Memorandum From Pauline Walton, Norwich
Leaseholders' Association
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The purpose of this document is to provide input
on Leasehold and Major Works to assist the Communities and Local
Government Select Committee in deciding whether a deeper understanding
of social housing sector leasehold issues would be useful for
the development of social housing policies. Oral evidence will
also be provided.
Leaseholders form a significant and increasingly
vociferous minority group of home owners in the social housing
sector and their complaints have serious implications for home
ownership policies and initiatives. It is vital to understand
why leaseholders are so unhappy despite the measures taken for
their benefit.
We have over twenty-five years experience of
100% home ownership through the Right to Buy initiative, and further
new home ownership policies are being proposed to allow people
to purchase part shares in their existing home (Social Homebuy).
However, there has been no research focussed on understanding
the challenges and opportunities of mixed tenure and home ownership
for a generation of leaseholders, landlords and the community.
I believe that an enquiry into leasehold issues
would help to drive and inform the debate over social housing
sector home ownership and provide a new platform for the formulation
of future Housing policy and legislation.
At this stage, any conclusions can only be exploratory,
and my personal experience is limited to local authority leasehold.
However, there are plenty of issues to suggest that the matter
is worth researching and in December I had decided to embark on
a research project entitled "The Leasehold Question",
intending to address those issues.
1. Problems which need to be addressed
1.1 Social housing sector leaseholders residing
in estates and tower blocks are some of the poorest home owners
in the country. They are inadequately represented and often poorly
managed. They do not own property and they have no right to influence
the works to their home and neighbourhood. They are obliged to
pay for these works—as and when commissioned by the landlord.
1.2 Leases in the social housing sector
are inconsistent and almost impossible for the leaseholder to
fully understand. Many leases are out of date and poorly drafted
and the balance of power is in the landlord's favour.
1.3 There are many leaseholders who are
currently suffering from charges which neither they nor the landlords
anticipated. Some of these charges are over-inflated, and driven
initiatives which are of little relevance to leaseholders. None
have considered the leaseholders' financial position. Home ownership
in the social housing sector will be brought into disrepute if
their immediate problems are not addressed successfully.
1.4 Mixed tenure will always present management
tensions and there is a serious dearth of information at every
level which presents a barrier to its effective long-term management.
1.5 Landlord communication with leaseholders
is generally poor, exacerbated by the lack of standard model:
differing leases; many landlord variations; and wide-ranging motives
for home ownership.
2. Thesis: The current legislative framework
for social housing sector leasehold management actively encourages
conflict and injustice:
2.1 Legislative provision has been made
against leaseholders becoming too powerful, which is a perfectly
understandable concern. However, the effect is that leaseholders
have very few rights (which are almost impossible to exercise)
and the landlord has few obligations (which are difficult to enforce).
2.2 Through the lease, landlords are given
unilateral rights to commission, control and charge for works
to the leaseholder's home and neighbourhood.
2.3 The legislative framework gives leaseholders
the right to "consultation" and to challenge charges
not "reasonably incurred"; but falls short of giving
the leaseholder any absolute right to influence the course of
events at any stage of the planning process.
2.4 Section 20 (S20) "consultation"
is conducted towards the end of the landlord's planning process,
when contractors are lined up and deadlines have been set. The
first notification to the leaseholder of works plans and prospective
charges is through this mechanism.
2.5 Clearly, the landlord will be resistant
to change at this stage, even if a change could be justified and
leaseholders had the power to enforce it. In practice it is already
too late to challenge effectively, and under S20, the landlord
has no obligation to change its plans.
2.6 Most challenges fail and leaseholders
give up and become resentful. It is hardly surprising that the
relationship is adversarial.
2.7 Leasehold Valuation Tribunal (LVT) is
often the final act of desperation of the most determined. The
landlord's obligations to the leaseholder are then viewed in the
context of wider obligations in the social housing sector, where
the leaseholder is a minority interest. Landlords usually win.
2.8 Recommendations in this paper are
primarily focussed on achieving a collaborative framework in which
all parties are appropriately empowered
3. Leaseholders offer an opportunity for
unique insight:
3.1 Vested interest in value for money
As 100% home owners, leaseholders are invoiced directly
by social landlords for the whole cost incurred in servicing,
maintaining and improving social housing sector housing. This
gives them a vested interest in achieving value for money on works
for which they pay service charges. This vested interest could
be harnessed for the common good.
