There is a parallel, and I think that it is important
that we formally emphasise that the new post, placed in statute
properly for the first time, is a public figure of the very front rank.
We would remove any perception that the appointment remains within the
control of the Treasury or the Chancellor. That is the purpose of
amendment No.
15.
Amendment No. 16
is designed to make clear that the National Statistician should have
right of access to the Prime Minister at all times. I want to emphasise
that although you have wisely grouped amendment No. 16 with
No. 15, Mr. Olner, it is not necessarily dependent on it. In
other words, even if amendment No. 15 falls, and Ministers insist that
it should be a Chancellor’s appointment, I would still argue
that the National Statistician should have in statute this right of
access to the Prime
Minister.
6.30
pm
Why should the
National Statistician have such a right of access? Because, as we have
begun to establish today, they need the authority if they are to do
their job properly across the system. Lord Moser, who served three
Prime Ministers, was quite emphatic about that. He explained to our
Select Committee what happened if there were problems in a particular
Department. I will not quote his evidence at great length but he gave
the example of a dispute with the Department of Health over hospital
waiting lists. I do not know whether that arose when he was the chief
statistician in the late 1960s or 1970s, but it is clearly of topical
interest today.
If
there were a dispute between the National Statistician and the
Department of Health about the way in which waiting lists were being
compiled or the statistics were being announced, Lord Moser said that
his first recourse would be to take it up with the
statistician—under our decentralised system, the senior
statistician in the Department of Health. It also helps that he would
have some role in appointing that statistician and, as we shall come to
in later amendments, some liaison duty with all the statisticians
across the Departments. If he did not get any joy in persuading the
statistician in that Department, he said that he would then go to the
permanent secretary. If he got no joy from the permanent
secretary,
“then I went
to my boss. This is important. My boss was the Prime
Minister.”
That
is the crux. There could well be a dispute between the National
Statisticians and different Departments and different departmental
Ministers. There has been in the past. Indeed, Lord Moser told us that
he resigned privately twice during his period of office. Therefore, we
must put the right of access of the National Statistician to the Prime
Minister in statute and give the National Statistician real authority
across Whitehall.
I hope that
amendment No. 29 speaks for itself. It is slightly different from the
supervisory functions that we dealt with earlier today. I think that it
has the support of many outside the House, including the statistics
users forum. Its objective is that we should give the National
Statistician some overarching responsibility to co-ordinate statistics
across the decentralised system that the Financial Secretary and I are
so keen to preserve and to ensure consistency, not simply across the
United Kingdom and the different nations and territories, but between
the Government Departments and the different series of statistics that
exist.
Mrs.
Villiers:
It is a pleasure and a privilege to follow my
hon. Friend and to speak in support of amendment No. 15 and various
other amendments in the group. We have a variety of issues to deal with
and I hope that the Committee will bear with me as I go through them
with some care. There are a number of areas where, even if we are
unable to persuade the Minister to accept our amendments, it would be
useful to receive some clarification from him. There is genuine
confusion among much of the statistical community about how the Bill
will operate in significant respects.
The first set of amendments
deals with the split between executive and scrutiny functions. The
second set seeks to enhance the authority of the National Statistician
and to clarify her role. My hon. Friend the Member for Sevenoaks
eloquently referred to the way in which it would boost her status.
Prime ministerial involvement in the appointment, as amendment No. 15
describes, would play an important part in enhancing that
authority.
It is also
vital to consider the issue that amendment No. 16 raises about direct
access to the Prime Minister. I shall not deal with it at length under
the amendments before us, because I anticipated it when we considered
the transfer of responsibilities between the Treasury and the Cabinet
Office. Instead, I shall highlight the question that I posed to the
Minister when we considered the issue during earlier amendments. I
asked him to clarify the National Statistician’s current access
to the Prime Minister. We heard how Lord Moser was convinced that the
link between the National Statistician and the Prime Minister had been
broken by the switch from the Cabinet Office to the Treasury. I hope
that the Minister will reassure us that the National Statistician still
sees the Prime Minister regularly, and that she has access as and when
she needs it.
