Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1200
- 1219)
1200. In percentage terms, the original split
was 36 per cent Liverpool Street; 64 per cent Moorgate, by my
arithmetic. I have not worked out what the percentage split is
on these amended forecasts but it looks to be about 55/45.
(Mr Spencer) I would have said exactly the
same. I have not calculated it either. It is quite a significant
shift in terms of the movement. There have been even further developments
from that. We have done a ticket gate assessment on the basis
of their revised forecast which I will come to later. In the last
few days only this week, rather than doing a sensitivity test
which is a manual test, they have done a full assessment in Railplan
using the employment distribution as we have calculated it. It
produces a very similar result of 8,400 journeys to Liverpool
Street station. The increase in terms of the demand forecast is
67 per cent in the number of passengers seeking to access street
level from Crossrail by way of ticket hall B. The two analyses
they have done I will come to later because they closely reflect
our first two sensitivity tests of the demand forecasting. We
have two further analyses which are remarkably similar. We can
then move to do further analysis of those. I have dealt with two
of the four points in my criticism of the results that led to
my forecasting so I do not need to dwell on the third and fourth
points.
1201. Now we can go to table 27, can we not,
because you have said that that and table 30 were the tables we
would need to refer to?
(Mr Spencer) Yes.
1202. What is table 27 telling us?
(Mr Spencer) Table 27 presents three sensitivity
tests of the base Cross London Rail Links' demand forecast. We
start with the Cross London Rail Links' demand forecast which
in column F you will see shows a demand forecast of 5,300.
1203. Table 27 falls to be contrasted, does
it not, with table 28 in that table 27 is talking about station
passenger exit forecast sensitivity tests; table 28 is station
passenger entry forecast sensitivity tests?
(Mr Spencer) Correct.
1204. Exiting passengers first, table 27: are
you dealing with 5,300 in column F1?
(Mr Spencer) That is the starting position.
That is the demand forecast that Crossrail produced. In test one,
we test a 65 per cent exit via Liverpool Street and a 35 per cent
exit via Moorgate which increases the demand forecast to 9,400.
1205. Column F, line two?
(Mr Spencer) Correct. In test two we test additional
passenger growth related to the level of employment at Liverpool
Street being higher than assessed in the original Cross London
Rail Link Railplan model which takes us to 9,700.
1206. That was column C, lines two and three,
producing the result at column F3 of 9,700?
(Mr Spencer) Correct. The third one is related
to what we believe the market share of Crossrail will be, the
proportion of trips to Liverpool Street station that would be
via Crossrail as opposed to via the other, alternative means of
accessing the local area. That sets us with an SDG test three
which is an exit flow of 14,500.
1207. Reflecting the results of the percentages
in column D at lines three and four?
(Mr Spencer) Correct, moving from 13.3 per
cent to 20 per cent. In the next table, we have test four where
we questioned whether the demand forecast related to how passengers
arriving at Liverpool Street by National Rail, not wishing to
go to the Liverpool Street area but wishing to head on predominantly
into the West End of London, made that journey. In the first instance,
Crossrail's forecast is that of the 24,600 people that make that
movement only 15 per cent would use Crossrail. We have looked
at this in some detail and we feel that it does not appear to
fit with our understanding of what you can do with Crossrail in
terms of the journeys that can be made, the quality and speed
of the service. Taking, for example, the journey to Paddington
which is a major development area within London, Crossrail has
numerous advantages over the other routes, the subsurface line
routes, using the Central line and changing somewhere else in
town, as well as the connection into the heart of the West End
to Oxford Street, picking up close to Oxford Circus. I know these
are AM peak hour forecasts and that not everyone will be shopping
between seven and ten in the morning but what we have tested here
is a one third market share for Crossrail as opposed to a 14.6
per cent market share. That increases the reverse of all of our
analyses of people coming out of Crossrail. This puts a significant
number of additional passengers trying to get into Crossrail through
ticket hall B.
1208. So that the Committee are anchored in
the approach of these tables 27 and 28, tests one, two and three
are applicable to exiting Crossrail passengers. Test four is applicable
to passengers entering the system?
(Mr Spencer) Correct.
1209. Do you then seek to summarise that in
table 30?
(Mr Spencer) Yes. What we then have to take
account of is that not all of these people cross the gatelines.
A lot of people change movements and go through different gatelines.
Also, in some instances, the assumptions that we are making about
who are regularly going through gatelines mean something else
so we have to take that out of the equation. In table 30 we get
to a presentation of all of the future year scenarios. I will
take you through each of the six calculations as to the result
that is produced. I will also touch on the fact that our tests
one and two compared to the amended Crossrail forecast give identical
results in terms of the gateline requirement which is quite important
because those are the main means by which we are testing these
things. I have already done the original Crossrail scheme. It
needs 16 gates on opening and should be provided with 20 to deal
with future proofing. With the amended scheme, the demand forecast
for ticket gates increases to 18 and there would need to be a
provision of 23 for future proofing. I compare that to the fourth
of the results that were presented in these tables, our SDG tests
one and two, which also say that there should be 18 gatelines
with 23 for future provision. Finally, I introduced our assessment
of the belief that the market share using Crossrail will be higher.
