Clause
20
Statistical
services
Question
proposed, That the clause stand part ofthe
Bill.
John
Healey:
Clauses 20 and 21 are important because they
enable the board to undertake valuable activities, currently undertaken
by the ONS, that are generally and necessarily widely known. Clause 20
allows the board to provide the range of services that the ONS
currently provides. For example, it will be able to provide
“information, advice and technical
assistance”
to outside
bodies, including statistical agencies in developing countries. Under
the clause, the board will also be able to undertake valuable
statistical surveys and analyses on behalf of others as the ONS
currently
does.
Question put
and agreed
to.
Clause 20
ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
Clauses
21 to 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1 agreed
to.
Clause 24
ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause
25
Reports
Dr.
Cable:
I beg to move amendment No. 89, page 10, line 25,
leave out ‘may’ and insert
‘must’.
The
Chairman:
With this it will be convenientto
discuss the following amendments: No. 201, page 10, line 25, leave out
‘any or all’ and insert ‘one or
more’.
No. 90,
page 10, line 31, leave out ‘as soon
as possible thereafter’ and insert
‘concurrently’.
Dr.
Cable:
With our amendment, we are once again having a
gentle tilt at the parliamentary draftsmen, but the amendment is wholly
uncontroversial and I hope that the Government will help us with it.
Clause 25 concerns the board’s function in reporting to
Parliament. Subsections (1) and (2) set out the procedure for annual
reporting, and state that the board “must” produce an
annual report and lay it before Parliament and the devolved Assemblies.
Subsections (3) and (4) then state, for no obvious reason, that it
“may” undertake other reports on matters relating to the
exercise of its functions, and leave it open as to whether any such
report should be laid before Parliament and the devolved Assemblies.
That prompts the question as to what they are preparing such reports
for—in a vacuum for their own amusement, perhaps.
The clause is about embedding
the reports of the board in parliamentary accountability. What we
suggest—changing “may” to
“must”—is meant as a drafting improvement. It is
certainly intended in that spirit, and I hope that the Minister will
take it as such.
6.15
pm
John
Healey:
I have already discussed
amendments Nos. 89 and 201 with the hon. Gentleman. I am grateful to
him for raising this matter and for his constructive approach. Under
the present drafting of the Bill, reports produced under clause 25(1)
must be laid before Parliament and the devolved legislatures. In
contrast, under clause 25(3), the board has only an option of laying
discretionary reports before Parliament or the devolved legislatures.
Looking at the matter, I find myself in agreement with the hon. Member
for Twickenham. If the board produces a report under subsection (3)
about a matter relating to the exercise of its functions, it must lay
the report before one or more of Parliament or the devolved
legislatures. That is entirely consistent with the Government’s
desire for parliamentary scrutiny to be at the heart of the new
arrangements. I will be happy to accept amendments Nos. 89 and
201.
Dr.
Cable:
That is quite overwhelming. In 10 years of dealing
with financial, immigration, asylum and benefits legislation in the
House, this is the first time that an amendment I have tabled has been
accepted. I will add the experience to my CV. I do not know what the
courtesies are—perhaps I should send a bunch of flowers or a
case of wine to the Treasury. Whatever is required, I appreciate the
Minister’s flexibility of mind, and I am glad that we are
proceeding on it.
Amendment agreed
to.
Amendment
made: No. 201, page 10, line 25, leave out ‘any or
all’ and insert ‘one or more’.—[Dr.
Cable.]
Clause
25, as amended, ordered to stand part ofthe
Bill.
Clause
26 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause
27
Directions
Stewart
Hosie:
I beg to move amendment No. 7,
page 11, line 13, leave out ‘, with
the consent of the Chancellor of the
Exchequer,’.
The
Chairman:
With this it will be convenient to discuss the
following amendments: No. 8, page 11, line 39, leave out
subsection (9).
No. 9,
in clause 45, page 21, line 4, leave out subsection
(7).
No. 10, in clause
45, page 21, line 7, leave out ‘and the
Treasury’.
No.
11, in clause 49, page 24, line 16, leave out subsection (7).
No. 12, in
clause 49, page 24, line 19, leave
out ‘and the
Treasury’.
Stewart
Hosie:
Clause 27 gives the Chancellor of
the Exchequer powers to direct the board if it has failed to comply
with its objectives or perform any of its functions, placing the office
at the heart of the process when things go wrong, which hopefully will
be very infrequently. Clause 27(2), (3) and (4) appear to give Scottish
and Welsh Ministers, and the Northern Ireland Department of Finance and
Personnel, the same powers but, of
course, it is not quite the same. Paragraph 116 of the explanatory notes
states that devolved Administrations will have powers in “a
similar manner”, but not exactly the same powers.