The first
group of amendments starts roughly at amendment No. 100. There should
be a clear separation of the executive and scrutiny functions. The
Government’s attempt to split the two roles within the board
does not go far enough to answer the concerns that a significant number
of people expressed during consultation. The executive functions
proposed for the board should be removed and transferred to the
National Statistician. That is the objective of most amendments in the
group; the remainder focus largely on enhancing the authority of the
National Statistician.
On Second Reading, the Minister
responded to a point that the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West
made about actuaries. The Minister said that technical queries about
methodology should be directed to the National Statistician, noting
that that
was how they were currently dealt with and that it would be unlikely to
change under the new system. However, to take just one example, clause
9 explicitly requires the board to develop and maintain definitions,
methodologies, classifications and standards for official statistics.
If his statement on Second Reading is to prove correct, he must support
amendment No. 100. It would give responsibility to the National
Statistician—to whom it rightly belongs. The Opposition support the
Treasury Sub-Committee’s approach to the matter. It stated that
executive responsibility for delivery of statistics should remain with
the National Statistician, whom the board would hold to account. Its
statement echoed the sentiments expressed by the Royal Statistical
Society on this important matter. It said:
“The
National Statistician should be responsible for professional and
operational matters and for statistical production. The Board should
not be assigned responsibilities integral to statistical production and
dissemination as the Bill envisages. It should instead hold the
National Statistician to account for these responsibilities so
separating the role of statistical producer from the role of monitoring
to ensure that the public interest is
served.”
Commenting
on the issue, a number of people have referred to the independent
status of the Statistics Commission, which is separate from the
production of statistics. Professor David Martin of the university of
Southampton
said:
“It
is a matter of concern that this board will be responsible both for the
production and quality assessment of National Statistics and no
provision is made for a separate quality assurance body, closer to the
role of the current Statistics
Commission.”
Similar concerns have
been expressed by Brian Gosschalk, chief executive of Ipsos MORI, and
by Jill Tuffnell, head of research at Cambridgeshire county council.
Speaking on behalf of the Central and Local Government Information
Partnership, she said
that
“the group would
like to comment on the need for independent scrutiny of official
statistics. The Statistics Commission is just such an independent body.
There is no guarantee that the proposed board will be able to act in
this way. A much clearer divide is required between scrutiny and
operations.”
Making
a similar appeal, Will Rossiter, the chairman of the Association of
Regional Observatories,
said:
“The
proposal to combine the executive (production) and scrutiny functions
within a single board is problematic. It is unclear as to what form of
redress or appeal would be open to an individual or organisation
wishing to challenge the decision of the board. The statistics
commission should not be abolished if the board is to have executive
functions.”
The
Committee will be aware that the Statistics Commission has done
valuable work in improving the quality and integrity of statistics in
the UK, and I acknowledge the achievements of the changes made by the
Government in setting it up. However, one of the commission’s
strengths has been its independence from the production process, and it
is difficult to believe that it could have had the same impact had it
been part of the Office for National Statistics. The statistics users
forum put it this
way:
“The
proposals suggest that the Board of the non-ministerial department has
responsibility for both the delivery of statistics and for assuring
quality and adherence to standards. We do not believe it is good
governance that the same body should be responsible for both functions.
Neither is it conducive to restoring or maintaining public trust in the
system ... The proposed
disappearance of the statistics commission would eliminate a check on
the system while replacing it with a system that would appear, at
least, to be
weaker.” Although,
in the main, the Bill is certainly a step in the right direction, a
fact which was acknowledged by both Opposition parties on Second
Reading, it is a matter of real concern that this particular aspect of
the Bill could be a step backwards—that it could actually weaken
some of the safeguards that currently
exist.