That leads to an opening day requirement of 20 gates and a future
proofing of 26 gates. Finally, I have the combination of the increased
entry and exit gates which leads to a gate requirement of 21 gates
with a future proofing of 27 gates, which is a 70 per cent increase
in the provision of gateline capacity at ticket hall B. I also
reaffirm that this test, which is a forensic test, means that
the equivalent space allocations within the station would need
to be enhanced by a similar proportion, 70 per cent, were it possible
to find a way of putting 27 gates in the station. You would need
70 per cent more space broadly speaking to be able to effectively
use those gates, which would flow to a proposal for what Mr Laurence
has referred to as a massively expanded ticket hall.
1210. I suggested that you go from tables 27
and 28 straight to 30 but would you go back to table 29, "Station
Passenger Entry and Exit Gateline Flows Ticket Hall B" and
talk the Committee very briefly through that so that they can
follow how you get your translation from the tables on this sheet
through to table 30 by a different method—that is to say,
by looking at the figures in table 29?
(Mr Spencer) The purpose of table 29 is to
clearly set out the calculations that we do in a progressive,
step by step function and to be aware of how the Crossrail forecast,
crossing the gateline, fits with all of the other things that
happen within Liverpool Street station in terms of the entries
and exits, not to reach Crossrail but to reach the Central line
or all the subsurface lines, and the movements in the opposite
direction. It is a summary of a series of calculations.
It allows us then to restrict gate-line exit
and entry flows in columns B and C of table 30 which allows us
then to do the calculation of what the future requirement would
be.
1211. Again I am conscious that only some, if
any, of the members of the Committee may have time to carry out
the exercise which I carried out to try and understand what is
going on here, but, Mr Spencer, could I clarify whether the numbers
in column C of table 29, starting with 13,500 and going down to
22,700, are all of them reflected in table 30 over the page in
the appropriate lines of column B?
(Mr Spencer) Correct.
1212. And, similarly, the numbers in column
D of table 29, starting with 19,800 and going down to the number
21,100, are all of them reflected in column C of table 30, starting
with C2, I think?
(Mr Spencer) Yes. In summarising the results,
I would simply say that the convergence we have got so far of
Crossrail has identified a minimum gate requirement of 23 gates.
That is on the basis of our sensitivity tests one and two, it
is on the basis of their RAILPLAN modelling and it is on the basis
of the other sensitivity tests that they provided a week or so
ago.
1213. Sir Peter Soulsby: It may be that
it is not something that can be done, but is it possible to take
us back to identify whether we may be able to see from these figures
the numbers using Liverpool Street for interchange purposes rather
than exit purposes? Is it possible to see that please?
(Mr Spencer) Good question. It is effectively
retained in the earlier analysis that we did in these tables where
we set out within sections A, B, C and D what the interchange
movements are.
1214. Sir Peter Soulsby: I realise they
are there, but it does not summarise, as far as I can see, any
related points.
1215. Mr Laurence: Sir, I would like
to ask Mr Spencer whether he thinks it might be useful to look
at tables 4, 9 and 14, in each case column D, to give you a flavour
of the Promoter's estimates of interchange numbers respectively
in 2001 and 2016 without Crossrail and 2016 with Crossrail. Would
table 4 be a convenient table just to begin with because that
is more or less the present position, is it not?
(Mr Spencer) Yes, that identifies entry and
exit flows for the three ticket halls and the interchange movement
that is relevant to the assessment of ticket hall B in terms of
numbers of people going through ticket hall B.
1216. Sir Peter Soulsby: That is 2001?
(Mr Spencer) Yes, and the same for table 14.
1217. Mr Laurence: At 5, first of all,
table 9, 2016 without Crossrail, column D, line 2, the interchange
number, the previous number of 4,200 is estimated to increase
by 2,000 to 6,000.
(Mr Spencer) And then with Crossrail to 5,400.
We have actually not done any sensitivity testing at this point
in time on the predicted level of interchange by Cross London
Rail Links; we simply adopted their numbers.
1218. Is that good or bad for your argument?
(Mr Spencer) I would say it is entirely neutral
because I have not the faintest idea and I have not explored it
in any great detail. Our focus has been very much on the numbers
of people coming out of Liverpool Street station via the Crossrail
scheme were there to be much higher levels of interchange where
we have obviously addressed the issue of interchange specifically
related to national rail levels going into Crossrail, but that
is the only number, apart from the exit flows, that we have sought
to question at this stage.
1219. For my own interest, you see what the
heading is to each of tables 4, 9 and 14, "Liverpool Street
Underground Ticket Hall Flows" in the respective years, but
is column D interchange at variance with that heading in that
it is adding something additional or does that involve the gate-lines?
(Mr Spencer) Well, it invariably does not involve
the gate-lines. It would be done from within the station, but
on occasions there will be people that will come out of the Central
line, walk across the main concourse and then go on to the District
line, but it would happen very rarely.
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