Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1360
- 1379)
1360. That is very helpful, Mr Spencer. Can
you keep open sheet two of A19 from this morning and can we look
at the base scenario that we are looking to compare it with, that
is to say the base plus 35 per cent, which is document 16 in the
bundle produced two days ago. There is no Crossrail in document
16, but clearly there is already substantial congestion at around
the gateline on the base, plus 35 per cent. We can see in fact
there is a red block by the gateline, is there not?
(Mr Spencer) Which is due to a column constraint.
1361. Which does not exist with Crossrail?
(Mr Spencer) As I have said, the detailed analysis
has to go beyond yellow and red. It has to look at the location
and it has to look at the detailed results, as I have led you
already to a detailed result. Often it is quite marginal as to
whether it is yellow or red.
1362. Let us just stick with the broad indications
which we agreed yesterday, because if we are going to get into
the details of each block the Committee will lose interest after
about 10 seconds, I should think, if that long?
(Mr Spencer) I have no intention—
1363. Mr Spencer, I understand your position,
but forgive me if I am not seduced down that route?
(Mr Spencer) Absolutely.
1364. Can we also look at the broad brush position?
We can see that even with your extreme modelling plus 35 per cent,
there is still massive improvement with the Central line. If we
look at the Central line and the base plus 35 per cent, one of
the platforms is almost exclusively yellow, one of the escalators
is yellow. That position is clearly much improved by Crossrail,
because, of course, one of the things that Crossrail does is divert
passengers from the Central line on to Crossrail because of the
common east-west movement of those two systems.
(Mr Spencer) I am absolutely content to agree
with you that Crossrail results in significant reductions on passenger
movements within the Central line. The Central line in the AM
peak hour, if anyone has the misfortune to use it, is absolutely
jam-packed. There are more than a thousand passengers per train
coming into Liverpool Street heading into the West End. What happens
in Liverpool street is a large number of people get off the trains
and almost an exact and equal number try and get on the trains,
and we are talking about hundreds of people doing it on every
single train. If there is any delay, and the Central line has
been resignalled so it is a lot more efficient than it used to
be five years ago, but if there is any hiccup in the service operated—if
a train is missed out if you like—that doubles. That then
means you have got up to 3-400 people on the platforms and another
400 people trying to get off the trains, which basically, for
an instant, puts 800 people on the platforms. That is why this
shows very severe congestion, and that is with normal operation—that
is without needing to clear a train—which is why the operators,
London Underground, turn off the escalators from ticket hall B
from which about half the entry flow to the Central line comes
through, and they close ticket hall C to prevent people getting
down to the platforms. That is a routine intervention by LUL to
prevent overcrowding of the platforms because they know very large
numbers of people are going to try and get off the trains.
1365. Coming back to Crossrail, what all of
this shows is that, even under the extreme testing of your scenario
one, two and three accumulated plus 35 per cent. Crossrail is
still performing and providing one of its major benefits, which
is relieving the Central line?
(Mr Spencer) First of all, I do not regard
it as extreme testing, and I need to say no more than that. These
are our views on the future demand forecast. The second thing
is, as I have already agreed with you, Crossrail provides substantial
benefits to the Central line.
1366. Can I remind the Committee, we have done
your exercise in these latest pedroutes—whether you call
them extreme or not we will have to differ on—but this is
your accumulated one to four plus 35 per cent. Can we just be
sure as to what you have produced in your own pedroute, today's
A19. You will recall these from yesterday: exhibit 34 within A17.
It is the base model plus 1500 out of Liverpool Street. What I
want to get clear is this. This not your accumulated plus one,
plus two, plus three, plus four, plus 35 per cent, is it? This
is something worse than that. What you have done is you have not
just applied your accumulation, you have added 1,500 onto the
Crossrail base of 5,000 odd, have you not, so it is actually worse
than the accumulated scenarios plus 35 per cent?
(Mr Spencer) I have actually added 15,000,
not 1,500.
1367. I am sorry, 15,000?
(Mr Spencer) It is very difficult to comment
really, because what we have in the two models is different assumptions
about the level of demands, and we also have different assumptions
about the facilities within ticket hall B. So, clearly, as you
have led me to already in the test that you most recently put
to me, you have got 20 exit gates, in the test that you have most
recently put to me you have the removal of the stations operations
room and also in the test that you have just put to me you have
a different basis for the demand, and, clearly, the work that
we have done latterly—this is a piece of work that was done
in September to assist us with understanding what the relative
benefit of Eldon Street might be—it is not putting evidence
as to my view of the future operation of ticket hall B; it is
under the scenarios that we have later presented.