At the heart of
the anxiety that has been expressed about the merging of functions is
that the proposed combination of functions will give rise to a conflict
of interest. The Select Committee on the Treasury considered that
this
“would be likely to
have a negative impact on the board’s perceived
independence.”
As John
Carlin, head of the North East Regional Information Partnership has
pointed out, there will be a problem reporting concerns about decisions
taken at the ONS because the board’s executive functions will
mean that it “will not be detached.” That, at any rate,
is how matters will be
perceived.
Rob
Marris:
I wonder whether the hon. Lady could help me by
telling me which part of the Bill indicates that the statistics board
produces statistics in contradistinction to examining quality, good
practices, comprehensiveness and so
on?
Mrs.
Villiers:
I am grateful for that intervention. I shall
direct the hon. Gentleman to clause 6(1), which
says:
“In
this Part ‘official statistics’ means ... statistics
produced by ... the
Board.”
There is another
reference, in clause 18, where it
says:
“The
board may itself produce and publish statistics relating to any matter
relating to the United Kingdom or any part of
it.”
I think that those
are the clearest examples.
It will be perceived that the
board will not be detached, and perception is crucial in this matter
because the purpose is to rebuild trust in official statistics. The RSS
have
said:
“Were
the Board itself to be involved in the production process then it is
difficult to see how it could command the public’s confidence in
its ability to monitor statistical
production.”
The problem
essentially arises because the board will be judge and jury in its own
case.
Let us look at
what happens when a member of the public or a Member is concerned about
a decision taken by the ONS. I shall give an example. My hon. Friend
the Member for Havant (Mr. Willetts) campaigned for a number
of years about the way in which pension contributions were measured by
the ONS and assessed in ONS statistics. In the end, the ONS admitted
that he was correct on several points, and it changed its approach, but
that took some
time.
What if the same
situation arose under the new structures? When, for example, my hon.
Friend received the initial response from the ONS, rejecting his
complaint and asserting that it considered its procedures to be
correct, the natural step would have been to make a complaint to the
board and to ask for
an assessment and review of the decision. Let us assume that the board
were sufficiently wise to realise that the ONS had not adequately or
appropriately
responded. 6.45
pm
If the board
were to issue a rebuke to the ONS it would, in effect, be talking to
itself. The chairman would be in the awkward situation of issuing a
rebuke to himself. The board’s standing to hold the ONS to
account would be undermined by the fact that the board, as a body, was
technically responsible for the decision taking in the first
place.
The issue is
thrown into stark relief when one looks at it in relation to judicial
review. A person who is concerned about practices at the ONS or a
decision made by it could in theory decide to apply for judicial review
at the same time as making a complaint to the board. However, the board
itself would be the relevant body for the purposes of reviewing the
decision. Will the Minister confirm whether that is the case?
On Second Reading, I made a
comparison with the structure of the BBC. The regulatory and delivery
functions of the BBC are mixed in a similar way to the arrangements
proposed in the Bill. Concerns have been expressed about the BBC
arrangements, including by the House of Lords Select Committee on the
BBC’s Charter Review, which called for greater external
regulation. The Burns panel, in its independent report to the
Department for Culture, Media and Sport, labelled the dual role of the
governors as regulator and defender of the BBC
“unsustainable”. Clearly, the Hutton crisis has led to a
shake up of governance, but controversy remains. How much greater would
the controversy attached to the BBC’s governance arrangements be
if it had the responsibility for regulating not only its own
activities, but the activities of other key broadcasters? That analogy
can be applied validly in the context of the statistics board, because
of its dual roles in relation to the production of statistics and
monitoring the statistical system as a
whole.
