Evidence submitted by the Electoral Reform
Society
1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
1.1 The Electoral Reform Society is a voluntary
organisation which campaigns for the enhancement of our democracy.
We are particularly well known for our advocacy of better voting
systems but we are also concerned with the efficacy and integrity
of our democratic system. We provide information and undertake
analysis on elections in the UK as well as other countries (for
example we have compiled a report analysing the various electoral
systems used in the EU, and have written briefings on recent elections
in the USA, Germany, New Zealand and Canada), and we maintain
links with international partners such as the Centre for Voting
and Democracy (now known as Fairvote) in Washington, USA.
1.2 We see party funding, particularly in
the light of recent controversies, as an issue that must be urgently
addressed. We support the maximum of transparency in the political
process, including party funding, and therefore warmly welcome
the Committee's inquiry into how the system might be improved.
2. FUNDING CONTROLS
2.1 The extent to which parties can campaign
is to a large degree dependent on their resources. A party that
enjoys more support than others will be able to campaign more
than others and that is broadly an acceptable situation. If, however,
a party with limited public support were to have considerably
more campaigning resources than other more popular parties as
a result of a few very large donations, we share the concern at
the disproportional influence of those wealthy donors on the outcome
of elections.
2.2 Nevertheless, we recognise that a cap
on party funding or on individual donations is not without problems.
Strict capping of donations or funding, in a situation in which
the parties will always have an incentive to spend extra money
on campaigns, risks further episodes of a sort which bring the
political process into disrepute. Without genuine willingness
on the part of the parties themselves to conform to the limits
(which runs counter to the logic of electoral competition) obedience
to the letter of those controls is likely to be accompanied by
ever more ingenious attempts to circumvent the controls. Strict
donation and spending controls in Germany and the United States
have not proved entirely effective in either preventing de facto
large donations or excessive campaign expenditure. We make the
point not as an argument against the capping of donations, but
to emphasise the need for a well thought-out scheme that can achieve
its objectives.
3. DEPENDENCE
ON HIGH
VALUE DONATIONS
3.1 We recognise that there is public concern
about the dependence of parties on individual high value donors,
but also that the reality of ever-increasing campaign expenditure
and ever-declining voluntary party membership leads inexorably
towards this dependence. We see no magic bullet solution to the
problem, including funding caps as noted above. Recent experience
in the USA, both at federal and state level, is instructive in
terms of this debate.
3.2 However, there may be room in public
policy to tilt the incentives for the parties more towards soliciting
donations from a wider range of sources through measures such
as matching funding (up to, say, £20 per individual) or the
registration/"donation" system recommended by the Power
Commission. Past proposals to allow parties to reclaim tax on
membership subscriptions and donations are worthy of further enquiry,
although we would be concerned if the funding system led parties
to value members who paid tax over those who did not.
4. PUBLIC FUNDING
FOR CAMPAIGNING
4.1 There is already public support for
candidates' campaigns for the House of Commons, European and London
Mayoral elections in the form of the free mailshot to electors.
This we support and welcome the piloting of its extension to local
elections. However, although election campaigns are primarily
run by parties, the support is to candidates and offered to all
candidates equally. We would be concerned if any new proposals
were to offer election campaign funds to parties without offering
equivalent support to independent candidates (although we recognise
that party political broadcasts are an exceptional case as the
facility could not reasonably be offered to every independent).
5. PUBLIC FUNDING
AND CANDIDATE
SELECTION
5.1 The report of the all-party Commission
on Candidate Selection (2004, copy enclosed) convened by the Electoral
Reform Society noted that candidate selection and training is
a significant function performed by the political parties. This
function is a public good provided by the parties. Representation
is an important role, increasingly recognised in parliament, local
government and devolved institutions as involving professional
skills, and the development of this role among candidates has
been left to the parties. In circumstances when funding is constrained,
activities more directly related to short term advantage (ie campaigning)
are naturally greater priorities for the parties' limited resources.
If candidate development falls by the wayside, there are adverse
consequences for equality, in that creating opportunities for
participation by women and ethnic minorities often needs a specific
focus on the part of the party organisation.
5.2 The Commission argued that there is
a case for an extension of public funding of political parties
to the area of candidate selection and development, as well as
maintaining the current system of support for parliamentary activities
and policy development. We would urge the Committee to consider
this question carefully.
5.3 The Commission suggested that funding
could be provided through an institution equivalent to the Westminster
Foundation for Democracy, but to support democratic development
in the UK rather than overseas. If such a body were created, it
is possible that there are areas other than candidate selection
(and other than political campaigning) in which the work of parties
could be supported.
6. OTHER PUBLIC
FUNDING OF
PARTIES
6.1 We note the funding of parties through
Short money which strengthens the capacity of parties to develop
their policies and provide a more effective and informed check
on Government in Parliament.
6.2 Where funds are provided to parties,
there must be some mechanism to determine the allocation of funds
between the parties. We therefore suggest a note of caution against
using any formulae that assumes the votes for the parties in general
elections is an accurate indication of their support in the country:
we have a voting system that discourages turnout in safe seats
where turnout is demonstrably lower. The voting system in single
member constituencies also encourages many voters to vote tactically,
rather than for a preferred candidate whose chances of success
might appear very slight, and there is no proof that this evens
out across the country. Of course, with our present electoral
system the use of seats won as a determinant would be wholly unacceptable.
Electoral Reform Society
March 2006
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