Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs Written Evidence


Further evidence submitted by Pierce Glynn Solicitors (LAR 169a)

  1.  This is submission is from Pierce Glynn Solicitors, a firm practicing from offices in Borough, London SE1.  It describes the impact which we forecast the proposed reform of Legal Aid will have on our firm and our clients if the programme currently put forward by the Legal Services Commission is carried into effect.

DESCRIPTION OF THE FIRM

  2.  The firm is a provider of legally-aided services in social welfare law.

The firm has contracts with the LSC in Housing, Welfare Benefits, Community Care and Public Law. The firm is classed as a Category 1 supplier. In terms of LSC expenditure, the firm is the largest civil supplier in the London Borough of Southwark, and the principal provider of advice, assistance and representation in social welfare law. The firm functions as a "second tier" organisation, taking almost all cases by referral from other organisations.

  3.  The firm comprises eight fee-earners and five support staff. Of the eight fee-earners, there are seven solicitors and one trainee solicitor. The fee-earners practice across the range of categories of social welfare law that the firm undertakes, such that all fee-earners are able to deal with a range of problems for our clients, thus achieving a "seamless" service across what are commonly inter-related problem areas.

  4.  The firm's caseload is 95% legally-aided.

THE CLIENTS WE SERVE

  5.  The high proportion of the firm's work that is legally-aided follows naturally from the fact that the firm's practice is in social welfare law. Its follows also that almost all are clients are on low or very low incomes. The firm has deliberately set out to be able to deal with clients who have multiple overlapping problems across the areas of law which the firm practices.

  6.  A high proportion of the cases undertaken (over 80%) are referred to the firm by other organisations, including advice and other local voluntary sector agencies, law centres, other solicitors, health service practitioners, social workers, local authority and central government departments, national voluntary organisations, advocacy services, and welfare groups working with ethnic and other minorities.

  7.  This combination of the matrix of legal services and expertise offered with the development of extensive referral networks has lead to the firm having significant categories of clients who are among the most disadvantaged in society as a whole. The firm has substantial numbers of clients in the following groups

    —  Physically-disabled people

    —  Mental patients and others with mental health problems

    —  Asylum seekers

    —  Other persons from abroad suffering destitution and the deprivation of accommodation and care services

    —  People with learning difficulties

    —  The elderly

  8.  The work of the firm is best illustrated by examples:

    —  Mr S is a man with learning disability and anger management problems, who is facing possession proceedings by the housing association landlord in respect of his supported accommodation, and the withdrawal of community care services and disability benefits because of a recent (and disputed) change in his diagnosis

    —  Ms B is wheelchair-bound and living in unsuitable accommodation. An offer of re-housing has been withdrawn by a housing association on grounds of her disability, despite the availability of adaptations to enable her to use the offered accommodation safely

    —  Ms J is elderly and suffers from dementia. She faces eviction for rent arrears because her family members are subjecting her to financial abuse and the local authority refuses to intervene to take on management of her finances.

  9.  The firm's expertise in these areas means that it has a high and wide reputation.

THE PROPOSALS

  10.  The LSC's proposals for the reform of legal aid in the area of social welfare law are contained the paper jointly published by the DCA and the LSC entitled "Legal Aid: a sustainable future". The material reforms for social welfare law are as follows:

    1.  The replacement of the current Tailored Fixed Fee Scheme for Legal Help with a standard fixed fee scheme, to be introduced from April 2007

    2.  The withdrawal of contracts from existing suppliers and the replacement of the service by Community Legal Advice Centres in urban areas and Community Legal Advice Networks in rural areas with a target date for implementation of 2009.

HOW THE PROPOSALS WILL AFFECT OUR FIRM

1.   The replacement of Tailored Fixed Fees by Standard Fixed Fees

  11.  The tailored fixed fee scheme was designed to pay suppliers according to the amount of work done on cases. The level of fees in the different categories of law is based on each firm's historic average costs per case in a previous 12 month period. For example, a fixed fee is paid for a housing case whether the actual costs incurred in the case are more or less than the fixed fee.

  12.  The present scheme thus creates two incentives for suppliers:

    (a)  to select cases that involve less work, because that will maximise profit per case

    (b)  to open a new case whenever a "fresh matter" can be identified under the rules of the scheme, since a new case will generate another fixed fee, whereas previously a number of matters for a client might have been dealt with as a single case.

  13.  These incentives have had the effects that were predicted for them. The number of "matter starts" has increased, for our firm as for other suppliers, and overall matter starts have increased despite the withdrawal of many suppliers from the market. In our firm, this has happened despite a deliberate policy of maintaining the current case mix, and of not selecting cases that are likely to involve less work. These effects have served the purposes of the LSC, which has been determined to reduce average costs per case. However, although the LSC is able to show more "acts of assistance" resulting from this scheme for the same expenditure, our view is that this is likely to be a statistical effect only, and not reflective of any significant change either in the actual cost of providing a particular legal service to a particular client, or in the actual number of clients assisted.