The
territorial appointments discussed in a previous sitting are not
actually made by the devolved Administrations but by the Treasury
following consultations. Scottish Ministers cannot offer disclosure of
information to or from the board without consent. Clause 27 operates in
the same way for the measures dealing with directions when things go
wrong. In a case of failure to comply or perform, the express consent
of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, not the Treasury, is required
before the devolved Administrations can issue directions. I might argue
that clause 27 follows a rather sad pattern of Treasury command and
control of the size and composition of the board, appointments to the
board and so on, but I will not make the case speaking to my amendment.
I merely argue that it is completely unnecessary, not least because the
direction given by Scottish Ministers in clause 27(2) relates only to
Scottish devolved statistics, something in which the Chancellor has, or
should have, no locus whatever. My amendments would remove the
requirement for the Chancellor’s consent in subsection (2), and
subsection (9), which is the catch-all measure that would stop Scottish
Ministers exercising the functions of the board in the case of its
failure to comply other than with the direct consent of the
Chancellor.
I tabled
the amendments because the powers given to the Scottish Ministers, even
with consent, relate only to devolved statistics, so UK Treasury
consent should be wholly
unnecessary.
I shall
speak briefly to amendments Nos. 9 to 12. Amendments Nos. 9 and 10 to
clause 45 would remove the requirement for Treasury consent before
Scottish Ministers can authorise the disclosure of information to the
board. Amendments Nos. 11 and 12 to clause 49 would remove the same
requirement before Scottish Ministers can authorise the disclosure by
the board. As with amendments Nos. 7 and 8, the proposals are
unnecessary as clause 45 applies only to Scottish public authorities
under the control of the Executive, and clause 49 allows information to
be disclosed only to public authorities.
The clauses allow the Treasury,
quite rightly in UK matters, to direct the board where there has been a
failure to comply or to perform and the Treasury has the ability to
authorise disclosure to and from the board to public bodies. Scottish
Ministers, Welsh Ministers and the Northern Ireland Departments have a
similar provision, but it still requires the consent of the Treasury.
It is a parent-child relationship which many will resent. However, the
key point is that the only information being discussed is devolved
statistics. In terms of disclosure to and from the board it relates
only to Scottish public authorities defined in the
legislation.
The
power of consent is completely unnecessary and I ask the Financial
Secretary to look again at the issue. The Administrations in Wales and
Scotland have their own mandate; they are properly elected, functioning
Administrations with a Parliament and an Assembly. I hope that one day
Ministers in Northern Ireland will take control again, as is specified
in the documentation with the Bill.
To require Treasury consent, and
in some cases specific consent from the Chancellor in order for
Ministers in the devolved Administrations to do their job, is
completely unnecessary. I hope that the Minister will consider the
matter in a trusting way, acknowledge the mandate of these
Administrations and recognise that the power of consent in the clauses
is
unnecessary.
John
Healey:
The clause has been drafted to ensure that the
devolved Administrations can play a full part in the work of the
statistics board and so that they can have control over matters
relating to wholly devolved statistics. For statistics that are not
wholly devolved, the Bill establishes an appropriate framework for
interaction between the board and the relevant devolved
Administrations.
In
respect of amendments Nos. 7 and 8 tabled by the hon. Member for
Dundee, East, the powers in clause 27 are designed to protect the
public interest so that if, and only if, the board fundamentally fails
to deliver, for any reason, the Government can intervene, always
publicly and in writing, to ensure that the board’s obligations
are met. The clause provides an important safeguard, allowing the
Chancellor of the Exchequer or the devolved Administrations to give the
board such directions as are, in those circumstances, appropriate in
the event of such a serious failure by the board to perform any of its
functions or to comply with EU
obligations.
I say
this to the hon. Gentleman: it is appropriate that the
Chancellor’s consent be needed for directions from Scottish
Ministers. That is a last resort because a board failure might affect
the position of statistics throughout the United Kingdom and so it is
important that such directions be consistent. The consent will ensure
that the directions are co-ordinated and that the Bill does not create
any potentially conflicting powers. In addition, the resourcing of the
board, in order to remedy a serious failure, will remain the
responsibility of the UK Parliament, to which the Chancellor will, of
course, be accountable. In such circumstances, shared accountability is
important for such decisions and
interventions.
We have
been working closely with the Scottish Executive, as the Committee
would expect, to ensure that the provisions in the Bill are appropriate
to—in this case—Scotland. I can confirm that Scottish
Ministers have agreed to their role in giving directions to the board
in the case of a serious failure, including to the requirement for the
Chancellor’s consent. The Scottish Parliament is being asked for
its consent as well via the legislative consent motion currently lodged
with it.
