Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1800
- 1819)
1800. It should also be borne in mind that the
view of the City Corporation, through Mr Rees, which presents
perhaps the more objective approach of a public authority understanding
the need to prioritise budgets, is that there is a balance to
be struck between the overall benefits of Crossrail and the cost
and extent of congestion. He agreed that the City's concerns should
only lead to further requirements if ticket hall B was "effectively
unable to operate". It plainly will work except under such
extreme conditions that many parts of the tube network would have
failed long before that point had been reached. If one thinks
of 118 per cent across almost any London Underground station the
mind begins to boggle. Therefore the Promoter does not accept
the SDG figures.
1801. However, the real issue is to determine
the impact of Crossrail, taking realistic assumptions, and realistic
growth. In order to test this question the Promoter has tested
the station, both at 2016 and with 35 per cent growth, by the
use of pedroute model. This is the model which has been used by
LUL for many years, including for the Jubilee Line Extension and
the underground works at Kings Cross under the Channel Tunnel
Rail Link Act. Mr Spencer of SDG accepted that pedroute was an
appropriate way of testing the operation of the station and accepted
that he did not propose any alternative of additional means of
doing so.
1802. The pedroute model shows that taking SDG
figures in Table 30 (i.e. a growth of 32 per cent over the Promoters'
figures) that in 2016 ticket hall B shows accepted conditions.
Perhaps that is the paragraph to highlight mentally.
1803. Pedroute also shows that in 2016 Crossrail
does not make the position in ticket hall B any worse than without
Crossrail. My exhibit numbers there are entirely wrong, Chairman.
I do apologise. It should be A19.[5]
In fact Crossrail produces significant improvements in congestion
through the station, by relieving the Central Line and the Circle/Metropolitan
Lines and providing substantial additional capacity. This confirms
the overriding benefit to business which is central to Crossrail's
aims—i.e. additional capacity to relieve overcrowding.
1804. It is necessary then to test the station
with a growth figure of 35 per cent in accordance with LUL's standards.
This has been done with pedroute. Again taking SDG's "Test
3" figures this shows that the position with and without
Crossrail is largely comparable in ticket hall B and significantly
better on the Central and Circle Line platforms. Note that the
LUL standards do not require that the number of gates be assessed
at 35 per cent growth, for the obvious reason that there are likely
to be constraints on the number of people getting to the gates
elsewhere in the station, for instance at the bottom of the Central
Line escalators.
1805. Therefore the conclusion is that there
is no problem with capacity in ticket hall B; and that any congestion
in ticket hall B needs to be seen in context of passenger growth
at Liverpool Street Station as a whole rather than the impact
of Crossrail. On this basis there is simply no ground for requiring
a further ticket hall or any further work to be undertaken at
this stage.
1806. That conclusion is compounded by: (1)
the British Land option of Eldon Street ticket hall costing a
considerable amount of public money, something in the order of
£40-80m, or even more with additional payments to Infraco;
(2) it would cause considerable disruption, both to LUL lines
and the surrounding area through utility diversions and associated
works; (3) it would serve a relatively limited catchment area,
because it lies between Moorgate and the existing Liverpool Street
Station, although it is of course very well placed for British
Land's development at Broadgate. It is therefore an alternative
which has significant detriments, and as such should not be adopted
unless the need for it is overwhelming.
1807. Very importantly there are a number of
far more straightforward and cheaper solutions which would solve
any problem that might possibly arise in the future: First of
all, and most straightforwardly, a reconfigured gateline at ticket
hall B to add gates and facilitate passenger throughput; secondly,
a greater and more efficient use of ticket hall C through management
measures and signage, which the pedroute modelling shows that
that ticket hall is consistently congestion-free; and, thirdly,
in the longer term, if necessary, engineering works to increase
capacity at ticket hall B. and that is what Mr Chapman did call
Option 6. Given that the concern is for a future date many years
beyond 2016, it is appropriate to look for possible works to be
provided as and when the need becomes clear rather than looking
to provide a solution for many years hence, on the basis of possibly
unrealistic assumptions, before the precise circumstances can
be known. There is no reason why such future works should be more
disruptive or cost more than if they were done in the future rather
than as part of the Crossrail works.