3.2 Leaseholders could act as a model
for other home ownership schemes
In view of the drive from Central Government for
home ownership by degrees, leaseholders are an important representative
voice and potentially a useful benchmark for ensuring the successful
implementation of the new and more complex homeownership schemes.
3.3 Leaseholders exemplify fledging home
ownership in the community
The behaviour of leaseholders (and all home owners)
in the social housing sector and their actions after purchase
directly affect the social housing community. Ex-tenant leaseholders
who stay in the community will have a very different effect from
those who arrive from the open market (often first time buyers).
These are different again from leaseholders who are non-resident.
A better understanding of these groups would assist the communities
debate.
3.4 Leaseholders embody the tensions
in private and social housing sector legislation
Leaseholders are also private home owners because
they can buy sell on the open market. Non-resident leaseholders
can also become private landlords, with the opportunity to lease
back to Council for its tenants. By analysing the issues for leaseholders,
it should be possible to derive principles for alignment between
the two sectors.
WHY ARE
LEASEHOLDERS UNHAPPY?
4. Leaseholders feel impotent
4.1 It is frankly scandalous that with Government
approval, some of the poorest people in England and Wales have
been encouraged to sign a contract with so few rights and so many
financial obligations.
4.2 Social housing sector leasehold is more
like a very expensive tenancy than home ownership:
— Leaseholders have no ownership rights—only
right to occupy for a limited period.
— Leaseholders have no right to influence:
— the landlord's plans (at any stage)
— work done to the property and neighbourhood
— timing and scope of works
— Leaseholders have no choice:
— Leaseholders pay for all works commissioned
and controlled by the landlord
— The opportunity to challenge the
landlord's plans comes too late in the process
— Leasehold Valuation Tribunal is the
only way to guarantee a hearing
4.3 Other types of social housing sector
home-owner are even worse off. Rent to Mortgage home-owners own
half of the right to occupy the property but pay the full cost
of works and services, and they can have no support even from
leaseholder associations, because they are not leaseholders. Shared
owners and social homebuy tenants (who may only own 25% of their
home) are in a similar position.
5. "Caveat Emptor"
5.1 If leaseholders had understood that
the landlord would have unilateral rights over works and charges
on their homes, they probably would not have signed the contract.
5.2 The rule of "caveat emptor"
is wholly unjustified for most prospective leaseholders who have
little opportunity to understand the full implications of a decision
to purchase.
5.3 Prospective buyers would be able to
judge the value of flats and maisonettes more correctly if service
charges were disclosed as an average over a relevant period.
5.4 Landlords are not obliged to reveal
(to prospective buyers on the open market) what they know about
works plans or the condition of property, partly because they
are not completely in control of funding.
5.5 Social housing sector leases are complex
long-term contracts, and conveyancers, more familiar with straightforward
transfer of freehold property, often skimp on leasehold advice
in order to keep costs down for purchasers who have low disposable
income.
5.6 Similarly, to save money, surveys are
minimised, partly because buyers assume that the landlord has
fulfilled its obligations to keep the property in good repair.
5.7 Landlords should be compelled to
yield up information about the condition of the property and plans
for major works to all prospective leaseholders—Section
30
5.8 Major maintenance works should be
disclosed at the point of sale as an average over a relevant period—Section
28
5.9 Prospective leaseholders should have
access to a wide spectrum of advice—Section 26
6. Lack of leasehold advice and support
6.1 If home ownership is to be viable as
a first step to responsibility in the social housing sector, it
is vitally important that leaseholders are adequately supported.
6.2 Whilst the government has recognised
some responsibility to support prospective Right to Buy leaseholders,
they are abandoned once the lease is signed. Such advice as they
receive would seem to be inadequate, as is evidenced by the current
outcry from leaseholder associations across the country.
6.3 A social housing sector lease is such
a complex contract, that it is unreasonable to imagine that any
lay person should be expected to manage without a source of local
specialist leasehold advice:
6.3.1 Legal: LEASE can provide post-purchase
legal information on a particular lease and general leasehold
advice, but no support is available for casework. LEASE cannot
provide national impartial advice to any prospective leaseholders.