On amendments
Nos. 9 to 12, we will discuss clauses on data sharing a little later.
Essentially, the Bill sets out a mechanism for data sharing for
statistical purposes between the board and public authorities only. The
key point is that the mechanisms in clauses 45 and 49 mirror the
mechanisms in other data-sharing clauses, which generally require the
consent of the Treasury, as the body with residual legislative
responsibility for the board, and of the Minister responsible for the
other body involved in the data sharing. That will ensure that the
Minister for the body disclosing data and the one responsible for the
body receiving the data are both content for the regulation to
be made. I see no reason why the provisions in Scotland should be any
different from those applying else where. On that basis, I hope that
the hon. Gentleman will not press his
amendment.
Stewart
Hosie:
On amendments Nos. 7 and 8, I recognise that clause
27 is designed as a safeguard. I understand the argument that
identified flaws might be universal and not simply relate to Scotland.
However, on data sharing, which, as the Minister mentioned, we will
have the opportunity to discuss in more detail later, I take issue with
him when he said that the requirement is that both sides be content.
That might be the intention and what is provided for in other
legislation, but this Bill requires that the Treasury give consent, not
that both parties be considered content with the data sharing. However,
I shall not seek to press my amendments, although I might wish to
return to them on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the
amendment.
Amendment,
by leave,
withdrawn.
Mr.
Fallon:
I beg to move amendment No. 28, in
clause 27, page 11, line 35, at
end insert
‘and a copy
must be placed in the Library of each House of
Parliament.’.
I
think that we have established that directions under the clause are a
serious matter. A failure by the board to comply with its objectives or
to perform its functions would be serious and so a direction is not
likely to be given lightly. In reply to the hon. Member for Dundee,
East, the Minister said that it is right that the remedy remain with
Parliament because that is where, he hopes, due accountability will be
exercised under the process. As I understand the clause, directions
from the Chancellor or devolved Ministers must be in writing, but do
not have to be public.
It is true that under
subsection (7) a direction must be published in such a manner that the
authority to which it is directed must be aware of it. However, that
could mean any type of notice—a notice in the Edinburgh
Gazette, for example. It could be very localised. If Parliament is
to exercise its ultimate accountability functions, it must be aware of
any direction made. I suppose that it is too much to hope that the
Government might accept a second set of amendments, but I cannot see
how he could logically oppose this one. He introduced the idea that
Parliament has ultimate accountability, so I think that Parliament must
be aware of directions laid under subsection (7). That is the purpose
of the
amendment.
6.30
pm
John
Healey:
The hon. Gentleman makes a useful point with his
amendment. It is consistent with his intention at each stage to widen
and deepen Parliament’s role in the scrutiny and accountability
of the system. At this point, I cannot accept it as tabled because I
would need to consider whether directions issued by Ministers in
devolved Administrations might be laid publicly. If he will permit me,
however, I will take away the point to consider, and I assure him that
I will do so sympathetically.
Mr.
Fallon:
I am extremely grateful—I must not sound
too surprised—to the Financial Secretary for that acceptance.
The amendment makes sense, but I take his point perfectly about
directions made by devolved Administrations. In the spirit in which he
has accepted the principle, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the
amendment.
Amendment,
by leave,
withdrawn.
Question
proposed, That the clause stand part ofthe
Bill.
Mr.
Hoban:
I want to push the Minister a
little further. He made it clear in response to the amendments tabled
by the hon. Member for Dundee, East that the directions would be used
rarely and in grave situations, and we recognise that. He committed to
my hon. Friend the Member for Sevenoaks that he would consider a way of
publicising those directions, but in the context of parliamentary
scrutiny, has he given any thought to whether, given their gravity,
expected rarity and importance, they should be subject to parliamentary
approval through the affirmative resolution procedure to give
Parliament the opportunity to hold the Executive to account for such a
degree of
intervention?
John
Healey:
I do not think that that
approach would be appropriate. The clause is quite standard. It is
intended to be used as a last resort when there is a serious failure to
carry out the duties with which Parliament will charge the board. It
may be that that failure will require rapid direction on the
Chancellor’s behalf or that of Ministers in devolved
Administrations. Much better than requiring a legislative response to
issue such directions might be the approach that the hon. Member for
Sevenoaks is encouraging us to take—ensuring that directions
laid under the clause would be reported directly to Parliament or the
appropriate devolved
Administration.
Question
put and agreed
to.
Clause 27
ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
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