Now I come to a
tricky point relating to clause 29, which I think is one of the more
difficult issues that the Committee must address, and I am particularly
keen to get the views and guidance of Ministers. A number of interest
groups expressed concern that the Bill fails to distinguish properly
between the functions of the board and the National Statistician. That
is a particular worry in relation to clause 29. Who is to make
technical decisions on statistics: the board, or the National
Statistician? Take the example of Network Rail given by the Royal
Statistical Society in its briefing. Let us assume that the ONS makes a
controversial decision relating to the classification of Network Rail
liabilities. Clause 29(4) gives the board the power to direct the
National Statistician to take a different decision—in essence,
the decision of the board can be substituted for that of the National
Statistician. Concern has been expressed that that blurs the role of
the board and the National Statistician and leaves the line of
responsibility for a decision insufficiently clear.
Amendments Nos. 139, 128 and
129, which have the same objective, are designed to clarify the
position, so that the responsibility to make a decision rests with the
National Statistician, but it can be monitored and
reviewed by the board. I hope that the Committee will have the
opportunity to consider the issue of the respective roles. Both the RSS
and the Statistics Commission have made representations. They say that
the board’s role in that context should be to focus on the way
in which a decision has been taken—it should consider whether
there has been a defect in the decision-making process; whether
improper political pressure has been applied; whether the code has been
complied with; and whether appropriate transparency requirements have
been observed to ensure that outcomes are adequately described and
explained to the public. The RSS and the Statistics Commission feel
that the board’s sanction should be publicly to highlight its
concerns before Parliament, and not to seek directly to overrule the
National Statistician. In some ways, those concerns
echo the Minister’s response to the amendment tabled by my hon.
Friend the Member for Sevenoaks, which would give the board the power
to direct Departments. The Minister indicated that the board should
focus not on directing people, but on monitoring and scrutinising how
they carry out their functions. The issue is one of some subtlety and
there is confusion, which is why I am interested to hear what the
Minister has to say. I hope that he will be able to reassure me and
those who have raised the concerns, because it is not easy to get to
the bottom of the
matter.
Another
concern about clause 29 relates to subsection (1), which
states:
“The
National Statistician is also to be the chief executive of the
Board.”
The Minister
might be able to reassure me, but I do not understand how the National
Statistician can be the chief executive of the board when, in theory,
there is to be a split between assessment and production roles. My
understanding is that the Bill is structured to keep the National
Statistician out of the assessment process, but to make her chief
executive of the board indicates that she will have important
assessment powers as well as her production role. Surely the subsection
therefore undermines the split of functions in the board that the
Government envisage.
The Opposition tabled amendment
No. 80 to attempt to make the National Statistician the chief executive
not of the board as a whole, but of the executive office to be set up
under clause 29(5). I understand that the Government envisage that the
production work carried out by the board will be formally delegated to
the executive office, which, in effect, will replace the ONS, which is
formally abolished by the Bill. Will the Minister expand on the
background to that change and the way in which the delegation will work
in practice, to reassure those who are concerned about what they regard
as a merging and blurring of executive and scrutiny
functions?
The
second big issue raised by this group of amendments is the office of
National Statistician. It is a pivotal role in both the existing and
the proposed structures for the statistical system. If the reform is to
achieve its goals, it is vital that the status and authority of the
National Statistician is strengthened by the Bill and that the
functions of her office are clearly defined. The reforms must enable
her to provide effective leadership of the statistical system. We must
ensure that she has real authority and that her views and concerns have
an
impact right across Government and statistical production. That is why I
would be particularly pleased by the strengthening of her position
through amendments Nos. 15 and 16, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member
for Sevenoaks. The
reforms should make clear provision for the professional authority of
the National Statistician. That point was made strongly to the Treasury
Committee by the Canadian chief statistician, Dr. Ivan Fellegi. He felt
that the role set out for the National Statistician in the
Government’s consultation document was weak and saw it as a
major defect in the proposals. Some of the amendments in the group are
intended to deal with Dr. Fellegi’s concerns, many of which were
acknowledged as important by the Treasury
Committee.