6.3.2 Technical: Where leaseholders
want to question service charges, there is often a need to speak
to an independent surveyor. This is expensive and no funding is
available for casework.
6.3.3 Financial: Citizens Advice
can provide general debt and money management advice, but would
not undertake casework for leaseholders without funding.
6.3.4 Service charges: I believe
it is possible to provide clearer advice to prospective and existing
leaseholders so that they can budget for work effectively. However
the advice needs to be relevant to individual local circumstances
if it is to be of any value.
6.3.5 Effective representation to the
landlord: Service charge payers must have more control over
the work for which they pay and they need effective representation
to the landlord to ensure that their interests are understood
and considered.
6.3.6 Participation: Participation
Officers have been instrumental in setting up leaseholder associations
in local authorities, and in helping leaseholders to understand
how to get the best out of the landlord. However, these officers
are understandably more focussed on neighbourhood issues and associations
are few, staffed by volunteers. There is a need for a funded source
of independent advice on leaseholder-specific issues with the
landlord.
6.4 Leaseholders are not a "community"
and as individuals they are difficult to engage. This level of
advice is therefore unlikely to become available without government
encouragement. However, if the support is not provided, government
will continue to have opposition from the vociferous minority
who are prepared to declare the injustice loudly.
6.5 Advocate(s) for a locality could be
appointed through an agency such as Citizens Advice under the
guidance and control of LEASE. These advocates could then be supporting
more than one landlord and have a wider range of knowledge and
experience.
6.6 Leaseholders should have access to
an independent local advocate—Section 26
QUESTION ONE
Difficulties experienced by leaseholders in connection
with major works initiated under the Decent Homes and other government
programmes
7. Almost all the difficulties experienced by
leaseholders in connection with major works stem from their exclusion
from the planning process at every stage. Leaseholders need to
be given at least a measure of control over the way their money
is spent.
7.1 Research into service charge experience
is minimal and attempts to quantify the problems beyond London
have yielded poor response. However, there is plenty of evidence
that at least some leaseholders in London and Manchester are being
presented with bills as high as £30-40,000 in one year. The
larger areas we hear about have grouped together to form leaseholder
associations.
8. Current and Historical Problems with large
scale service charges
8.1 Leaseholders' issues are giving home
ownership in the social housing sector a bad reputation and it
is clear that measures must be taken to avoid the problem recurring.
8.2 Suggestions for impact assessment could
be used as a compensatory measure—Section 25
9. Boom-Bust approach to maintenance
9.1 Tower blocks and estates with properties
of poor construction are the most expensive to maintain. Residents
in these properties are on the lowest incomes.
9.2 There is a "boom-bust" approach
to maintenance in the social housing sector, because major works
are expensive and landlords depend on funding from central government.
If funding is not available, then property is often neglected
for long periods. As buildings deteriorate, maintenance bills
become higher and the burden on leaseholders increases.
9.3 The current Decent Homes programme is
the best recent example where leasehold bills are rocketing, particularly
for tower blocks. This pattern can be expected to continue unless
maintenance can be managed more effectively.
9.4 Central government should compel and
support social housing sector landlords to undertake rolling maintenance
programmes—Section 28.
10. Economies of scale for major works
10.1 Economies of scale seem to be inverted
in the social housing sector and charges are usually significantly
higher than in the private sector. This can be explained in many
ways, but it would be interesting to test the principle that high
quality long term works are cheaper in the long run. Social housing
sector home owners have a direct vested interest in obtaining
value for money and this attribute could be harnessed to other
measures of spending control.
10.2 Leaseholders should be protected from
being charged a premium for works because they are in the social
housing sector—Section 25.
10.3 One of the responsibilities of any
local service charge advocate should be conduct leaseholder impact
analysis at local level—Section 26.
10.4 It would be interesting to test the
principle that higher quality long term works are cheaper in the
long run—Section 33.