1808. Both (1) and (2) are within Bill powers
and LUL are prepared to accept them if justified. LUL make clear
in their notes, and I would commend the Committee to look again
at that note, that where the cost of making provision is disproportionate
to the benefit gained they would look to other solutions, such
as a concession, station management measures or accepting a degree
of congestion, and that is all referred to in that LUL note. I
would urge a degree of realism there on the part of the Committee
in terms of remembering that money is not an unlimited resource,
and for TfL there may well be other priorities.
1809. Other engineering solutions, such as Option
6, exist and can be carried out after Crossrail if necessary without
entailing excessive cost. Therefore, there is no unacceptable
impact from Crossrail; and, further, to the degree that there
may be increased congestion in the future, there are a number
of alternative ways of dealing with this if and when it arises.
1810. There are in truth, we would suggest,
two ways the City puts their case. Firstly, on congestion and
the need for further capacity, which we have answered conclusively
above—and that is the ostensible case in the City's opening.
Secondly, and perhaps the true heart of their case although less
clearly stated, that the City should have a landmark dedicated
entrance and ticket hall, perhaps a little bit like the Westminster
new underground station down the road, to reflect the importance
of the City and the importance of Crossrail.
1811. Chairman, we urge on you strongly the
thought that Crossrail is designed to provide major new operational
capacity across London at a cost which provides value for money
and is affordable. It should be tested against those aims. If
there is no operational requirement for a facility then it would
be quite wrong to provide one as a "statement, entrance or
landmark". There are doubtless many enhancements to Crossrail
which could in theory be provided to overcome historic problems
with the London Underground network. However, if this course is
taken then the result will be an unaffordable railway, which will
either not be built or which will divert resources from operationally
needed transport provision elsewhere. This is a considerable risk
to take for a station which the evidence shows will work, to apply
the approach taken by Mr Rees. Therefore, the Promoter asks the
Committee to resist the temptation to provide a dedicated ticket
hall at Liverpool Street as some form of fitting statement in
the City for Crossrail.
1812. The City has asked the Committee to require
us to go away and draw up detailed solutions. We say that that
is not a justifiable use of the Promoter's resources where the
evidence shows there is no real problem, and the Committee has
not yet been able to consider the issues arising on other petitions.
1813. Having said that, the Promoter acknowledges
that forecasting always has an element of uncertainty, and it
is essential to keep Crossrail under review. We have therefore
offered a series of undertakings to the City and the Committee.
These undertakings were handed in, as I understand, but I do not
think anything very much was said about them.
1814. The first requires the Secretary of State
to keep the layout of the ticket hall under active review and
to carry out any reasonably necessary changes to the gateline.
Major infrastructure projects such as Crossrail, I am sure the
Committee knows, go through a number of design stages and when
the detailed design is being worked up the matter can be looked
at further and in detail. It is unrealistic, we say, of the Petitioners
to demand what is, in effect, advance detailed design work to
be provided ahead of other demands on time and resources. We give
a commitment that we will continue to keep under review the layout
of the ticket hall and any information that we receive as to how
that should be amended.
1815. The second requires the Secretary of State
to ensure that the works are carried out in such a way as not
to preclude a future expansion of ticket hall capacity, if needed.
In other words, take as an example Option 6, the works in the
Bill will not prevent that going ahead. By not accepting the City's
case the Committee is not tying Crossrail forever to the layout
or the physical form of ticket hall B as the present time.
1816. The third requires the Secretary of State
to establish a scheme for monitoring passengers going through
ticket hall B and with the City to keep under review the need
for additional capacity, and then to work with the City and LUL
you secure such implementation if works are needed.
1817. It is our view that those three undertakings
are really sufficient to deal with the concerns that the City
has raised, and we would therefore commend them to the Committee.
1818. Sir Peter Soulsby: I have one question,
in the evidence we seem to note from London Underground with regard
to their intentions for station control in ticket hall B, I recall
they said it was their intention to move that during 2006?
1819. Ms Lieven: Yes.
5 Committee Ref: A19, Liverpool Street Station: with
Crossrail (SDG Test 1-14) Pedroutes. Back
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