  14.  The TFF scheme is to be replaced by a standard fixed fee scheme. Under this, a fixed fee will be paid for Legal Help cases. Under the scheme preferred by the LSC, the only differentiation will be by category of law. For example, all welfare benefits cases will be paid at a standard fee of £143.00. This standard fixed fee takes no account of

    —  The actual work which is reasonably required in any particular case

    —  The level of work undertaken by any particular supplier

    —  The difference in the cost of supply in different areas of the country

  15.  So far as the differential between the fixed fee and the actual work required on a case is concerned, the LSC's response is that there will be a "swings and roundabouts" effect. The higher cost cases will be balanced out by the lower cost cases. However, for all suppliers, there will be an incentive, as under the TFF scheme, for suppliers to "cherry pick"—to select those cases that are likely to cost less, and to avoid taking on those cases that are likely to cost more. The LSC in its public statements simply denies that there will be such an effect, despite the evidence of the TFF scheme that this is just what will occur. The LSC points to safeguards in the form of its intention to monitor supplier's "case mix" to prevent cherry picking, but these safeguards have been applied under the TFF scheme, and have not prevented suppliers exploiting the scheme by increasing the numbers of case starts to increase the number of fixed fees paid. It is surely naive on the part of the LSC to think that in introducing a scheme which has built-in incentives to increase the number of cases started for the same amount of legal services provided, the altruism of lawyers can be relied on to resist such economic pressure, in circumstances where payment rates have steadily declined in real terms.

  16.  In taking no account of the level of work undertaken by particular suppliers, the effect of the reform is to force all suppliers to be generalist and not specialist. Our firm is a case in point. We are specialist suppliers with a high level of expertise undertaking complex cases. These cases take more time. At the Legal Help level, the time spent by our highly skilled and highly qualified lawyers on these complex cases is charged at the same rate as work undertaken in other suppliers by unqualified caseworkers. It is not economically-viable for such skilled practitioners to undertake this work, but in our firm, we do it because of a commitment to our clients, and because the higher rates of pay we receive for court work subsidises the Legal Help work. Our fixed fees under the TFF scheme reflect the higher level of work we do. For example, our net tailored fixed fee for welfare benefits work is £397.78, compared with the proposed national standard fixed fee of £143.00.  Disbursements are included in the TFF but not in the SFF; allowing for this element, the average net TFF we have received in the past 12 months for costs alone is £370.98.

  17.  With the introduction of standard fixed fees, we will no longer be able to afford to provide a specialist service. To continue to provide the current service would involve a cut in income of 31.48% under the proposed SFF. In order to be able to continue, what are we supposed to do? The following options emerge:

    —  to expand and take on a large number of cheaper unqualified staff to do shorter cheaper "low level" cases, to balance out the complex, longer, "high level" cases we do at the moment—we do not have the space to accommodate such numbers of staff, nor would our existing staff agree to devote the amount of time required to supervision. Besides, we do not believe such volumes of shorter cheaper "low level" cases exist

    —  to re-deploy our staff on shorter cheaper "low level" cases—this is simply not cost effective—the SFF income would not be sufficient to meet the overhead costs of staff pay.

    —  To merge with another supplier or suppliers undertaking larger volumes of shorter cheaper `low level' cases, so as to balance out our longer more complex work—this hardly seems a viable proposal—what incentive would there be to such other suppliers to merge with a firm such as ours, when the work we do costs more and is paid less?

  18.  In our view, the SFF scheme will see the end of the provision of high quality expert advice and representation in Legal Help cases which involve more than a minimal level of work. It will also see the end of "second tier" specialist providers, dictating rather that all suppliers be generalists.

  19.  The SFF scheme must also be considered in the context of the overall thrust of the Carter reforms, which is directed at the early resolution of disputes, by clients seeking assistance at an early stage, with a view to avoiding unnecessary litigation. The SFF scheme will work directly against this objective, since it will create an incentive to suppliers to avoid taking on cases that require lengthy efforts at dispute resolution under Legal Help, and to select those cases where litigation has already been started (usually by a non-Legally aided opponent) or those where litigation is the only reasonable course, since in those cases the amount of work undertaken under Legal Help will be minimised, and the profit on the fixed fee maximised. The SFF scheme is therefore likely to have the perverse effect of reducing early resolution of disputes and increasing the amount of litigation.

  20.  The SFF scheme will also deny access to solicitors to some of the most needy, and challenging clients. If firms like ours cannot continue to act for challenging and disabled clients, who will? It is of enormous concern that no assessment of the effect of the scheme on the most vulnerable and socially excluded clients has been undertaken.

2.   The Replacement of Existing Suppliers with CLACs and CLANs

  21.  Our firm is located in an inner London borough with high levels of deprivation, and according the LSC's paper "Legal Services Commission's Strategy for the Community Legal Service 2006-11" the intention of the LSC would be to set up a Community Legal Advice Centre to provide services in social welfare law.