QUESTION TWO
The role of central and local government in commissioning
works, ensuring value for money and determining the level of costs
to be carried by leaseholders
The role of central government
11. Observations on the resources available to
central government
— Lease contract: No standard
model exists in the social housing sector
— Legislation: Landlord and Tenant,
Housing, Local Government: inadequate provision for the protection
of leaseholders and home owners in the social housing sector
— The Audit Commission: KLOE
no 12 is still very new and needs to bed in
— Communities and Local Government:
Leasehold issues are spread across departments which do not interact
(eg Landlord and Tenant issues are managed entirely separately
from Housing Revenue Account)
— LEASE: narrow definition of
responsibility
— NROSH: not a top priority
although the information is potentially crucial in developing
community strategies
12. The ring-fenced Housing Revenue Account has
been most effective in starting the process of getting landlords
focussed on home ownership and the standardisation of housing
software will provide one of the means by which best practice
can be developed.
12.1 Lack of leaseholder influence over
works
There is no provision for leaseholders to have any
influence at all over the work done to their home. This is unacceptable
and urgent action is needed to correct this very serious injustice.
12.2 Central government should add new levels
of control in the form of a service charge impact analysis for
national and local Housing initiatives—Section 25
12.3 It is possible for a single leaseholder
to be charged thousands of pounds for damage caused by antisocial
behaviour in the neighbourhood
There are still inconsistencies which could be removed
through implementing government guidelines for which provision
has been made. In particular, there are items of "public
works" which should reasonably be paid from the public purse,
but which are currently levied from service charge payers. An
example of this is that leaseholders can be charged for cleaning
and repairs caused by antisocial behaviour in the neighbourhood,
for which no insurance is available.
12.4 Central government should implement
a set of guidelines for the allocation of works to the HRA. This
provision already exists—Section 29
13. The Lease is a poorly drafted contract
and there is no single model
13.1 It follows that no central measure
can have a consistent effect if it acts on a non-standard contract.
Moreover, the burden on landlords to understand the variations
in every lease must be very expensive and unreliable.
13.2 It is likely that leasehold became
the contract of choice for the social housing sector in the absence
of any alternative for flats and maisonettes. It may also be that
government wanted the option to regain the asset at the end of
the term.
13.3 A contract for tenure involving such
high costs of maintenance might be easier to justify if transfer
of the asset itself had taken place, especially since lease terminations
will become an administrative headache eventually. Commonhold
as the tenure of choice for the social housing sector should be
considered as an option.
13.4 In the light of twenty-five years'
experience, recent developments and future plans over home ownership,
it would be useful to review all aspects of a lease as the contract
of choice for the social housing sector—Section 27.
14. The impact of government policies and
initiatives on leaseholders
14.1 At times, social housing sector landlords
are obliged to implement government policies and initiatives on
existing stock for reasons other than straightforward asset management.
The Decent Homes programme was explicitly directed towards repairing
years of neglect, which was directly the result of landlord failure
under the lease to keep property in good repair.
14.2 We are regularly reminded that leaseholders
must not be subsidised by tenants, but yet the leaseholder is
obliged to pay the full cost of these works irrespective of any
benefit derived.
14.3 In the private sector there is less
opportunity for government funding to undertake such works and
landlords have more control and time to plan.
14.4 Leaseholders should be protected against
paying a premium for policies which are irrelevant or detrimental
to them—Section 25.
15. Landlord and Tenant legislation contains
unresolved tensions
15.1 Social housing sector leaseholders
purchase on the open market in the private sector but suffer considerable
disadvantage by lack of control and higher charges through being
managed in the social housing sector. There has been some disagreement
in SSWP discussions over whether the two sectors should be aligned.
15.2 The alignment between the private and
social housing sectors should be reviewed to establish the principles
by which legislation should be interpreted—Section 27.
15.3 There seem to be considerable tensions
for landlords in managing tenants and home owners, especially
in customer service. It is unclear to me why this should be, but
staff seem to find it difficult to understand the perspective
of a home owner and it is likely to be that there is a lack of
training.
15.4 The tensions between tenant and home
ownership management need to be more thoroughly understood and
appropriate action taken to alleviate the problems—Section
30.