Amendment
No. 97 emphasises the vital leadership role of the National
Statistician and would make explicit the fact that she should be the
Government’s chief adviser on official statistics, including on
matters relating to their planning, production and quality. I hope that
that is implicit in the Bill, but those are vital tasks and it would
send a strong signal of the status accorded the National Statistician
if they were given explicit recognition. Some members of the
statistical community have expressed the concern that in the past
Governments have failed to engage in effective planning for statistical
production. An explicit recognition of the importance of that task
would be valuable; if that is not possible, recognition by the Minister
today of the importance of the planning process would be
welcomed.
Amendments
Nos. 29 and 98 would ensure that the National Statistician’s
remit includes the co-ordination of statistical production across the
Government and ensuring that the production of official statistics
across the UK is consistent. The importance of co-ordination has been
emphasised by a range of expert groups. There is grave concern that
past efforts to co-ordinate statistical production have been
insufficiently effective. Given that the Bill is a once-in-a-lifetime
opportunity—statistics Bills come only every 60 years—we
should use it to try to put that problem
right.
The amendments
also raise the question of consistency. Clearly, it is vital that we
address the concerns expressed about the fragmentation of UK statistics
and the difficulty of obtaining information to cover the whole country.
It is extremely welcome that the Bill proposes a framework that is to
apply across the United Kingdom. I pay tribute to the work that the
Minister must have done to bring that about; it cannot have been an
easy political task, and he deserves the Committee’s
congratulations.
Lack
of consistency has been a significant problem that needs to be solved;
the Royal Statistical Society has described it as “serious and
worsening”. The chairman of its national statistics working
party, John Pullinger, told the Treasury Committee that the problem was
so significant that last time around there were three different
censuses—for England, Scotland
and Wales—instead of a single UK one. During our scrutiny of the
Bill, we should try to ensure that the people of Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland have equal access to statistics produced according to
principles of integrity, impartiality and honesty. That is why we
welcome the extension of the Bill to the whole United Kingdom. However,
if the National Statistician were given the explicit task of promoting
the consistency of official statistics across the UK, that would send a
visible signal about the importance that the Government clearly attach
to the
issue. Amendments Nos.
115 and 116 would impose the efficiency obligations in clause 26 on the
National Statistician. Unlike most of the other amendments in the
group, which would substitute the words “National
Statistician” for “Board”, amendments Nos. 115 and
116 would impose the duty on both institutions. Clause 26
contains sensible provisions on minimising the burdens placed on
businesses and individuals affected by statistical collection, and the
Opposition will return to that issue at another point. However, given
the important role that the National Statistician should play in the
production of statistics, it makes sense for the efficiency
requirements to apply to her and her office as well as to the
board.
I welcome amendments Nos.
118 and 119, which would provide very useful parliamentary input into
the appointment of the national statistician. They would enhance
parliamentary scrutiny in respect of the statistical system as a whole.
In many ways, the reasons for supporting the amendments would be
similar to those for supporting the previous group about the importance
of hands-on parliamentary scrutiny of the statistical system. The
amendments would also give parliamentary recognition to the importance
of the role of National Statistician. We want to make hers a household
name, and having hearings in Parliament and increasing parliamentary
scrutiny of the appointments process would strengthen and enhance the
role of National
Statistician.
Alun
Michael:
I should like to clarify something. The hon. Lady
referred to amendments Nos. 118 and 119, but they are not in the group
that we are
discussing.
Mrs.
Villiers:
I might have mixed up the numbers; I meant to
say amendments Nos. 188 and 189. I appreciate the right hon.
Gentleman’s correction and
apologise.
Finally, I
appeal to the Minister to assist the Committee by providing
clarification on those important questions. I hope that he can allay
the fears that I have expressed and those expressed by the many people
who are very keen to see the structure work. We want a rational
separation of the roles of scrutiny and delivery and to ensure that the
Bill achieves its
purposes.
Debate
adjourned.—[Kevin Brennan.]
Adjourned accordingly at
Seven o’clock, till Thursday 18 January at Nine
o’clock.
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