1368. Certainly I got the impression yesterday
it was slightly confusing. So the Committee can effectively shut
this page. This is not what you are now saying?
(Mr Spencer) I was absolutely clear about that
yesterday, that it was a comparative analysis at an early stage
to understand that the scheme that we were beginning to develop
was likely to yield substantial benefits. That is exactly what
I said in evidence yesterday.
1369. Sir Peter Soulsby: I think the
Committee have a clear impression as to what this is.
1370. Mr Elvin: I think we can leave
it.
1371. Mrs James: I want to move back
a few steps. You mentioned re-routing, and perhaps this is a very
simplistic question, but what happens in these pressure areas
that you have identified if there were an emergency situation?
(Mr Spencer) What you have, whether it is yellow
or red, is very large numbers of people within constrained spaces.
The block that we are focused on—the head of the escalators
and the opening of the tunnel—even in yellow would have
perhaps 200 people in them. That would be a very high density:
there would be perhaps two or three people per square meter in
parts of that block. In an emergency evacuation the station operation
commander, the person who runs the station, will basically throw
open the gates. They will just open up. That basically means that
you have twice the capacity to actually move through the gateline.
With the gates in operation it is reported to be 25 people per
minute; when they are open and clear you can put 50 people a minute
through there, but what you have actually got to do—I would
say that LUL are rather expert at it these days—is you have
got to tell people the scenario, you have to explain to them that
you are evacuating the station. You will always have people that
do not understand, but most people do understand. Clearly, because
it is already congested and because it is very complicated, basically
everybody is going to turn around and try and head back towards
the gates. There are a lot of people in that area, and they should
be able to clear relatively quickly, but I would have to say pedroute,
as I have said, is a design tool. Her Majesty's Railway Inspectorate
would not accept pedroute as a justification for a scheme design
and would want to see much more thorough and sophisticated analysis,
and they will dictate precise evacuation scenarios which flow
to evacuating the trains as well as evacuating buildings, because,
as happened on July 7, the entire inner London Transport system
was evacuated in a very short period of time. What the railway
inspectorate will want to be assured of is that all aspects of
the new scheme are capable of fitting into an evacuation strategy,
but that clearly that is in the level of design and approval beyond
that which Crossrail are currently at.
1372. Mr Elvin: I wonder if Mrs James
would find helpful if Crossrail were to prepare at some stage
during the next few weeks of committee hearings a general note
on how evacuation procedures are handled.
1373. Mrs James: Yes, please.
1374. Mr Elvin: It will not be in the
specific context of Liverpool Street, but we will produce a general
note so that you have a better idea of how it operates, if that
is helpful.
1375. Sir Peter Soulsby: I am sure that
will be very helpful to the Committee.
1376. Mr Elvin: Before we leave pedroutes,
Mr Spencer, can we look at your Eldon Street option, which is
two pages on in A17? I appreciate all your reservations about
pedroute—we can take those as read, I am sure—but
if we look at your sensitivity testing with 35 per cent, which
is our only point of comparison in pedroutes for your Eldon Street
option, with the Crossrail plus 35 per cent and all your scenarios,
we do actually see in fact significant amounts of yellow within
your exit, and in fact the three up escalators are yellow all
the way through. All three sets of escalators up to Eldon Street
on your exit are yellow, are they not?
(Mr Spencer) This test is showing that the
connection from Crossrail to Eldon Street is running at the yellow
level of service. They are congested.
1377. So if the Committee is trying to do a
point of comparison with the British land alternative, you are
swapping one scheme with a degree of congestion for another scheme
with a degree of congestion?
(Mr Spencer) This is, as I have said, a relatively
simplistic assessment of a particular scenario that we used to
help us understand the relative benefits of Eldon Street. I have
not even bothered, and excuse the phrase, but there was no merit
in me doing the 35 per cent test of the 15,000 with ticket hall
B as an entrance route. I have not done that in this analysis.
If I had done, it would show a far worse situation than what I
am showing with the Eldon Street scheme. I did not need to go
there because it already patently failed; so I have not got a
side by side comparison.
1378. This is the only test that has been run
at Eldon Street, Mr Spencer. I am going to leave it to the Committee
to do their own comparisons in terms of the levels of service.
Can I add one point? You are assuming you can get four escalators
in this modelling, are you not?
(Mr Spencer) At this point in time we were
assessing a scheme with four escalators.
1379. It may only be possible to accommodate
three, in which case the position would be worse?
(Mr Spencer) As I have said, this is a tool
that you use iteratively going through a design process.
|