  22.  The CLAC will be a single centre providing an advice and representation service across 5 areas of social welfare law—including the areas of law undertaken by our firm—housing, welfare benefits, community care, and also including debt and employment. For a fixed sum of money, the CLAC will contract to undertake a prescribed number of "case starts". Under the contract tender documents published for the first 2 CLACs in Leicester and Gateshead, a ratio of "generalist" level help to `specialist' level help is prescribed—in the case of Leicester, 12,000 case starts were required of which 9,000 were to be at a general level.

  23.  As a Category 1 firm specialising in the mainstream social welfare law areas, and being the largest civil supplier in Southwark in terms of LSC spend, it might be thought that our firm would be a likely candidate to apply to form a CLAC in Southwark. However, there is not prospect of this, for the following reasons:

    —  to become a CLAC we would have to transform ourselves from a relatively small group of highly trained and qualified legal practitioners undertaking specialist work into a much larger organisation, involving considerable commercial risk, where the lawyers in the firm would effectively have to give up the complex litigation and casework (for which they are qualified), and devote their time to the management of a large business probably with extensive sub-contracting arrangements, and the supervision of large number of caseworkers (for which they are not).

    —  not only are the members of the firm not qualified to do this, it is simply not what they want to do. It is not what they became lawyers for. They will look for employment as lawyers elsewhere rather than do this.

  24.  The LSC wishes to reduce it management and administrative role in providing Legal Aid, but it is management and administration that nonetheless needs to be done. The LSC expects existing suppliers to take this on. But this is surely an unreasonable expectation. It is surely not a reasonable use of lawyers to expect them to undertake this work, nor are they competent to do so. The LSC paper and the Carter report contains sections about "supporting suppliers through this process", but these are quite unreal—they do not come close to understanding the degree of dislocation involved.

HOW THE PROPOSALS WILL AFFECT OUR CLIENTS

1.   The replacement of Tailored Fixed Fees by Standard Fixed Fees

  25.  The effects of the introduction of these proposals follow on from the effects on the service which we and other suppliers will be able to provide. We forecast an overall "dumbing down" of legal services provided under the Legal Help scheme. Perversely, the depression of the Legal Help scheme is likely to lead to clients becoming involved in unnecessary litigation.

  26.  Clients with complex cases are likely to be unable to find lawyers to take them on, since the more work a case will involve, the less profitable it will be.

  27.  Clients with particular characteristics which lead to their cases absorbing more time will be adversely affected for the same reason.

    —  physically-disabled clients frequently need to be visited at home

    —  mentally-ill or disabled clients frequently need to be visited in hospital or at home, and the process of obtaining instructions and communicating advice typically requires considerable time and consultation with family and professionals involved

    —  people from abroad usually do not have English as a first language, and the use of interpreters and translators lengthens the time spent and cost incurred in cases

    —  asylum seekers, as well as having language problems, are frequently withdrawn and traumatised, and interviews absorb more time in consequence

  28.  The tendency of the reforms to destroy specialist suppliers and require all suppliers to be generalists, identified above, will mean that those clients with complex and difficult cases are unlikely to find the standard of service and expertise that their cases require.

  29.  Clients who do find a lawyer to deal with their case are likely to find that—far from providing the "holistic service" which the reforms are directed at achieving—the lawyer will be under pressure to do the minimum amount of work to bring the case to a conclusion, whether the presenting problem is resolved successfully or not, and ignoring any inconvenient associated problems that may arise in the course of the case.

  30.  Clients with problems that are in their early stages are likely to find that they cannot get a lawyer to deal with the case until the case is or can be litigated. For example,

    —  a client with a complex housing benefit problem involving, say, an appeal, is unlikely to be able to find a lawyer until the rent arrears created in consequence prompt the landlord to start possession proceedings.

    —  a client in receipt of complaints about the nuisance behaviour of her children and served with notice of possession is unlikely to find a lawyer to assist in managing the problem until the landlord issues ASB or possession proceedings in the court.

    —  A homeless applicant will be refused legal assistance with seeking a review and will only get it when turned down on review and an appeal to the court is the only option.

  Failure to ensure the availability of early intervention has serious consequences for clients—homelessness, hospitalisation,

children going into care—each of which prove very expensive for the state.

2.   The replacement of existing suppliers with CLACs and CLANs

  31.  For our clients, the consequences of the introduction of a CLAC will be, quite simply, the loss a legal service. A CLAC would mean that our firm would close down, and the resource we provide to the community would be lost.

  32.  We anticipate that several other suppliers heavily dependant on legal aid would also simply disappear, and those suppliers for whom legal aid forms a small portion of their income will simply stop doing legal aid and concentrate on other sources of income.

  33.  Whether these forecasts are correct or not, there will be a massive and unnecessary upheaval and dislocation of the supply base in Southwark. Unnecessary because the borough already possesses a comprehensive and sophisticated network of suppliers, that have developed to meet local needs, and from our client's point of view, a CLAC, even when up and running would deliver no significant improvement in the legal services currently being delivered.

October 2006





 
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