Examination of Witnesses (Questions 200
- 219)
200. "The accuracy of assumptions regarding
employment and population growth. The uncertainty could be associated
with the scale of growth, as well as the location of the growth.
201. "The accuracy of assumptions regarding
the demand growth rate assumed in years subsequent to the Future
Year.
202. "In order to validate that a design
is adequate for expected future demand levels, the scheme design
must be subject to sensitivity testing. In order to do this, it
is necessary to forecast the maximum demand level that the station
might have to handle".
203. Then in a box, setting it all out with,
I hope what you think is, clarity, sir, this follows:
204. "The scheme design(s) should be tested
against the high case demand scenario for the future year. The
future year (scheme design) will usually be 2076—60 years
after the future year (appraisal). As explained above, 0.5% growth
should be assumed for each year after 2016, which generates a
compound growth of 35% after 60 years. Therefore, the total demand
level that should be tested is: test demand level = high case
demand scenario (2016) x 1.35."
205. I will just read the first of the two paragraphs
which follow:
206. "As explained above, a number of Railplan
scenarios exist, with different assumptions about underlying demand
levels and the major schemes that will be pursued. The highest
case for the station should be identified and used to generate
a high case scenario."
207. Mr Binley: Mr Laurence, would you
please clarify this again because I am concerned about the phrase
"sensitivity testing"? Am I wrong in assuming that that
is from a human point of view when you talk about sensitivity
or not and, secondly, am I right in assuming that the trip from
the Crossrail platform to the gates is something in the order
of 200 metres up two escalators and does the sensitivity testing
take that journey into account?
208. Mr Laurence: As to the latter, it
is easy to answer. I certainly do not know, so we will check and
find out. As to the former of the two questions, sir, you asked
whether it has, as it were, a human element to it, this sensitivity
testing. As I understand it, it is not to do with that at all,
but it is a way of arriving at getting a feel for how large, how
comprehensive, how commodious your new station needs to be not
merely at the year when it is expected to come on stream, but
over a period of 60 years ahead when it is still expected to do
the job for which it is designed. You will be hearing a lot more
about that in due course.
209. Sir, I will pick it up at paragraph 15.
Thus the guidelines mean predicting what numbers of passengers
will want to use those gates to exit and enter in the morning
peak in 2016 and adding 35% to the predicted 2016 figure. A 35%
increase in a gateline requirement of 16 gates adds the need for
another four gates (total now needed 16 plus four equals 20) even
if you assume that CLRL have got the Moorgate/Liverpool Street
split right. That is something I have not yet mentioned and will
come to. When I am talking about the Moorgate/Liverpool Street
split, I am talking about the question of predicting how many
of the Crossrail passengers alighting at Livergate will chose
to go to Moorgate as opposed to going to Liverpool Street. If
they have it wrong, the gateline requirement rises further. To
provide 16 gates when you need 20, and more if the split is wrong,
is folly.
210. For those alert Members of the Committee
who have noticed that if you add 35% to 16 you do not obviously
get four; you get a number more like five or approaching six,
the reason as I understand it that you get as low a number as
four—I am putting it purely in layman's language—is
that there is a complicated formula that has to be applied that
ends up where you have 10 gates or more with you having to add
two gates. The way I have explained it to myself is that in order
to see what is the effect of 35% through 16 gates you have to
begin by taking away two gates and that gives you 14. You increase
14 by 35% and add two. I will no doubt be told I have this completely
wrong but that produces an increased requirement for another four
gates. At any rate, we are being properly conservative.
211. We say it is folly to provide 16 gates
when you need 20. It is also potentially dangerous. Mr Weiss on
behalf of the Corporation and Mr Spencer of SDG on behalf of British
Land will tell you why. This critically important example shows
that the Corporation and British Land come before you not merely
to seek redress in respect of matters which are of particular
concern to them, but also because they want to see the Bill improved
for the benefit of all who care about the Crossrail project, including
the Corporation, British Land, the Promoter, CLRL and the nominated
undertaker in due course.