16. Cost vs Value of Works
16.1 Central and local government assume
that the cost of works will directly translate to increased value
of the property. This is a gross over-simplification:
— Property prices are driven by location
and overall impression rather than stock condition
— Prices of flats are also driven by
service charges, which are not transparent
— Property prices are artificially
limited by stamp duty thresholds
— In a stagnant market, works may not
affect property prices at all
— The relationship between capital
works and property price is complex
16.2 Capital works should be reviewed to
take account of the way in which value is realised for the leaseholder
and adjusted accordingly—Section 25
16.3 Service charges including capital
works should be disclosed at the point of sale and charged as
an average over a relevant period—Section 30.
17. An understanding
of leaseholders will help to drive and inform the housing debate
17.1 If policies are to be formed for the
social housing sector, then it would seem unreasonable to make
any assumptions about leaseholders without more information. At
present little is known about leaseholders and the impact they
have on the local community.
17.2 Mixed tenure is difficult to manage
at least partly because growth of home ownership is organic and
no longer under the control of the managers.
17.3 Leaseholders have a foot in many camps
and understanding their behaviour, needs and issues could provide
useful input to the development of social polices. For example
what are the implications of increasing numbers of non-resident
leaseholders?
17.4 It would be useful to understand leaseholders
better—Section 32.
18. National Register of Social Housing (NROSH)
is now operational but not high priority
18.1 As the most prevalent form of social
housing sector home ownership leasehold assignments must now be
numbered in millions. It is a symptom of the lack of focus on
leaseholders that no statistics are readily available for the
number of social housing sector leaseholders
18.2 NROSH was launched in 2006 and now
provides the means by which data can be collected automatically
from the housing management systems of local authorities and housing
associations. Automation means that the burden on landlords is
minimal. This is currently being rolled out on the basis that
participation by landlords is voluntary and as a result only a
quarter of the social housing stock has been captured to date.
NROSH already has the ability to collect information on the tenure
of properties, including whether they are leasehold, but this
information is often not provided by landlords.
18.3 LEASE was not involved in this project,
but should be included in any review.
18.4 A directive given to social housing
sector landlords in March 2007 could require delivery of tenure
statistics by April 2008—Section 32.
The role of social housing sector landlord
19. "Recognition" of Leaseholder
Groups is almost meaningless
19.1 Leaseholders are a disparate set of
individuals and hardly form a "community" in the conventional
sense, and this is why so few groups exist. Things have to be
very bad for them to take such action.
19.2 Energetic unpaid leaseholders can volunteer
to form a Tenant Management organisation or Leaseholders' Association,
and they will be "recognised" by the landlord if they
are correctly formed.
19.3 However, "recognition" is
not legally enforceable.
19.4 Even if the group is "recognised"
it is difficult to be truly representative when access to its
members is controlled by the landlord (due to perceived Data protection
Act limitations).
19.5 Although leaseholder groups should
be encouraged, there are many pockets of individuals and voluntary
leaseholder organisations are unable to reach everyone.
19.6 Leaseholders should be properly represented
by a recognised independent advocate supported by government and
funded primarily from service charge—Section 26.
20. Social sector housing stock has a history
of neglect
20.1 Under the lease, landlords are obliged
to keep properties in good repair:
— Leaseholders, before and after purchase,
presume that the landlord will be expected to fulfil this obligation.
— The lease often provides for a higher
standard of maintenance than landlords have been accustomed to
provide for tenants.
20.2 The Decent Homes programme was specifically
designed to address the years of neglect undergone by social housing
sector stock, and leaseholders are expected to pay for the privilege.
— Homes had been sold under the RTB
scheme prior to this programme, and these works were not taken
into account
— Leaseholders have bought homes in
a poor state of repair at market prices trusting that landlords
have met their obligations
20.3 Landlords should be obliged to maintain
their Housing stock on a rolling basis—Section 28
20.4 Leaseholders should not be expected
to pay a premium for landlord neglect—Section 25
21. Service management quality is a major
issue.
21.1 There seems to be a lack of clarity
and standards in the management of leasehold and services: service
management standards and procedures are not always transparent
to leaseholders. Repairs and maintenance services seem particular
prone to confusion.
21.2 Leaseholders are expected to pay for
block repairs (up to a given threshold) which were not initiated
by them and which were never reported to them. It is often normal
practice for landlords to present a bill as standard, with no
detail about charges for block repairs.
