Conclusions and recommendations
1. Significant
changes to the Lord Chancellor's responsibilities as Secretary
of State took place as a consequence of the creation of the MoJ.
They are of constitutional importance as they may affect, in practice
or public perception, the exercise of the Lord Chancellor's core
statutory function of guardian of judicial independence, both
in organisational and budgetary terms. They can have the potential
to upset the carefully balanced arrangements agreed between the
judiciary and the Lord Chancellor in the Concordat of 2004 which
was given statutory footing in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005.
Such changes go far beyond a mere technical Machinery of Government
change and as such should have been subject to proper consultation
and informed debate both inside and outside Parliament. (Paragraph
15)
2. The process leading
to the creation of the Ministry of Justice leaves the impression
that the Government has failed to learn the crucial lessons from
the way changes to the Lord Chancellor's office were announced
and subsequently effected between 2003 and 2005. As in 2003, the
Government has manifestly underestimated the significance of the
Machinery of Government changes announced on 29 March 2007. (Paragraph
21)
3. Lack of sufficient
consultation prior to the initial, Government-prompted, public
proposal and then announcement of the creation of the Ministry
of Justice has led to a highly undesirable public conflict between
the senior judiciary and the previous Lord Chancellor. This conflict
appeared to have been exacerbated by an underestimation of, and
insensitivity for, the concerns of the judiciary which changes
to the role and responsibilities of the Lord Chancellor may raise.
Had the lessons of 2003 been learned, we believe such a situation
could have been avoided. (Paragraph 22)
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