212. The matter does not of course stop there.
Still using only CLRL's predicted figures for 2016 with Crossrail,
the number of Crossrail passengers needing to exit through ticket
hall B's gates, 3,600—not a number you have heard before—is
part of a larger number, 5,300, leaving Crossrail in the morning
peak who proceed along the two tunnels and two escalators to point
M.
213. Point M is the point at which the second
tunnel exits into the ticket hall. When you go round tomorrow,
you will be shown that a great big hole will be made in a wall
just here. That is precisely where you will be able to imagine
these 5,300 Crossrail passengers coming through in the morning
peak in 2016 if the promoter is allowed by your Committee to introduce
its scheme.
214. From point M, 3,600 then go through the
gates. The remaining 1,700 set off for the street in the direction
of ticket hall A. These 1,700 extra Crossrail passengers of course
contribute to the general overcrowding on the paid side of ticket
hall B, especially near point P. That is where the Central Line
escalators go up and down. Our concern is not only with that number;
it is with the 3,600 Crossrail passengers alighting at Livergate
who CLRL predict will use the gates at ticket hall B. Every passenger
from Crossrail in excess of that number, 3,600, who elects to
get to the street via ticket hall B rather than via Moorgate adds
to the particular gateline problem that I have already identified.
215. The 5,300 Crossrail passengers who exit
to the street at Liverpool Street Station in 2016 may be contrasted
with the 9,200 Crossrail passengers who CLRL predict will arrive
below ground but exit to the street via Moorgate. There is a reference
there to a table which I would like to hand out now.[3]
These tables will be referred to by Mr Spencer. They are documents
that are simplified versions of station demand matrices, 10 car,
Hybrid Bill Scheme, CLRL, December 2004. It does not take long
for the mind to begin to boggle if you look at them for any great
length of time. However, it is table 11 that I want you to look
at on page five.
216. The heading tells you that these are CLRL
2016 forecasts with Crossrail. There are four columns, A, B, C
and D. Down the right hand side of the entire page we have put
number that go from one to fifteen in order to aid elucidation
of where is the particular number that I am referring the Committee
to. The one that I want the Committee to look at is at line five
in table 11, columns B and C. Those two columns tell you that
what is predicted by CLRL is that at Liverpool Street there will
be 5,300 Crossrail emerging passengers. At Moorgate there will
be 9.200 alighting passengers. In other words, of that total of
14,500 in column D at line five, the prediction is that the split
will be 5,300 to Crossrail, 9,200 to Moorgate.
217. If Crossrail are right that those 9,200
alighting passengers will choose to exit at Moorgate, fine, but
what if they are wrong? What if instead, say, 4,000 of those 9,200
passengers who alight at Moorgate on CLRL's predictions choose
to use UTH B's ticket gates instead? The answer is simple. You
will need to add another two gates to the 16 you already need
even on Crossrail's figures and without taking any account of
the need to add 35% in order to ensure that the new station has
the 60 year design life which the guidelines require. That is
still only the half of it.
218. CLRL's figures, we respectfully submit,
are themselves completely wrong by an order of magnitude. That
is because the model on which they are based is a strategic model
and it cannot be expected accurately to predict the use of individual
stations—see the Environmental Statement, volume 8A at paragraph
2.37. Mr Spencer has written to CLRL about this. His letter dated
9 January 2006 reads as follows:
219. "We note with interest paragraph 2.37
of the Environmental Statement, volume 8A, appendices, transport
assessment: methodology and principal findings: `Although the
Railplan model replicates the overall number of passengers travelling
into and within London for 2001, a strategic model—these
are the words I would stress—cannot be expected to predict
the use of individual stations; the forecasts of station use are
always thoroughly checked and, where necessary, adjusted. The
forecasts also draw on any actual passenger counts that are available,
using a statistical "goodness of fit" technique developed
jointly by London Underground and Transport for London. Changes
to the 2016 Baseline resulting from the introduction of Crossrail'
3 Committee Ref: A3, Technical Annex to the proof
of Evidence of Mr Tim Spencer. Back
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