21.3 Employees handling leaseholders in
the social housing sector do not generally undergo formal training
on the subject, so there is no standard practice and therefore
no assurance that Housing staff know how to handle leaseholders.
21.4 In the private sector, RICS and ARHM
have a code of management practice. Something similar should be
adapted for the social housing sector.
21.5 Social housing sector landlords should
be accountable under a management code of practice—Section
30.
QUESTION THREE
The effectiveness of measures available or proposed
to reduce the burden upon leaseholders
22. Section 20 "consultation",
in its current form (and if applied at all) gives leaseholders
inadequate consultation rights, although it is an improvement
over earlier legislation.
22.1 Under Section 151 of the Commonhold
and Leasehold Reform Act 2002, Major Works usually require landlords
to "consult" leaseholders on reaching a specified annual
service charge threshold. This is called "Section 20 Consultation".
22.2 Government procurement procedures conflict
with the landlord's obligations under Section 20, and they must
seek dispensation from Section 20 through Leasehold Valuation
Tribunal.
22.3 Section 20 needs to be aligned with
Government procurement guidelines—Section 24
22.4 Section 20 "consultation"
obliges landlords to seek observations from relevant leaseholders,
but does not oblige them to change plans even if it is appropriate.
In practice, at this stage plans are complete, contractors are
lined up and consultation is the last box to be ticked.
22.5 Furthermore, the threshold for "consultation"
is flawed and potentially landlords have unilateral freedom to
undertake works which could be poorly scoped, of poor value and
charged over many years.
22.6 Section 20 should be recognised as
the final part of a collaborative process in which leaseholder
impact assessments have been conducted; and should include some
right for individual leaseholders influence proposed works—Section
24.
23. Leasehold Valuation Tribunals should
be a measure of last resort, not the only way in which a leaseholder
can guarantee the landlord's full attention.
23.1 In practice LVT is a thoroughly intimidating
exercise which costs money to initiate and legal support is vital,
as anyone knows who has been a litigant in person. Very often,
the challenge is on technical grounds, and so a surveyor will
need to be paid for an expert opinion. The process is time-consuming
and leaseholders are not experts in the field.
23.2 Leaseholders have no access to case
support (LEASE provides general legal advice). Citizens Advice
and Shelter might provide limited advice, but their role does
not extend to casework for leaseholders. Social housing sector
leasehold is a narrow field of expertise and specialists are few
and far between.
23.3 At LVT the terms of the lease must
be enforced, but they are interpreted in the context of legislation
for the wider obligations of the landlord. The obligations enforced
by legislation do not include collaboration with leaseholders.
23.4 Leaseholders who are successful at
LVT will often be in groups and the challenge will involve significant
sums of money. Most leaseholders would not run the risk of being
wrong, or could not handle the emotional and intellectual demands
of the process.
23.5 It would be far more effective and
fairer to consider leaseholder impacts from the outset and to
encourage collaboration throughout the process of works planning
and implementation.
23.6 Leasehold Valuation Tribunals should
become the tool of last resort, to be brought into use only when
the collaborative process of consultation has broken down—Section
24.
RECOMMENDATIONS
24. Social housing sector legislation for
"consultation" should be reviewed and extended:
See Sections 22 & 23
— Through collaboration, to secure
Leasehold Valuation Tribunal as a tool of last resort
— To provide balanced empowerment through
local and central advocates for home owners and service charge
payers to influence projects and initiatives from the outset
— Individual service charge payers
should also have power to change plans under strict guidelines
— To take account of Government procurement
guidelines
— To incorporate changes into the appropriate
Audit Commission KLOE
— To establish a wider role for LEASE
25. Social housing projects/initiatives affecting
the Housing Revenue Account should undergo service-charge impact
assessments to include: See also Section 8
— Section 16—Recognition
through a new charging (or payment) structure, that cost of works
does not necessarily translate directly or immediately into increased
home value
— Section 14—Recognition
through service charge reductions, that works driven by government
initiatives may be of little relevance or even detrimental to
the service charge payer
— Section 10—Recognition
through proper consideration of payment and charging alternatives,
that social housing sector major works can disadvantage the leaseholder
and attract a premium
— Section 20—Service charge
payers should be protected from paying a premium for landlord
neglect
25.1 Section 11—Communities
and Local Government departments need joined-up thinking to achieve
this
25.2 Section 12—HRA measures
should be the foundation for new controls, to encourage collaboration
through an advocate network (see below).
25.3 Sections 6 &, 11—LEASE
should be a key member of the development team.
26. Service charge payers should have access
to an independent local advocate See Sections 5, 6, 10 &
19
26.1 An independent local leasehold advocate
service should be funded through service charges (similar to the
Ombudsman service) and could be conducted through a local leaseholder
association or through an organisation supporting a locality,
such as Citizens Advice.
26.2 Norwich & Islington Leaseholder
Associations are campaigning for a subscription service. The service
is estimated to cost under £25 per year.
26.3 If the service were to be extended
to welfare tenants, then this should continue to be funded by
central government. Could prospective buyers could pay a fee through
landlord services?
26.4 LEASE should be actively involved in
this process.
26.5 Suggested roles for a service charge
advocate:
— To achieve successful collaboration
between landlords and home owners
— To act as the landlord's primary
point of contact for all home ownership issues
— To undertake service charge impact
assessments
— To advise and monitor standards for
customer service
— To advise and monitor standards for
repairs and maintenance
— To advise prospective and post-sale
home owners
— To be a member of a nationwide network
coordinated through LEASE
26.6 Suggested scope of advice for prospective
and post-sale home owners:
— Legal: supported by LEASE; general
leasehold advice, including casework
— Technical: access to survey services
at a reduced price
— Financial: provision of debt and
money advice geared to service charge payers
— Service charges: individual local
advice on the landlord's chargeable services, including implications
of central and local government initiatives
— Participation: Liaison with landlord
staff and leaseholders to encourage communication and feedback
27. The whole concept of leases in the social
housing sector should be overhauled: See Sections 13 &
15
— What sort of home ownership contract
is best for the social housing sector?
— What are the principles of home ownership
and (how) can the private sector and social housing sector be
aligned to remove injustices across the board?
— How can the home ownership contract
be structured to ensure that central legislation is applied consistently
— Consider the introduction of model
contracts for all social housing sector landlords
28. Compulsory maintenance of social sector
housing stock See Sections 9, 16, 20
Social sector housing stock should be compulsorily
maintained to a reasonable standard and service charge payers
should be protected from paying a premium for neglect.
29. Government guidelines should be introduced
to define the criteria for allocating works to the Housing Revenue
Account (HRA) See Section 12
This refers to "grey areas" such as
public services and works resulting from anti-social behaviour.
Provision for these guidelines already exists.
30. Social housing sector landlords should
be subject to a code of practice for management similar to RICS/ARHM
and by April 2008 they should be obliged to: See Sections
5, 15 and 21
— Fully understand their commitments
under the lease
— Implement a staff training scheme
— Implement the HRA for home ownership
under guidelines from central government
— Collaborate with service charge advocates
for project impact analysis
— Supply Tenure information to NROSH
— To provide clear average service
charge information to all prospective buyerso To place all
stock plans in the public domain
31. LEASE should have wider dispensation,
potentially to incorporate: See Section 11
— o consider how advice could be
extended to prospective buyers
— consider how all service charge payers
might be representedo the facilitation and training of local
home ownership advocates
— guardian of the code of practice
for landlord management in the social housing sector?
— advise all other agencies on social
housing sector home ownership issues and trends
— membership of NROSH board
— advice to Office of National Statistics
(ONS) on incorporation of home ownership statistics (to the new
survey to replace CLG English House Condition Survey and ONS Survey
of English Housing planned for 2008)
32. Prioritise delivery of National Register
of Social Housing (NROSH) Tenure statistics: See Sections
17 & 18
— By April 2008 all landlords should
be obliged to supply Tenure information to NROSH on all their
stock
— NROSH Tenure information should be
reviewed and enhanced to provide better support for housing policy
development and to enable benchmarking for landlord best practice
— LEASE should be represented on the
NROSH board
33. Investigation the causes of high service
charges for major works in the social sector Section 10
This could include the evaluation of the principle
and its application that higher quality works lead to lower overall
costs.
It would also be interesting to assess whether
and how the premium for OJEU works might be avoided. It is possible
that large-scale works are no longer the optimum approach.
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